

THE ANSO REPORT

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YOU NEED TO KNOW

- AOG attack levels appear to have peaked for 2008
- NGO incidents remain at unusually high levels
- Voter registration begins with security implications
- Major changes anticipated in IMF command structure

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COUNTRY SUMMARY

The ending of September confirms that the AOG attack rates have dropped for the first time in 8 months indicating the onset of the normal seasonal decline.

They remain a good 40% higher than the same period of 2007 however with even military sources estimating that winter fighting will remain significantly higher than previously.


This can be understood as the logical result of AOG having secured multiple support & resting areas across the country.

Despite the downturn, NGO's have continued to experience difficult times with upwards of 14 incidents recorded in the short two week reporting period.

This continues (for the fourth month) the trend of unprecedented highs in NGO incidents (*see graph*)

These included a number of actual and attempted abductions, rocket attacks, armed assaults on compounds and acts of intimidation.

While not indicative of an overall 'attack plan' against NGO (there is not one in our opinion), the volume and



diverse nature of the incidents demonstrates very well NGO's vulnerability to the changes in the ambient security environment.

NGO are often the only organizations to have staff and resources at the sub-district level and so are increasingly the only targets available when the context changes.

Also within this reporting period the registration of voters ahead of next years elections entered its first phase.

As a possible portent of things to come registration cards bound for Nuristan were intercepted and destroyed by suspected AOG.

The gathering pace of election preparations is bound to provide a focus for AOG

energies in the short to medium term and NGO are advised to keep a close eye on developments in their area.

Finally, this period there has been considerable attention paid to possible changes in the command structure of the IMF (currently separated as OEF and ISAF) and the creation of a new force under US leadership.

NGO are advised to keep a close eye on developments in this debate as any new (and by implication more aggressive) force will likely exacerbate the multitude of woes already surrounding NGO acceptance and community support for civilian activities.

KABUL

AOG incident levels have dropped compared to August, but remain high. October may see a spike in incidents as AOG bump up activity prior to the onset of winter.


Areas around Kabul City continue to show signs of instability with incident levels trending up in all areas except for the areas north of the city. Compared to Kabul City, Surobi has had the most AOG incidents in recent months, but Chahar Asyab, Paghman, and Musayi are also becoming areas of

- IED attacks and collateral damage from attacks on security/government targets
- Armed robbery
- Attacks on high profile targets

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	19
This Report Period	1

increasing concern.

Recently, Paghman and western Kabul city have appeared to be particularly vulnerable to attacks on government targets, as demonstrated by the 13 September killing of Logar's governor, body guards, and driver in an IED attack in Paghman, and the 24 September execution of an IED attack on ANA in District 5 of the city. This latter incident is especially notable. Three police were murdered and beheaded and two more were killed and five injured when an RCIED was detonated at the scene during the investigation. While this incident does not directly impact NGO, such brutality and planning is a clear indication



of an ability to both inflict terror and execute a sophisticated attack within city limits, thus serving as evidence of a greater overall security threat.

Crime remains a notable threat, especially for local staff, whose freedom of movement makes them more vulnerable than international staff. Two INGO national staff were victims of separate early-morning armed robberies in Shar-i-Naw.

The threat of a spectacular attack on a high profile target in the city remains active.

WARDAK

Wardak continues to be assessed as unstable and as a high risk area for NGO due to significant AOG presence and continual armed clashes and military operations. Illegal check points, DAC attacks, IEDs, the threat of abduction, active conflict, and, especially, AOG attacks on security and support convoys all remain prominent threats in Wardak. Saydabad,


KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Heavy fighting between AOG and security forces
- Overall instability and volatility
- Abduction

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	7
This Report Period	0

Nirikh, Maydan Shahr, Chack, and Day Mirdad all logged AOG incidents this period.

