

THE ANSO REPORT

*ANSO and our donors accept no liability for the results of any activity conducted or omitted on the basis of this report.
-Not for copy or sale-*

Inside this Issue

Central Region	2
Southern Region	5
Eastern Region	8
Western Region	10
Northern Region	12
ANSO Info Page	14

YOU NEED TO KNOW

- Record number of AOG attacks recorded this month.
- Attacks continue against NGOs in Khost Province.
- High abduction risk and AOG actions in Ghazni
- Ongoing threat to NSP staff in the south and southeast of the country.

ANSO is supported by

EUROPEAN COMMISSION



Humanitarian Aid



Schweizerische Eidgenossenschaft
Confédération suisse
Confederazione Svizzera
Confederaziun svizra

Swiss Agency for Development
and Cooperation SDC



NORWEGIAN MINISTRY
OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS


COUNTRY SUMMARY

A record number of AOG initiated attacks were reported in May (the highest on record).


Factors contributing to this include: surging AOG activity in Ghazni, Paktika, Zabul and Kandahar City in the south; the escalation in fighting in Kunar in the east; and substantial increases in AOG activity in Logar and Wardak in the Central Region.

Although AOG attacks are at a record high, information received during this reporting period suggest that worse is still to come. The peace agreement in Pakistan has now freed-up hundreds of Taliban fighters and some Taliban commanders have already publicly stated their intent to focus on Afghanistan.

Most provinces bordering Pakistan are already seeing high infiltration rates and the effects of this AOG migration will no doubt drive AOG attack rates to new record heights in the coming months.



NGO DATA & TRENDS



This graph shows the number and percentage of NGO incidents by Region to date. It demonstrates clearly that NGOs are affected relatively equally in every region.

KABUL

So far this year, the number of total AOG incidents in Kabul province is more than double that of the first five months of last year, with Kabul city overwhelmingly the locus. We anticipate a steep increase in security incidents in the coming month.

The general threat level is up, especially in Kabul city. This is reflected primarily by the anticipated climb in incidents. Reports of planned AOG attacks against westerners, police, and security forces occurred, but threat traffic

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS


- Attacks against high profile targets
- IED and rocket attacks
- Suicide attacks against military

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	4
This Report Period	0

itself was low, and most reports seemed to be a recirculation of previous warnings rather than new threats.

Notably, in May there were two suicide attacks (one vehicle-borne, one body-borne) targeting international military forces. These are the first suicide attacks we have recorded in the city since December, and the threat of such attacks is likely to remain in the coming months.

The trend in Kabul continues to suggest that military forces are the primary target, and NGO, thus far, are not directly threatened. That said, there are unresolved cases in which NGO have been visited by people claiming to work



for the government and asking questions about international staff. (These are separate from known Afghan government visits.) Unless more information becomes available, these incidents will remain suspicious and may evidence plans to target NGO in the future.

KAPISA

Intensive military and police operations in April may have helped reduce the AOG presence in Kapisa this month, as security incidents were down in May compared to March and April.

Given Kapisa's strategic importance as an AOG staging area for attacks in Kabul, the current lull is likely temporary.


KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Attacks, especially in Tagab and Nijrab
- Spread of attacks to schools

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	1
This Report Period	1

Nijrab and especially Tagab districts have the highest AOG presence and consequently are the main battle areas for AOG and security forces. These districts should be considered unsafe for NGO operations. NGO working in Mahmud Raqi report no notable security problems, and that district appears relatively safe for NGO activity.

The only direct NGO threat so far this year occurred during this reporting period. An INGO working in Kohistan received a



night letter warning them to stop operations. Though a definitive source has not been identified, this appears to have been the work of someone with personal grievance rather than an AOG-related threat.

NOTICE: Your input is invaluable for the production of this report. While we appreciate information on incidents, we also need general information on the security situation in your area. So please remember to call or email us regularly.

PARWAN


Parwan maintains its typical standing as the safest of Kabul's central region border provinces. However the past month saw AOG activity in the districts of Chaharikar, Siagard, Salang, and especially Ghorban. While incidents are up compared to last year, the threat

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Security and poppy eradication operations in Kohi Safi
- AOG presence in Ghorban

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	2
This Report Period	0

to NGO operations in Parwan can still be considered low. Ghorban warrants extra caution due to this month's incident spike. Kohi Safi, given its border with the troubled Surobi district in Kabul Province and Tagab district in Kapisa, is another area that has the potential for problems. However, for the few NGO that do have operations in Kohi Safi, any current threat is indirect, as the



likely targets will be military/police forces conducting security and poppy eradication operations in the area.

