

THE ANSO REPORT

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Inside this Issue

Central Region	2
Northern Region	5
Eastern Region	6
Western Region	9
Southern Region	10
ANSO Info Page	13

YOU NEED TO KNOW

- Increased frequency of BBIED attacks in population centers
- Prevalence of AOG checkpoints along main roads
- Prevailing abduction/kidnapping threat

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
NORWEGIAN MINISTRY
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COUNTRY SUMMARY

While the overall suicide attack volumes are down (30%) this year in comparison to 2007, changes in the methods of deployment, targeting patterns, as well as efficacy, have all been witnessed in relation to such attacks reported this year.

The efficacy of suicide attacks in regards to casualty yields has increased, primarily due to the chosen target sites (as in the Indian Embassy and “dog fight” bombings in Kabul and Kandahar) and the resultant high civilian casualties.


In regards to deployment patterns, suicide attacks are being used more “surgically”, and in unison with other at-



tack vectors. Using a combination of small arms fire and/or multiple bombers against high profile GoA and security force installations, AOG have attempted to increase the likelihood of tactical success. These types of combined attacks,

seen most commonly in the Eastern and Southern Regions, allow follow on attackers to gain access into the facility itself, causing a greater casualty yield in the target population.

NGO DATA & TRENDS



Though the overall NGO direct incident volume is up this year, the geographic distribution patterns have remained largely unchanged as 2008 has developed.

KABUL

AOG incidents remained high during this reporting period. Most common were rockets attacks on Kabul city, attacks on ANP check posts, and IED.


There were several incidents of intimidation and terror tactics targeting government and/or NGO: These included the circulation of letters in Kabul city, Dis-

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- IED/Suicide attacks
- Rocket attacks
- Abductions

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	16
This Report Period	0

trict 8 warning the locals to refrain from supporting the GoA and for GoA employees to quit their jobs; the murder of the chief judge of the Narcotics Tribunal; and an RPG attack on a mine dog training site; as well as the recent assassination of the Governor of Logar in Paghman District. Taken in the context of the overall security situation in and around the city, NGO can expect such threats against “soft” targets related to the government and/or government-affiliated organisations



(including the possibility of NGO) to continue. Threat traffic warning of potential suicide and/or high profile attacks has been frequent and consistent therefore threat of spectacular or high profile attacks should be considered active.

WARDAK


The security situation in Wardak Province has not changed significantly since the last reporting period. During this reporting period most of the incidents were DAC attacks, roadside IED explosions, attacks and ambushes on ANSF/

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Abduction
- Overall instability
- Ongoing clashes between AOG and security forces

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	6
This Report Period	0

IMF checkpoints and convoys, and AOG check points on the main Kabul-Ghazni road. The threat of abduction in Wardak remains extremely high, most recently this was evidenced on 7 September when two international engineers and four escort guards of a construction company were kidnapped in Saydabad District while enroute to their work site.



Wardak Province is currently assessed as a high risk province, especially Saydabad, Nirkh, Jalriz, and Chack districts. NGO operations and travel in Wardak are not advised.

DAYKUNDI


In Sangtakht District, a gunman threatened the head of local NGO and told him to close the office. We do not have information to indicate the motive for the threat. Local elders intervened and reportedly solved whatever problem

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Minimal security presence
- AOG freedom of movement

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	2
This Report Period	1

existed, so this does not seem to be indicative of a broader threat to NGO and the NGO has continued since its activities. Security reporting from Daykundi remains limited. Anecdotal reporting from Nili, Kijran, and Gizab suggest an increase in AOG movement and activities. AOG have relative freedom of movement facilitated by the limited security presence and the possibil-



ity for unexpected migrations into other areas should be taken into consideration when planning activities.

PARWAN

Parwan experiences periodic AOG incidents throughout the province, and is likely experiencing an increased AOG presence in recent months. This is typically


KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- IED
- Attacks against security forces

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	5
This Report Period	0

manifested in IED, rocket, and RPG attacks targeting security forces, with the Districts of Bagram, Shinwari, and Kohi Safi all reporting either rocket or RPG attacks during this period.

The road to Bamyar through Bagram, Chahrikar, Shinwari districts of should be considered a potential risk area for IED attacks.



However, so far this month no such incidents have been recorded.

