

# THE ANSO REPORT

*ANSO and our donors accept no liability for the results of any activity conducted or omitted on the basis of this report.*

-Not for copy or sale-

## Inside this Issue

|                 |       |
|-----------------|-------|
| Central Region  | 2-4   |
| Northern Region | 4-6   |
| Eastern Region  | 7-9   |
| Western Region  | 9-10  |
| Southern Region | 11-13 |
| ANSO Info Page  | 14    |

## YOU NEED TO KNOW

- Attacks against voter registration efforts
- Suicide attacks in provincial centers
- Collateral damage from armed clashes

## ANSO is supported by

### EUROPEAN COMMISSION



Humanitarian Aid



Schweizerische Eidgenossenschaft  
Confédération suisse  
Confederazione Svizzera  
Confederaziun svizra

Swiss Agency for Development  
and Cooperation SDC




NORWEGIAN MINISTRY  
OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

## COUNTRY SUMMARY

High profile abductions and spectacular suicide attacks dominated the period as routine attacks continued apace across the country.

The spate of kidnappings (and releases) in and around the capital highlighted the vulnerability of travel in the area. The (at best) reciprocal conditions of release of abductees and general lack of arrest or punishment will likely serve to encourage further attempts.

The period saw an alarming volume and diversity of suicide attacks (+8 in the period) ranging from high yield truck borne devices (in Wardak and Kandahar),



devices targeted towards schools (Khost) and voter registration centers (Kunduz) to more 'routine' attempts on Government staff/facilities (Nimroz/Wardak/Khost) and IMF (Herat/Nangahar)

Even a cursory look at the target range and geographical spread of these efforts gives an informative glimpse of the nature and reach of the AOG campaign.


Incidents involving elections preparation appear to be increasing slightly, but this is more likely caused by the simple availability of targets rather than AOG "investment" in undermining the process.

Winter downturn continues, but not as deep as expected.

## NGO DATA & TRENDS

Though NGO direct incident volumes are trending downwards, this should not be taken as a signal that the context has become more amenable to NGO staff safety.

Rather, this decrease is in line with the overall seasonal decline in conflict volumes as well as the inevitable draw down of NGO activity with the advent of winter. The severity of those incidents reported (including abductions, intimidation, and collateral damage) remains largely unchanged with AOG attributed for an estimated 70% of all NGO incidents.



## KABUL

Abductions were prominent this reporting period. On 3 November in the Karte Parwan area of Kabul, a French national working for an INGO was abducted while travelling from his guest house to office. This appears to have been a criminally motivated incident, but there is no follow-up information at this time. In Surobi, a Dutch journalist was abducted after meeting with an AOG commander. She was later released, as was a Canadian journalist abducted on 12 October after a visit to Cha Rahi Qambar IDP camp near Qargha Lake. On 10 November in Logar (see Logar assessment), an American journalist was abducted, also reportedly after


|                    | NGO Incidents |
|--------------------|---------------|
| Year to Date       | 22            |
| This Report Period | 1             |

meeting with AOG. Together the incidents indicate an increased targeting of internationals for profit-motivated abduction, and NGO should be aware of an elevated threat. However, the actual abduction threat for NGO is likely lower than the recent spike suggests, as the journalist abductions were likely facilitated by the victims being in vulnerable or risky situations that are out of the norm for NGO. In the NGO abduction, the victim had likely been targeted through surveillance. It is this latter scenario that is most applicable to NGO.

Overall in Kabul Province, the amount of threat traffic and actual incidents indicate a threat environment on par with the highs of this summer. In Kabul city, IEDs and suicide attacks are commonly mentioned and these extant threats were given weight by a 9

### KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Suicide attacks
- Abduction/kidnapping
- Decreased security for Kabul



November ANP/ANA discovery of an IED-rigged vehicle entering the city from the west in District 5.

Khaki Jabbar and Mussayi show a recent increase in AOG activity. On 30 October, AOG attacked the Khaki Jabbar DAC, and since then both Khaki Jabbar and Musayi have appeared in several reports of AOG activity and planned attacks. While these would likely target government entities, NGO can also assume some level of risk in relation to this.

Road travel between Kabul and Jalalabad is still not recommended. On 11 November, the danger was highlighted by an RPG attack in the vicinity of a two-car UN convoy and two ANP check points on the main road in the Tangi area.


## WARDAK

The two Bihsud districts have been consistently assessed as the safest areas for NGO operations in Wardak. However, early this month there was a report that AOG or ACG were active in Hisa i Awali Bihsud and possibly Markazi Bihsud. It is believed that the group originated from, and returned to, an eastern district, and possibly were seeking to target NGO for criminal purposes. If this is the case, international NGO staff would be a particularly desirable target. The fact that there have been no additional AOG/ACG sightings reported

|                    | NGO Incidents |
|--------------------|---------------|
| Year to Date       | 7             |
| This Report Period | 0             |

since the initial sighting suggests that the group has remained back in the eastern area but the possibility of return should be assumed. NGO should keep a low profile and maintain high security vigilance at compounds. Local staff should sanitize themselves and vehicles of materials that may identify them with international NGO and the presence of international staff is not recommended.

