

THE ANSO REPORT

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Inside this Issue

Central Region	2-4
Northern Region	4-6
Eastern Region	7-9
Western Region	10-11
Southern Region	11-14
ANSO Info Page	15

YOU NEED TO KNOW

- Considerable abduction rates persist
- Decreased NGO incidents this period
- Encroachment of AOG onto Jalalabad City

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COUNTRY SUMMARY

A media report gained considerable attention this period, similar in nature to the impact of the 'Al Samood' website report in early February. Of particular concern for NGO was the quoting of a Taliban commander who indicated the active collection of information on foreign aid workers. Taken into context with previously identified trends and operational patterns, this does not represent any significant escalation in the threat to NGO by AOG.

Plans for utilizing the northern corridor (originating in Uzbekistan) as a military logistical supply route will likely have a negative impact on security for the Northern Region. As part of the strategic AOG goal of disrupting such routes (as seen in the east and south), efforts to further infiltrate and influence operationally important areas adjoining the road (and subsequent destabilization of same) will be realized in the short term. This is also likely part of the 'northern campaign' detailed in the same media report mentioned above.

The issue of dialogue ('peace talks') with armed opposition also gained momentum during this period, though this is unlikely to have any significant short to mid term impact on the ascendancy of the conflict.


The SVBIED attack on the outskirts of Jalalabad marked the latest in a series of incidents that indicate a steady encroachment of AOG onto that city.

Overall abduction rates have continued to trend well above those reported from 2007, with this periods volume already surpassing (+2) the total for March of last year (see graph on page 15).

NGO DATA & TRENDS

The month of March is situated to trend well below the considerable incident volumes recorded during January and February. The two incidents thus far, both reported late in the period, occurred in Kunduz and involved NGO interaction with AOG. Fortunately both incidents concluded positively for the staff involved, though threats were issued by AOG warning cessation of employment with NGO. In one instance, the staff received forewarning of the AOG presence by the local population, suggesting that local acceptance strategies in the area still maintain a level of efficacy despite AOG attempts to the contrary.

NGO DIRECT INCIDENTS-REGIONAL DATA



KABUL

Abductions continue to remain one of the primary security concerns in Kabul. Despite a concerted effort by the ANP, evidenced by a number of recent high-profile arrests of kidnapping groups, abductions continue unabated in the capital. Criminal groups hold the monopoly on the number of kidnappings in Kabul city, with AOGs holding a similar position in the provinces.


Whereas ACGs abduct victims for monetary gain or to settle disputes, AOGs are motivated by both monetary gain as well as political considerations. The tactic has become increasingly lucrative as a method for AOG and ACG to achieve their goals.

Although a significant number of

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	4
This Report Period	0

abductions go unreported, there were 40 recorded abductions or attempted abductions in the Central Region in 2007, seven directly involving NGO. In 2008 that figure rose to 97, with nine incidents directed at NGO workers. For the year to date there have been 13 recorded abductions or attempted abductions. This year, however, has been marked by numerous arrests of kidnapping gangs by the ANP. In the last reporting period, Police District 5 has witnessed two abductions of local businessman and the arrest of six kidnappers.

On 8 March, the ANP is believed to have intervened in an attempted abduction in the Taimani area of District 10, killing two kidnappers and arresting four others. While confirmation remains elusive, reporting suggests a local businessman was the intended target of this attempt. In the vast majority of instances, GoA em-



ployees or local businessman are the targets of kidnapping gangs. Abductions remain an obvious concern for NGO, however the risk can be mitigated by varying travel times and routes and ensuring guards and drivers maintain an active situational awareness, reporting anything out of the ordinary.

In a separate event, the Company area bordering Police Districts 5 and 13, has again witnessed a further IED attack. On February 1, a VBIED narrowly missed a French IMF convoy, injuring four people. A BBIED, believed to be targeting an ANSF or IMF convoy, struck a civilian vehicle on 15 March, killing two local nationals and wounding 14 others. The use of the road by IMF and ASF convoys heading to Wardak is well known and therefore further incidents should be expected.

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- ☛ Suicide/IED attacks
- ☛ Abduction/kidnapping
- ☛ Decreasing security in Kabul City environs


WARDAK

With the exception of two IED discoveries by the ANP and IMF in Tangi Valley, Saydabad, and Maydan city, there have been few recorded incidents in Wardak. Anecdotal reporting suggests that

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	0
This Report Period	0

the 'co-habitation' between the GoA and AOG, whereby the government controls the district centres and opposition elements control the territory immediately outside the urban areas, continues.

Although seemingly untenable in the long term, the present accommodation has the appearance of serving the interests of both sides. However, the introduction of IMF to the province will in all



likelihood destabilise the existing informal arrangement and contribute to a discernible rise in the number of incidents reported in the coming months.