Incident reports this period have been confined to the eastern districts. NGO with operations in the province's Bihsud districts in the west report the region to be quiet with no observed AOG presence or migration of problems from the eastern districts. The primary difficulty is reported to be access to the areas due to road insecurity. There are anecdotal reports that the route through Hajigak from Bamyān into His-i-Awali Bihsud Wardak should be



considered unsafe for international staff travel. NGO should also be aware that, in general, Wardak's western region poses the problems of isolation and a limited security presence, which can facilitate criminal and AOG freedom of movement.

PARWAN

Parwan remains mostly calm and relatively safe for NGO operations compared most provinces in the Central Region.

The main concern for NGO is travel on the road west of Chaharikar to Bamyan, which has ex-


KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- IED attacks
- Collateral damage from attacks on security forces and DACs

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	5
This Report Period	0

perienced several IED incidents in recent months—including two that struck civilian vehicles and one that struck an NGO vehicle.

While most such incidents have occurred on the main road, during this reporting period an ANP vehicle travelling on a dirt road in Ghorband was hit by an RCIED. During this reporting period, AOG presence was also evident in



the form of rocket attacks in Salang and Kohi Safi.

BAMYAN

Travel to the province has become the primary concern, with the routes through Shibar from Parwan and Baghlan experiencing IED incidents last month, and the route through Wardak completely unsafe for NGO travel. Kahmard,


KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- IEDs & mines
- Likely AOG presence in Shibar and Kahmard
- Highway robbery

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	2
This Report Period	0

just north of Shibar, is believed to be an area of AOG activity that is risky for NGO operations and especially dangerous for international staff.

Overall, Bamyan remains one of the quietest and safest provinces in the Central Region. It has however experience a sharp increase in AOG activities compared to last year (nine AOG incidents so far this year compared to one all of last year). Though this needs to be considered in the context of an



overall low incident level—for example, so far this year, the mean average number of AOG incidents for Central Region provinces is around 80—it is also evidence of an increasing level of AOG activity that may portend future problems.


KAPISA

Kapisa should be considered risky for NGOs, with this assessment most pertinent to Tagab, Nijrab, and Alasay districts. In Tagab during this reporting period, one national staff from an international organization and two national staff from local NGOs were abducted while travelling together in a rented private vehicle. The incident appears to have been criminal rather than politically motivated, as the three were released after negotiation and ransom paid

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	2
This Report Period	1

by the family. While it is not known if NGO/international organization affiliation contributed to their targeting, the incident highlights a danger in the district beyond the usual and ongoing military operations and clashes between security forces and AOG.

AOG spread throughout the province is probably not pervasive, but it is extant and should be viewed as a concern for NGO,



most likely in the form of the potential for collateral damage from attacks targeting government entities and security forces. This period saw AOG attacks on ANP and the DAC in Mahmud Raqi, and on ANP in Kohistan.

LOGAR

There were no direct NGO security incidents during this period or the month of September, after a total of six direct NGO incidents in June, July, and August. But AOG incident levels remain high and on par with recent months. The lack of direct NGO incidents may be at least partially due to reduced NGO activity in the province. AOG attacks on secu-


KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Armed and IED attacks on vehicles
- AOG freedom of movement
- DAC attacks

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	7
This Report Period	0

rity/government targets and contract vehicles continue to impact DACs and the roads.

While there is a decrease in obvious AOG presence on the main road going south (with our last recorded report of an AOG checkpoint on 5 September) this should not be construed to mean the route is safe. There are anecdotal reports that police/security presence in the Puli Alam is very limited, and there were several incidents of armed and IED attacks on vehicles this period. AOG were highly visible in Puli Alam last month and earlier this



month, and all roads in Logar should still be considered to be highly risky for NGO travel and off-limits for international staff.