AOG incidents have slowed down in eastern Wardak compared to the last half of October, but remain frequent and violent. While attacks were typically directed at security forces, in Jalrez and Saydabad there were Independent Election Commission (IEC) tar-



geted attacks. In addition, four civilians were wounded in a 7 November suicide vehicle-borne bombing in Saydabad. The incident, which involved large truck and substantial (and apparently premature) blast is believed to be a failed attempt to target the DAC and/or adjacent IMF base. While the casualties were low, the damage potential appears to have been significant. The incident is indicative of the highly volatile security situation in Wardak and the potential for collateral damage for NGO with operations there. All districts east of the Bihsuds should be considered unsafe for NGO.

### KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Overall instability
- Suicide/IED attacks
- Kidnapping/abduction

## PARWAN

Parwan had no AOG incidents through most of October, then experienced one or possibly two belatedly reported incidents at the end of the month: a rocket attack on the Kohi Safi DAC and the abduction of a senior ANA official's daughter in Jabalussaraj. (The latter of which may be crimi-


### KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- AOG in Ghorband and Kohi Safa
- Collateral damage from clashes

|                    | NGO Incidents |
|--------------------|---------------|
| Year to Date       | 5             |
| This Report Period | 0             |

nally rather than politically motivated.) While these do not directly affect NGO, they are indicators of some presence of AOG in areas that are typically fairly quiet.

This period there was a rocket attack on Bagram airbase and an IED explosion in a private compound in Ghorband (details unknown), events that indicate a lingering AOG presence but don't suggest any new threat. The road west from Chaharikar to Bamyan



has not experienced an IED incident since late September. NGO can view this as sign of a reduced threat compared to the summer months. However, this route should still be considered risky and is not recommended by ANSO.

## BAMYAN

Police discovered three rockets reportedly aimed to target national and international security forces in Bamyan centre. Such a discovery is part of a trend of indicators that there is a growing AOG presence in the still largely safe province.

Also this period, an armed gang


### KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Increased AOG presence
- Highway robbery
- IED

|                    | NGO Incidents |
|--------------------|---------------|
| Year to Date       | 2             |
| This Report Period | 0             |

robbed vehicles in the Shibar Pass area. While for NGO the threat of banditry is low, the practice is ongoing and should be recognized as a potential danger, especially in Yakawlang, Panjab, and Shibar.

ANSO does not recommend NGO travel by road between Kabul and Bamyan. This is due to Wardak's extreme danger, and the risks of travelling west of Chaharikar in Parwan or through Kahmard and Shibar in Bamyan.



The province has started to experience its first heavy snowfalls, and NGO can expect hazardous travel conditions and closed roads to be common in the coming months.

## DAYKUNDI


There were no significant changes in Daykundi's security situation this period. The southern area, especially Kajran and Gizab are heavily infiltrated with AOG. While Nili and the areas to the north are safer than the south due to some ability of the local population to control and deter AOG

### KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Minimal security force presence
- AOG freedom of movement
- Banditry

|                    | NGO Incidents |
|--------------------|---------------|
| Year to Date       | 3             |
| This Report Period | 0             |

movement, the security situation throughout the province is unpredictable. There is an extremely limited security presence and local power struggles that can make NGO operations and/or the presence of international staff risky due to the potential for AOG/ACG targeting. The onset of winter could also decrease stability and increase criminal incidents as the people of the province seek the means to obtain scarce re-



sources necessary for basic survival. In Khadir and Shahrstan this period, there were reports of armed criminals robbing vehicle passengers, which may have been one manifestation of this situation.

## LOGAR

Though overall levels are down since the peaks of the summer months, AOG incidents remain relatively high and continual in Logar within the context of the CR and as such ANSO considers Logar a high risk area for NGO operations.


On 10 November, an American journalist along with an Afghan

### KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- SAF/IED attacks on vehicles
- AOG freedom of movement
- Abduction/kidnapping

|                    | NGO Incidents |
|--------------------|---------------|
| Year to Date       | 7             |
| This Report Period | 0             |

driver and interpreter were abducted, possibly while travelling between Charkh and Khawar. Reportedly, the abduction occurred after a meeting with AOG. While the AOG contact likely facilitated this particular abduction, NGO should consider the possibility of abduction and other serious threats high in Logar. AOG conduct extensive surveillance on the main road from Kabul to Gardez for the purpose of attack and/or abduction. Most of the province is considered to be



heavily infiltrated with AOG and attacks on district centres and security forces (vehicles, convoys, and check points) are frequent. While there have been no reports this period, random AOG check points are common, especially in the Puli Alam District.