BAMYAN

Bamyan mostly remains quiet and appears operational for NGO, though travelling to the province from Kabul through the northeast


KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Banditry
- IED/Mines
- Likely AOG presence in Shibar and Kahmard

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	2
This Report Period	0

(Kamard and Shibar) may be increasingly risky as evidenced by an IED attack on an NGO vehicle last month and the 4 September discovery of a mine in the Shikary Valley of Shibar District.

The threat of highway robbery is low but notable in Bamyan. In Panjab District during this period, armed robbers robbed a mini-van



on the 4th of September and two trucks and a mini-van on the 12th.

LOGAR

A considerable AOG presence and a proven willingness to attack NGO make Logar unsafe for NGO operations and travel.

The Porak/Kolangar area of Puli Alam remains especially risky for abduction or terror tactics as AOG in the area continue to at-


KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- AOG checkpoints along main routes
- Abduction

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	7
This Report Period	0

tack military/security contracted vehicles and logistical convoys. Also common are the establishment of AOG temporary check points along the main roads with the intent of searching vehicles for passengers that may have NGO or GoA links.

The Districts of Baraki Barak, Kharwar, and Charkh are also reported to effectively be under Taliban control.



ANSO recommends the complete suspension of road travel by international or local staff that might be identified as having an NGO link.

TRAINING ANNOUNCEMENT:

Please review Page 12 of this edition for upcoming NGO training opportunities in October at ANSO.

KAPISA


There have been no significant changes in the overall threat environment compared to recent reports. The general security situation in Kapisa Province remains

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- DAC attacks
- Collateral damage from clashes/air strikes

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	1
This Report Period	0

uncertain and unstable for NGO, with Tagab, Alasay, and Nijrab remaining the most volatile areas. Mahmud Raqi remains vulnerable to periodic—typically late night—attacks on the DAC, with the most recent occurring on 12 September.



KUNDUZ

The situation in Kunduz has not changed qualitatively from that of the last report, but important trends have emerged in both the organisation and distribution of AOG elements.

In this period incident distribution has continued to shift away from the south and east of Kunduz City into the north and west. This consists of a broad swathe of territory running from Chahar Darra District west of the city to the districts along the Amu River, primarily Dashti Archi and Imam Sahib. Qal'ai Zal, which is usually very quiet, also saw one attack on a police checkpoint. This shift in vector may be a result of the recent IMF presence east and south of the city and of the additional capacity it aimed to build within the ANSF, but it is too early to say whether it will remain part of a more long-term shift. The incidents which did take place were not out of character for the province, consisting of SAF and IED attacks.


Regarding AOG organisation, it

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- IED
- AOG patrols
- Abduction threat

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	8
This Report Period	1

has emerged that AOGs have formed into 'neighbourhood watch' patrols of 20-25 people who appear sporadically in villages in Kunduz province (north and west of the city again) and also on the eastern fringes of Chahar Darra and in Dashti Archi. While they are armed, their main interest consists of making speeches in the village mosques against the government and those who support it. One such group was involved in a verbal exchange with an NGO staff, which led to the AOG patrol giving assurances that they would not disturb the NGO in question. Although the specifics of this particular incident are ambiguous in their implications (it would be positive if AOGs engaged in an open non-violent persuasion of their views and also listened to reason in the course of deliberation), the fact remains that locals are frightened of them and the story that quickly gained currency was that that of an abduction rather than a verbal confrontation. Some of the AOG members in patrols show a predilection for violence (suggesting kidnapping will be likely in the future) and they are reported and widely believed to be organised



and sponsored by the same source that supports other kinds of more violent anti-government agitation.

In sum, the area of the AOG patrols bears a lot of resemblance to the area where there has been a more general surfacing of agitation against NSP. These groups are new in that they are not hit-and-run, but interested in making themselves known to the population. This is the first time AOGs in the field in Kunduz have put on a public face, which shows both a degree of confidence and an exposure to accountability. Whatever the inclinations of the patrol, they seem to have come to the obvious conclusion that harming something that has a direct benefit on people's livelihoods (as in the case of the NGO facility) would entail a loss of legitimacy. Nevertheless, it is also important to recognise that public patrols are likely the flip-side of AOGs' masked hit-and-run teams and that they are being coordinated in tandem. NGOs have to try their utmost to pursue acceptance within the communities where they are operating but also understand that such acceptance may ultimately not suffice in the greater context of Kunduz.

