

THE ANSO REPORT

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YOU NEED TO KNOW

- Criminality is a pervasive, country wide concern for NGO security
- Attacks against NSP related activities/facilities in Khost continue
- Abduction/kidnapping threat in Ghazni remains
- Increasing volatility as the summer develops

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
COUNTRY SUMMARY

While the full volume for June was not available at the time of writing (approx 1 week missing), AOG initiated attacks are almost in line with May, a month that noted the highest monthly volume ever recorded. As well, almost 40% of all international military casualties recorded this year occurred in the month of June alone, highlighting the extreme volatility of the conflict at present.

Of importance, some recent media/open source reporting has not always reflected this reality, due in part to limitations on their access to primary sources (the “ground truth”). The result is a skewing of public perceptions on the state of the conflict (particularly in the South and some portions of the East).

AOG INITIATED ATTACKS PER MONTH—ANNUAL COMPARISON

(Shows combined suicide, indirect fire and close range attacks only)




As such, though ANSO encourages NGO to conduct their own situational analysis of security in relation to their activities, this issue needs to be factored into their analysis, particularly in regards to source selection. Confirming media (and other information)

through a variety of available mechanisms—be they local contacts, staff members, or other reporting apparatus—is highly encouraged to help ensure that NGO develop an accurate, relevant safety and security picture.

NGO DATA & TRENDS

This chart indicates a marked increase in direct NGO incidents between May and June. While at present there is no clearly definable reason for this increase, it is in line with previous year comparisons between May and June. It is also worth noting that the Northern and Central Regions, areas that conventional views consider “permissive”, now account for over 50% of the country total for direct NGO incidents. While these areas are not necessarily as affected by the conflict (when compared to highly volatile South and East) they nonetheless present their own specific challenges in regards to the safety and security of NGO.



KABUL

In Kabul city the threat of spectacular attacks against high profile targets as well as the danger of collateral damage from attacks directed at government and military targets should still be considered active.

For the province overall, the number of AOG and ACG incidents in June was about the same as May. A notable difference this month in comparison to May is a reduction of AOG incidents in Kabul city and an increase of


KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Complex/spectacular attacks against high profile targets
- Suicide attacks against military convoys
- Criminal incidents

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	7
This Report Period	3

these incidents in other districts, with varied attacks directed at government and/or security targets in Char Asyab, Surobi, Kahki Jabar, and Paghman. For NGO this suggests an increased risk for travel and operations outside of Kabul city. So far, most of these incidents have occurred after 10 pm, when the risk to NGO should be low.

An INGO in Kabul city experienced three separate security incidents during this reporting period. These included a reported threat to their director, an assault on a guard who confronted three suspicious men outside of an international staff member's residence, and the burglary (of the same guest house) and subsequent dis-



appearance of the guard. As of this writing the guard's disappearance is being treated as a possible abduction. The incidents are likely targeted at that particular NGO and not representative of any specific threat to the wider NGO community. However, as mentioned in the last report, direct NGO incidents are becoming more common and suggest a general increase in awareness of NGO operations by undesirable elements.

WARDAK

Active combat between AOG and military forces is occurring regularly in Saydabad, Nirkh, and Chak, and intermittently in Jaghatu, and Jalrez. The road through Jalrez poses a high abduction risk and NGO should not travel from Kabul to Bamyan via Wardak.

There are indicators that AOG attacks are becoming more sophisticated, as demonstrated by the two recent incidents in which


KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Collateral damage from tribal conflict
- Increasingly common clashes
- Abduction

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	1
This Report Period	0

simultaneous attacks occurred on separate targets in the same area, with one incident involving an ambush against the military response team. Additionally, IMF air strikes pose the threat of collateral damage in any area where military and AOG are engaged.

