

THE ANSO REPORT

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YOU NEED TO KNOW

- Taliban conduct spectacular attack in Kandahar resulting in over 1000 prisoners released
- Taliban in control of areas north of Kandahar City
- 5 suicide bomber arrested in Herat
- AOG attacks escalate to records levels again

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COUNTRY SUMMARY

Dominating this report period was the spectacular Taliban attack on June 13 against the main prison in Kandahar that led to the escape of over 1,000 criminals and Taliban members (see pictures on right).


The number of spectacular attacks and the use of highly effective blended suicide / infantry assault teams are increasing country wide. In the past 8 months, armed opposition groups have carried out no less than 4 spectacular attacks including the Serena Hotel and Military Parade attacks in Kabul, the Baghlan Sugar Factory bombing, and the Kandahar prison break noted above.

There is a very high volume of information indicating that more spectacular attacks are planned for Kabul in the short term, and the arrest this week of 5 suicide bombers who were apparently set to attack

hotels and foreign forces in Herat shows that this tactic is now being used country wide.

The increasing frequency of these attacks is concerning but the target of these “spectacular” attacks is more alarming for the NGO community. Unlike most conventional AOG/Taliban attacks that target government and security forces, spectacular attacks are occasionally designed to target the wider international community. The attack against the Serena Hotel, the planned attack against hotels in Herat this week, and public statements made by Taliban spokesmen all support this assessment.

Although not a popular or easy decision, it may be best to limit or restrict visits to popular hotels, restaurants and venues (frequented by the international community) given the high threat level.



KABUL

While the month started with a high profile RCIED attack on an ANA bus in Kabul city, there have been no additional AOG attacks within the city so far in June. The province overall has experienced only four incidents this month. This is actually a slight decrease compared to last year at this time. That said, a spectacular attack is widely expected sometime in the near future, especially in the wake the highly successful

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Complex attacks against high profile targets
- Criminality
- Suicide attacks


prison attack in Kandahar. Unfortunately, as that incident demonstrates, the target will likely be

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	8
This Report Period	4

unpredictable and the timing unexpected.

Crime is a notable issue in the city, and is on the rise. Armed intrusions are a particular concern with several such incidents occurring in local homes in recent weeks. NGO, given the likely presence of guards, have not been affected recently but are still vulnerable.

There were four NGO incidents so far in June. We received one report of a suspected robbery attempt at an INGO guest house in which an unknown man (not believed to be armed) was seen within a compound late at night. There were two reports of suspicious activity that suggested NGO offices or guest houses were being observed (nothing further transpired that indicated intent). Also,



an INGO national staff working in Kabul received a threat letter at his home in Chahar Asyab. The incident was almost certainly personal and does not appear to suggest any AOG focus on NGO.

Taken individually these incidents don't indicate any specific threat. However, the fact that four NGO incidents occurred in Kabul in the course of two weeks does suggest that the profile of NGO is rising, which may make them more susceptible to harassment or more serious incidents.

PARWAN

Parwan security incident levels remain relatively low. AOG are present and do pose a potential threat, but most likely this would be in the form of collateral damage from attacks directed at police or military forces. This was highlighted by a 6 June attack that killed three police who were contracted to guard a micro-credit NGO in Chaharikar. Though not


KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Rocket and IED attacks
- Weapons cache discoveries
- Collateral damage from attacks against security forces

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	2
This Report Period	0

confirmed, it appears that the attack targeted the police and was not part of an attempt to rob the NGO.

Compared to last year, Parwan has seen a considerable increase in the number of weapons and IEDs recovered. So far this year there have been about 20 cases of weapons/IED recovery compared to four for all of last year. In June so far there have been three such discoveries. In addition, while three of last year's four discoveries were in Bagram, this year caches and IED's have been discovered in nearly equal numbers



in Bagram, Chaharikar, and Kohi Safi. This increase in weapons and IED recoveries may be due to improved security measures/increased police operations. Or it may suggest an increased potential for incidents in the province and/or that the province is becoming a more common transport point

KAPISA

AOG incidents appear to be dropping for the second month in a row in Kapisa; so far we have only recorded two incidents in June, compared to nine last month and 12 in April. This is likely due to an intensive military


KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Rockets, IEDs, and mines
- Abduction
- Collateral damage from armed clashes

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	1
This Report Period	1

concentration focused on rooting out AOG that use Kapisa as a staging area for Kabul attacks.