BAMYAN


Bamyan has not experienced any notable AOG activity since March when a PRT and international military vehicle were struck by IEDs. Last week the discovery of land mines in Bamyan District was reported. But these are likely

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Armed robbery along roadways

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	1
This Report Period	0

old ordinances uncovered during de-mining operations in the area. Criminal incidents are relatively high in the province. Though these typically pose little threat to NGO, armed highway robbery is a concern. ANSO-recorded robberies since January are up compared to last year. By the end of May 2007 we had only one recorded armed highway robbery. So far in 2008, we have recorded



six incidents, only one of which has occurred in the last month.

DAYKUNDI


Information from Daykundi remains extremely limited. Last week, there were reports of planned Taliban attacks in Nili.

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- AOG infiltration in Kiti, Gizrab, and Kajran
- Low security force presence

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	0
This Report Period	0

But these appear to have been erroneous. Until additional information is available we believe our previous assessment of Daykundi remains valid—i.e the northern part of Daykundi Province is believed to be safe and the south (Kiti, Gizrab, and Kajran) unstable.



LOGAR

AOG incidents in Logar this year began with two in January, dipped to one in February, then climbed steeply over the next three months to around 20 in May. This pattern virtually mirrors the same time last year, though with incidents up roughly 140% in March, 60% in April, and 12% in May compared to last year.


KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Collateral damage from attacks on security forces/police
- Abduction

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	2
This Report Period	0

The declining percentage of increase each month compared to last year is a promising trend that will hopefully continue. Even so, June will likely see an increase in incidents over this month.

Two threats currently stand out as possible problems. One is a report (unconfirmed) that AOG are planning to take over the District Centre in Kerwan (southwest Logar) in the near future. The other is the ultimate reaction to the killing of a mullah during military operations by international forces, which occurred on 26



May. Either threat could destabilize Logar even further and increase the risk for NGO operations. This particular danger diminishes quickly with time, and it is promising that as of this writing we have heard of no violent incidents related to either threat.

WARDAK

As expected AOG incidents climbed in May, more than doubling the number of incidents in April. The incident types are a mixed bag of IED, small arms, and rocket attacks typically directed at military and police forces during travel.


KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Steep increase in AOG incidents
- Collateral damage from AOG attacks and clashes with security forces

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	0
This Report Period	0


With the exception of the west/northwest districts of Markazi Bihsud and Hisa-i-awali, almost entire province has recently been impacted by AOG activity, especially in the eastern areas of Nirk, Maydan Shah, and Sayadabad.

Last month, with the emergence of threats against schools and NSP projects, groups outside of the usual security targets appeared to face increase risk of becoming AOG targets. There has been no further evidence of such threats recently. While the reason for this is not known, it is likely that AOG



still pose a significant threat to activities of their choosing. So while NGO have not been targeted, the AOG presence coupled with the potential for collateral damage from frequent AOG-security force clashes makes Wardak extremely risky for NGO operations, and the level of risk is anticipated to increase in the coming months.

CENTRAL REGION NGO DIRECT INCIDENTS 2008



KANDAHAR


Recent reports indicate that increased numbers of AOG are migrating into multiple districts of Kandahar with the intent of carrying out offensive operations against national and international military forces. The most compelling of these reports suggest that a group is intent on carrying out direct actions within Kandahar City itself. While the veracity of this report cannot be confirmed, regular attacks against ANP units stationed within the city, frequent suicide attacks, as well as IED trend analysis indicates that AOG elements insitu already enjoy a significant level of freedom of movement and action. IED placement patterns from across the province indicate that an estimated 30% of all IED related in-

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- IED within Kandahar city limits
- Abduction threat
- Increase migration of AOG

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	6
This Report Period	0

cidents (to include successful detonation, premature, and prevented) reported from within Kandahar Province occur within Kandahar City limits. This figure is compelling and clearly indicates that AOG elements not only freely exercise a considerable level of freedom of action (likely borne out of a sense of security), but also suggests some level of support from the local population, though this may be less complicit than it appears and instead a result of intimidation and fear of reprisal. While the primary targets of these devices remain security forces and GoA installations and personnel, the prevalence of this threat suggest it does pose some form of risk to NGO staff, though further analysis is required to understand how this may affect activities and what mitigation strategies are available.



