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THE ANSO REPORT

Inside this Issue

Central Region	2
Eastern Region	6
Western Region	7
Southern Region	8
Northern Region	11
ANSO Info Page	13

YOU NEED TO KNOW

- Possible Split In AOG Ranks
- AOG attacks reaching highest volume ever recorded
- Significant AOG assaults on NGO in Khost continue
- Central Region deteriorating sharply

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COUNTRY SUMMARY

Although the report period was blighted by a number of violent attacks on NGO as well as an ongoing escalation in the volume of AOG incidents, the more important strategic aspect was the emergence of a night-letter (inset right) apparently indicating a doctrinal & ideological spat within AOG forces.

The letter (and others) was widely distributed around southern Nangahar towards the end of April, purporting to be from the Haqqani faction, and is highly critical of the current AOG leadership structure and recommends a change in both tactics and command.

The implications of the letter are of a significant sub-group going their own way strategically and perhaps taking a




different approach towards attacking civilian targets and organizations.

It must be stressed however that there are valuable indications that the note is a fake designed to provoke internal dissent.

ANSO will update readers as available

NGO DATA & TRENDS

The volume of AOG incidents directly impacting NGO has continued to grow with April 2008 figures already matching the highest point of last year (July, 10 incidents) and May already superseding last year despite only being half over.



A significant AOG assault against an INGO clinic in Khost (May14th) appears to continue the trend of attacks of NSP projects and followed a similar M.O

Good news came with the release of two NGO staff abducted in Parwan (Apr8th) providing some indication of a return to the normal profile of NGO abductions.

KABUL

Although attacks initiated by Armed Opposition Groups (AOG) are up approx 30% in Kabul province this year, the overall trend is very similar to previous years. Incident data from previous years indicates that from January to May, the number of AOG attacks in Kabul Province (and in the city) tends to remain relatively low, with weeks of relative calm peppered with occasional suicide attacks and attacks against high profile targets. AOG attacks then tend to spike upward in June until they peak in August. Given that the incident data and trends observed in 2008 match closely with data from previous years, it is safe to assume that the


KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Complex attacks against high profile targets
- IED and rocket attacks

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	4
This Report Period	0

relative calm period of the last few months does not represent an improvement in the security situation in Kabul, but is rather a yearly calm period that is about to end.

The only noticeable difference between this year and last year seems to be the decrease in the number of suicide attacks within Kabul city (2 vs. 4 for the same period) and the Taliban's intent to carry out more spectacular attacks, perhaps motivated by the media attention and destabilizing effects that resulted from the Serena Hotel attack and recent Afghan national day parade attack. Security agencies continue to receive high volumes of threat traffic regarding planned suicide attacks and spectacular or "Serena style" attacks against government and security installations. The possibility of such attacks against embassies,



international hotels, and other public venues frequented by internationals (which are more likely to impact NGO staff) is also still assessed as being very high.

Of course, crime remains a constant issue in Kabul, and while not usually or particularly directed at NGOs, the number of brazen day-time criminal acts (including shootings, robberies and kidnapping) is certainly concerning. Although crime volume is difficult to measure, it seems as though more crimes are being committed during the daytime this year than last. In the short term, rising food prices and the high school teacher strike in Kabul city will probably lead to additional protest in the coming weeks.

KAPISA

Few incidents were reported in Kapisa during the last two weeks and NGOs operating in the area do not report any significant changes in the security situation.


KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Attacks, especially in Tagab and Nijrab
- Spread of attacks to schools

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	0
This Report Period	0

Therefore, this office maintains its previous assessment that Kapisa is risky for NGO operations, with the possible exception of the district capital of Mahmud Raqi. Nijrab and Tagab should be considered extremely dangerous.

Rocket attacks and close range attacks against security forces (especially police) still make up



the bulks of incidents which so far this year has made collateral damage the most likely threat for NGO.

PANJSHIR

Panjshir appears to be consistently calm and likely the safest province in the Central Region. The amount of security info ANSO

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	0
This Report Period	0

receives from those operating in this province is limited, probably due to the safe conditions, and

not to a lack of reporting or cooperation. There have been no known AOG initiated incidents recorded in the province since before 2007. Since January 2007, we have recorded only one minor criminal incident.