Still, with the exception of Mahmud Raqi, Kapisa Province is risky for NGO operations. Nijrab and especially Tagab should be considered volatile and off limits. The substantial international military operations can also be expected to present a collateral damage threat, most recently evidenced by the death of boy in



Tagab when IMF artillery shells struck a school yard.

LOGAR

The situation in Logar continues to deteriorate with a rash of AOG small arms and IED attacks on police and military vehicles. Threats of attack on Kerwar mentioned in the last ANSO Report have materialized in the form of attacks on the police and district centre. The most hazardous time in the district appears to be at night, though daytime attacks do


KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Abduction
- NGO mentioned in night letter
- Collateral involvement in attacks against security force

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	2
This Report Period	0

occur. Conflict in Kwarwar has escalated to include international military operations with air support. More attacks on the district centre are expected.

IED use is increasing: Charkh, Kharwar, and Puli Alam have already experienced as many incidents in the first half of the June as the province did for all of May. There were at least three attacks on international military forces and police. There were also two botched IED attacks by AOG and the discovery of an IED by police.



NGO (non-specific) were referenced in a night letter found with the body a local mullah accused of being a spy. While this may indicate AOG have consciously begun to include NGO among enemies, there is no current indication that AOG are targeting NGO in the province.

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Contact details of ANSO staff are provide on the last page.

ANSO: “..by NGOs for NGOs..”

WARDAK

Wardak has a high level of AOG infiltration and is volatile and unstable. May experienced over 30 AOG incidents (after eight in April). So far June is matching May's activity, with 16 incidents recorded in the first two weeks of the month. The most active areas so far this month are Chak, Nirkh, Sayed Abad, and Maydan Sharh.


KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Collateral damage from indirect fire attacks
- Abduction
- Night letter mentioning NGO

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	1
This Report Period	1

In the first two weeks of June there have been five AOG incidents in Maydan Sharh. Maydan Shahr has been considered the only area in Wardak possibly permissible for NGO operations. But attacks on the district centre are becoming more common, and, consequently, that area too may be too risky for NGO operations.

In Maydan Shahr district, night letters threatening local people whose children attend girls' schools were posted on the walls of schools and mosques. The let-



ter mentions that these schools are supported by INGO and promote immorality. In April in Nirkh district letters were distributed warning people not to work with NSP. Such letters may indicate that AOG in Wardak are now counting NGO among enemies or potential targets, but currently there is no additional evidence of NGO targeting in the province.

NIMROZ


While Nimroz is still the least volatile province within the Southern Region (reporting the lowest incident volumes comparatively), it has nonetheless been consistently reporting an estimated 35% increase in yearly incident volume since 2006, with 2008 trending to match, or exceed, this figure. This accounts for one of the highest yearly increases within the SR and can be attributed to the ongoing infiltration, as well as displacement resulting from operations, of AOG elements into the eastern districts (intent on opening the "western front") from neighbouring Helmand.

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Acts of intimidation within Zaranj
- Suicide attacks in Khash Rod
- Abduction threat within isolated areas

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	0
This Report Period	0

The District of Khash Rod continues to be the focal point of AOG activity within this province, accounting for over 40% of all incidents reported province wide in 2007 and 2008. This district also accounts for the majority of significant incidents reported, including suicide attacks (both vehicle and body borne) as well as attacks/ambushes against security forces. AOG elements have also been consistently targeting road construction efforts in this district, with suicide and conventional attacks, intent of disrupting an activity that is viewed from their perspective as pro-governance. These targeting patterns have resulted in a high level of instability along primary and secondary routes (including Hwy1), which directly affects NGO freedom of movement. ANSO SR continues to advise



NGO to utilise alternate means of transport (air travel) to access this province as well as cease all road movements in this district due to the risk of collateral involvement in an incident.

Zaranj (both city and district) consistently accounts for the second highest incident volume reported within the province. These incidents consist primarily of IED and acts of intimidation (i.e. night letters) targeted against ANSF and GoA personnel. While these present a risk of collateral involvement for NGO staff, as of yet there has been no direct targeting of NGO activities. Thus far, Zaranj remains the most permissive environment for NGO operations within the province.