Along with this, criminality continues to be an issue affecting the security within Kandahar City with three separate incidents of armed robbery during this reporting period. The prevalence of this issue has not gone unnoticed by the populace with dissatisfaction culminating in a peaceful demonstration on the 25th of May. A large group of local shopkeepers gathered to protest the levels of serious crime in the city and demanded resolution from the local government and security forces. Though no NGO have been affected by this threat as of yet, they nonetheless need to be cognizant of crime and their vulnerabilities to it and continue to implement policies and procedures designed to limit staff risk levels.

ZABUL


Unlike other provinces within the SR, Zabul AOG activity trends continue to be reported at levels well below those from 2007. The past two months have accounted for an average 50% decrease over last years monthly totals for AOG initiated events, something that can be at least partially attributed to force migration to neighbouring Ghazni and attrition resulting from previous security force operations. In addition, the AOG

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Abduction threat along Hwy 1
- AOG checkpoints
- Roadside IED

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	0
This Report Period	0

operational tempo in Zabul peaked in May of last year with 2008 developing in similar fashion. This month reports the highest incident levels for the year thus far, though still below those reported from 2007. Though Zabul has been mostly unaffected by the widespread increase in volatility region wide, at present it is too early to assess how the situation will develop in the mid to long term. Incident composition continues relatively unchanged this reporting period with roadside IED, small scale ambushes against security forces, and intimidation measures taken against the local



population dominating reporting. The overall security situation within Zabul is assessed as volatile and as such is considered high risk for NGO activities.

HELMAND

While the overall suicide attack trends are down country wide this year, Helmand remains one province unaffected by this reality. As witnessed last year, AOG elements within Helmand continue to utilise body borne suicide attacks with a singular regularity and intent, with a specific focus on targeting GoA and security elements within Lashkar Gah (thus far accounting for half of all incidents reported alone). By end-May this year, a full 63% of 2007 totals (totals to include successful, premature, and prevented detona-


KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Ongoing military operations in Garmser
- Increased suicide attack threat
- Roadside IED threat

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	0
This Report Period	0

tions) has already been reached. With recent reporting indicating that further suicide assets have been deployed to the SR (with a high probability many deploying to Helmand), as well as the fact that monthly incident volumes are averaging 55% higher over those reported last year, it is likely that Helmand will continue to be an aberration and suicide attack levels will continue unabated, meeting or surpassing 2007 figures. NGO are advised to continue minimising their exposure to this threat by limiting their presence at, or in the vicinity of, security and governance facilities.

The military operations in Garmser are an ongoing issue affecting provincial wide stability. The displacement of the local civil popula-



tion as a result of the regular clashes between the opposing forces, along with discontent over civilian casualties, has resulted in one demonstration thus far, an event that will likely recur as no short to mid term conclusion to these operations appears likely at present. NGO are advised to cease all activities and movements within this district.

Helmand is assessed as volatile and unstable and as such is considered high risk for NGO activities.

PAKTIKA

There have been no updates regarding the fate of the INGO staff member kidnapped on the 3rd of April in the Urgon District. While the NGO had been previously contacted by the AOG responsible and their demands were outlined, the negotiations are presently ongoing.

Though AOG activity levels during the opening months of 2008


KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- IED attacks against security forces
- Abduction threat
- Attacks against IMF convoys

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	1
This Report Period	0

were well below those reported from 2007, since April AOG initiated events have been 40-45% higher per month when compared to the previous year.

AOG elements continue attempts to influence the local population through acts of intimidation, with three separate incidents occurring during this reporting period which included the execution of a private construction company employee, a case of arson against a school, and the discovery of 2 executed ANP officers who had previously been abducted. As with other AOG activities within this province, these occurrences



are widespread, with the incidents being reported from three separate districts, suggesting that the AOG presence continues to be diffuse with no significant concentration points, something previously identified in 2007 trend analysis

The security situation is assessed as volatile and as such is considered high risk for NGO activities.