Some NGO working in Wardak report they can only fully operate in the Maydan Shahr district centre, and rely on staff embedded in the local communities to run and monitor programs in areas where their work is permitted by AOG. NGO operations in Hisa-I-Awal Behsud are subject to indirect threat from clashes between local people and Kuchis. This was evi-



denced by a 21 June incident in which an INGO office and property were extensively damaged as a result of fighting and indiscriminate property attacks. At last report, security forces have quelled the violence. However, numerous Kuchis and locals were killed in the clashes, and NGO operations are vulnerable in areas where such violence can flare-up.

NOTICE: Your input is invaluable for the production of this report. While we appreciate information on incidents, we also need general information on the security situation in your area. So please remember to call or email us regularly.

Contact details of ANSO staff are provided on the last page.

PARWAN

Local and tribal resistance to AOG as well as a considerable security presence make Parwan a relatively safe province for NGO operations. However, there have been troubling incidents throughout the province recently and there was a slight increase in AOG incidents in June compared

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS


- Roadside IED
- Collateral damage from attacks against security forces

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	3
This Report Period	1

to May.

In mid-June an INGO suspended Shinwari operations in response to a reported threat against them. While this was criminal rather than AOG related, it is one of several recent incidents in the central region that suggest NGO are becoming more susceptible to threats and harassment.

Rocket attacks are becoming more common, with four incidents recorded in June, which is the same



as there had been in January through May. In the past two weeks, Chaharikar, Jabalu-saraj, and Shinwari all experienced rocket attacks targeting the government and military.

BAMYAN

Reporting from Bamyan continues to be limited. As there are a fair number of NGO operating in Bamyan, the limited reporting likely reflects an overall safe environment rather than a simple lack


KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Tribal/ethnic conflicts

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	1
This Report Period	0

of information.

There have been reports of tensions between locals and Kuchis in the districts of Waras, Panjab, and Bamyan, which border Markazi Behsud in Wardak. Though this poses limited direct threat to NGO, the possibility of collateral damage from clashes exists, as evidenced by damages to



an NGO recently caught in such a skirmish in Wardak.

DAYKUNDI

There is very little security reporting from Daykundi, which may be as indicative of limited security presence as it is of low incidents. The areas north of Kiti, Kajran, and Gizrad are reported to be most hospitable for NGO operations. Nili is reportedly relatively

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS


- Limited security force presence
- Tribal/ethnic clashes
- AOG presence in some districts

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	0
This Report Period	0

safe, but with free AOG movement.

There have been periodic reports of plans for large-scale AOG attacks on villages in Kajran District, but thus far there have been no indications that these attacks have occurred. As such, Kajran should be considered off limits to NGO.

In the eastern district of Miramor there is the possibility of armed



clashes between locals and Kuchis. Shahrستان and Kajran have also reported problems between local and Kuchis.

LOGAR


The direct threat to NGO is increasing in Logar. There were two NGO incidents recorded in the past two weeks, the first since April. In Baraki Barak AOG burned a micro-finance NGO office. Baraki Barak has a high level of AOG infiltration and is considered a high risk area for NGO operations. This is especially true for work that may be

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	4
This Report Period	2

perceived or exploited as being incompatible with local culture.

In Muhammad Agha, three staff of a national de-mining NGO were abducted and later released. The details of incident are limited, but NGO should consider abduction, either for criminal or political reasons, a viable threat in Logar.

Overall incidents have continued to climb this month. The largest increase in incidents has come in the form of close range attacks. In the last half of the month small arms attacks occurred in Muham-



mad Agha, Kwarwar, Charkh, and Puli Alam. IEDs and mines are also a concern and these stand-off incidents have been rising modestly but steadily each month since March. The targets have been police/security forces and district centres, making indirect casualties the primary concern for NGO.