KANDAHAR

The spectacular success of the Kandahar (Sarposi) Prison break by AOG elements on the evening of the 13th of June dominated reporting from Kandahar this period. AOG elements (estimated 30) deployed a coordinated attack utilising an SVBIED (fuel tanker), 2 BBIED's, RPG and SAF. The attack resulted in 15 ANP killed (as well as an unconfirmed number of wounded) as well as the release of an estimated 1000 inmates (both AOG and criminal). The delay in security force response allowed for all those involved to subsequently escape unimpeded, either to areas south of the city, or in the case of most of the escapees, into the city itself. At the same time of this attack there were parallel attacks (RPG) to other security force installations, with the likely intent to delay/disrupt security force response to the primary scene. Reporting also indicated a secondary force was in place (in the southern portion of the city) intent on attacking even more facilities, though the immediate success of their primary goal negated the necessity for these attacks (which may have included further suicide attacks). This incident followed

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	6
This Report Period	0

reporting indicating AOG intent to engage in offensive operations within Kandahar City and supports previous conclusions that AOG elements enjoy, and are willing to exercise, a disturbing level of freedom of movement and action both within, and in the vicinity of, Kandahar City. The entire operation was well planned and coordinated, witnessing the utilisation of multiple attack vectors, a phenomenon more recently (and commonly) seen in the Eastern Region. This attack also indicates that these more sophisticated tactics have migrated into the SR, and considering the dramatic success of this operation, similar types of attacks (against DC's for example) are likely to occur with an increasing regularity. While this attack (and subsequent release) is unlikely to have a short term affect on AOG/ACG activity in the city, there may a mid to long term affect as those remaining in the city eventually begin to reengage in their previous activities, be they AOG or ACG.

In addition to this event, there were also numerous indirect fire attacks (both rocket and RPG) within the city during the past week, marking the introduction of another tactic into the already diverse threat context present within Kandahar City. These attacks, along with regular IED placement and attacks against



ANP elements add a further dimension to the ongoing “pressurisation” of the city and will serve to further increase local perceptions regarding insecurity. While these indirect fire attacks were likely targeted at IMF and local security force installations, the inherent unpredictability of their targeting means that they present a threat to NGO staff and facilities. NGO are advised to review their compound physical security measures, with a specific focus on their bunker facilities.

NGO presently operating within Kandahar City are now facing unprecedented levels of instability. The likelihood of a “wrong place, wrong time” incident (as in an IED strike or indirect fire attack), coupled with an increase in AOG attack sophistication (and willingness to engage within the city) and the ever present kidnapping/abduction threat, means that it has become nearly untenable to mitigate the myriad of threats NGO are presented with. Organisational managers need to take this reality into consideration when planning programming and staff allocation (i.e. international staff), and a thorough (and honest) threat to benefit analysis should be conducted regarding both present and future operations within Kandahar Province.

The security situation within Kandahar is assessed as volatile and unstable and as such is considered high risk for NGO activities.

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Prevailing insecurity surrounding Kandahar City
- IED/suicide attack threat
- Kidnap/abduction threat

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ZABUL

While AOG initiated incidents have been trending below those levels reported in 2007, the overall incident volume is developing in line with those last year. This is unlike other provinces within the SR, most of which are reporting dramatic increases in volumes, though this fact can be partially attributed to a refocus of AOG efforts in neighbouring Ghazni. This week also marked the first occurrences (2 separate incidents) of direct attacks against District Centres by AOG within Zabul. There were 11 separate direct and indirect fire attacks against various DC across the province in 2007.


KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Abduction threat along Hwy 1
- AOG checkpoints
- Attacks against DC

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	0
This Report Period	0

In addition, this week also reported an incident involving an AOG attack against an IMF logistical convoy; both of these types of attacks were regular features in the security landscape in 2007 and will likely continue to be so in 2008. While most attacks against DC occurred during the late night/early morning hours, NGO are still advised to minimise their presence at such facilities in order to mitigate the threat of collateral involvement in an incident. In addition, office locations within the vicinity of DC are also at risk of collateral involvement, so compound location, along with physical security measures should also be reviewed.

Qalat District consistently reports the highest number of incidents from within Zabul, accounting for



almost 40% of total incident volume. While this can partially be attributed to the minimal security force presence in the more isolated, rural districts elsewhere in the province, it also indicates a focused AOG effort to influence the main population centre (Qalat City), primarily with regards to local perceptions on instability and security force/GoA effectiveness.