## KAPISA


AOG incidents, mostly in the form of attacks on, and clashes with, security forces, jumped this reporting period after a slowdown in the second half of October. These remain concentrated in Tagab and Nijrab. However, Alasay is also reported to be heavily infil-

### KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Collateral damage from clashes
- AOG presence in some districts

|                    | NGO Incidents |
|--------------------|---------------|
| Year to Date       | 2             |
| This Report Period | 0             |

trated with AOG, but little information is available on the area likely the result of a significant AOG presence and a very limited security presence. For NGO, these areas remain highly risky for operations. The provincial centre of Mahmud Razi was quiet with only some general police actions recorded, and should remain generally safe in the coming weeks. The north-western districts (Koh Band and the two Kohistan)



have also been quiet, but NGO are cautioned to maintain a low profile due to the potential for periodic AOG activity.

## SAMANGAN


Reporting from Samangan continues to be limited, with the only incident occurring during this reporting period attributable to UXO. Although overall relatively

### KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Criminality
- Attacks against ANSF

|                    | NGO Incidents |
|--------------------|---------------|
| Year to Date       | 1             |
| This Report Period | 0             |

tranquil, in the past Samangan has been the site of some AOG and ACG activity in its outlying districts, attributable to either resource scarcity, smuggling of illicit substances, or some combination thereof. Incident volume for Samangan is likely to remain extremely low as winter sets in and



large swathes of the province become inaccessible.

## JAWZJAN


While the volume of incidents in Jawzjan has not increased, the pattern of the last month continues in that a few incidents have been characterized by an unusual degree of zeal and severity. Despite the shift from the previous ACG dominated paradigm, a pattern is emerging behind the recent activity in Jawzjan.

The two particularly significant incidents of this reporting period consisted of a complex attack on a Turkish-run high school and nearby IMF patrol and an ambush on the district governor of Fayzabad, with both occurring in the vicinity of Aqcha city. Full details of the attack on the high school are still emerging but what is known is that the belligerents shifted from this target to attacking a nearby IMF patrol. It is unusual for an AOG to try to target two [different kinds of] targets at once, and on top of that to move from the softer target (the school) to the harder one (the IMF). There is conflicting information as to whether the AOG “finished” its operation against the school before it engaged the IMF patrol but it is known that the AOG assumed the forward posture and engaged the IMF in-

|                    | NGO Incidents |
|--------------------|---------------|
| Year to Date       | 9             |
| This Report Period | 1             |

stead of melting into the background. Furthermore, the fact that the AOG felt so emboldened as to engage the IMF suggests that it was surprisingly well-armed for a simple raid on a school (the proximity of the IMF patrol was fortuitous), and a lot more firepower is necessary to take on an IMF patrol than a school.

The recent AOG activity in Jawzjan, and specifically in Mardiyon and Aqcha districts, differs from other hot spots in the Northern Region, such as western Balkh and Baghlani Jadid-Kunduz, in both its scope and context. In the latter two areas, AOG activity occurs within the context of a much broader and deeper base of AOG sentiments (that base is much smaller in western Balkh than in Kunduz, but the underlying dynamic is comparable). In both western Balkh and Kunduz, the reservoir of AOG sentiment is what gives AOGs their operational range and hence translates that sentiment into incidents. In Jawzjan, on the other hand, incidents have been occurring without precursors such as grandstanding at the mosque, night letters, and extended rumour campaigns. While activity in western Balkh and Kunduz appears to be “bottom-up”, in Jawzjan the movement seems to be “top-down”. The motivation in this case would be to create the ap-



pearance of instability with a number of high-profile attacks. The modus operandi would be for an AOG operative (usually deputized by one or other AOG faction in the south) to pay ACGs to carry out the actual operations. Recent threats received by NGOs have mentioned large sums of money, and AOG-motivated incidents (whether carried out by ACGs or not) have featured better-quality tactics and materiel than before. There is currently not enough information to speculate which AOG faction is financing the upsurge in activity in Jawzjan, but its orchestrated character is noteworthy and also a departure from the previous situation in which incidents were more apparently the manifestations of factional or ACG disputes. At least one individual arrested in connection with an incident has identified himself as being involved with Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, a claim which is both significant and dubious. Dubious because it is somewhat doubtful that IMU has any operational capabilities beyond Uzbekistan's Ferghana Valley (if that), but significant in that it might mark a new AOG branding strategy. The moniker “Taliban” is unacceptable to numerous conservative individuals otherwise amenable to Islamist governance because of its overwhelming association with Pashtun ethnic affinity, whereas IMU would offer the promise to local Uzbeks of a seat at the table.

### KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Threats against NGO staff
- Attacks against GoA and ISAF
- IED

**NOTICE:** Your input is invaluable for the production of this report. While we appreciate information on incidents, we also need general information on the security situation in your area. So please remember to call or email us regularly.