FARYAB

The number of overall incidents in Faryab has decreased in August of this year in comparison to the preceding two, and it appears likely that September will follow this same downwards trend.

There is some margin for error though, thanks to the province's relative remoteness and the resultant problems in reporting. The area of most concern in the prov-


KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Increased AOG activity in Qaysar
- Kidnapping
- IED

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	0
This Report Period	0

ince is Qaysar District which borders Ghormach in Badghis province. Aside from the Salang road, Qaysar represents the only other easily accessible approach to the northern provinces of Afghanistan for persons and materiel.

The most important incident occurring in the recent reporting period is the kidnap of two CDC members from Qaysar for apparently economic reasons. Even if ransom is the proximate cause of the kidnapping, it can not be ruled out that the CDC members' involvement in the relatively effec-



tive and accordingly much-maligned (by AOGs) NSP made them more tempting targets, or that ACG money is funding AOG enterprises. Elsewhere in the province rumors of kidnapping (all disproved or unconfirmed) have mixed with a significant number of roadside attacks on ANSF to add to an environment of general concern amongst NGO.

BALKH


While Balkh has been more stable than in previous months, it is still noteworthy in that certain regions of it plays host to a steady stream of incidents. The centre of gravity for incidents remains the Chimtal and Chaharbulak Districts. In

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- AOG attacks on GoA and ANSF
- Criminal activity

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	8
This Report Period	0

these areas SAF attacks on ANP, political intrigue, and large drug seizures remain common while the rest of the province remains almost without incident. August is the most active month of the year in terms of incidents in Balkh. While the number of incidents in Balkh this year (31) is significantly higher than last year's (7), it is about even with that seen



in 2006 (29). Likewise, the type of incidents seen has also not varied significantly in the last three years.

BAGHLAN

Baghlan remains one of the most serially stable provinces in the country, due to the combination of inaccessibility (save by the Salang road) and strategic importance. No reports have recently emerged concerning any immediate threats to the area but a few incidents do highlight underlying tensions. On the main Salang road a commercial vehicle was


KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Criminality in remote areas

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	0
This Report Period	0

robbed in Khinjan District, and an ANP patrol was ambushed in remote Andarab District.

Baghlan is a mountainous province consisting of a number of remote and unconnected regions which is transacted by the vital and closely watched Salang highway. The areas surrounding this main route are usually little documented or reported upon, and every valley is host to its own political ecology. Reports from Tala-va-Birfak, for example, indi-



cate that residents have little understanding of what the government due to their limited interaction with it and as a result harbour little support for same. Similar reports have also noted tensions in isolated locales between the various religious sects, though nowhere has any of this translated into open hostility.

KUNAR

The level and intensity of AOG initiated attacks continues at the high level experienced in August, with 27 such incidents in this reporting period. There have been numerous attacks against ANP and IMF/ANA locations, mostly involving small arms fire as well as the use of heavy weapons. Several have involved the use of rockets in indirect fire attacks, including the launch of 15 rockets against an IMF base in Pech (Mano Gai)

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS


- Clashes between AOG and security forces
- Indirect fire attacks

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	4
This Report Period	0

district. Another rocket attack in the same district missed its intended target and caused injuries to two children. As usual, a large number of incidents have occurred in Pech, with over half of those reported for the province occurring in this district during this reporting period.

Four IED incidents were reported in Kunar, the same number as reported in August. One of these was a device found and defused, another was a device that detonated prematurely and killed the AOG placing it.

While AOG activity continues at



this high level, the advice issued by ANSO ER during August remains valid, that international staff should limit their movements to Asadabad city and the main Jalalabad – Asadabad highway.

If there is an increase in the use of IEDs in the province, movement will be further restricted and NGOs are advised to consider possible mitigating measures before that stage is reached.

LAGHMAN

With 5 AOG initiated incidents in Laghman in this reporting period, the downward trend in incident numbers seen during August is continuing into September.

The nature of AOG activity has been similar to that in other provinces in the region, with attacks or attempted attacks occurring on District Centres, ANP locations, and road construction works.


KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- IED along routes to DAC
- Indirect fire attacks against DAC

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	3
This Report Period	0

In Mihtarlam attacks against ANP occurred on two successive days. Early in the reporting period equipment belonging to a road construction company in Alingar was damaged and 3 IEDs were found on the road leading to the district centre.