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- ☛ Attacks along main routes
- ☛ De-facto AOG control of most areas
- ☛ Overall instability

LOGAR

Ambushes on IMF convoys are becoming a regular occurrence in Baraki Barak district. Bordering the volatile Wardak district of Saydabad, Baraki Barak has experienced four significant ambushes on IMF for the year to date. The district is host to the road which links the Kabul to Kandahar and the Kabul to Khost highways and is frequently used


KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- AOG freedom of movement
- Abduction/kidnapping
- Armed clashes

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	0
This Report Period	0

by IMF convoys. On 9 March, a number of IEDs were also defused in the Baraki Rajon area.

In Charkh district, the scene of several IED attacks this year, IMF launched an operation against an alleged local AOG figure, which resulted in the deaths of four local nationals. Echoing a similar raid in Muhammad Agha district on 14 February, the provincial authorities claimed the victims were in fact civilians. In both instances, within hours a demonstration had formed outside the district administration centre protesting the



alleged civilian deaths.

The sensitive issue of civilian casualties, unless addressed, will continue to deepen the chasm between the local population and the IMF (and by extension the provincial authorities) and will likely further engender support for AOG activities.

KAPISA

IMF/ANA initiated contacts with AOG continue to dominate reporting from Kapisa. The intensive IMF activity in Tagab, specifically around the Uzbeen valley, have significantly reduced AOG operations by more than a half for

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS


- AOG presence in eastern districts
- Collateral damage from clashes
- IMF operations

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	0
This Report Period	0

the year to date compared to the same period in 2008.

The unintended effect, however, may serve to displace AOG forces from Tagab northwards to the districts of Nijrab and Alasay, which is evidenced by an increase in IED seizures as well as general AOG activity.

The western districts of Kapisa remain relatively immune from



the instability of the eastern areas and provide a comparatively safe operating environment for NGO.

BAMYAN

Bamyan remains a safe operating environment for NGO. Reports of criminal incidences, the primary threat in the province, is considerably lower than in 2008,


KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Weather related road hazards
- AOG presence in Khamard, Saygan, and Shibar

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	0
This Report Period	0

perhaps attributable to the heavy snowfall which has hampered movement across the province for the year to date.

A cache of weapons and ammunition found in the Shikari valley of Shibar district, which included several landmines, serves as a reminder of the possibility of the



use of IEDs along the main roads; however the risk at this stage remains minimal.

PARWAN

In March, the majority of incidences have occurred in Bagram and Chaharikar. Typically, AOG attacks in Bagram take the form of IEDs targeting IMF convoys or alternatively the use of rockets against the airbase; however a VBIED attack near the main gate of the facility is a new development. Unconfirmed reports sug-


KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Historical IED threat along Chaharikar-Bamyam road
- Attacks against security forces

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	1
This Report Period	0

gested that there may have been a diversionary explosion prior to the blast near the main gate, which would again signal the evolving nature of AOG attacks.

The neighbouring district of Chaharikar has also experienced similar styles of attacks with an IO vehicle being struck by an IED in Laghamani Area, injuring the driver. Separately, night letters were distributed in the district threatening action against women who study and work in the area.



The two districts, hosts to important transit routes, are likely to experience a rise in the number of incidences as the IMF northern supply route becomes fully operational. IEDs and standoff attacks on convoys, if this scenario is realised, will be the favoured form of attack.

DAYKUNDI

Daykundi remains a comparatively safe province for NGO operations. The southern districts of Kajran and Gizab are largely under the notional control of AOG


KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Minimal security force presence
- Banditry

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	0
This Report Period	0

elements and present a higher risk to NGO operations. Banditry also presents a potential risk due to the minimal government presence throughout the districts.

As the weather improves, there is the potential for AOG to increase their level of control in the south as supply lines of men and equip-



ment arrive relatively unimpeded from Uruzgan.

BADAKSHAN


Activity in Badakhshan remains sparse, diffuse, and varied in accordance with the province's size and diversity. In Kishm an IED place in a culvert underneath the main road was reported and diffused before it could detonate, serving as a reminder of the small

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Local disputes
- Criminality

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	0
This Report Period	0

pocket of AOG sentiment in and around this area. Elsewhere there were a few small scale confrontations between groups of armed individuals, most likely resulting from matters of local or criminal importance. The often extreme isolation of many parts of Badakhshan means that local dynamics are subject to high degrees of variance and must be understood in depth by organisations



seeking to work there. Criminal activity is also evidenced by a number of incidents where ANSF incepted parties in the process of crossing illegally to and from Tajikistan.