Contact details of ANSO staff are provide on the last page.

**ANSO:** “..by NGOs for NGOs..”

## SAR-E-PUL


Reporting from Sari Pul continues to be limited with no incidents having been reported in this period. Ongoing concerns in Sari Pul focus on the potential confluence of food security issues and

### KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Food security issues
- Criminality

|                    | NGO Incidents |
|--------------------|---------------|
| Year to Date       | 0             |
| This Report Period | 0             |

criminality. Food security is likely to get a lot worse as winter sets in and areas of the province become inaccessible, but it is not yet known whether or how increased desperation will impact coercive attempts at redistribution. An anthropological approach suggests that the “Robinhood” paradigm is



owned more by the warlord than the ACG in Afghanistan.

## KUNDUZ


Unique among provinces in the Northern Region, violence in Kunduz has targeted electoral infrastructure in at least three instances as well as continuing its normal manifest in the form of IED and SAF attacks targeting GoA, ANSF, and IMF. One electoral staff member received threats from an AOG, while elsewhere registration centres were

### KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- IED
- Suicide attacks
- Attacks against electoral infrastructure

|                    | NGO Incidents |
|--------------------|---------------|
| Year to Date       | 13            |
| This Report Period | 0             |

the targets of attacks. In Chahar Darra an attack on the DAC was apparently aimed at destroyed the registration centre and in another instance a SVBIED detonated prematurely en route to a target in the vicinity of Khanabad. Given these threats, NGOs should add electoral infrastructure to their list of things to regularly avoid like ANSF, IMF, and other GoA installations. Kunduz province has also seen another periodic upsurge in reports of the presence of active suicide attackers. Despite the immediacy of these reports,



NGOs should always assume this threat to be real and active in Kunduz. Suicide attackers in Kunduz, however, have a consistent record of targeting IMF and more rarely ANSF, which means that NGOs can mitigate a significant amount a risk by practising a consistent strategy of avoidance to these particular high-profile targets.

## TAKHAR

Two incidents in Takhar indicated a degree of AOG sentiment not usually seen in the province. A local INGO staff member received a threat via night letter and an individual was caught in the act of trying to distribute a template for more night letters. Both of these incidents occurred in relative isolation, with no signs of prior AOG activity nor any subsequent follow up as of yet. Be-


### KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Threats against NGO staff
- UXO

|                    | NGO Incidents |
|--------------------|---------------|
| Year to Date       | 3             |
| This Report Period | 1             |

cause local reporting has not indicated other issues symptomatic of increased AOG sentiment, the most likely conclusion is that AOGs from further afield (probably Kunduz) are trying to establish a presence in Takhar with the help of a few like-minded local actors.

The injury of several young children by unexploded ordnance, serves as a reminder that risks posed by UXO are particularly high as a result of its position between shifting Taliban and North-



ern Alliance lines throughout much of 2000 and 2001. Along with a large quantity insitu, UXO also pose a threat in that it often gets washed down from its location and deposited along riverbanks where it can easily be picked up by unsuspecting individuals, as seems to be the case in Taluqan.

## KHOST


The first half of November in Khost witnessed a range of security incidents similar in nature and number to the corresponding period in 2007. The majority of AOG activity has been IED related and initially saw attacks against security force patrols in the south and east of the province. The northern district of Sabari saw a concentration of activity for several days with some lim-

### KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Suicide attacks in district centers
- IED along main routes
- Indirect fire attack collateral damage

|                    | NGO Incidents |
|--------------------|---------------|
| Year to Date       | 6             |
| This Report Period | 0             |

ited IED activity and a rocket attack on an IMF facility. This period also saw an IMF attack against the security escort for a construction company on 10 November resulting in the deaths of 14 security guards. The reporting period concluded with a number of incidents in or close to Khost City, with 3 construction workers being fatally shot by AOG in the central district of Mando Zayi on 14 November followed by a SVBIED attack against an ANP patrol in Khost City on the same day. The next day a failed BBIED attack at a school in Khost City showed that, in common with the



preceding month and with November 2007, education facilities continue to be targeted by AOG.

As one of the most volatile provinces in the eastern region it is likely that, in common with the winter of 2007, this tempo of activity will be maintained over the coming months and any working in the area should take account of the range of risks presented in Khost.