PARWAN

Parwan has been largely safe for NGO operations, and is typically one of the central region's quieter provinces. There are no current indications of the likelihood of drastic change. Incidents levels have been similar to those of last year and if this trend continues we


KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Collateral damage in the area of Bagram Airbase
- NGO-targeted criminal abduction

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	2
This Report Period	0

can expect to see a slight increase of incidents in May. What incidents do occur are typically directed at police and military targets, most notably Bagram Airbase.

The direct NGO incidents which have occurred so far this year have been a theft and an abduction. The two INGO staff (doctor and driver) who were kidnapped on April 8 were apparently re-



leased on May 5. Although the motive for the abductions was probably criminally/financially motivated, the INGO has not released any information to ANSO.

BAMYAN

Bamyan Province is consistently one of the Central Region's safest provinces with no incidents reported yet in May. Typically the greatest security threat to NGO is crime, most notably armed highway robberies between October in March. This year seems to be


KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Increasing threat of IED/mines
- Armed robbery along roadways

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	1
This Report Period	0

following the same pattern with only 2 highway robberies reported in April and none yet in May. Clashes resulting from land disputes between rival ethnic/tribal groups are also relatively common, but the last month has also been quite calm in this regard.

While these do not pose a direct threat to NGO, they may pose the threat of indirect collateral damage. AOG activity will probably



increase in this province in the coming months but will likely remain relatively low and is unlikely to pose a significant threat to NGOs in the medium term.

DAYKUNDI

Daykundi's relative isolation limits available information on and the ability to assess the province's security situation. There are limited or no security forces throughout the entire province and most security is imposed by local tribes


KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- AOG infiltration in Kiti, Gizrab, and Kajran
- Low security presence

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	0
This Report Period	0

who are largely able to control the AOG movement.

In general, the northern part of Daykundi Province is believed to be safe and the south (Kiti, Gizrab, and Kajran) unstable. Kajran and Gizab are especially prone to clashes between the local population and AOG moving between Helmand and Uruzgan. These districts are considered to be unsafe for NGO operations.



There have too few incidents to determine trends beyond those mentioned above, and recent reports from the northern part of the province indicate that that area is safe for NGO operation.

LOGAR

As noted in the last report, the volume of AOG incidents this year is markedly higher than last year. There was no slowdown in April and incidents continued to climb in May.


Also noted in the last report was the apparent increase of direct threats to the general and NGO communities. At least two more public threats were issued during this reporting period, both of

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Abduction
- attacks to schools or other non security-related targets

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	2
This Report Period	0

them in the relatively safe area of Puli-Alam, warning against working with the government and against watching TV and movies. One source who resides in the area also commented that AOG “used to hide from the public and operate at night, now they are starting to show themselves and make public threats”, yet another sign that AOG forces are becoming bolder and probably stronger in the province. This assessment is reinforced by the growing number of small arms, rocket, and RPG attacks on security forces/ police in Logar this year. Most



incident areas are in the high traffic areas of Muhammad Agha and Puli Alam, but the southern districts of Kwawar, Charkh, and Baraki Barak (which combined have borders with Paktya, Ghazni, and Wardak) are likely the most heavily AOG infiltrated and dangerous areas for NGO.

WARDAK

AOG in Wardak tend to start their spring offensive in May (usually 1 month earlier than Kabul) and this year seems to be following that trend. As predicted by ANSO Central in the last report, the number of attacks increased dramatically this month in Wardak and is already twice as high as last month. Although the heavy fighting season has not yet started, current trends suggest that Wardak may see a 200% to 400% increase in AOG attacks over last year.

Over 17 AOG attacks were reported in the first 15 days of May alone, most of them concentrated in the districts of Chak, Sayeda-


KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Abduction
- Rocket and IED attacks
- Use of terror tactics/intimidation

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	0
This Report Period	0

bad, Maydan Shahre and surrounding areas. And although AOGs continue to carry out standoff attacks such as IEDs and rockets, approx half of the attacks are close range attacks against security forces convoys and installations which indicate that AOGs forces are growing stronger overall.