GHAZNI


The steady and dramatic upsurge in AOG activity within this province that began in the opening weeks of May continued this reporting period. Ghazni has eclipsed other provinces with well established levels of volatility (such as neighbouring Zabul), marking an estimated 45% increase in incidents in comparison between April and May. While this can be partially attributed to the opening of the summer “campaign season” it is also in line with established AOG migration patterns, specifically the shift of operational focus to areas viewed as more permissive for their activities due to limited security force presence allowing for greater freedom of action. The reporting of two abduction incidents, as well as the temporary occupation and subsequent destruction of a District Centre, are clear indicators of an established AOG presence and intent.

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Kidnapping/abduction threat (primarily along Hwy 1)
- Attacks on District Centers
- Ongoing security force operations

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	1
This Report Period	1


The abduction incident on the 29th of May of two national INGO staff members in the Ghazni District (along with a local leader) during a planned meeting at a project location marks the first NGO related security incident reported for 2008. While 2007 noted multiple NGO related kidnapping incidents (primarily along Hwy 1), the primary targets of this activity within 2008 have been GoA associated personnel. The seamless execution of this incident indicates that there is an increasing level of sophistication and professionalism of AOG elements engaging in this activity, as well as “tactic migration” within the SR as aspects of this incident mirror similar NGO incidents in Kandahar. The segregation and identification of persons of interest through on site “tactical questioning”, as well as the reality that the staff affected has been under prior observation and targeting for a period of time prior to being kidnapped support this conclusion. The abduction of French national (identified as the owner of a private construction company) also on the 29th of



May, further highlights the pervasiveness of this threat within Ghazni at present and indicates a singular intent to identify relevant individuals for kidnapping/abduction.

This incident also furthers the previous assessment that NGO staff (especially those with NSP links) are now considered viable targets by AOG elements within the SR, a reality that should be factored into NGO activity planning. NGO are advised to restrict road movements along Hwy 1 within the SR. If road movements are to be undertaken, previously advised threat mitigation strategies (sterilisation of staff, cover story, etc) should continue to be observed and strictly implemented. As well, if staff suspect they are under observation, appropriate security focal points/agencies should be notified and activity patterns and plans altered or ceased in order to disrupt the kidnappers planning cycle. The security situation within Ghazni is assessed as volatile and unstable and as such is considered high risk for NGO activities.

SOUTH REGION DIRECT NGO INCIDENTS



NANGARHAR

Demonstrations continue to be an issue within this province, with 4 separate occurrences during this reporting period. However, local governance recognisance of this issue has resulted in effective security force response, both prior to and during, and as of yet there have been no relapses to the violent, destructive protests seen in previous years. 3 of these protests occurred in Jalalabad City with the 4th occurring in the District of Achin. The reasons behind these protests are diverse but include: student dissatisfaction over government policies affecting the university; local reaction to IMF actions (i.e. detention of suspected AOG); and the ongoing issue involving the abduction of a local parliamentarians family members and their frustration with local


KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Suicide attacks against GOA
- Demonstration in Jalalabad
- AOGs in southeast districts

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	1
This Report Period	0

governance/security force response. This last issue resulted in the largest demonstration (an estimated 3500 people) and illustrates the impact they can have on NGO activities. As previously mentioned, effective local security force response has limited the destabilising effects of violent protest, though peaceful demonstrations nonetheless cause restrictions to NGO freedom of movement. Cessation of movement (particularly in built up areas) during demonstrations remains the most prudent, and effective, threat mitigation measure and continued observation of this is recommended as the possibility of violent escalation always exists during any demonstration.

Following military operations in the Achin and Shinwar Districts by national and international military forces, AOG distributed a number of night letters. The letters warned against the local community cooperating with GoA and



security forces as well as informing those identified as IMF “spies” that they will face dire consequences. These letters also invited the local population to join the conflict against the current government and IMF and support AOG forces. These distributions mark the 4th and 5th reported occurrence within this province since the 16th of February, affecting a total of 4 districts. As of yet there have been no indicators or reports suggesting that AOG elements have conducted any follow up to the threats outlined in the letters, and as of yet there have been no specific mention of NGO activities or staff. Having said this, the developments in Khost regarding night letters and attacks on NGO facilities are provocative and the possibility of tactic migration to other areas (i.e. Nangarhar) is possible.