KUNDUZ


The situation in Kunduz has not changed substantially since the last report. NGO incidents have continued apace with two occurring during this period, and the province saw one of its not infrequent suicide attacks against IMF. The two NGO-related incidents reflect the character of incidents in Kunduz, with one being explicitly criminal in its motivations and the other being explicitly AOG. The criminal incident involved the familiar scenario of a gang of unknown armed individuals stealing property (a motorcycle) from an NGO-run clinic. The other inci-

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- AOG mobile checkpoints
- IEDs and suicide attacks
- Attacks on NGO facilities and staff

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	12
This Report Period	2

dent amounted to an encore appearance of the roving AOG groups met in the last bi-weekly. Along with continuing their visits to villages and giving speeches, they had now set up a mobile checkpoint. At the checkpoint the AOG members were not employing the sort of force seen in the south of the country (searching the car and interrogating the passengers—see the Badghis section for such an incident) but rather asking a few basic questions and then presenting their list of talking points. Had the AOG taken more initiative they might well have found evidence linking the NGO staff to the NGO and the confrontation could have taken another tack. The continuing appearance of AOG patrols and checkpoints shows a concerted effort on the part of AOGs to establish and



legitimise their presence in Kunduz. This tactic is also appearing in the neighbouring province of Baghlan (see summary), so it must be considered part of a more generalised phenomenon though not necessarily carefully orchestrated. The patrols do not appear and do not claim to have control over territory and are probably on relatively good behaviour in order to ingratiate themselves with the local community and establish their presence more generally. NGOs operating in the area should pay close attention to the movements of these groups and are encouraged to report any sightings or new activity to ANSO.

FARYAB


Faryab remains most active in its western districts; Almar, Qaysar, and Pashtun Kot. Activity in these three districts has been concentrated in the form of AOG attacks on police checkpoints and the ANP's discovery of a signifi-

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Attacks on ANP checkpoints
- Increasing AOG activity
- Crime associated with cross-border smuggling

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	0
This Report Period	0

cant weapons cache in at least one instance. NGOs operating in these three districts should continue to be especially vigilant of the local political environment in that these three provinces are an important link with other areas of western Afghanistan and by far the most convenient route to the north for AOGs. Western Faryab could also be adversely affected by the problems of the eastern



Badghis (Ghormach and Bala Murghab districts) where the security situation might deteriorate.

BALKH


Balkh continues to be subject to political agitation and criminal activity, and it experienced a significant attack against a major IMF facility. The political agitation took the form of a few attempted assassinations of important persons (a former commander and two village elders) in the more unstable districts of the province, Sholgara, Chintal, and Chahar Bulak. Meanwhile an ACG engaged in a firefight with police in one of Mazari Sharif's most important jewellery bazaars.

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Political conflicts in Sholgara, Chintal, and Chahar Bulak districts
- Agitation of local Pashtun community

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	8
This Report Period	0

The most significant bit of political agitation involved a demonstration in front of Balkh University over a proposal sponsored by elements in the central government to change the official name from the Farsi *danishgah* to the Pashto *pubantun*. The demonstration turned violent with protesters firing live ammunition into the air and forcing police to break it up with force, after which the police continued to lock down and search the campus for the remainder of the day. The protest was certainly orchestrated by outside forces, probably in the interests of stirring up the local Pashtun community, many of whom are integrated and politically uninvolved but some of whom have sympathy for the same political group which



pushed the university name change. Both before and after the protest, coaches could be seen providing transportation to those brought in to the protest.

The other event which captured attention in Balkh was the firing of two BM-1 rockets at Camp Marmol, the headquarters of ISAF's RC North. Although the rockets caused no damage, they seem to have caught the IMF by surprise and constituted the most brazen attack seen so far in the vicinity. It must however be stressed that this incident was isolated and there are no reports to suggesting a significant AOG presence in the area.

SAMANGAN


Reporting from Samangan re-

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Attacks on ANP checkpoint
- Conflicts over local disputes and resource scarcity

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	1
This Report Period	0

mains limited due to the low volume of incidents. Additionally no further information has emerged to support ANSO earlier fears of kidnapping of NGO staff in the province.



SAR-E-PUL


Sari Pul continues to be one of the most stable provinces in the northern region with little activity

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Potential for discontent over food security
- Conflicts resulting from local disputes.

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	0
This Report Period	0

having been reported for the whole of the month of September. Concerns about food security, remote populations, and local disputes have not translated in to actions affecting the security environment.