Based on the above, the situation does not look promising for NGOs this year. Although International and National military forces will probably launch operations in this province this summer in order to stem the flow of AOG into the Central area, it will probably not result in an improved situation for NGOs this summer. Last year, the sudden increase in fighting in Wardak caught several NGOs offguard; and most NGO subsequently pulled out of the



province or reduced their staff to a minimum. Obviously, since few NGOs are left in Wardak, the increasing fighting will probably not affect the NGO community as much this year. That said, the situation does not bode well for those NGOs that have chose to remain in Wardak. AOGs in Wardak have shown only sporadic tolerance for NGOs in its areas of operation and therefore the few remaining NGOs in Wardak will probably continue to face a very high level of risk, especially in the coming summer months when incidents tend to peak.

NANGARHAR

The ~ 20% increase month to month in AOG incidents over 2007 levelled off in April in Nangarhar which continues, despite its economic importance, history of guerrilla operations and proximity to Pakistan, to be surprisingly calm. The major threat remains suicide bombs directed at GOA facilities.

Relations between the security forces and locals drastically deteriorated in Shinwar after an IMF operation resulted in the deaths of at least three people and the arrest of five others. Both the identities and guilt of these people is disputed.


KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Suicide attacks against GOA
- IEDs in Kama and Ghosta
- AOGs in southeast districts

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	3
This Report Period	0

puted. 3,000-3,500 demonstrators blocked Highway 1. Some started stoning the ANP who opened fire killing two and wounding six people. Anti-IMF demonstrations will likely be organized over the next few days in Shinwar and Jalalabad City. It is likely that some anti-IMF and GOA feeling will attach itself to all international staff and caution is urged.

On 10 May ACG invaded the home in Jalalabad of Hazrat Ali, a MP, who was absent. His father was murdered and seven family members were kidnapped. The motive and identity of the culprits is unknown but rumours abound of old scores being settled. Demonstrations protesting the lack of action on the part of the ANP in solving this crime occurred in Kuz



Kunar, Dari-Noor, Marko-Bazaar and Jalalabad.

Competing night letters supporting Mullah Omar and others complaining of his leadership reputedly from his rival Jalaluddin Haqqani have been distributed in Achin District. A split in the Taliban could result in increased risk to the NGO community as some commanders begin to ignore direction from their leaders to allow humanitarian aid. Achin is particularly risky as AOG, including recent reports of numerous foreign fighters, numbers increase.

LAGHMAN

The security situation in Laghman was quieter this period than last with only one IED incident and several direct fire attacks on security forces. Most activity remains in Alingar and Alishing Districts.


KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- IEDs
- IDF against GOA & IMF
- AOG attacks along Highway 1

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	3
This Report Period	0

There were reports that a group in Mihtarlam was openly celebrating the attack on Hazrat Ali's home (see Nangarhar report). If true this could be the precursor to a series of violent crimes that could decrease stability the region.

The Lataband Detour is deteriorating with frequent traffic jams and the road itself being pounded into talcum like dust. The level of security on the road is limited and



an incident should be expected. The opportunity for the use of IEDs is high. Flying Kabul-Jalalabad is the recommended means of travel.

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KHOST


Khost is rapidly gaining on Kunar as the province with the greatest number of AOG initiated incidents in eastern region with 21 incidents this reporting period. Most incidents were IEDs with the most serious attack killing

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Attacks on NSDP projects in Sabari and Tere Zayi Districts
- IEDs on Gardez- Khost Road

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	2
This Report Period	0

three IMF personnel and wounding two in Sabari District. The majority of IEDs are still located before detonation and appear to be of relatively unsophisticated design. Sabari District remains the most volatile in the province with over 1/3 of incidents occurring there and further intensification of AOG operations should be anticipated. AOG in Khost still appear to be capable of more coordinated



and hence lethal operations than other AOG groups in the region. NSP projects are very risky in border districts with the AOG luckily satisfied at this point with destroying property.