The security situation within Zabul is assessed as volatile and as such is considered high risk for NGO activities.

URUZGAN


Through the ongoing efforts of security forces within Uruzgan, the city of Tirin Kot (the main population centre) remains the most permissive area for NGO activities. Having said this, the surrounding areas within the District of Tirin Kot remain affected by AOG efforts, primarily through the deployment of IED along primary and secondary routes in the area. It is worth noting that

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- IED along primary and secondary routes
- Attacks against ANP

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	0
This Report Period	0

75% of all incidents reported this year have originated in this district, though this is partially due to the limited reporting structures in the more isolated areas that make up the majority of the province. As well, the Districts of Chora, Dehraud, and Khas Uruzgan remain highly volatile hosting high levels of AOG where engagements between these and security forces are commonplace. Ultimately this leaves Tirin Kot as an island of stability in what is inherently and unstable province. As such, NGO are advised to limit



their activities to the population centre limits in order to limit their exposure to the inherent risks that operating in the out lying areas present.

The security situation within Uruzgan is assessed as volatile and as such is considered high risk for NGO activities.

HELMAND

Incident volumes within Helmand continues to be trending above those reported in previous years, both in regards to AOG initiated events as well as total incident volumes. There was an estimated 20% increase over incident volumes reported between 2006 and 2007; and 2008 will likely exceed this by a significant margin. While the year to year increases can be partially attributed to a steady increase in IMF presence


KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- IMF/ANSF operations
- Suicide attacks within Lashkar Gah
- Roadside IED threat

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	0
This Report Period	0

and operational tempo, it also clearly indicates a willingness (and capacity) of AOG elements insitu to continue engaging in operations against same. At present there are no indicators that this high level of volatility within this province will abate within the mid to long term.

While the city of Lashkar Gah remains the most permissive area within the province for NGO activities, it continues to be plagued by body borne suicide attacks, with the latest foiled attempt (of an individual wearing a burqa attempting to target an



ANSF facility) bringing the total to 5 BBIED related events this year within Lashkar Gah. NGO are advised to continue minimizing their presence in the vicinity of GoA/ANSF facilities (the primary targets of such attacks) in order to mitigate the threat of collateral involvement in a strike.

The security situation within Helmand is assessed as volatile and unstable and as such is considered high risk for NGO activities.

PAKTIKA

While there has been no official confirmation regarding the fate of the NGO national staff member kidnapped on the 3rd of April in the Urgan District, reporting indicates the individual has since been released unharmed (date and location unknown at this time) following the conclusion of negotiations with the AOG responsible.


There were two separate protests

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- IED attacks against security forces
- Security force operations
- Attacks against IMF convoys

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	1
This Report Period	0

(on the 10th in Mata Khan and the 12th in Sharan) protesting the civilian casualties that resulted from an IMF airstrike on the 10th of June. While both of these incidents resolved peacefully, it harkens back to an issue within the SR that consistently resulted in public outcry in 2007. While most of these protests ended peacefully, Paktika has proven a fertile ground for protest, though some cases are likely the result of AOG agitators influencing the local populace (as in the case of pro-



tests against the Danish Cartoons). NGO are advised to cease movements upon notification of such occurrences as the potential for protests to degrade into violence always remains a possibility.

The security situation in Paktika is assessed as volatile and as such is considered high risk for NGO activities.

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GHAZNI


The 2 INGO national staff members kidnapped on the 29th of May 08 were subsequently released unharmed following the conclusion of negotiations. One staff member was released on the 1st of June and the other on the 2nd. At this time there have been no updates regarding the local leader who was also taken in this incident. Information confirms that this kidnapping was perpetrated by AOG with a specific intent on targeting the NGO staff and followed a period of observation and targeting. NGO are advised to strictly observe and implement counter-surveillance protocols in order to mitigate this threat. Early identification of a possible threat is the best method of minimising it and any such indicators should be treated with accordant seriousness. The modification of movement plans, cancellation of meetings, and informing of all staff members (so all maintain the nec-

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	1
This Report Period	0

essary situational awareness) should be considered in such circumstances. In addition, notification of possible observation to the local authorities should also be considered. As seen in other incidents, by presenting oneself as a “hard target” (through the use of sound and effective protocols) an organisation can dissuade possible kidnappers and maintain the safety of their staff.