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Abduction
- Roadside IED
- Decreasing stability province wide


KAPISA

June AOG incidents were on par with last month, with nine recorded incidents. All were in Tagab, with the exception of one in Mahmud Raqi and one in Nijrab. The direct targeting of individuals was notable in Tagab. In separate attacks over the last 10 days the Chief of Police and the former NDS Chief were killed, and a dis-

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	1
This Report Period	0

trict council member was wounded. The primary threat to NGO is collateral damage from such attacks and other attacks targeting government buildings and military forces.

While much of Kapisa is risky for NGO operations, some NGO report the ability to operate in volatile areas. NGO operating in Tagab District report that their long-term presence coupled with good relations with local authorities, respect for local customs, and willingness to address AOG con-



cerns have enabled them to continue their work. Conversely, without such acceptance, NGO operations in areas such as Tagab are considered high risk.

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Abduction
- Collateral damage from security force/AOG clashes

PANJSHIR

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	0
This Report Period	0

No Graph Available

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Limited threat of attacks against military installations

Panjshir remains one of the central region's safest provinces with limited security related reports of any kind. Mid-July noted the first AOG incident since August 2006 recorded by ANSO. In this inci-

dent, RPGs and small arms were fired at a PRT base in Rukha District. There have been no subsequent problems and the environment for NGO in Panjshir appears to remain secure.

FARYAB


Along with the presence of AOG activity in the west of the province, specifically in the vicinity of Dawlatabad, reports have suggested a growing amount of synergy between local political units (shuras, village headmen, etc.) and

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Criminality
- Possible escalation of AOG activity

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	0
This Report Period	0

AOGs. Unconfirmed reports have circulated regarding discussions between these various actors and their intent to attack a variety of targets, including national security force elements. While these reports themselves remain unsubstantiated, NGO should take note of this changing tenor of political discourse and take precautions accordingly, such as increasing the



amount and nature of contacts with beneficiary communities in order to maintain an appropriate level of situational awareness, allowing staff precognition of possible threats.

JAWZJAN

This reporting period has served as a reminder of the complicated political situation within the Northern provinces and the direct affect it can have on NGO activities. This reporting period witnessed incidents directly affecting an INGO as well as member of the greater international community. In the Mardian District an INGO was targeted for armed robbery, an incident that may have included the complicity of the locals and intended beneficiaries. ACG attacked a group of INGO vehicles with small arms


KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Criminal activity
- Blending of ACG/AOG activities

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	5
This Report Period	1

fire and subsequently made off with a large amount of cash. It is noteworthy that this incident was planned and carried out locally. While a Taliban faction claimed responsibility for it, the lack of clear details in their claim clearly indicated that this was not the case. This provides an indicator that even though AOGs have little direct influence in the area, they are present and that local groups (whether ACG or AOG) are also capable of acting independently.

Another incident which occurred in the vicinity of Fayzabad in Jawzjan, the attack against an international community vehicle, was



almost certainly AOG in nature. As these types of attacks are high profile and not undertaken lightly; this incident might herald a tactic shift, as well as escalation, amongst AOG in the area. One suspect has since been taken into custody in relation to this attack.

In light of these events NGOs should review their transport policies in the Jawzjan area, especially with regards to money transfers. Maintaining a low profile, as well as limiting external knowledge of sensitive activities that might present a target for theft, remain crucial.

SAR-E-PUL


While no significant incidents occurred in this reporting period, Sari Pul is assessed to share security concerns common to the surrounding provinces, specifically that of criminality. As well, the geographic isolation of many of

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Criminality

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	0
This Report Period	0

the population centers in this province (both in the provincial and country level contexts) denotes an extremely variable NGO operational context. This isolation indicates the need for NGO working to maintain their situational awareness at all levels; provincial, district, and community. The attempted abduction of an Iranian official recently by ACG



elements highlights this. Nonetheless, this province remains permissive to NGO activities.

KUNDUZ

The primary security concerns for NGO operating in Kunduz Province remain the threat of hostile actions taken directly against NGO as well as the risk of IEDs along the Baghlan-Kunduz road.