## KUNAR


Kunar continues to be the most active province in the Eastern Region, and total reported incidents and AOG attributed incidents in this period have been on a par with those reported in early November 2007. In addition to reported incidents, there are indications of new AOG movement in clusters based in the northern district of Chapa Dara as well as

### KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- IED in Sirkanay
- Abduction/kidnapping
- AOG attacks against security forces

|                    | NGO Incidents |
|--------------------|---------------|
| Year to Date       | 4             |
| This Report Period | 0             |

Sirkanay in the south-east. IED activity in Sirkanay between 09-10 November included two finds by security forces and an explosion that killed a construction company employee. Otherwise, incidents in the province have largely maintained the familiar pattern of direct fire attacks against security force positions in the districts of Mano Gai, Wata Pur, and Narang, with some locations coming under attack more than once over the course of several days. Outside this pattern, the abduction of an engineer in Chapa Dara, and an attack against the residence of an



IMF employee in Asadabad demonstrate that AOG in Kunar are using a range of methods in pursuing their goals. The effects of reported security force successes against AOG in neighbouring Pakistan are yet to be seen in Kunar and other border provinces, and those working in or travelling through the area should account for all contingencies in their operational planning.

**ANSO: “..by NGOs for NGOs..”**

## NANGARHAR


With more than double the number of reported security incidents than the corresponding period in last year, it is clear that the security situation in Nangarhar is deteriorating. AOG movement into the province during October has resulted in activity levels in early November that are similar to those for the entire preceding month. The direct threat relayed to one NGO working in the province and necessitated the temporary removal of some international staff and illustrates the impact of the current situation. The seizure of BBIED vests at the Torkham border crossing point on 04 November reinforced the

### KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- IED
- AOG attacks against security forces

|                    | NGO Incidents |
|--------------------|---------------|
| Year to Date       | 6             |
| This Report Period | 1             |

reported threat of a suicide attack in Jalalabad City and security forces found a number of other IEDs throughout the province in early November. An IED explosion in Jalalabad on 08 November is believed to have targeted a local trader but failed to cause any casualties having detonated prematurely. The use of a SVBIED against an IMF patrol in a bazaar in Bati Kot on the morning of 13 November caused at least 80 civilian casualties, including approximately 8 fatalities. Had the device been used later in the day, the bazaar would have been busier and casualties much higher. Local reactions to the bombing have been almost completely anti-AOG, but considering the level of recent activity this may not result in a drop-off of in activity as seen



in Laghman following last month's killings of its residents in Kandahar.

Unusually for Nangarhar, AOG have also used direct fire against a number of locations, attacking ANP and ANBP checkpoints in the east of the province, as well as the house of a GoA employee in the district of Khogyani.

The risk to those working in the area is not confined to the province. With many organisations having national employees with relatives in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas of Pakistan, recent events in and around Peshawar have meant that personal security measures routinely adopted locally should also be carried out on any cross-border journeys including personal travel.

## LAGHMAN


With only two reported AOG initiated incidents in early November, Laghman has maintained the low level of activity that began in mid-October. The two incidents that did occur were typical of those that could have been expected, being an attack on an IMF supply vehicle using Route 1 and a direct fire attack on a security force position in Alishing. While

### KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Attacks along Route 1
- AOG attacks against security forces

|                    | NGO Incidents |
|--------------------|---------------|
| Year to Date       | 3             |
| This Report Period | 0             |

attributed AOG activity is similar to last year, the overall number of reported security incidents in Laghman is significantly lower than in early November 2007, and this is likely to be at least in part due to the province-wide reaction to the killing of Laghman residents in the Kandahar bus incident in October. The reported increased deployment of ANP personnel along Route 1 may also have had some effect in increasing security along part of the Kabul-Jalalabad road, however, as al-



ready mentioned, incidents continue to occur, and, in light of reported AOG movement in districts close to the route, travel along Route 1 is not recommended.

## NURISTAN


The movement of additional IM Forces to Nuristan may account for the increased reporting of security incidents in this period, with AOG attacking security force positions with direct fire in the north-eastern districts of Bargi Matal and Kamdesh on multiple

### KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Abduction/kidnapping
- AOG/security force clashes

|                    | NGO Incidents |
|--------------------|---------------|
| Year to Date       | 3             |
| This Report Period | 0             |

occasions. Other reported incidents include an attack against a police checkpoint in the south of the province and a fire that destroyed the offices of the Provincial Education Department in Paroon City. The temporary deployment of additional security forces to voter registration sites has minimised AOG activity directed against the election process which is reported to be progressing well. Nuristan continues to



host a range of AOG and security force activity that is not reported and it is recommended that any travel or work in Nuristan should only be conducted by those from the province.

## PAKTYA


An increase in AOG activity compared to the corresponding period in 2007 has seen the bulk of reported security incidents occur in the western district of Zurmat, straddling the route between Gardez and Ghazni. These inci-

### KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- IED along main routes
- Abduction/kidnapping
- AOG attacks against security forces

|                    | NGO Incidents |
|--------------------|---------------|
| Year to Date       | 1             |
| This Report Period | 0             |

dents have almost exclusively been attacks against security forces, the one exception being an indirect fire attack on a DAC. Outside Zurmat the nature of incidents has been less consistent and has included an AOG VCP on the main Gardez-Kabul road during daylight hours, as well as the attempted abduction or killing of a de-mining team that was foiled by the arrival of an ANP patrol, initiating a firefight which



nonetheless left one of the de-miners dead and two injured. The Gardez-Khost route has also seen further incidents, with an IED detonation and an indirect fire attack both occurring in Schwak on 07 November.