In Alishing AOG engaged an IMF helicopter with small arms fire, killing a member of the IMF and forcing the aircraft to make an emergency landing. Two days later AOG attacked an IMF location in the same district in an engagement



which lasted approximately 2 hours.

While the number of reported incidents is low, the distribution of incidents in or close to district centres on routes north from Jalalabad again reinforces the importance of minimising road travel and wherever possible avoiding district centres.

EASTERN REGION NGO DIRECT INCIDENTS 2008



KHOST

This reporting period witnessed a drop in the intensity and frequency of AOG related incidents from 15 to 7 reported serious incidents in the province. Of these, 5 were related to IED detonations or finds. The non-IED incidents were an AOG small arms attack on an ANP CP in Nadir Shar Kot District Centre and a firefight between IMF/ANP and AOG in


KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- IED on main routes
- Decreasing AOG activity level

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	5
This Report Period	0

Sabari. All the incidents reported have taken place in districts that regularly witness AOG activity, namely Sabari, Nadir Shar Kot, and Khost City. Since the beginning of August 08, more than half of the 58 reported incidents in the province have taken place in these three districts.

In addition to these AOG activities, in Khost City on the evening of 14 Sep 08 a project site of an international organisation was subjected to a robbery. Equipment valued at over \$30,000 was taken during the robbery and one



of several sub-contractors present during the robbery was taken against his will by the perpetrators. Of note, the incident site is in close proximity to multiple well guarded premises of other international organisations. This incident reinforces the value of basic access control and building security measures.

NANGARHAR

Attacks against District Centres and the use of IEDs against road traffic have been the main features of AOG activity in Nangarhar this reporting period.

District Centres in the southern districts of Achin, Dih Bala, Dur Baba all came under some form of AOG attack. The attack against Dur Baba is noteworthy for its duration of approximately 2 hours from 0100hrs on 12 Sep 08. During the attack an NGO office (which is located next to the DAC) suffered collateral damage which resulted in two national employees of an NGO sustaining


KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Attacks against DAC
- Increased use of IED
- Attacks against road construction efforts

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	4
This Report Period	2

minor injuries.

In the central district of Chaparhar an IED explosion in the early hours of 10 Sep 08 caused no significant damage and had no apparent target. Elsewhere in the district later that day an IED placed in the road detonated and injured the national employee of an INGO driving his private vehicle. The IED had been placed in a section of the road that was being repaired or resurfaced which was likely targeting the road construction efforts. These efforts are a common target of such activities in the area, furthered by the fact that property and material belonging to an organisation working on road construction in the same area was damaged in another attack in the same area on the same day. During August two



of the three IED incidents in Nangarhar were premature detonations. In this reporting period, as well as the incidents in Chaparhar, there was an IED attack against IMF in Khogyani and a find of 3 IEDs in Shinwar.

Reports of AOG infiltration continue, particularly in Dur Baba and Khogyani where an IMF supply convoy was attacked at the start of the reporting period.

Intimidation against people working with the international community has continued with the circulation of a night letter in Jalalabad, and reports of specific threats against UN staff and those employed on construction projects persist.

NURISTAN

Two incidents in Kamdesh saw INGO staff directly involved in AOG initiated actions. On 05 September approximately 30 AOG broke into and looted an INGO clinic. On leaving the clinic the AOG abducted a female national member of staff whose whereabouts are still not known. Two days later AOG stopped and


KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Abduction/kidnapping
- Security force/AOG clashes

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	3
This Report Period	2

searched a vehicle making a delivery to the same clinic. As well as the driver, a national member of staff and a representative from the company making the delivery were in the vehicle. The INGO staff member, a doctor, was allowed to remain at the scene while the AOG took away the vehicle and other two people. The next day one of these people was released. The vehicle and third person are still unaccounted for.

While information on the security



situation in Nuristan is limited, the incidents outlined above give an indication to the high level of AOG activity in the province. International staff are strongly advised not to travel to the area and wherever possible local staff should be employed in NGO facilities.

PAKTYA

Serious incidents have occurred across the province during this reporting period. The geographical spread and range of incident types highlights the unpredictability of the security situation as well as the capacity of AOG operating in the area.