NURISTAN

On the 26th of May a staff member of a construction company working on road rehabilitation was abducted in the Kamdesh District. This incident has been attributed to AOG and marks the second such abduction reported in this province for 2008. The previous incident was also reported from the Kamdesh District, and similarly involved staff


KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Clashes in east districts
- High threat to non-local staff
- High criminal threat in western

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	1
This Report Period	0

of a road construction company, though in this event all 4 of the abducted staff were subsequently executed by their captures on the 30th of January. While there is little detail regarding this recent abduction, this sole precedent suggests that a positive outcome is unlikely and that these abductions are occurring for activity disruption and intimidation purposes.

Recent reports indicate that AOG elements are expanding and increasing their activities within this province, and the low number shown in the graph on the right




are likely due to a lack of reporting (to ANSO) in the area, not from a lack of activity. As seen in other provinces, the advent of the summer months suggest the possibility of increased actions.

KHOST

There have been three separate security incidents involving NGO facilities reported this year, with the latest one occurring on the 27th of May in Khost District which affected an INGO health clinic. All of these incidents have involved the destruction of NGO structures (the immediate goal of these attacks), though AOG elements have demonstrated a level of restraint in that no staff have been harmed thus far. While the two previous incidents were NSP related, this recent event involving a health facility suggests that AOG elements within this province (who have already clearly demonstrated a willingness to directly target NGO activities) are expanding their targeting scope. In addition, the geographic dispersion of these events (3 separate

incidents, 3 different districts) also suggests a level of AOG command cohesion and some level of definition to their operational goals for this province. AOG elements appear willing to accept the negative local repercussions from the disruption of NGO programs in order to further perceptions of insecurity.

Related to this, these attacks have been preceded by the distribution of night letters (the latest of which was distributed on the 14th of May), though these have been relatively generic in content, warning the local population against supporting the GoA and working with national and international security forces. This suggests that NGO need to take the appearance of night letters seriously and consider them as a probable precursor to AOG action and adapt their security posture accordingly. It is highly recommended that NGO advise their staff to report ANY threats (in whatever form




they may take) to senior management (as well as ANSO) and to maintain local situational awareness. An evaluation of compound security measures would also be prudent. This evaluation should include the identification and exercise of clearly defined escape plans and routes. As most of these attacks occur outside regular operating hours, all night staff should be briefed and advised accordingly.

Khost has consistently reported the second highest level of AOG initiated attacks within the ER during 2008, though this incident volume fell by 27% this month in comparison to those reported in April. Taking into consideration the opening of the summer “campaign season”, incident volumes are unlikely to decrease any further, rather they will begin to steadily increase through to a peak in July as seen in 2007.

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Attacks on NGO facilities (particularly in the border region)
- IED along main routes

EAST REGION NGO DIRECT INCIDENTS 2008



KUNAR

Kunar has consistently been the most volatile province within the ER, accounting for an average 40% of all AOG initiated attacks reported in the region during 2008, a trend that is in line with AOG activity patterns from 2007. The steady downwards trend of AOG activity witnessed during the past 3 months has ceased, with May marking an definitive upswing, accounting for an estimated 40% increase in AOG initiated attacks. This deterioration is likely to continue, with reports


KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Pech, Chawkey and Sirkanay
- Indirect fire to Asadabad City
- Demonstrations re: Hazrat Ali

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	2
This Report Period	0

indicating ongoing infiltration of AOG elements intent on conducting attacks on security forces, specifically focused on engaging ANBP installations in the border regions. The Districts of Dara-I-Pech and Sirkanay continue to be particularly volatile, these areas being ongoing focal points for clashes between AOG and security forces.

Along with regular attacks against security forces, AOG elements in this province have also been engaging in regular intimidation activities, apparently with the intent on disrupting local support for the GoA as well as asserting their authority. Two abduction incidents during this reporting period di-



rectly attributed to AOG highlight this threat, one being of a local leader in Sirkanay (ironically following a tribal leadership meeting pledging to deny support to AOG), and the second involving the abduction of 5 local residents following a funeral in Wata Pur. In addition, on the 22nd of May in the Godar area of the Pech Valley, a group of AOG established a temporary mobile check point. While manning this checkpoint, AOG physically assaulted several motorists and pedestrians over the length of their beards.