KUNAR

Security activity in Kunar remained at a high level with most incidents again occurring in Pech and Chawkay Districts. The most significant incident was the arrest of a BBIED cell in Asadabad City. The bomber had been guided to Asadabad from Pakistan, conducted a reconnaissance of several government facilities and was found with a police uniform and a


KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Pech and Sirkanay Districts
- Potential for demonstrations with regard to the Hazrat Ali issue

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	4
This Report Period	0

suicide vest. His mission was apparently to kill the governor or chief of police. Asadabad has been free of suicide attackers over the past year and this attempt very nearly succeeded in replicating the recent attack in Khogyani District on the DAC. The security on GOA facilities remains very porous and NGOs are advised to stay clear of them.

There were no rocket attacks on the Asadabad PRT this period which may be a sign of improved IMF surveillance of the usual launch sites in Sirkanay.



The Hazrat Ali issue (see Nangarhar report) is providing more fodder, after last period's Afghan flag incident, for demonstrations in Kunar. Any demonstrations have the potential for an outbreak of serious violence as security forces are likely to resort to firearms if stoned or otherwise assaulted as they lack crowd control training and "less or non-lethal" options.

PAKTYA


The major trend of incidents in Paktya has been an AOG campaign of intimidation against the security forces. Several policemen, a retired soldier and a man

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- IEDs on Gardez- Khost road
- Increased attacks on DACs
- intimidation of local population

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	0
This Report Period	0

accused of spying for the security forces were murdered in Zurmat District in which most serious incidents in Paktya have recently occurred. Zurmat is becoming a very dangerous area and NGOs are advised to be very cautious and be wary of doing anything to lead to the perception that their local staff are assisting the security forces.



NURISTAN


Several security incidents occurred in Nuristan in Kamdesh where AOG are reported to have taken over Paprok and Bar Mondagal areas. Increased clashes between

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Clashes in east districts
- High threat to non-local NGO staff
- High criminal threat in western districts

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	1
This Report Period	0

IMF and AOG can be expected in eastern Nuristan as both sides struggle over control of the border. Western Nuristan remains highly volatile with many ACG at large. The Alingar- Kalagush Road is being improved and that route is viable for NGOs wishing to visit the district centre or PRT. Travel beyond the DAC or off the main road is not advised until good relations with local leaders



are established and ANSO as always advises very low profile travel limited to local staff. Guides from the local villages would also be a wise precaution.

HERAT


Herat Province's criminal based activities continue unabated and have dominated activities conducted around the province during this reporting period.. This period has seen a direct criminal action against an NGO in the form of an armed robbery. This activity, netted the armed group with a large amount of cash and equipment.

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- ACG activities to increase
- Serious abduction risk
- IEDs

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	6
This Report Period	1

The event was conducted on the stretch of road leading from Herat to Obe, a sector of road, which has been reported upon on many occasions as being unsafe for NGO travel. It is likely; that this stretch of road, and indeed the districts it passes through, will remain a high-risk transit area for NGO's, at least for the foreseeable future. Such robberies can be limited if NGO operational security is developed and or further strengthened. In most cases, a "Need To Know Ba-



sis" regarding any field mission and indeed anything pertaining to the shipment or transit of valuables will minimize an event leading to the loss of cash and precious goods and equipment. Minimizing these events can be achieved by sounds and prudent safety & security procedures.

FARAH

Coupled with the high amount of both armed attacks and kidnappings in Farah Province over the past few months, is the discovery of another caches of weapons, ammunition and equipment. This adds weight to the assessment that Farah Province is a major re-supply route feeding


KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Abduction along the Ring Road.
- AOG activities increasing
- Increased use of IED

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	2
This Report Period	0

into Hilmand Province and possible as far as Kandahar provinces.

It also remains assessed as being a High-Risk operational area for NGOs, a status that is unlikely to change before the close of the year. NGOs operating in, or transiting through the province, can expect at sometime to be confronted with possible ambush, kidnap, robbery, extortion, other armed clashes and including homicide. NGOs are advised not to operate in this region unless their transit via road systems



in kept to an absolute minimum and that their foot-print on the ground is minimized, reducing the risk to personnel and the organization as a whole. Contingency plans must be solidified in case NGO personnel are involved in any of the above-mentioned incidents.