IMF supply convoys were attacked twice in one day in different parts of the province, with convoy escorts sustaining fatalities on


KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Indirect fire attacks against DC
- Introduction of VBIED devices
- IED

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	1
This Report Period	0

both occasions and 29 vehicles being destroyed in the attack in Zurmat district. The same day saw a brief attack on the DAC in Wuza Zadran and an attack on an ANP CP in Gardez. Schwak DAC was attacked earlier in the reporting period, and Jaji Aryoub and Jaji DACs were also both targeted in rocket attacks.


IEDs were found and defused in several districts including a VBIED recovered in the Khost Bridge area of Gardez. IED explosions occurred in Zurmat and Gardez districts. Clashes between ANP/IMF and AOG also occurred. A missile fired by IMF



against AOG in Jani Khel on 09 Sep malfunctioned and landed in a populated area, killing 2 civilians. A number of people were also injured, and property damaged in the incident included two mosques. While there was no report of any significant public demonstrations resulting from this incident, as mentioned in the previous report, this type of occurrence will likely increase anti-IMF feeling and the possibility of civil unrest.

Total AOG Initiated Attacks per Month - 2008

(Close Range + Indirect Fire + Suicide Attacks)



HERAT

The traditional division of labour in Herat province between ACGs (the city) and AOGs (the countryside) shows some signs of breaking down. This can be seen in the escalation and scope of ACG methods and the expanded range of AOG activities.

An example of how ACG have escalated their tactics is demonstrated in the recent use of an IED in a crowded area of town (also near to important government buildings) to settle a “personal dispute”. ACGs are also making common use of kidnappings and extortion. A trou-


KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Expanding geographic range of AOG activity
- Escalation of AOG activity
- Criminality

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	9
This Report Period	1

bling aspect of kidnapping trends is the lack of information regarding many of the incidents. Members of wealthy families are currently the most common targets (due to their ability to pay ransoms), and either out of embarrassment or fear for the victims, they tend not to contact the police but instead attempt to secure release through other channels. This fact greatly hinders the ability to track and analyze the scope of the threat, though at this time it is assessed that kidnapping does not pose a direct threat to the NGO community as the kidnappers are primarily motivated by financial gain and attempt to maintain as low a profile as possible.

Three recent incidents show AOG's increased operational range, all occurring within, or in



the vicinity of, the Herat metropolitan area. A suicide bomber detonated near an ISAF convoy in the southern suburbs of the city, in Pashtun Zarghun (east of the city) an AOG attacked the office of a local NGO with a grenade, and most boldly of all a number of rockets (though small, poorly aimed, and causing no damage) were fired at the airport from a location inside the city.

Given that increasing amounts of rural Herat are slowly becoming more unstable (especially south of the city), NGOs should complete a threat to benefit analysis of their activities outside of Herat City as well as review their present security procedures and protocols.

BADGHIS


Badghis appears as the reflection of Faryab province to its east, with the majority of recent incidents having occurred in its two easternmost districts, Murghab and Ghormach. As mentioned in the Faryab analysis, these two provinces form a strategic corridor that is a vital consideration for

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- AOG activity in Gormach and Murghab
- Demonstrations

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	0
This Report Period	0

AOGs with a desire to influence the balance of power in the north. Reports of AOG activity are exceedingly common in these districts—one such report indicated that a large number of armed fighters were poised to take over a village. Whether or not all such reports are true, it remains that they are in common circulation suggesting that there is at least some level of AOG infiltration and activity in the area. Other salient issues in the security con-



text of this province were the rare use of ISAF airstrikes on AOG elements and the growing discontent with the Governor (accused of corruption and incompetence) which is finding expression in large demonstrations in the provincial capital, Qal'ai Naw.

NOTICE: Your input is invaluable for the production of this report. While we appreciate information on incidents, we also need general information on the security situation in your area. So please remember to call or email us regularly.

Contact details of ANSO staff are provide on the last page.

KANDAHAR

The most significant incident to occur during this reporting period was the suicide attack against a UN convoy in the District of Spin Boldak. While those staff affected were involved in the polio vaccination program, a program that generally enjoys the acquiescence of the Taliban, it is unlikely that, at least at the level in which the attacker operated, this knowledge would have been known or understood. At present it is unclear if this incident represents an isolated “tactical” level decision, or one that has a broader implication for the International Community overall.


KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Increased suicide attack threat
- Continued instability along Hwy 1
- IED

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	11
This Report Period	0

Also of significance was the attack against the ANP HQ located in District 1 of Kandahar City on the 7th of September. In this attack, two BBIED devices were deployed, one to facilitate access into the facility and the second detonating within the facility itself. Besides causing a significant number of ANP and civilian casualties, this bold attack occurred during mid-day in the middle of Kandahar City, both being factors which highlight the ability of AOG to infiltrate, plan, and execute within the city limits. While this fact has been previously reported and is firmly established at this time, it nonetheless illustrates an escalation in both AOG tactics and confidence.

This attack was mirrored in various other provinces within the SR, including Helmand, Zabul,



and Zaranj (as well as Herat in the West) in which suicide attackers were utilised against ANSF targets in population centers. While overall suicide attack numbers are down in comparison to last year (please refer to chart provided on page 1), the efficacy of these in regards to both casualty yields and success rates are increased. Suicide attacks are being used more surgically, and in unison with other attack vectors, to ensure tactical success. It is likely that these types of attacks (either multiple bomber or conjoined tactics) will continue due the success rates incurred. As such, ANSO advises NGO to continue limiting their presence at, or in the vicinity of, high profile security force and GoA facilities.

ZABUL

The steady decline in the number of security incidents that began in August has been furthered in September, particularly since the onset of Ramadan, though this has been attributed in reports indicating that AOG elements are limiting their activities both in scale and scope during this month. While only 13 AOG related incidents have been reported during this reporting period, this province is still assessed as unstable


KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Attacks along Hwy 1
- AOG presence in Naw Bahar
- Decreasing AOG activity level

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	2
This Report Period	0

and volatile.

Five IED detonations were reported targeting ANP/ANA/IMF and a civilian Town Ace type vehicle, killing 6 occupants of the vehicle and 2 others being wounded. The majority of these IEDs attacks were undertaken in the Naw Bahar District, an area that has been previously assessed as stable. Recent reports received indicate that a significant number of AOGs are also migrating from this area intent on joining other AOG elements in order to engage in actions along the main Kandahar-Kabul main route (Hwy 1).



As with other areas of the SR, there has also been an increase in regards to suicide attack activity, with a failed attempt reported during this period as well as further report indicating other such attackers present and active within Qalat City. While this threat bears no direct implication to NGO safety, staff should be cognizant of it and avoid high profile target areas in order to limit the risk of collateral involvement in an incident.

NIMROZ

As indicated in the previous report regarding the reports of an increased AOG presence and operational focus in Zaranj, and the subsequent assessment that this would likely be translated into suicide attacks against high profile GoA targets, there was a suicide attack against an NDS facility on the 6th of September. This attack resulted in numerous casualties and of primary concern was the

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS


- Suicide attacks
- Instability in Khash Rod
- Increasing AOG activity level

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	1
This Report Period	0

attackers ability to gain access into the facility grounds.

There was a second BBIED attack during this reporting period, this one occurring in the Khash Rod District on the 11th of September. Further information from this incident indicated that the target was an ANP convoy despite what was initially reported.

This sudden increase in suicide attack activity mirrors incidents reported during this period from other provinces in the SR, including Kandahar, Helmand, and Zabol. This sudden upsurge, while



likely temporary, has an impact on NGO safety as they occurred (as in the Zaranj incident) in the primary population centres or resulted in numerous civilian casualties.

ANSO SR advises continued avoidance of high profile target facilities in order to minimise the risk of collateral involvement in such an incident.

PAKTIKA

Of primary concern for NGO operating in this area were the recent reports of AOG checkpoints being established along the Sharan-Ghazni main road. The reports elaborate that multiple checkpoints have/had been established and those manning these were vigilantly searching for those with GoA connections. As with other similar occurrences, those

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS


- AOG checkpoints
- Attacks against logistical convoys

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	1
This Report Period	0


with such connections are subsequently abducted, primarily for ransom purposes, though execution for intimidation reasons or the failure to pay ransom should not be discounted.

Further to this, there were three separate instances of arson committed against vehicles at an AOG checkpoint along the same route, though the reasons for this remain unknown at this time.

This marks the first confirmed instance of AOG checkpoints being utilised within Paktika,



something that is common throughout the SR. As such, NGO are advised to exercise extreme caution when planning road missions along this road. Thorough trip planning, the “sterilisation” of travelling staff, as well as the establishment of a cover story are all recommended in order to mitigate this threat.