BAGHLAN

Baghlan has seen an usually high amount of activity in the preceding weeks. Incidents were diverse and diffuse in their character involving outlying districts on either side of the Salang road. Two incidents, a clash between ANP and an AOG and an AOG attack on an ANP checkpoint, occurred in Puli Hisar.

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Attacks on remote ANP checkpoints
- Rising discontent in isolated districts
- Possibility of AOG patrols


	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	1
This Report Period	1

In Tala-wa-Barfak an INGO compound was attacked for reasons still unknown.

Meanwhile at the other end of the province two BM-1 rockets were fired at Baghlani Jadid and reports have emerged of an AOG patrol making an appearance and giving a speech in there as well.

Local sources indicate that some of the members could be coming from Kunduz but that these patrols are also drawing on discontent from Burka and Nahrin, which lie to the east of Baghlani Jadid.

An expat in Baghlani doing research initially received a warm



welcome, but then found residents exceedingly cold and uncommunicative the next day after the patrol made its appearance.


The three centres of activity during this period (Tala-wa-Barfak, Puli Hisar, and Baghlani Jadid) do not appear to have any connection to one another for the moment and are likely the result of localized disputes. For the time being they will likely have little effect on the Salang road.

JAWZJAN

The few incidents which have occurred in Jawzjan during this reporting period are quite outside the normal framework of politically motivated machinations which are the province's hallmark. These consist of an attack on a group of teachers and a rocket fired at a compound belonging to a few NGOs in Aqcha.

Interestingly the attack on the INGO compound happened the day that expats, who had not been resident there for six weeks prior, were scheduled to return. No motivation is known for either event and no clues have since surfaced as to the identities of the attackers, making further speculation a moot point.

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	6
This Report Period	1




FARAH

The rather low number of incidents in Farah are a product of the low levels of exposure in the province of IMF and NGOs. Most NGOs have ceased operations in the province. While the whole of the province must be

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	6
This Report Period	0

considered volatile, the incidents occurring in Farah are associated with two contiguous districts, Bala Buluk and Pushti Rod, where the IMF happen to be based. The mass abduction of over 100 workers is an action on a scale which is



only possible in any area where AOGs have considerable freedom of movement.


HERAT

Herat's business community is heavily put upon by the high level of kidnapping and extortion it suffers by ACGs and AOGs. Additionally legitimate businessmen are forced to compete against illegitimate ones who traffic in illegal goods of all kinds from household products to weapons. Recently the volume of smuggling made headlines in local papers because it has reached the point where it is causing factories to close. The closure of major employers and

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	10
This Report Period	1

the legitimate economy being crowded out by the black market are potential destabilising factors that should be watched by NGOs in Herat.

In addition to kidnappings affecting the business elite, NGOs also received a blanket threat against their female staff. The threat was a cleverly worded document that bore more resemblance to a press released that the night-letter threats which appear throughout the country. The threats were attributed to a local commander who was recently a member of Herat's elite but appears to have fallen out with the governor. Taken in context, the threats are



likely a way of jockeying for political influence and in the subsequent two weeks since their issuance no follow up threats have been issued nor have any NGO staff come to danger. Even so, NGOs should maintain above-average situational awareness in Herat given the potent cocktail of stimuli present in the city.

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS


- Increased AOG activity south and east of Herat city
- Criminal activity

GHOR

Chaghcheran and Shahrak districts have been centre of activity in Ghor during this reporting period. AOGs graduated somewhat in their tactics by firing rockets at

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	4
This Report Period	1

the local PRT and planting a roadside IED. In the west of the province, local AOGs also engaged each other in fighting, suggesting that although that has been a marked uptick in violence, it is not coherent and unified as of yet. In other NGO-related incident staff members were assaulted and robbed by a group of unknown armed men.



KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Threat of NGO robberies
- Localised conflicts
- IEDs

BADGHIS

The two axes of activity in Badghis consist of growing discontent over the provincial governor and the deteriorating security situation in Ghormach and Bala Murghab provinces in the east of the province. Constituting a vital corridor with Afghanistan's northern provinces, these areas have historically received a lot of attention from AOGs. This attention has translated into an increased amount of incidents in the summer of 2008 and increasing reports of foreign AOG elements. Outside of the troubled eastern districts the current governor,


KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Increasing AOG activity in Ghormach and Bala Murghab
- Increasing discontent with the provincial governor.

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	1
This Report Period	1

accused of corruption and incompetence, has been the focus of an extended political campaign to oust him from office which operates at both the national and local levels. Qal'ai Naw itself came under rocket attack (apparently directed at the PRT) and there are reports of concurrent agitation in the streets (people making a ruckus, firing guns, etc.). No sources however were inclined to attribute blame for the rocket attack and social disruption to AOGs but rather thought it to be motivated by parties which are otherwise participating in the political process.

The NGO-related incident which occurred in Laman was important in that it demonstrated clearly the link between ACG and AOG activity that constitutes a significant



part of the west's security dynamic. The NGO staff in question were robbed by an apparent ACG and relieved of their valuables, but also made a point of trying to ascertain whether they were NGO employees, roughing them up and threatening to kill them if this was found out to have been the case. The victims' status as NGO staff, while undiscovered, directly increased their level of risk in this incident from robbery to death and serves as a reminder that NGOs should develop procedures in consultation with their staff as to where and when they should carry their NGO identification.

PAKTYA


With 10 reported AOG initiated incidents in Paktya during the latter half of September 2008, the province saw similar levels activity as the same period last year (11), with half of incidents taking place in the district of Gardez. Six of the reported incidents were IED detonations against security force patrols. Other incidents included a rocket attack against an ANA base in Gardez district centre and an attack against an IMF supply convoy in Wuza Zudran in which a

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	1
This Report Period	0

civilian driver was killed.

Other incidents of note include the abduction of a number of men from a mosque in Gardez district, the release of the remaining deminers who were abducted from Mehlan in August 2008, and a failed attempt by AOG to down ANA helicopters with RPG fire in Zurmat.

All of these incidents have been distributed on or close to the road running from the SW, through Gardez to Sayyid Karam in the centre of the province. While this reporting period has seen fewer incidents than earlier in the year, the concentration of incidents around



this road demonstrates the advisability of careful route planning and limiting any road movement outside main population centres.

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Roadside IEDs
- AOG attacks on IMF supply convoys

NANGARHAR


IED activity has been concentrated on Route 1 between Jalalabad and Torkham, with three finds in or close to Jalalabad and another roadside device found by ANP in Nayzan Khowal. A further illustration of the hazards faced in travelling this route was provided on 27 September on the outskirts of Jalalabad when an IMF patrol fired on a private vehicle injuring two passengers. Another incident on Route 1, on the western side of Jalalabad early in the morning of the next day again illustrates these dangers; a money dealer was forced from his vehicle by a group of armed men in ANP uniforms and forced into their marked ANP vehicle. Shortly afterwards a struggle occurred and

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	6
This Report Period	1

shots were fired, injuring the money dealer and 2 of his abductors.

An IED explosion in Lal Pur, in the east of the province on 16 September killed and injured a number of ABP. Immediately after the incident ABP attended a nearby INGO clinic and demanded that an ambulance attend the incident site. Clinic staff refused at which stage the ABP assaulted staff members and forced a driver to take them, in one of the clinic's ambulances, to the incident site and then to convey injured ABP personnel to Jalalabad.

Also on 16 September, on the other side of the province, in the village of Shandi Toot in Sherzad, workers on an international development project were travelling home from Khogyani when their vehicle was stopped by AOG. The two workers, a driver and engineer, were taken by the AOG



and their whereabouts is still not known.

Other incidents have included two attacks by AOG on district centres in the east of Nangarhar, both of limited duration with no reported casualties, and an attack on an ABP checkpoint in which one member of the ABP was killed and another injured.