## BADGHIS

Combining the twin factors of the narcotics trade in the border areas and the strategic importance of the passage through Badghis to the Northern provinces, Badghis remains an area preferred by the AOG for its activities. This was highlighted by the overhead firing


### KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Ambushes
- Collateral damage from military operations

|                    | NGO Incidents |
|--------------------|---------------|
| Year to Date       | 1             |
| This Report Period | 0             |

of small arms on a WFP convoy in Muqur district, an incident that may be construed as a message of warning by the AOG. Though it may be early to see too much into the incident, NGO operating in the area may like to review their acceptance levels with the beneficiaries and other actors.

The number of military operations being conducted by the ANP and IMF (along with use of air strikes) in the districts of



Murghab and Ghormach, and the AOG activities in Muqur and Ab Kumari districts, make portions of Badghis a high risk area for NGO operations.

## GHOR


The recent incident involving the Governor of Teyvareh, in which he was killed as a result of a shoot out with ACG who were engaging in a roadside robbery on the road to Chaghcharan, highlights the level of risk travel along the Chaghcharan-Pasaband road en-

### KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Criminality
- Banditry along main routes

|                    | NGO Incidents |
|--------------------|---------------|
| Year to Date       | 5             |
| This Report Period | 0             |

genders. This incident, combined with an earlier report indicating an AOG had positioned itself on this stretch of road intent on engaging in criminal activities, suggest that this is a high risk area for NGO travel due to its instability and pervasive criminality, factors that NGO need to be cognizant of when planning road travel within this province. The Chaghcharan-Herat road also presents a level of



risk due to tribal conflicts and local strife, particularly in the area of Shahrak.

## FARAH


Instances of ANP operations against AOG and IED attacks and ambushes by the AOG against both IMF and ANP were reported from districts of Bala Buluk., Gulistan, Bakwa as well as

### KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- IED attacks
- Ambushes

|                    | NGO Incidents |
|--------------------|---------------|
| Year to Date       | 4             |
| This Report Period | 0             |

Farah City itself. As well, the kidnapping of an ANP personnel, the indiscriminate firing on the passengers of a local bus, and ambushes on IMF provide indications of the extent of AOG presence and activity in the province. As well, the heavy presence of IMF and the ongoing military operations there indicate that stabil-



ity in this province will likely be elusive for the mid to long term.

## HERAT


The incident of an NGO worker being killed as a collateral casualty amongst a team of security and government functionaries in Shindand district as a result of an IED attack targeting the vehicle in which the team was travelling in brings home the stark reality of the threats posed to NGO travelling in such high profile targets. The other incident affecting the international community was the placing of an explosive device (albeit aimed at causing panic than casualty) outside the compound

### KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Criminality
- IED attacks
- Suicide attacks

|                    | NGO Incidents |
|--------------------|---------------|
| Year to Date       | 14            |
| This Report Period | 1             |

wall of an UN warehouse. Herat province continued to report a spate of robberies and kidnappings, especially in the Herat City, while the ANP made a sizeable seizure of opiates and weapons in the border district of Gulan after a fire fight with smugglers. While the ANP conducted offensive operations and made a number of arrests in connection with cases of kidnappings and crime, the AOG carried out rocket and IED attacks against ANP check posts and patrols inflicting casualties, especially in the districts of Adarskan and Shindand. All-in-all the situation speaks of the high involvement of



AOG in criminal activity (particularly narcotics smuggling and gun running) in the province and the resultant boost reported AOG activity levels. This increased activity by AOG was witnessed by the suicide bombing of an IMF convoy on the Herat-Kandahar highway in Shindand district and the capture of an armed suicide bomber in Adarskan, further highlighting and cementing the predicted increase, some of which can be attributed to IMF operations being conducted in Helmand and Farah.

## KANDAHAR

The suicide attack within District 6 of Kandahar City dominated reporting from this period. The device itself was constructed of a small oil tanker which resulted in a considerable size blast. Though the device failed to reach it's intended target (the Provincial Council Chambers) it nonetheless resulted in 54 wounded and an estimated 15-20 killed. In addition, due to the size and location of the incident, considerable structural damage was also caused to the surrounding buildings, some of these included NGO and International Community facilities.

### KEY THREATS & CONCERNS


- Abduction/kidnapping
- Suicide attacks
- IED

|                    | NGO Incidents |
|--------------------|---------------|
| Year to Date       | 12            |
| This Report Period | 0             |

This incident further highlights the prevailing risks with operating in this province and the need for sound site security measures. Such measures include the installation of blast film, creation of a bunker/blast shelter, as well as prudent selection of facility location (away from high profile target locations such as GoA and security installations).