JAWZJAN


Jawzjan saw a few incidents that bore the hallmarks of the organized and targeted AOG activity seen in October and November of 2008. A powerful RCIED targeted a GoA vehicle, managing to both severely damage the vehicle as well as a bridge on the main road between Aqcha and Mard-

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- IED in vicinity of Aqcha
- Criminality

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	0
This Report Period	0

yan. Significantly, NGO staff witnessed the incident from too short a distance, underlining the risk of collateral damage from attacks on GoA, ANSF, and IMF. In another targeted attack, and ANP convoy was struck by an IED on the Aqcha – Balkh main road just outside of Fayzabad. Despite the lack of indigenous AOG sentiment, the possibility for more such attacks will remain



significant in the run-up to the August elections as different political actors seek to influence the situation.

BALKH


Balkh has been relatively quiet ahead of Nawroz celebrations, with the exception of an IED which prematurely detonated in the restive western district of Chimalt. AOG sentiment is often in evidence in Chaharbulak and Chimalt, but does not take the form of IEDs often (these are seen more in Jawzjan and organized by networks different than

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Increased AOG activity in Chimalt
- Pending Nawroz celebrations
- Criminal activity

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	2
This Report Period	0

those based in western Balkh). The apparent increase in weapons trafficking into the north could be a factor in empowering local AOGs to move from militant rhetoric to action, particularly when related to the public night letters directed at the Pashtun community designed to incite such actions. All NGOs should plan on restricting movement in and around Mazar for the Nawroz holiday, when the Mazari Sharif population is expected to increase by around one million individuals and host numerous high-profile events and VIPs (including the



presidents of Afghanistan, Iran, and Tajikistan). Threats of IEDs and suicide attackers cannot be independently confirmed by ANSO, but such events have occurred in years previous. The sheer magnitude of the crowds and the attendant possibility of civil disturbances, criminal activity, and protest should in itself recommend a strategy of prudence.

TAKHAR


The cause of an earlier incident that involved the armed robbery of an INGO compound appears to have been uncovered. While the robbery did not occur as the

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Criminal activity

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	2
This Report Period	0

result of an inside job (as previously suggested), leaked information facilitated the robbers in identifying the compound as a worthwhile target. In other respects Takhar has remained calm over this reporting period, both in terms of AOG and ACG activity.



BAGHLAN


Activity in Baghlan has shown signs of increase in accordance with the spring thaw. The seizure of a large haul of weapons in Khinjan lends support to increased volumes being transported from the south. Similarly a

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Increased AOG activity
- Armed clashes in Eastern Districts

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	0
This Report Period	0

rare attack in Doshi on a police checkpoint is also likely the result of criminal activity. Whether the weapons are ultimately intended for ACG or AOG use, their transport involves criminal networks and has the potential have a wider affect on law and order. The risks presented by armed local actors also became apparent when a large section of Nahrin was



blocked when local factions engaged in armed clashes, the reasons for which remain unclear at this time.

KUNDUZ


This last reporting period has seen a significant upswing in AOG activity in Kunduz, reminiscent of the height of activity last year. Two AOG-initiated incidents occurred directly targeting NGOs. In the first instance an NGO vehicle was surveilled, followed, and finally stopped. After the occupants of the vehicle were detained and threatened with its destruction (and following receipt of directions from the perpetrating groups superiors), the AOG element let them go after warning them to cease work in the area and not return. The second NGO incident involved another

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Increased AOG activity
- Direct targeting of NGO staff

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	1
This Report Period	2

targeted attack on an INGO national employee. Despite repeated verbal warnings from concerned and informed locals, the employee maintained a regular pattern of activity and was subsequently intercepted by four armed men on motorcycles. The employee was then beaten, robbed of his valuables and motorcycle, and warned to cease working with NGOs. This incident highlights the importance of strong and well-enforced security management protocols. Had the victim reported all such warnings, varied his routine, and avoided the area for an indefinite amount of time it is likely this incident could have been avoided. The fact that locals repeated attempted to warn the individual of this specific threat also demonstrated how accep-



tance strategies can complement security management in enabling NGO work to continue in difficult environments.

Elsewhere in Kunduz increased AOG activity was apparent. In Kunduz district, an ANP convoy was ambushed by AOG with SAF and RPG and an IMF convoy was struck with an IED. Another IED was found and defused in Aliabad district. BM-1 rockets were launched at the airport/IMF military base on at least three separate occasions. The greatest threat to NGO traffic passing through Kunduz remains that of collateral damage from attacks targeting IMF, ANSF, or GoA.

NOTICE: Your input is invaluable for the production of this report. While we appreciate information on incidents, we also need general information on the security situation in your area. So please remember to call or email us regularly.

Contact details of ANSO staff are provide on the last page.