During this reporting period an INGO located in the isolated, and hitherto quiet, district of Qalai Zal was attacked by two men claiming intent to burn the INGO facility

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- IED threat
- ACG attacks on NGO facilities/staff

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	2
This Report Period	1

down. During the altercation which followed, both a guard and a member of the national staff were killed and the perpetrators escaped without doing any damage to the facility. While there had been no specific threat to the NGO prior to this, this event must be viewed in light of general threats levelled against NGOs in the area. Because the attack happened in an otherwise little-affected district, NGOs should bear in mind that both AOGs and ACGs have extreme flexibility to shift patterns and tactics in order



to achieve their objectives.

IEDs planted along the Baghlan-Kunduz road are most often directed at IMF's and not at NGOs in particular. When travelling this stretch NGOs should keep their distance from IMF to minimise the risk of collateral involvement in an IED strike.

GHAZNI

The kidnapping of 2 INGO national staff members on the 24th of June further illuminates the scope of this threat within Ghazni and furthers support to a previously noted shift in kidnapping targeting patterns. Kidnapping and abduction patterns in 2007 primarily occurred along Hwy 1 or in more isolated and rural areas of the province. 2008 has noted a steady encroachment of kidnappers on the primary population centre of Ghazni City. The previous abduction of NGO staff occurred in the vicinity of city limits (within 10 km) with this recent incident occurring within the city itself. This presents a new development for this threat in that it is now in closer proximity to NGO staff concentration areas therefore


KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Kidnapping/abduction threat
- Increased AOG activity level

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	2
This Report Period	1

increasing their level of exposure to this threat. General kidnapping trends indicate that while both ACG and AOG engage in this activity, 2008 presented with over a quarter of all abduction/kidnappings reported directly attributed to AOG. Data from both 2007 and 2008 also indicates that both groups engage in this activity primarily for funding purposes, though AOG occasionally conduct both politically motivated abductions (primarily affecting internationals) and those for intimidation purposes (generally affecting GoA/ANSF staff).

Irrespective of the perpetrators, the majority of kidnappings conclude with a positive resolution with the staff being released unharmed following the payment of a ransom. Of note, information from previous incidents also indicate that NGO staff are targeted due to their perceived financial



“value”, particularly those with the designation of engineer. With the inclusion of this incident, 2008 has already achieved an estimated 70% of the total (both ACG and AOG) abduction/kidnapping incidents reported from Ghazni in 2007.

NGO need to be cognizant that the threat of abduction/kidnapping within Ghazni has escalated this year. As such, NGO need to ensure that all staff vigilantly observe “in transit” security protocols as well as regularly reassess if these are adequately mitigating the prevalence of this threat. In addition, all field missions/road moves need to be considered with the appropriate gravity and evaluated on a threat to benefit basis accordingly.

KANDAHAR

The enhanced presence of security elements, both ISAF and ANSF, within Kandahar City (in response to the prison break on 13 June 08) is presently being downgraded, though it is still increased in relation to the regular presence. Due to this, last week noted a slight downturn in AOG activity level within the city, though AOF nonetheless continued to actively engage security elements, though this was primarily limited to stand off RPG attacks on checkpoints and the continued placement of IED. With the eventual withdrawal of the remaining supplementary forces, AOG activity levels are likely to return to previous levels as reporting indicates that influencing Kandahar City is a primary AOG operational goal in this province. In


KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Increased security force presence within Kandahar City limits
- Suicide attacks

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	6
This Report Period	0

addition, the overnight curfew (between 2300-0400hrs) remains in place and all NGO staff are strongly encouraged to observe this restriction.