GHOR


As with a number of other towns in Afghanistan, Chaghcharan saw a large demonstration, which had its impetus, not in Afghanistan, but in Iraq. A US Soldier serving in Iraq

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Tribal tensions
- Crime
- AOG activities increase

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	0
This Report Period	0

with coalition forces, who used the Holy Qu-Ran for target practice, sparked the demonstration. Four people died as a result. Such events can crop up, often with little warning. After the demonstration, ANP patrolled the streets and as a result, were able to restore and maintain calm. Other than this incident, Ghor Province saw very few incidents over the reporting period.



BADGHIS


After ANA operations in Badghis came to a close, the province fell relatively quiet. There have been no major incidents or indeed any substantial sightings of AOG

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- AOG presence in the north
- Illegal road blocks
- Armed clashes

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	0
This Report Period	0

movement. This may be due to a tactical withdrawal by AOG from the area after confronting the ANA/ISAF. AOG activity should still be expected in the northern region of Badghis as the opium season progresses. Activities which could affect NGO are likely to be illegal checkpoints



along the roads systems. Encounters with smugglers are also likely, particularly in the Murghab & Ghormach districts.

HERAT

As in previous reports, Herat Province continues to see an escalation in predominantly criminal based activities. It was previously assessed that there would be a greater visibility in narcotic trafficking, which in fact has turned out to be the case. More and more Opium has been seized over the reporting period compared to recent months in Herat; indicating

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS


- ACG activities to increase
- Serious abduction risk
- Increasing AOG activity

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	5
This Report Period	0

that the harvest season and associated trafficking activities are increasing.

Coupled with this increase in opium related activities, is the discovery of large quantities of weapons and ammunition. The quantity of items within the cache could have a bearing on the amount of opium being traded for weapons, ammunition, equipment and capital.

It can be expected, that Herat Province will see more related activities into the summer



months. This will allow AOG commanders to conduct operations more effectively with rear echelon supplies being well developed. ANP operations have been successful in the recent discovery of caches containing, opium, weapons and ammunition in 'occupied houses' and or in registered motor vehicles in and around Herat; yet there seems to be a substantial lack of arrests relating to these discoveries.

FARAH


AOG armed attacks led the main incidents in Farah Province during this reporting period. This form of activity is predominantly conducted by AOG units operating along the Herat-Kandahar ring road. Coupled with armed attacks,

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS


- Abduction along the Ring Road.
- AOG activities increasing
- Increased use of IED

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	3
This Report Period	1

is the high number of kidnappings along the very same road. Farah is also seeing an increase in the use of suicide bombings and roadside IED. Kidnap for ransom remains of high-risk to NGOs, particularly along the Herat-Kandahar ring road and along the road from Farah City to Delaram. It is envisaged, based on current trends, that the activities above will remain a constant threat to NGO opera-



tions for the mid to long term. Farah remains the main hot spot for the Western Region and is classified as a high-risk area



FARYAB

Faryab remained calm overall in spite of sporadic AOG and IMF/ANSF operations continuing across the province. Some AOG have reportedly migrated deeper into western provinces (Ghor and Farah). These groups may return to the area as security forces shift focus to other locations in the NR over time. The security situation surrounding the Qaisar border (Ghormach District, Badghis


KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Factional tensions
- Crime, primarily road robbery

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	0
This Report Period	0

Province) areas continues to fluctuate with an increase in AOG associated incidents reported in recent days.

Factional issues flared up again during this period. The leader of the Azadi Party and some sympathisers apparently conducted illegal searches of residents in Ghunad Sang Village (believed to associated with the commander the Junbesh Party) and allegedly seized a number of weapons. In reaction to this event, the Faryab peace and reconciliation association (whom the majority of mem-



bers maintain long term Junbesh affiliation) requested that security organs take stern action to prevent a return to factional violence, which this event suggests is probable. Therefore caution is advised when operating within Alamr, Qaisar and Pashtun Kot districts.

TAKHAR


The overall security situation was calm but one significant incidents reported. A hand grenade was hurled inside an International Organization (IO) in Khwaja-e-Ghar District. The explosion resulted in

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Increasing AOG activity

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	2
This Report Period	0

a night security guard being slightly injured. Initial reports suggest that this was an AOG attack, but this has not yet been confirmed. Although the motive for this attack is not yet clear, it is safe to assume that there is an increase risk to IOs and NGOs at the moment.