Regarding the French National abducted on the 29th of May 2008 in the Gelan District, reports indicate that negotiations are presently ongoing.

Related to the incidents above, SR kidnapping trends indicate that Afghan nationals with the professional designation of engineer remain one of the likeliest targets for kidnapping (both criminal and AOG). This is mostly due to their perceived financial value for ransom and the perpetrators do not distinguish between NGO and Non-NGO engineers. NGO need to factor this reality into their mission plans (particularly involving missions to high risk and/or isolated, rural areas) and



conduct a threat to benefit analysis and take team composition into consideration.

Overall incident volumes reported from Ghazni continues to trend upwards following the record volume of events reported last month. AOG initiated events in the first half of June has already surpassed 2007 volumes by 30%, indicating that this upwards trend will continue.


The Districts of Andar, Ghazni, and Qarabagh continue to focus heavily in AOG activity patterns, accounting for 27%, 22%, and 20% of total incident volume respectively.

Ghazni is assessed as volatile and unstable and as such is considered high risk for NGO activities.

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Kidnapping threat (primarily along Hwy 1)
- Steadily Increasing AOG activity level

SOUTH REGION DIRECT NGO INCIDENTS



NANGARHAR

The security situation was relatively stable in Nangarhar over this reporting period. The major event was an SBVIED attack on an IMF convoy that resulted in six IMF casualties near the Torkam bus station on Highway 1 in Jalalabad City. Following the attack a number of unoccupied private vehicles were destroyed by IMF searching for further IEDs. A policeman was also injured after being run over by an IMF vehicle. A week later an unsuccessful SVBIED attack was made on IMF forces on Highway 1 in Muhmand Dar District. These incidents will lead to a hardening of IMF convoy tactics in Nangarhar which will lead to incidents involving innocent local people and to in-


	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	1
This Report Period	1

creased opposition to IMF presence.

An INGO clinic in Nazyan District was “visited” by AOG on 31 May 08. The lone staff member, a nurse, was questioned about the INGO's activities for approximately 20 minutes and released with assurances that he and his clinic would come to no harm. This incident appears to be in keeping with the idea that AOG in Nangarhar have a policy to allow humanitarian aid to proceed as part of their “hearts and minds” campaign. This does not mean that international staff should not use extreme caution when operating in the rural areas; only that NGO local staff for the time being are being allowed to operate. Had the nurse been an international staff member rather than a local the chance of his being kidnapped would have been very high.

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Suicide attacks against GOA
- Demonstration in Jalalabad
- AOGs in southeast districts




AOG “cease fire” agreements with Pakistan have not yet resulted in an increase of AOG offensive activity in the province. Although reports of increased AOG movement into Afghanistan have been received in fact AOG related security incidents have been quite low for this time of year. This could be the result of the AOG being in a “consensus building” phase in Nangarhar where attempts are being made to establish good relations with locals in order to recruit and build safe havens for future operations. Whether this is the quiet before the storm remains to be seen but NGOs are advised to be extremely cautious, particularly in border districts.

NURISTAN

The security situation in Nuristan Province remains unstable. There are continuous reports of large numbers of AOG at large but reporting remains limited due to the thinness of NGOs, GOA and IMF organizations on the ground.

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	1
This Report Period	0

The major event of the period was an attack on the IMF base in Waygal. As is usual with deliberate attacks on IMF bases, and after a fire fight the AOG were driven off by IMF fire or may have simply left after running out of ammunition. At this stage of the conflict it would appear unlikely that AOG expect to overrun an IMF base and an assault with the intent of capturing the base is not part of the plan. The more likely aim is



to reinforce to the local population the ability of AOG to operate and to harass IMF. NGO operations in the rural areas of Nuristan remain highly dangerous.

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Clashes in east districts
- High threat to non-local staff
- Criminal threat in western districts

LAGHMAN

Laghman remains relatively stable. The majority of incidents involve IEDs, the majority of which are discovered before detonation. Two IEDs were located on the road leading to the Alishing DC and IEDs should be expected to be regularly employed on the roads leading to all the DCs in the


KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- IEDs
- More attacks in Qarghayi air field
- Increasing attacks on Highway 1

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	3
This Report Period	0

province. The most serious incident of the period was a successful IED attack on a vehicle belonging to a private security firm outside of the security force air field being constructed in Qarghayi District. This follows a previous lethal attack on a water tanker travelling to this site. More attacks on this base can be expected.