Kandahar continues to be the most volatile province within the context of the Southern Region. Consistently high levels of incident reporting, as well as a steady increase in volumes as the year develops indicate that a significant improvement in the security situation remains unlikely for the mid to long term. While the steady encroachment of AOG elements into Kandahar City has been momentarily slowed, without a consistent, focused effort to improve security, not only within the city but the surrounding districts as well (i.e. Arghandab, Daman), Kandahar will continue to be a highly inhospitable environment for NGO activities. The primary exception to this reality remains the "movement box" within the city itself, though all should be



reminded that a considerable number of significant events have occurred there in recent weeks. These events included a number of indirect fire attacks, small arms engagements (in relation to the prison break), IED, and a force protection shooting.

NGO should also factor into their planning the fact that previous years trending indicates that hostilities continue to escalate through the summer months, typically peaking in late July. As May of 2008 has already surpassed peak volume of last year and is continuing to climb, it is safe to extrapolate that the situation within Kandahar will continue to deteriorate in the upcoming months. ANSO continues to advise NGO to limit both their activities and presence (particularly of international staff) for the mid to long term, or until the data indicates a dramatic, and sustainable improvement in the overall situation.

HELMAND

Despite a robust presence of international and national military forces, this province is persistently affected by a significant (and active) presence of AOG elements, as witnessed recently in the operations within the District of Garmser. Reporting also recently indicated that ongoing reinforcement of AOG elements has been occurring in the districts of Khana Shin, Baghran, Dishu and Naw Zad


KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Ongoing military operations
- Increased AOG presence
- AOG checkpoints

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	0
This Report Period	0

with the intent of engaging in offensive operations in same. Despite GoA assurances to the contrary, local reporting suggests that these AOG elements enjoy a considerable level of control and influence in these districts, either directly (through parallel governance structures) or indirectly by sheer presence alone.

As well, the environs neighbouring Lashkar Gah city are also reported to host some level of AOG presence, though the extent of this is unknown at this time. To support this, AOG were recently reported to be planting



IED and establishing checkpoints in the vicinity of Sra Qala, an area approximately 5km west of the city limits. While it is assessed that these threats are directed towards security and government elements, NGOs are strongly advised to limit their activities to within city limits at present in order to mitigate the threat of collateral involvement in an incident.

ZABUL

While travelling in his personal vehicle en route between home and office on the 24th of June, a national staff member of an INGO was stopped by three armed individuals. Reports indicate that the individual was stabbed multiple times while being forced from the vehicle. The perpetrators subsequently departed in the vehicle and left the wounded victim at the scene. All details from this incident indicate that it was perpetrated by an ACG for the sole intent of stealing the vehicle and was in no way connected to the individual's employment with an INGO. In addition, while the victim survived the incident, local reporting indicates that the severity of this event could


KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- AOG checkpoints
- Ongoing military operations
- Continuing instability in Shah Joy



	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	1
This Report Period	1

have been mitigated if the victim had avoided presenting any resistance. This supports previous ANSO advisories recommending the compliance of individuals involved in a criminally motivated incident as it is clear that resistance only serves to escalate the incident

ISAF and ANSF operations are presently ongoing and reporting some success in reducing the operational capacity of AOG through attrition and apprehension. Having said this, AOG elements in this province have proven resilient to such actions and have recently been reported reinforcing their elements within the Shah Joy District, intent on establishing illegal checkpoints and engaging in direct attacks against international and national military forces. This reporting is furthered by the number of sig-



nificant incidents being noted of late in this district. In addition, the latest incident involving an illegal checkpoint occurred on Hwy 1 between Qalat and Shah Joy in which AOG elements conducted multiple vehicle searches in an attempt to identify GoA associated individuals, likely for the purposes of abduction and/or intimidations. Despite regular security force patrols along this route, AOG continue to demonstrate a considerable ability to influence the security of Hwy 1, as identified by the constant attacks against ISAF logistical convoys. The unfortunate reality is that NGO will have to accept that Hwy 1 will continue to be an operational focus of AOG activity within the province and therefore will continue to remain highly unstable and unsafe for NGO passage.



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ANSO: “..by NGOs for NGOs..”