In addition, there were numerous examples of intimidation measures being taken, including the spraying of acid on a group of school girls, the arson of a civilian IMF related contractor, as well as attacks against a WFP food convoy.

Though there have been no recent NGO incidents, a threat report regarding 2 (possible) NGO international staff members tar-



geted for abduction surfaced during this reporting period. While this could not be confirmed, AOG elements have demonstrated in past a willingness to include NGO staff in their targeting and as such organisations need to continue implementing stringent security measures.

While the overall incident volume is trending downwards (as per seasonal standards) the volumes are still well above those reported from last year and the incidents detailed indicate a pervasive and persistent AOG presence that is willing to inflict civilian casualties in order to achieve it's operational goals.

## ZABUL

While Zabul has accounted for one of the most stable AOG incident volumes in the southern context during the past few months, the opening weeks of November indicate that the downturn witnessed in other provinces is beginning to occur here as well. Having said this, recent reports indicate that large numbers of AOG are presently infiltrating into Zabul (from neighboring provinces), intent on focusing efforts along all primary and sec-


### KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Intimidation against election efforts
- Attacks along DAC access roads
- AOG checkpoints

|                    | NGO Incidents |
|--------------------|---------------|
| Year to Date       | 3             |
| This Report Period | 0             |

ondary routes leading to District Centers throughout the province. In addition, reports further indicate that AOG plan to engage in a large scale intimidation campaign in order to discourage the local populace from engaging in the election process. While it is unclear at present what exactly this campaign will consist of, similar past efforts have included night letters, verbal threats, executions of GoA personnel, and will likely include direct attacks against election staff and efforts.

As well, AOG elements continue to carry out well planned attacks against ANSF, roadside security checkpoints and PSC convoys escorting IMF logistical convoys



despite an increase in the number of ANA posts along the Kandahar – Kabul main road. Anecdotal reporting consistently indicate the presence of AOG checkpoints engaged in searches of vehicle intent on identifying individuals with links to the GoA, IMF, local security forces, as well as anyone having an association to “foreign” organizations. This last group should be considered to include NGO and as such previously advised mitigation strategies should continue to be stringently applied.

## NIMROZ

The suicide attack against the Deputy Governor in Zaranj marks the 6th BBIED incident reported from Nimroz this year. With the conclusion of road construction activities in the north of the province, AOG have continued to focus their suicide attack efforts to Zaranj City. These have consistently targeted high profile GoA officials and as yet pose no direct threat to NGO, though the risks


### KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Suicide attacks in Zaranj
- Increased AOG activity in Chakhansor

|                    | NGO Incidents |
|--------------------|---------------|
| Year to Date       | 1             |
| This Report Period | 0             |

of collateral involvement remains. Despite a 50% success rate for such attacks (with the remaining 50% either premature detonation or security force prevention), it is likely that this mode of attack will continue to dominate the Nimroz security context.

Following the (unsuccessful) attack against the Chakhansor DC on the 25th of October, recent reporting indicates that further AOG elements (est. 130 in strength) have infiltrated into this district with the intent of continuing operations there, with a specific focus on the DC. While



cross border migrations of AOG between Helmand and Nimroz are common, this has rarely translated into any considerable level of action and as such there has been little change in the AOG activity trend line this year. Recent events, however, may mark a watershed in which AOG begin efforts with a greater vigour though further time will be required to solidify this assessment.

## PAKTIKA


There has been no significant changes in the overall security context of Paktika during the past few reporting periods. Following the summer "peak" in activity incident volumes have stabilised

### KEY THREATS & CONCERNS


- IED
- Security force operations
- Intimidation efforts

|                    | NGO Incidents |
|--------------------|---------------|
| Year to Date       | 3             |
| This Report Period | 0             |

at +/- 25 per month with incident composition also relatively unchanged as well. In comparison to this period last year however, incident volumes are trending 40% higher in 2008. This increase is in line with trends throughout the SR and it is likely that these volumes will continue over the short term.



**AOG Initiated Incidents-Yearly Volumes**



## HELMAND

IMF and ANSF air and ground operations are purportedly ongoing in the districts of Nada Ali and Nawa in the province in response to the significant AOG movements being reported in these districts, as well as the neighboring districts of Garmser and Dishu. Recent reports also indicate that an AOG recruitment campaign is also presently ongoing in the districts of Nawa and


### KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- High profile attacks within Lashkar Gah
- Significant AOG presence throughout province
- Suicide attacks

|                    | NGO Incidents |
|--------------------|---------------|
| Year to Date       | 0             |
| This Report Period | 0             |

Garmser, with 3 separate groups utilizing local mosques as a platform for their messaging. This further cements the reality that the majority of Helmand will remain both highly unstable and therefore inhospitable for NGO activities for the mid to long term.