The Qarghayi District Centre and the IMF base in Mitharlam were both the targets of inaccurate



rocket fire and this form of attack continues to be more for harassment than as a serious threat to the target.

KUNAR


The security situation in Kunar Province continues to worsen with Pech, Wata-Pur, Sirkanay and Nari Districts being the scenes of most of the incidents, all of which targeted security forces. During this reporting period 15 direct attacks were reported along with six indirect fire attacks. AOG enthusiasm for attacking security forces is still not matched with skill and security force casualties remain infrequent. Surprisingly

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Increased AOG infiltration and clashes in Pech, Nari, Chawkay and Sirkanay Districts

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	2
This Report Period	0

only two IED incidents were reported. Following the incident of Afghan flags with an improper inscription being inadvertently distributed earlier this spring by a IMF unit in Kunar, reports were received this past week of a Holy Koran being found in the trash at a IMF base in Pech. This resulted in a demonstration that ANP members may have helped instigate. More such incidents, whether simply as the result errors on the part of IMF or deliberately staged by AOG to foment disorder can be expected. Many people in Kunar are predisposed to believe the worst of IMF and the



potential for violent demonstrations is high. Sirkanay District remains the scene of heavy fighting which this week included the killing of at least 11 Pakistani soldiers by IMF during a battle with AOG. The Pakistani forces stationed in the area had previously been accused of assisting AOG and this incident should further poison relations with IMF and GOA in the province.

NOTICE: Your input is invaluable for the production of this report. While we appreciate information on incidents, we also need general information on the security situation in your area. So please remember to call or email us regularly.

Contact details of ANSO staff are provide on the last page.

ANSO: “..by NGOs for NGOs..”

PAKTYA

The security situation in Paktya continues to deteriorate particularly in Zurmat and Swak Districts and around Gardez. In Zurmat IMF were attacked by IEDs on two occasions resulting in numerous casualties. A demonstration on 14 June in Zurmat protesting the killing of civilians in an IMF air strike became violent with as many as 15 people shot by police.


KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- IIEDs on Gardez- Khost road
- Increased attacks on DCs
- Increased intimidation of local population

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	0
This Report Period	0

Swak saw attacks on the police and a private road construction company. The Gardez-Khost road is particularly dangerous and subject to IED employment as well as direct fire attacks on security forces. The IMF base in Gardez was the target of two unsuccessful indirect fire attacks and this can be expected to continue.

AOG in Paktya have so far limited their operations to attacks on GOA, IMF and civilians working for GOA. As has happened in Khost Province the AOG are ca-



pable of changing their policy with regards allowing schools to operate or humanitarian aid to be delivered and NGOs should be aware that the permissive situation for NSPs etc. in Paktya could change quickly.

KHOST

Khost continues to be one of the most active provinces for AOG activity in Afghanistan. An additional concern is that AOG groups there are relatively better coordinated than those found in most other provinces. The majority of attacks remain IEDs targeting security forces and typically most IEDs are found by security forces before detonating. Three attacks on school infrastructure occurred. Attacks typically occur


KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Attacks on NSP facilities
- IED along main routes
- Increase in AOG infiltration

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	3
This Report Period	0

at night and the guards are allowed to flee unharmed followed by arson or use of IEDs to destroy property. AOG appear to have adopted a policy along the border to interfere with education, as a symbol of the government, but have been careful not to harm any staff or students probably in fear of reprisals from enraged local residents.

Spera District saw an increase in activity with two attacks on its DC and a school. Although the majority of AOG initiated incidents occurred in Khost, and in previous periods were centred in Sabari



and Tere Zayi Districts, it appears that AOG operations are spreading throughout the province. Districts bordering Pakistan remain the areas of highest activity. District centres and GOA employees are increasingly likely to be attacked throughout the border areas. AOG appear to have given up on ineffective indirect fire attacks on DCs and are instead concentrating of direct attacks on the facilities and assassination of government

HERAT

Herat Province has seen an increase in AOG activity over the course of the reporting period. The increase in AOG movement was predicted coming into the poppy harvest and due to an increased effort by NATO forces operating to the south. Such movement is expected to increase over the summer months before tapering off during the late autumn months leading into winter.


KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Kidnap of Foreigners
- Suicide Attack
- Criminal Activity

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	6
This Report Period	0

There are two particularly concerning elements being exposed during this period. First, is the numbers of AOG fighters being seen and or engaged, primarily in Shindand district. It is assessed that pressure being brought to bear from southern provinces (Hilmand & Farah) may be pushing AOG further to the north and northwest. This makes operations for NGO's particularly more hazardous in the southern part of Herat province.

The second major concern is the recent arrest of five suicide bombers in Herat City. The bombers with 110 kgs of explosive were



targeting five separate targets, mainly foreigners living in hotels and foreign forces based at PRT and the airport. Of concern is the move to deliberately target Herat City and the foreigners, which reside there. NGOs would be well advised to re-assess their security plans and to conduct security surveys on the locations they choose for accommodation or their personnel. Compound security and security procedures need to be honed and or further developed.

FARAH

Following on from the previous reporting period, Farah Province remains the most unstable province in the western region.

In the last 2 weeks, AOG attacks on ANP check points have increased and clashes between ISAF have also been escalating. Heavy AOG losses have been reported in the last few weeks as a result of ISAF air strikes.

As predicted, more suicide attacks have taken place. Important to note at this juncture is that the

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- AOG Activity Increasing
- Kidnap threat remains
- Suicide Attack and IEDs


	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	3
This Report Period	0

latest suicide attacks have been on private construction companies; whilst IED's have taken their toll on ISAF forces with four ISAF being killed in the last week.

As NATO forces to the south push harder, NGOs can expect to see more AOG activity in this region, making NGO operations in this area – extremely hazardous.

Of particular note is the area of Delaram. This area remains dangerous, as it seems to be a conduit for AOG movement to and from the south.

NGOs need to pay particular attention to travelling along the road systems in this province. Approaches to ANP check points are



considered hotspots as the ANP are on high alert for attack. Approach this location with caution. Finally, following ISAF convoys can be hazardous. During this reporting period, ISAF opened fire on a private vehicle which approached their convoy too closely. As a safety measure, allow 1000m between your vehicle and an ISAF convoy, even if it means pulling over to allow for such a gap. IED's, especially those encased in metal, such as a gas bottle, can send shrapnel out as far as 800m.

BADGHIS


Badghis Province saw little change over the reporting period. AOGs remain in the northeastern area of the province and have also been

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Criminal based activities
- AOG activity
- Illegal road blocks

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	2
This Report Period	0

seen in numbers north of Qalah-Now. It is assessed that AOG activity in these areas will remain at current levels, particularly during the harvest season and of course through transit of opiates across the border. Of primary concern for NGO's operating in this area is kidnap and other criminal based activities.



GHOR


Ghor Province remained quiet over the reporting period and the aftermath of the recent incident at the Chagcharan PRT seems to have abated. The ANP are however expecting more movement of opiates from the south. This could see an escalation in AOG & ACG

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Provincial Crime
- Tribal Tensions
- AOG activity

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	0
This Report Period	0

activity in the movement of opium to both the north and to the west. AOG activity will most likely increase as we move into the summer months. It is likely that AOGs operating in the southern province of Hilmand, may venture further north into Tawara and Saghar Districts to avoid contact with NATO forces or to make NATO forces disburse over a wider area, thus weakening NATO forces capacity. There



remains tension between tribal groups; however, there have not been any significant clashes in the area since the last report. Whilst Ghor remains calm at this time, NGOs should be cautious when moving through this area.

BAGHLAN

Only two AOG incidents took place during this reporting period. There is no change in the security situation/trend of incidents in the Province; particularly Baghlan-e-Jadid and Pul-e-Khumri Districts are mainly suffering from road side IEDs. Assessment of the re-


KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Escalating AOG activity
- Risk of IED related incident
- Factional Clash

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	0
This Report Period	0

corded events indicates a continuation of insecurity / AOG presence in the region; however the events do not form a trend pointing to an organised AOG offensive in the province. AOG activity in Balkh has generally been aimed at IMFs and not NGO activity.

In addition to the AOG motivated events, factional clashes are big concerns for the NGO community in the province, particu-



larly in Nahrin District. Although these clashes are perpetrated by ACGs and didn't affect any NGO in the province, the risk and intimidation remains.