GHOR

As mentioned in the previous report, Ghor Province has an increasing AOG presence. Whilst the province was relatively calm as far as NGO related incident going during this reporting period, there was however a clash between ANP and AOG in the province.

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS


- Tribal tensions
- Crime
- AOG activities increase

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	0
This Report Period	0

Attacks on ANP or ANA posts are ways in which the AOG can show dominance of a particular area and to collect weapons and ammunition and other equipment for the own operations. It also provides a clear passage for smuggling routes.

It is expected that NGO's will see more of this kind of attacks across the province as we move towards summer and as the poppy harvest comes in to full operation.

Travel for NGOs in this region is best described as Medium-High



Risk due to the amount of AOG activity. NGO's should plan well ahead and observe strict operational security if venturing into this region, particularly in the districts bordering Farah and Hilmand provinces, where activity is more common.

BADGHIS


As reported during the past week via ANSO WEST Security Warnings, AOG activity in Badghis Province has increased with large numbers of AOG fighters entering the Ghormach District. Initially, it was envisaged that the sighting of more AOG in the area (than is usual), was linked with the poppy harvest and pending smuggling into and through the porous areas of the international border.

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- AOG presence in the north
- Illegal road blocks
- Armed clashes

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	0
This Report Period	0

Whilst ANSO WEST assesses this still to be the case, it does not account for the sizable numbers being seen on the ground and the activities be carried out by the AOG units in this area. On further information received and additional analysis; the AOG is strengthening their numbers, with fighters coming from districts to the west and south. This influx of fighters indicates that they be are preparing to not only defend their trade routes, but, just as importantly, actively engage ANA and ISAF troops who have just entered into the region.



If the ANA and ISAF forces are successful in pushing the AOG from their positions, then NGO's who operate in regions to the west, south-west and south, may very well see more AOG activity in their area as they withdraw. Nevertheless, NGO's need to remain alert to any changes in their environment and ensure they have a solid evacuation plan in place should the NGO need to move to a safer location.

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ANSO: *"..by NGOs for NGOs.."*

KANDAHAR

The threat warning of kidnap of NGO international staff members continues in and around Kandahar City. The specific threat also includes NGO national staff however no incidents targeting have occurred recently.

In this reporting period, both ANP and NDS continued to make significant numbers of arrests and weapons seizures. On 4th May 2008, ANP announced the arrest of two foreigners and one Afghan in a Corolla sedan


KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Suicide attacks
- Force escalation shootings
- Abduction threat

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	6
This Report Period	0

who were transporting an unknown quantity of explosives in District 3 of Kandahar City. The suspects confessed that they were planning to construct suicide vests from the explosives and carry out attacks against IMF.

There was also an ongoing hunger protest by prisoners inside Kandahar Jail for one and a half weeks. Approximately 40 prisoners sewed their lips together and decided not to eat unless their demands are met. Some of the prisoners' relatives staged a peaceful demonstration in front of the Jail. ANP deployed and maintained the situation under control. Eventually, a committee consisting of parlia-



mentarian members arrived from Kabul and settled the dispute peacefully between the prisoners and Government.

AOG continued to threaten the security situation by undertaking deadly attacks against ANP posts/convoys as well as targeting several IMF patrols with the employment of IEDs in the province. This trend of AOG attacks is becoming common over the summer as a deliberate strategy to weaken the administrative infrastructure of the GoA.

ZABUL


The district of Shah Joy has consistently been the focal point of AOG activity within this province. There was a joint 24 hour IMF and ANP operation which

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Abduction threat (Hwy 1)
- AOG checkpoints

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	0
This Report Period	0

led to the death of 17 AOG and 3 others arrested. This week AOG continued to assault ANP elements and installations with a mixture of direct attacks and IED strikes in other parts of the province. The overall security situation within Zabul is assessed as unstable and high risk for NGO.



PAKTIKA


There has been no new information regarding the fate of the NGO national staff member who was kidnapped in Urgon District on 3 April 2008. The identity of the perpetrators has also yet to be

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Roadside IED
- Attacks against IMF convoys
- Intimidation against civilians

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	1
This Report Period	0

substantiated. At that time the NGO was contacted by the kidnappers to pay a ransom or release three detainees who had been held by the local Government. This province has been assessed as volatile due to the constant infiltration of AOGs and the ongoing IMF and ANSF operations in various parts of the province. Although no incidents were noted with implications in



regards to aid movements, the NGO community is advised to reconsider the implementation of their aid projects in outlying districts of the centre.