Anecdotal reporting from the province also indicates that there remains a significant threat of high profile attacks against GoA targets and facilities, primarily within Lashkar Gah City. This information, while unconfirmed, is in line with recent AOG activity patterns within Helmand which has witnessed a focus on destabi-



lizing this primary population center. Plans are reported to include complex attacks which utilize a combination of suicide strikes/small arms fire for access facilitation and damage maximization, a tactic that has become increasingly more common throughout 2008. As a result of these reports however, security forces have launched operations in the areas neighboring the city with a focus on disrupting such plans though it is unclear at this time the extent to which these will decrease the threat.

## GHAZNI


The 2 INGO national staff members who were abducted on the 23rd of October were released on the 1st of November. Reports regarding their release have been conflicting, though it appears that their freedom was secured following an ANP operation though no arrests have been made in conjunction with this incident.

### KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Abduction/kidnapping
- AOG interference in voter registration

|                    | NGO Incidents |
|--------------------|---------------|
| Year to Date       | 3             |
| This Report Period | 1             |

AOG have recently begun focusing some level of effort on disrupting the voter registration process, with incidents of direct voter intimidation (the collection of voter ID cards and the subsequent issuance of death threat against those partaking) as well as the execution of a voter registration employee. While this does not pose a direct threat to NGO operating within Ghazni, they should remain cognizant of the threat and modify their movements/activities in order to mini-



mize their presence at, or association with, such facilities and activities. In addition, efforts should be made to avoid any perceived association with such activities to further mitigate the threat.



ANSO is hosted by  
[Deutsche Welthungerhilfe](#)

To Register with ANSO  
contact:  
[operations2@afgnso.org](mailto:operations2@afgnso.org)

ANSO is managed by an NGO  
Board. If you have any  
feedback, good or bad, let  
them know on:  
[ansoab@yahoo.com](mailto:ansoab@yahoo.com)

#### ANSO ACRONYMS

**IMF**-International Military Forces / **AOG**-Armed Opposition Groups / **GOA**-Government of Afghanistan / **ACG**-Armed Criminal Groups / **ANA**-Afghan National Army / **ANP**-Afghan National Police / **IED**-Improvised Exploding Device / **AEF**-Afghan Eradication Forces / **RPG**-Rocket Propelled Grenade / **IDF**-Indirect Fire (ex: mortars) / **VBIED**-Vehicle Borne Improvised Exploding Device / **PRP**-Previous Reporting Period / **ANBP**-Afghan National Border Police / **SAF**-Small Arms Fire / **NDS**-National Directorate of Security (intelligence) / **PSC**-Private Security Company / **DAC**-District Administrative Centre / **VCP**-Vehicle Check-point

## CONTACT ANSO

### CENTRAL REGION OFFICE (KABUL)

Blake Kehler - [central@afgnso.org](mailto:central@afgnso.org) - 0799 323 792

Mukhtar - [central2@afgnso.org](mailto:central2@afgnso.org) - 0799 322 116

### NORTH REGION OFFICE (MAZAR)

Scott Bohlinger - [north@afgnso.org](mailto:north@afgnso.org) - 0799 404 617

Firoz Fahez - [north2@afgnso.org](mailto:north2@afgnso.org) - 0799 408 252

### EAST REGION OFFICE (JALALABAD)

Chris Hansen - [east@afgnso.org](mailto:east@afgnso.org) - 0799 248 362

Khisor Shohar - [east2@afgnso.org](mailto:east2@afgnso.org) - 0798 778 014

### SOUTH REGION OFFICE (KANDAHAR)

Vacant - N/A - N/A

Mohammadi - [south2@afgnso.org](mailto:south2@afgnso.org) - 0700 300 730

### WEST REGION OFFICE (HERAT)

Kulvinder Brar - [west@afgnso.org](mailto:west@afgnso.org) - 0799 322 192

Najma Fazly - [west2@afgnso.org](mailto:west2@afgnso.org) - 0799 446 820

### COUNTRY MANAGEMENT (KABUL)

Nic Lee - [director@afgnso.org](mailto:director@afgnso.org) - 0799 325 349

Nathan Ronaldson - [operations@afgnso.org](mailto:operations@afgnso.org) - 0797 165 017

Chona Bollos - [administration@afgnso.org](mailto:administration@afgnso.org) - 0797-093-073

## MISSING

This report ANSO could not provide analysis for the provinces of:

- Panjshir
- Badakhshan
- Baghlan
- Balkh
- Faryab
- Uruzgan

This is because we do not know enough about the area to comment on the significance of the incidents occurring there.

If you can help us understand the province better please contact us.

*Ever Wondered if you needed Blast Film?*



*With*



*Without*

The ANSO South (Kandahar) Office post-blast 12 November 2008