FARYAB

During this report period, Faryab has sustained a continued trend of crime and domestic-related incidents, ranging from theft to aggravated home invasion. In addition two incidents of note (2 Schools) have been targeted by AOG elements


KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Ongoing risk of crime
- Escalating AOG activity

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	0
This Report Period	0

in Dawlat Abad and Afghanistan Kot Districts, which resulted in no casualty or injuries and only minor damages to the affected schools. The attacks on schools are part of a trend which has widened this period, with schools being also targeted in Balkh and Kunduz provinces.

This is the first time that AOG elements have targeted schools in



Faryab Province since the beginning of the year.

TAKHAR


The overall security situation was calm with only two incidents reported. The security situation has been relatively calm and stable for NGOs operations. The two inci-

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Escalation of AOG related activity

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	2
This Report Period	0

dents were AOG-initiated events consisting of a rocket attack on Khwaja-e-Ghar District Police HQ and a complex attack on a private truck transporting IMF supplies in Kalafgan District. Therefore, caution should still be exercised if traveling to Taloqan via Khanabad District.



KUNDUZ

The security situation in Kunduz Province is unstable and has witnessed more AOG-motivated incidents. Reports point to AOGs being fairly active and capable throughout the province, particularly in Chardar, Khanabad, Aliabad, and Kunduz districts. In


KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Risk of IED related incidents
- Elevated threat of rocket attacks

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	1
This Report Period	0

this period a suicide bomb prematurely detonated on the attacker in Chardara district (the second suicide event in that area since the beginning of the year).

There have been IED and RPG attacks (the RPG attack was on a school) that should be viewed with an eye to AOG claims of escalating activity in Kunduz province. NGOs should exercise a high degree of caution in Kun-



duz province, especially Khanabad, Aliabad, Chardara, and Kunduz districts.

BALKH

While Balkh province has remained calm during this period, a trend of attacks on schools has continued with another having been attacked in the Sholgara district. This follows a wider pattern of attacks on schools throughout the Northern provinces. The at-


KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- High risk of general crime

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	3
This Report Period	0

tacks are either by AOG groups themselves or contracted out through ACGs. Such attacks have tended to manifest themselves where GoA resources are particularly thin.

Also of note a well-known ACG leader was arrested by the ANSF in Mazar-e-Sharif City, who is believed to be behind the most robberies, home invasions, and murders in Mazar-e-Sharif and on



the Mazar-Jawzjan road. His arrest will like influence the security situation in and around Mazar city.



ANSO is hosted by
[Deutsche Welthungerhilfe](#)

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ANSO is managed by an NGO
Board. If you have any
feedback, good or bad, let
them know on:
ansoab@yahoo.com

ANSO ACRONYMS

IMF-International Military Forces / AOG-Armed Opposition Groups / GOA-Government of Afghanistan / ACG-Armed Criminal Groups / ANA-Afghan National Army / ANP-Afghan National Police / IED-Improvised Exploding Device / AEF-Afghan Eradication Forces / RPG-Rocket Propelled Grenade / IDF-Indirect Fire (ex: mortars) / VBIED-Vehicle Borne Improvised Exploding Device / PRP-Previous Reporting Period / ANBP-Afghan National Border Police / SAF-Small Arms Fire / NDS-National Directorate of Security (intelligence) / PSC-Private Security Company / DC-District Centre

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MISSING

This report ANSO could not provide analysis for the provinces of:

- PANJSHIR
- DAYKONDI
- BAMYAN
- JOWZJAN
- BADAKHSHAN
- SAMANGAN
- SAR-E-PUL

This is because we do not know enough about the area to comment on the significance of the incidents.

If you can help us understand the province better please contact us.

THE ANSO MANDATE

Scope of Services, P.1, 2008

The community of NGOs has established ANSO in recognition of their interdependence and shared responsibility towards security management.

They have acknowledged that ANSO is important in maintaining the impartiality, independence and political neutrality of NGOs by allowing them to be free from dependence upon security information originating from political or military sources.

They have also recognized the need to avoid association with the military in the complex Afghanistan environment and have therefore perceived a valuable role for ANSO in protecting NGO from direct contact with the military.

The community recognizes that the success of ANSO in fulfilling these functions is dependant upon the willingness of NGOs to cooperate with one another in the area of security management and to support ANSO in delivering these objectives.

In so forming ANSO then, the NGO community has accepted the inherent obligation to contribute and participate for the effective management of their own security.