NANGARHAR

Nangarhar remains relatively stable with the focus of activities being a series of incidents in Khogyani District. The events started on 23 June with an early morning IMF operation (including rocket fire) that resulted in the deaths of two civilians. Later that morning locals staged anti-IMF demonstrations. The following day an IMF patrol hit an IED resulting in at least four casualties. Also in Khogyani threats have been made against people involved in road construction. The situation has deteriorated badly as of late and NGOs are advised to keep international staff out of the district.

Bati Kot also saw anti-IMF dem-

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS


- Suicide attack threat
- Kidnapping/abduction
- Demonstrations

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	1
This Report Period	0

onstrations following the death (from unknown causes) of an elder who had been detained in Bagram along with approximately 11 other people several weeks previously. A delegation of elders met with the provincial governor and violence was avoided. Anti-IMF sentiment is growing and NGOs are advised, as always, to avoid security force convoys and installations, particularly in the rural districts.

An INGO was the victim of an arson attack on 27 June in Shinwar District in which an office received minor damage and a computer was stolen. This does not appear to be an AOG initiated incident and whether the arson was the purpose of the break-in or cover for the theft is unknown at this time.

According to security sources three criminal kidnap gangs are at



large in the Jalalabad area. The general threat to NGO staff, particularly internationals is continuous and personnel security measures should be reviewed for all staff members. Likewise reports of potential suicide bombings are continually circulating. ANSO's advice on mitigating the threat from IEDs remains to maintain a low profile and avoid security force installations and convoys.

Clashes between the government of Pakistan and AOG in the Peshawar area have increased the risk to the large number of NGO staff who live in Peshawar. At the time of this report the Torkham crossing has been closed. The security situation is very fluid and likely to deteriorate. NGOs are advised to avoid FATA and NWFP.

LAGHMAN


While Laghman remains the least volatile province in Eastern Region (and is also among the quietest in Afghanistan), several serious security incidents have been reported; including the discovery and subsequent defusing of an RCIED leading to a District Cen-

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- IED
- Attacks against Qarghayi Airfield
- AOG activity along Hwy 1

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	3
This Report Period	0

tre, and an attack against an ANP post, both within the District of Alishing. Dawlat Shah District is being used as a transit corridor for AOG moving from Nuristan into the Central Region, with Afghan security forces at times being considerably outnumbered by AOG in the district. The government's precarious hold on the district was highlighted when the DC was attacked by AOG on 27 June. NGOs should remain very cau-



tious in planning trips for international staff north of Mitharlam. Although there were no attacks on the Qarghayi Airfield this period the road leading to it remains a likely location for IEDs.

KHOST


Khost remains volatile accounting for 29% of total AOG initiated incidents in the eastern region this year with another NGO related incident reported this period. On 21 June in Gurbuz District AOG disguised as police, and having successfully convinced the on site guard, gained entrance into an NSP office. The office was then heavily damaged by arson with documents being destroyed and

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Increasing number of attacks on NSP related projects/facilities
- Increasing infiltration of AOG

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	4
This Report Period	1

several computers being stolen. A small IED was also left behind near the gate which was later safely defused. The guard was also abducted and released unharmed a short distance away. This latest attack points to the rapidly increasing danger to NGOs involved with NSP projects in Khost. So far the attacks have been limited to property damage but the potential for violence is great and NGOs involved in Khost should consider the viability and vulnerability of their operations.



Khost District was the scene of the majority of incidents this period which included a failed suicide VBIED attack on IMF and an attempt to burn down a school. Tere Zayi District was also the scene of an attack on a police post and discovery of several IEDs. The border districts will likely remain the scene of increasing AOG activity.