HELMAND

IMF and ANA conducted operations for the past ten days in Garmser District of this province. A large number of casualties were inflicted on the AOG. Several mid-level Taliban commanders were among 22 AOG detained. Approximately 300 hundred fami-


KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Roadside IED
- Suicide attack threat
- Criminal activity/corruption along the main routes

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	0
This Report Period	0

lies were forced to leave the area due to the recent IMF operations into Lashkergah. A demonstration was staged condemning the ongoing IMF operations to avoid civilian casualties and to distinguish between AOG and civilians during operations. The protestors also demanded IMF hand over the operations to ANSF.

Two other separate incidents were occurred involving ISAF shooting civilian vehicles moving too close



to their convoys. As a result, 8 civilians were killed and 3 others were wounded. Given the current prevailing security situation, IMF and Government forces are on a high alert and NGOs are strongly recommended to refrain from overtaking or moving close to any military convoys.

GHAZNI

On 11 May, a convoy transporting engineers from a road construction company was attacked by AOG in Khoshaki area of Ghazni City. The guards escorting the convoy engaged in a fire fight with the assailants which resulted in the death of one engineer and two PSC guards. No casualties were reported to the assailants. The threats of further similar attacks are high probable in the region especially against convoys


KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Roadside IED
- Attacks against ANP
- Abduction threat

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	0
This Report Period	0

utilizing armed protection. It has been assessed that AOG rules of engagement specifically allow attacks on any armed convoys regardless of its purpose or composition.

The total number of AOG incidents sharply increased within the past two week period compared to the past reporting period which can be attributed to the onset of warm weather. Of note were the closure and an armed attack against two different local schools in Ander District of this province. A local school was warned and closed due to a number of threats made by AOGs. At the same dis-



trict, another school was attacked by two motorcyclists who killed a student. In addition, occurrences of IEDs, abductions and targeting of ANP/IMF continued to occur at a very high scale across the province. The NGO community is strongly advised to consider limiting all aid activities to the District Centre.

NOTICE: Your input is invaluable for the production of this report. While we appreciate information on incidents, we also need general information on the security situation in your area. So please remember to call or email us regularly. Contact details of ANSO staff are provide on the last page.

ANSO: “..by NGOs for NGOs..”

FARYAB

Faryab Province remained calm during this reporting period but overall incident volumes have steadily increased with a number of AOG associated IED discoveries.


Whilst the majority of incidents occurred in the Northern districts (bordering Jawzjan), information

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Factional tensions
- Crime, primarily road robbery

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	0
This Report Period	0

indicates that the situation along the Western border region will decline drastically. In Teznawa village of Ghormach (Badghis), ANSF/IMF engaged a group of AOG, killing two (including a suspected mid-level commander) and injuring one. Immediately after this incident, reportedly, 200 Taliban fighters assembled in Jari Sia, Langari and Tiznawa areas intending to engage national and international security forces moving into the area.



Therefore due to the increased national and international security presence and the high probability of conflict ANSO advises NGOs to temporarily suspend operations in Qaisar and Almar Districts of Faryab Province.

JAWZJAN


The general security situation has been relatively calm and stable with no significant incidents reported, however general crime, road robberies and murder remains prevalent in the region. The previously reported Tashkil reduction within Jawzjan will be

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Escalating crime rates
- Embolden ACG activity

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	4
This Report Period	0

further exacerbated by MoI instructions ordering the sacking/suspension of officers who have not completed reform courses. There are more than 130 police officers in Jawzjan who have not been reinstated through the reform so a further reduction of Jawzjan ANP is imminent. This initiative will likely affect the ANP's capabilities in Jawzjan and



therefore a spike in criminal activity in this area is probable. The increase will likely be born from increased freedom of ACG movement and the swelling ACG numbers due to potential recruitment of former officers.