AOG activity is widespread across Nangarhar and this period has seen continuing reports of infiltration in the north and south of the province. In the village of Kamar in Rodat on 24 September AOG encountered resistance from villagers and after exchanging gunfire withdrew from the areas leaving behind a number of weapons and quantity of ammunition.

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Roadside IEDs in and close to Jalalabad City
- Clashes between AOG and security forces

LAGHMAN


Continuing the trend seen since late July, AOG activity in Laghman again decreased in the second half September.

A total of 3 AOG initiated incidents were reported, although ANP also disrupted an AOG attempt to place an IED and found another roadside device that was

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	3
This Report Period	0

made safe by IMF. In common with the first part of September, incidents occurred on or close to the main route north from Jalalabad, between Mehtarlam and Dawlat Shah.

There have been no significant incidents on Route 1 in Laghman during this period. Almost all incidents occurred in Alishing, including two attacks on ANP checkpoints and an attack on an IMF supply vehicle in which a passenger was injured.



Any NGO road travel through Alishing should therefore be risk assessed and appropriate security measures taken.

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Roadside IEDs
- AOG direct fire attacks on ANP

KUNAR

With 22 AOG initiated incidents, this reporting period was less active than either the first half of September or the corresponding period in 2007 which saw 27 and 28 incidents respectively. A range of AOG activity has occurred across Kunar, with a familiar concentration of activity in Mano Gai (Pech) where over half of the province's incidents took place. AOG in Kunar continue to be the most regular users of stand-off rocket attacks in the eastern region. A civilian was injured in one of two rocket attacks against Sirkanay district centre while an IMF/ANA base in Kandlay was

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS


- IMF airstrikes
- Stand-off rocket attacks
- Clashes between security forces and AOG

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	4
This Report Period	0

also attacked.

On 26 September an AOG of approximately 35 members conducted vehicle checkpoints in the district of Chapa Dara. On the following day, less than 10km from the site of the checkpoints, a vehicle carrying election materials was stopped by AOG and its contents destroyed.

A number of attacks against IMF convoys occurred during the latter half of the month. IMF aircraft were used in response to one such attack on 21 September, killing a person claimed to be AOG by IMF but who those living close to the incident in Bar Kanday stated was a local farmer. Two days later in nearby Omary, IMF aircraft were used to attack an AOG position with the resultant claim by local authorities that 4 civilians were killed and a number injured.



Further east, in Bar Kunar, a similar incident on 28 September resulted in another conflicting casualty claim, with local authorities stating that 3 civilians had been killed in an IMF airstrike.

IED incidents in this reporting period were limited to two devices being found and dealt with by IMF/ANP. Both of these were on main routes into district centres. While there has been little reported activity on the Jalalabad-Asadabad road, those using the route should consider the risk of encountering AOG or IMF activity and avoid travelling early or late in the day.

NURISTAN


	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	5
This Report Period	0

As has been reported previously, the security situation in Nuristan is dominated by AOG activity, albeit largely unreported due to the limited contact with reporting agencies.

In this reporting period IMF and ANA close to Kamo in the district of Kamdesh clashed with AOG on two separate occasions. In Paroon City on 20 September a

food poisoning incident temporarily incapacitated approximately 150 ANP members as well as a number of GOA officials.

A smaller scale incident occurred elsewhere in the region and affected a smaller family group. Arrests were made following the Paroon incident and no further similar reports have been received.



KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Ongoing clashes
- Lack of conflict information

KHOST


An upswing in AOG activity was characterised by IED detonations in this reporting period. There was also a number of IED finds by IMF and ANP across the province. While most were roadside devices, there was also an explosion in a boys' school and a suicide attack against a district centre. It was in this event in Jaji Maydan on 26 September that a national staff member of an INGO was injured while on personal business. This attack followed a previous suicide attack at the same DAC in June 2008. Another incident involving an NGO occurred in Alisher on 23 September when a number of AOG members approached and de-

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	5
This Report Period	2

manded entry to an INGO clinic. The clinic guards refused until AOG directed small arms fire at the clinic entrance, whereupon they gained entry and proceeded to assault the guards before securing them in a locked room. After a short amount of time the AOG left the facility in an INGO ambulance, having caused little or no other damage and taking no other property. With no other reported AOG activity there was no apparent immediate AOG requirement for the vehicle.