KUNDUZ


ANSF, IMF and Private sector (communication towers) remained the favored targets for AOG associated elements in and around Kunduz. Examples include the

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Escalating AOG activity
- Risk of IED related incidents

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	1
This Report Period	0

complex attack on an ANP check post which resulting in two ANP members being killed and an attack upon an AREEBA communication tower resulting in slight damage in Qala-e-Zal District. Extreme caution should be exercised within Khan Abad, Ali Abad, Char Dara and Kunduz districts.



BALKH


Balkh remains calm but acts of crime continue to be reported regularly. Home invasion and general theft continue to be a significant issue, particularly in Mazar-e-Sharif and surrounding areas. The

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Crime
- Drug related activity.

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	3
This Report Period	0

ongoing drought will likely make matters worse and lead to an escalation in criminality in the Northern Region in the coming weeks and months. This will probably be most evident in areas such as Balkh and more specifically Mazar-e-Sharif. These regional centres will probably also see an influx of people in search of food as



food stores become depleted over the course of the summer.

BADAKSHAN

Badakshan Province remains calm with no significant incident reported this period.


AOG attacks targeting GoA establishment continue with some regularity and are increasing

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS


- Escalating AOG activity
- Possibility more demonstration
- Elevated threat of IED/ rocket

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	3
This Report Period	0

gradually (as can be seen on the graph on the right). Local clash / dispute are still common and are often associated with local militias involved in drug smuggling. The possibilities of further demonstration still exist due to the recent religious insult by IMF members in Iraq. Recent demonstrations have ended peacefully.



NORTH REGION DIRECT NGO INCIDENTS 2008





ANSO is hosted by
[Deutsche Welthungerhilfe](#)

To Register with ANSO
contact:
operations2@afgnso.org

ANSO is managed by an NGO
Board. If you have any
feedback, good or bad, let
them know on:
ansoab@yahoo.com

ANSO ACRONYMS

IMF-International Military Forces / AOG-Armed Opposition Groups / GOA-Government of Afghanistan / ACG-Armed Criminal Groups / ANA-Afghan National Army / ANP-Afghan National Police / IED-Improvised Exploding Device / AEF-Afghan Eradication Forces / RPG-Rocket Propelled Grenade / IDF-Indirect Fire (ex: mortars) / VBIED-Vehicle Borne Improvised Exploding Device / PRP-Previous Reporting Period / ANBP-Afghan National Border Police / SAF-Small Arms Fire / NDS-National Directorate of Security (intelligence) / PSC-Private Security Company / DC-District Centre

CONTACT ANSO

CENTRAL REGION OFFICE (KABUL)

Blake Kehler - central@afgnso.org - 0799 323 792
Hedayatullah - central2@afgnso.org - 0799 322 116

NORTH REGION OFFICE (MAZAR)

Mathew Russell - north@afgnso.org - 0799 404 617
Firoz Fahez - north2@afgnso.org - 0799 408 252

EAST REGION OFFICE (JALALABAD)

John Binns - east@afgnso.org - 0799 248 362
Khisrow Shohar - east2@afgnso.org - 0798 778 014

SOUTH REGION OFFICE (KANDAHAR)

Nathan Ronaldson - south@afgnso.org - 0797 414 100
Mohammadl - south2@afgnso.org - 0700 300 730

WEST REGION OFFICE (HERAT)

Russel Hutchings - west@afgnso.org - 0799 322 192
Najma Fazly - west2@afgnso.org - 0700 540 225

COUNTRY MANAGEMENT (KABUL)

Nic Lee - director@afgnso.org - 0799 325 349
Sebastien Hogan - operations@afgnso.org - 0797 165 017
Chona Bollos - administration@afgnso.org - 0797 093 073

MISSING

This report ANSO could not provide analysis for the provinces of:

PANJSHIR
PAKTYA
JAWZJAN
SAR-E-PUL
SAMANGAN
BAGHLAN
URUZGAN
NIMROZ

This is because we do not know enough about the area to comment on the significance of the incidents.

If you can help us understand the province better please contact us.

UPCOMING SECURITY TRAINING AT ANSO

The following NGO security related courses will be offered at ANSO in June by the [Armadillo Group](#).

June 3-5: Personal Security & Safety

June 8- 12: Management of Security & Crisis Management Training

For more information, please contact Armadillo directly:

The Armadillo Group

www.armadillo-group.co.uk

Email: steve@armadillo-group.co.uk