KUNAR


Kunar remains the most volatile province in the Eastern Region accounting for 31 % of the total AOG initiated incidents this year. The 28 serious incidents within the province this period were again concentrated in Pech and Sirkanay, with attacks on Afghan security posts and indirect fire attacks being evenly split. The

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Increasing threat of indirect fire attacks
- Increasing IED
- Frequent clashes between AOG and security forces

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	2
This Report Period	0

number of rockets being fired (67 rockets in 10 incidents) has increased substantially perhaps pointing to improved AOG logistics. AOG indirect fire accuracy is still poor but shows signs of slight improvement with a barrage of 15 mortar bombs causing several casualties at an IMF base in Pech. AOG attacks on security forces still tend to be focused on harassment (using small arms) rather than actual attempts to take a position. The use of IEDs in Kunar has been surprisingly infrequent but is slowly trending upwards. NGOs should expect to see more



IEDs deployed in the coming weeks; particularly on roads leading to DCs. The targets will continue to be security forces, road construction firms and IMF logistic contractors. The security situation along the Jalalabad- Asadabad Road remains stable, and with the exception of errant rockets fired at the PRT, security within the city also remains manageable.

NOTICE: Your input is invaluable for the production of this report. While we appreciate information on incidents, we also need general information on the security situation in your area. So please remember to call or email us regularly.

Contact details of ANSO staff are provide on the last page.

ANSO: “..by NGOs for NGOs..”

NURISTAN


Nuristan saw only two security incidents reported this period. AOG attacked an ANA base in Kamdesh and a council member was physically assaulted by an unidentified group in Wama. This low level of reporting in Nuristan follows a long standing pattern

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Criminality in western districts
- Increasing clashes in border area

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	1
This Report Period	0

resulting from a lack of GOA, IMF and NGOs in the province. Although Nuristan is actually one of the few provinces in Afghanistan to see a reduction in incidents from 2007 to 2008 in the period between 1 January -23 June, this should not be taken as an indication that a permissive environment for NGOs exists in the province. The province lacks the



level of governmental control required for ANSO to cease advising NGOs to avoid the province with the exception of locally hired

PAKTYA


The security situation Paktya continues to rapidly deteriorate. The province saw 20 serious incidents reported this period, second only to Kunar in the Eastern Region. Ten separate IED incidents were

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Attacks against DC
- Intimidation against local population
- IED along main roads in Zurmat


	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	0
This Report Period	0

reported this period with six occurring in Zurmat District alone. AOG also conducted seven attacks on security force convoys and installations; including four separate ambushes in Shwak District. Rather unusually, the two reported indirect fire incidents in Gardez hit or came very close to their targets, both of which were Afghan security force installations. Zurmat, Shwak and Gardez Dis-




tricts continue to be the most volatile areas and NGOs should expect the situation to intensify further as AOG appear to be becoming more active.

EAST REGION NGO DIRECT INCIDENTS 2008



EASTERN PROVINCES - AOG INCIDENTS



HERAT

The most significant development to security within the province during this reporting period was the arrest of 5 suspected suicide attackers (body borne) within Herat City on the 13th of June. Of particular concern was the identified list of possible targets of these attacks, some of which were locations frequented by NGO staff. While the identification of subsequent arrest of these individuals by ANP is promising and indicates the efficacy of these security apparatus, it does mark a significant escalation of AOG presence and intent within the city. While


KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Kidnapping/abduction
- Developing threat of suicide attacks within Herat City

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	6
This Report Period	0

previous indicators suggested just such an escalation (as part of the overall development of the “western front”), as this is a single event it is difficult to extrapolate the long term impact to stability or the likelihood of similar future events. NGO need to cognizant of their movement patterns and habits and ensure that some level of threat mitigation is applied. The most basic, and effective, threat mitigation strategies available is the avoidance of templated movements (i.e. same place, same day, same time) and minimising concentrations of “high value targets” (i.e. international staff members) in public and accessible venues.