As well as the IED detonation in a boys' school in Shamal, AOG forced their way into a girls' school in Khost before being engaged and deterred by ANP. The murder of a schoolteacher elsewhere in Khost a few days later is still being investigated and may or may not be part of a pattern of activity against education facilities.

One of only two indirect fire rocket attacks outside Kunar oc-



curred on 23 September when four rockets were launched against an IMF base in the city without causing any casualties.

Khost continues to present a range of hazards for those operating in the province. An indication of which occurred on 27 September when an IMF patrol in Sabari encountered a firefight between two families. At the conclusion of the incident three people were dead and another three injured.

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Roadside IEDs
- Increased infiltration by AOG
- Renewed targeting of DACs

HELMAND

Most of the districts of this province such as Nawzad, Khanashin, Baghran, Sangin, Dishu and Washer still remain under the control of AOGs.


As well, there is a threat of an AOG force consisting of 200 including an unknown number of

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	0
This Report Period	0

suicide attackers is being circulated to have positioned in the surrounding villages of Lashkergah City.

In this reporting period, there were 4 different IED incidents including the recovery of 2 roadside IEDs by an IMF patrol in Nahri Sarraj District.

The other 3 IED incidents caused casualties involving the death of 2 ISAF soldiers in which one in two was wounded at first and later succumbed from his injuries.



There is still a high risk of roadside IEDs and AOG mobile checkpoints on Kandahar – Lashkergah main route.

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- General 'saturation' of AOG
- Prevalence of IED
- High abduction threat

KANDAHAR

An NGO incident involved an armed robbery of an NGO supported Community Health Clinic in Kandahar City, District 1, on 20 September 2008. It was a group of 4 armed men gained entry to the clinic by force and tied up a total of 5 staff members and locked them in a room. During the execution of this incident, no harm was reported to the staff members but all their valuables were stolen from them. Also, an ambulance that had been parked inside the clinic was taken away by the perpetrators and found burnt the following day in District 9 of the city.

It's worth noting that on 31 of August 2008, another clinic which


KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Suicide attacks
- Force escalation shootings
- Abduction threat

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	12
This Report Period	0

was belonging to the same affected NGO was the victim of an assault by 2 armed men wearing masks on motorbike in Zhare District. The armed men killed a well-known female midwife and had stolen all the valuables from other 4 medical staff members. Neither ACGs nor AOGs have claimed the responsibility for both incidents so far. The most probable reason for targeting such facilities could be their vulnerabilities. ANSO South advises any staff of a medical facility if involved in a similar occurrence not to interfere with the perpetrators as their primary objective is the theft as the majority of these incidents the staff is left unharmed.

The second incident involved a suicide VBIED strike against a joint mission of UN agencies convoy in Spin Boldak District of the province on 14 September 2008.



The target was an armored vehicle as carrying 2 national doctors (one doctor assigned to WHO and the second one being a Government employee). As a result of the detonation, the 2 doctors were killed on the spot and their driver succumbed from his injuries. 10 civilians and 5 ANP were also wounded in the incident. This incident as well as the recent suicide BBIED attack against an ANBP passing convoy at the same district (inflicting a high number of casualties to civilians other than ANBP officials) coincides with a number of serious threats being made by AOGs highlighting an increase in the number of suicide attacks with targeting any high value assets in the region.

ZABUL

AOGs have been continually setting up illegal check posts and searching for people having association with ISAF/GoA/UN/NGOs. In this reporting period, an AOG cell entered a village of Shinky District and had gathered a number of 12 community elders. They were beaten severely by


KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- AOG check-posts
- Intimidation

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	2
This Report Period	0

AOGs and then made them to see a teacher with cut ears and his nose as an example.