SAMANGAN

The security situation has remained calm with a single significant incident reported this analytical period.


An INGO (administering micro finance projects) site office was set on fire by unknown individuals. Subsequent investigations identified that two rooms were significantly damaged in the blaze.

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Crime
- Increasing AOG activity

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	0
This Report Period	1

This incident marks the first direct NGO event within the Province this year. Although this attack may have been a criminally motivated, it is not clear at this point, and political motives cannot be discounted. There have been some reports of anti western proselytising (primarily at religious gatherings) within the region. In addition a majority of people have vented frustration denoting the lack of response from the government and international actors to alleviate ongoing drought effects.



Villagers believe that the government and the international community provide vast monies in insecure areas like Helmand and Kandahar and peaceful regions, such as Samangan, are forgotten. Regardless of whether this is fact or perception, dissatisfaction in the region is perceived to be on the rise.

BALKH

Balkh Province remains calm with minimal incidents reported. A number of successful arrest operations however have been witnessed in the province and have resulted in some poignant seizures and informational obtained.

Of particular importance was the arrest executed by Sholgara security organs in Jari Sayedan village.


KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Crime
- Drug related activity.

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	3
This Report Period	0

The arrestee, detained in connection to the recent rocket attack on Be Be Zainab School, stated that he had targeted the establishment in return for 500 USD. The suspect's admittance that he was acting as proxy (whilst unsubstantiated) adds credence to the theory that local ACG carry out political attacks for profit on behalf of AOG and or regional political actors.

Further continuing this trend of successful ANSF arrests was the apprehension of two suicide



bombers (VBIED) in Balkh District. Whilst this event marks the first VBIED discovery since the beginning to the year further information surround the event remains minimal and will be forthcoming in future reporting.

UPCOMING SECURITY TRAINING AT ANSO

The following NGO security related courses will be offered at ANSO in May and June by the [Centre for Safety and Development \(CSD\)](#) and the [Armadillo Group](#).

May 26-28: Basic Safety and Security course (by CSD)

May 27-29: Security Management Country Level Course (by CSD)

June 1-2: Field First Aid (by Armadillo)

June 3-5: Personal Security & Safety (by Armadillo)

June 8- 12: Management of Security & Crisis Management Training (by Armadillo)

For more information on these courses, please contact CSD and Armadillo directly:
NGOs are encouraged to register early if interested as places are limited to ensure quality of learning .

Centre for Safety and Development

www.centreforsafety.org

Email: esther@centreforsafety.org

The Armadillo Group

www.armadillo-group.co.uk

Email: steve@armadillo-group.co.uk



ANSO is hosted by
[Deutsche Welthungerhilfe](#)

To Register with ANSO
contact:
operations2@afgnso.org

ANSO is managed by an NGO
Board. If you have any
feedback, good or bad, let
them know on:
ansoab@yahoo.com

ANSO ACRONYMS

IMF-International Military Forces / AOG-Armed Opposition Groups / GOA-Government of Afghanistan / ACG-Armed Criminal Groups / ANA-Afghan National Army / ANP-Afghan National Police / IED-Improvised Exploding Device / AEF-Afghan Eradication Forces / RPG-Rocket Propelled Grenade / IDF-Indirect Fire (ex: mortars) / VBIED-Vehicle Borne Improvised Exploding Device / PRP-Previous Reporting Period / ANBP-Afghan National Border Police / SAF-Small Arms Fire / NDS-National Directorate of Security (intelligence) / PSC-Private Security Company / DC-District Centre

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MISSING

This report ANSO could not provide analysis for the provinces of:

- SAR-E-PUL
- BAGHLAN
- KUNDUZ
- TAKHAR
- BADAKH-SHAN
- NIMROZ
- URUZGAN

This is because we do not know enough about the area to comment on the significance of the incidents.

If you can help us understand the province better please contact us.

ANNOUNCEMENT

UPCOMING SECURITY TRAINING AT ANSO

The **Centre for Safety and Development (CSD)** and the **Armadillo Group** will be conducting various NGO security related courses at ANSO in May and June.

Please see page 12 for more details

NGOs are encouraged to register early if interested as places are limited to ensure quality of learning .