NGO also need to aware of the impact of ongoing repairs, and subsequent closure, of the Herat Airport on their evacuation/relocation plans. The estimated duration of these repairs is 60 days (though this is



only an estimation and is subject to modification) and will be ongoing during the months of June and August. Early repair plans will result in the complete closure of the airport (estimated 15-20 days) with follow on repairs resulting in limited/disrupted service. NGO are advised to review their relocation/evacuation plans and prepare contingency plans for cases in which evacuation is required and the airhead is unavailable.

BADGHIS

There has been little change in the overall security context within Badghis Province during the past reporting period. AOG activity remains concentrated in the north-eastern & central areas of the province, though infrequent incidents (as demonstrated by the 2 attacks recorded during


KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Illegal checkpoints
- Criminality
- AOG activity

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	0
This Report Period	0

this period) also occur to the north of Qala-I-Naw. It is assessed that this AOG activity pattern will remain stable in regards to frequency and geography for the mid to long term.

In addition, the road network within the province also remains subject to the illegal checkpoints and attack, incidents of which are also focused in the north-east and central regions of the province. These activities have been attributed to both ACG and AOG activity and though they have different, yet converging aims,



ANP elements remain the primary targets. As such, NGO are advised to maintain standard distance protocols from security force installations and to minimise

GHOR


This province remains relatively calm with a minimal amount of security incidents being reported. Thus far 2008 has reported a total of 26 incidents which accounts for an average of less than 1 incident per week. Of these, almost 40% have been reported in the Chagcharan District, though, with the exception of the

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Tribal tensions
- AOG activity in the north/east

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	0
This Report Period	0

recent demonstration (22 May 08), these incidents have been relatively benign in nature (and focused on security forces) and do not suggest any significant level of AOG activity or threat from criminal activity, therefore posing limited risks to NGO safety. Tribal tensions (and the outbreak of armed clashes from same) also continue to be a threat, though these remain a rare occurrence and typically have a limited, short term impact on the security picture in terms of both duration and affected area (due to limited scale and scope). NGO are advised to maintain



situational awareness when working in areas impacted by this type of activity in order to limit exposure to collateral involvement in an incident.



ANSO is hosted by
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ANSO is managed by an NGO
Board. If you have any
feedback, good or bad, let
them know on:
ansoab@yahoo.com

ANSO ACRONYMS

IMF-International Military Forces / **AOG**-Armed Opposition Groups / **GOA**-Government of Afghanistan / **ACG**-Armed Criminal Groups / **ANA**-Afghan National Army / **ANP**-Afghan National Police / **IED**-Improvised Exploding Device / **AEF**-Afghan Eradication Forces / **EOD**-Explosive Ordnance Disposal / **RPG**-Rocket Propelled Grenade / **IDF**-Indirect Fire (ex: mortars) / **VBIED**-Vehicle Borne Improvised Exploding Device / **PRP**-Previous Reporting Period / **ANBP**-Afghan National Border Police / **SAF**-Small Arms Fire / **NDS**-National Directorate of Security (intelligence) / **PSC**-Private Security Company / **DC**-District Centre

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MISSING

This report ANSO could not provide analysis for the provinces of:

- Baghlan
- Badakshan
- Takhar
- Samangan
- Balkh
- Farah
- Nimroz
- Uruzgan
- Paktika

This is because we do not know enough about the area to comment on the significance of the inci-

THE ANSO MANDATE

Scope of Services, P.1, 2008

The community of NGOs has established ANSO in recognition of their interdependence and shared responsibility towards security management.

They have acknowledged that ANSO is important in maintaining the impartiality, independence and political neutrality of NGOs by allowing them to be free from dependence upon security information originating from political or military sources.

They have also recognized the need to avoid association with the military in the complex Afghanistan environment and have therefore perceived a valuable role for ANSO in protecting NGO from direct contact with the military.

The community recognizes that the success of ANSO in fulfilling these functions is dependant upon the willingness of NGOs to cooperate with one another in the area of security management and to support ANSO in delivering these objectives.

In so forming ANSO then, the NGO community has accepted the inherent obligation to contribute and participate for the effective management of their own security.