HELMAND

ISAF and ANSF operations are presently ongoing in the Nada Ali District with intentions of expanding the scope of these into the Districts of Nawa and Garmser. As a result, AOG forces have continued to suffer significant casualties by ISAF air, with a particular incident resulting in the killing of 52 AOGs, including 2 high ranking Taliban commanders. The gathering was said to have been assembled with the intent of splitting the force into smaller cells for deployment in to the neighboring districts of Kajaki. Despite this, AOG elements in


KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Ongoing military operations
- Significant AOG presence throughout the province
- Instability along Hwy 1

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	0
This Report Period	0

these areas are reported to have nonetheless maintained their operational capacity and tempo as seen in the numerous indirect fire and IED attacks against ANSF and IMF installations and elements across the province.

The failed BBIED attack in Lashkar Gah City highlights the ongoing nature of this threat, though the ANP stationed in the target area quickly identified and neutralized the threat. In this case there are some indicators that this attack marked a blending of both AOG tactical as well as an internecine conflict goal, though the full nature and scope of this is not fully understood at this time. Despite this lack of information, it does suggest that as the conflict in this province matures, there will be an increasing blend between



the political, criminal, and conflict elements which would likely result in a further erosion of governance and stability overall. This incident also marks the 5th BBIED attack within the city for 2008, and considering the increased level of such suicide attacks throughout the SR recently, it is likely to continue being a threat within this population centre for the immediate future. NGO are advised continued avoidance of high profile target facilities and elements.

The Kandahar – Lashkar Gah main route still remains at high risk for roadside IED, AOG mobile checkpoints, as well as attacks against high profile convoys.

UPCOMING SECURITY TRAINING AT ANSO

The following NGO security related training courses will be offered at ANSO (in Kabul) during October by the **Centre for Safety and Development (CSD)** and the **Armadillo Group**.

October 6-8 2008: Basic Safety and Security Course (by CSD)

October 7-9 2008: Security Management Course-Country Level (by CSD)

October 21-22 2008: Field First Aid (Armadillo)

October 23-24 2008: Personal Security and Safety (Armadillo)

October 28-November 1 2008: Security and Safety Management (Armadillo)

NGO are encouraged to register early as places are limited to ensure quality of learning. For more information regarding these courses please contact CSD and Armadillo directly:

Centre for Safety and Development

www.centreforsafety.org

Email: esther@centreforsafety.org

The Armadillo Group

www.armadillo-group.co.uk

Email: steve@armadillo-group.co.uk



ANSO is hosted by
[Deutsche Welthungerhilfe](#)

To Register with ANSO
contact:
operations2@afgnso.org

ANSO is managed by an NGO
Board. If you have any
feedback, good or bad, let
them know on:
ansoab@yahoo.com

ANSO ACRONYMS

IMF-International Military Forces / AOG-Armed Opposition Groups / GOA-Government of Afghanistan / ACG-Armed Criminal Groups / ANA-Afghan National Army / ANP-Afghan National Police / IED-Improvised Exploding Device / AEF-Afghan Eradication Forces / RPG-Rocket Propelled Grenade / IDF-Indirect Fire (ex: mortars) / VBIED-Vehicle Borne Improvised Exploding Device / PRP-Previous Reporting Period / ANBP-Afghan National Border Police / SAF-Small Arms Fire / NDS-National Directorate of Security (intelligence) / PSC-Private Security Company / DC-District Centre

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Chona Bollos - administration@afgnso.org - 0797-093-073

MISSING

This report ANSO could not provide analysis for the provinces of:

- Panjshir
- Ghor
- Farah
- Samangan
- Jawzjan
- Badakhshan
- Sar-e-Pul
- Takhar
- Ghazni
- Uruzgan

This is because we do not know enough about the area to comment on the significance of the incidents occurring there.

TRAINING ANNOUNCEMENT

UPCOMING SECURITY TRAINING AT ANSO

The [Centre for Safety and Development \(CSD\)](#) and the [Armadillo Group](#) will be conducting various NGO security related courses at ANSO during October.

[Please see page 12 for more details.](#)

NGO are encouraged to register early if interested as places are limited to ensure the quality of learning.