The teacher was forcibly taken from his house at the same area and displayed to public with cut ears and nose, deterring people to refrain from having any association with the GoA or will face the same consequences.



GHAZNI

There were 2 incidents involving the NGO community within this reporting period.

On 26th September 2008, an engineer along with his 2 colleagues, traveling in their private vehicle were stopped and abducted somewhere in this province on the Paktika – Kabul main route by an unknown group.

Prior to kidnapping, the victims were accused of working on US funded projects. Later the families of the victims were informed that they had been abducted and would be killed if the families did not come to collect them. Since, community elders and family members are in negotiations with the abductees. At this stage, no specific demands have been made.

In a separate incident in the same area another vehicle carrying a number of a local NGO employees (including a provincial manager, driver, guard and 2 other their colleagues) were also kidnapped by a group claiming to be AOGs.

The victims were en route to Ka-

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Elevated kidnap threat
- IED
- Illegal Check Posts

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	2
This Report Period	2


bul for passing their Eid celebration when the incident occurred. Both incidents occurred at the same day and in the morning hours however the abductions appear to have been executed by 2 different AOG groups.

Soon after the incident, one of the victim's family members was contacted by an AOG representative, informing them of kidnap and assured them of their safety and being in good health.

The negotiation is ongoing with reported no major success to show the imminent release of the victims at this stage.

These two kidnappings come after an unconfirmed local reporting source citing of a sizeable AOG force on Sharan – Ghazni main route. They were said to have been publicly checking in taxis and all private vehicles. Their initial objective was to kidnap anyone found in connection with the GoA or ISAF for a considerable ransom purpose. And those who don't meet their demands are getting killed.

The districts of most concern still remain Ander, Qara Bagh, Zana Khan, Gelan, and Ajristan. These districts have recently witnessed a significant increase in AOG activities and attacks during the last



several months and are assessed as extreme high risk areas for NGOs Operations. As well, the threat of both suicide BBIED/VBIED and IED attacks in Ghazni city remains very high. The primary targets of AOGs in this province continued to encompass ANP, ANA, ISAF and civilian Road Construction workers along the Kabul – Kandahar main route.

The incidents reported this reporting period clearly denote that the AOGs are attempting to degrade the support and effectiveness of both GoA and security forces within this province. The recent targets in AOG attacks included ANSF forces and Construction Company employees with intimidation tactics SAF and IEDs.



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Board. If you have any
feedback, good or bad, let
them know on:
ansoab@yahoo.com

ANSO ACRONYMS

IMF-International Military
Forces / AOG-Armed Oppo-
sition Groups / GOA-
Government of Afghanistan
/ ACG-Armed Criminal
Groups / ANA-Afghan Na-
tional Army / ANP-Afghan
National Police / IED-
Improvised Exploding De-
vice / AEF-Afghan Eradica-
tion Forces / RPG-Rocket
Propelled Grenade / IDF-
Indirect Fire (ex: mortars) /
VBIED-Vehicle Borne Impro-
vised Exploding Device /
PRP-Previous Reporting
Period / ANBP-Afghan Na-
tional Border Police / SAF-
Small Arms Fire / NDS-
National Directorate of Se-
curity (intelligence) / PSC-
Private Security Company /
DC-District Centre

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MISSING

This report ANSO
could not provide
analysis for :

- Daykondi
- Panjshir
- Nimroz
- Paktika
- Uruzgan
- Takhar
- Badakshan

This is because we
do not know enough
about the area to
comment on the sig-
nificance of the inci-
dents occurring
there.

If you can help us
understand the prov-
ince better please
contact us.

TRAINING REMINDER

The **Centre for Safety and Development (CSD)** and the **Armadillo Group** will be
conducting various NGO security related courses at ANSO during October.
NGO are encouraged to register directly with them if interested as places are limited.
Please contact the persons below and NOT ANSO.

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www.centreforsafety.org

Email: esther@centreforsafety.org

The Armadillo Group

www.armadillo-group.co.uk

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