ANSO: “..by NGOs for NGOs..”

KHOST

While the level of security activity in Khost during this reporting period is close to that of the corresponding period in 2008, the distribution of that activity has become more concentrated, with 10 of 16 AOG initiated incidents taking place in just 2 districts, Sabari and Bak. On 5 separate occasions Sabari DAC has been subjected to indirect fire attacks, including the evening of 03 March when approximately 20 mortar rounds were fired and a rocket attack on 09 March in which over 25 projectiles were launched, both attacks which failed to hit their

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS


- Suicide attacks in Khost City
- Indirect fire attacks
- Collateral damage from clashes

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	0
This Report Period	0

target. The latter incident saw IMF respond with airpower, which it is understood to have resulted in injuries being sustained by two people not linked to AOG.

Unlike the previous reporting period, there has been relatively little IED activity in early March, with one of four incidents occurring in Sabari where a device was found and made safe on 09 March. Other incidents occurred in Mando Zayi and Tere Zayi on 08 and 10 March where security forces again dealt with devices found.

In Bak, AOG used indirect fire against the DAC on three occasions, and failed to hit it in every instance. After these three attempts the DAC was instead attacked with direct fire for a short



period on 12 March, as was the site of road construction work in the same district two days previously. In Tere Zayi on 11 March this period's most significant event occurred when an IED detonation killed 7 Afghan members of an IMF sponsored security force returning to Khost City.

The increased use of indirect fire and concentration of AOG activity in those areas most easily accessed from Pakistan is an indication that the improving weather in the province has made available supply routes largely denied to AOG during winter. As Spring progresses it is reasonable to assume that access will improve further and incident rates will increase.

LAGHMAN


Compared to many other provinces in the region, Laghman has had few security incidents reported in this period but levels are nevertheless significantly higher than during the same period in 2008. IED finds in Mehtarlam on 02 March, Alingar on 15 March, and a premature detonation in Alingar on 13 March all demon-

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- IED along main routes
- Attacks against DAC
- Abduction/kidnapping

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	1
This Report Period	0

strate that AOG in the province see disrupting traffic and causing casualties through the Alishing and Alingar Valleys as important means of furthering their aims. Two short direct fire attacks on Alishing DAC on the nights of 05 and 11 March were unusual occurrences indicating that AOG will be diversifying their target groups and methods during 2009. A slightly longer engagement, of approximately 30 minutes, took place close to the village of Jabin in Alishing on 01 March, although



again, no casualties were caused. The destruction of equipment used on a road construction project, and the short abduction of a construction company employee during the same incident in Alishing on 10 March, is the only other AOG activity reported in the province during this period.

KUNAR

During this reporting period 41 of 58 reported AOG initiated incidents occurred in just 3 districts, Mano Gai, Ghaziabad, and Sirkanay. Mano Gai alone accounted for 20 of those incidents, all but one of which were direct fire attacks on security force locations or patrols; in Korangal on 01 March one location was attacked at least three times during a period of several hours throughout the day.

As reported previously, AOG activity in Ghaziabad and Sirkanay has been increasing and both have experienced a diverse range of incidents during early March. The DAC in Sirkanay was subjected to limited and poorly aimed indirect fire on five occasions, causing minor structural damage to a single building in one of the attacks. IED activity in Kunar is concentrated in Sirkanay and in this period was at its highest level so far this year, with

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS


- IED in Sirkanay
- Attacks against DAC and security force installations

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	4
This Report Period	0

5 IED related events, including 2 detonations that damaged private vehicles on the same stretch of road close to Tango on the morning of 09 March. AOG in the district also used direct fire, when they attacked an ABP location in the Nawa Pass on the morning of 10 March.

Direct fire was used more frequently in Ghaziabad where ANP checkpoints and ANA observation posts were shot at on four occasions, and where the DAC was attacked in the middle of the day on 15 March. The DAC was also attacked on 10 March when a single rocket was fired at, and missed, the administrative centre, instead hitting and damaging a private residence. The most serious IED incident in Kunar took place in Ghaziabad on the morning of 02 March when a device exploded and injured two people in a commercial vehicle used to supply IMF in the area. One of the casualties sustained major injuries.

The dominance of AOG in Chapa Dara is being challenged by increased security force patrolling



and IMF have twice come under fire in the district during early March, most recently on 14 March when the attacked patrol was able to return fire, injuring and capturing 2 members of the AOG involved. A similar engagement on 10 March resulted in one of the attackers being killed. Both of these incidents occurred close to the village of Senji, as did the destruction of a partially built ANP checkpoint by AOG on 09 March.

Reports of AOG leadership movement into Kunar from Pakistan are now being followed by reports of AOG members assembling, and while it is not yet clear what the full effects of the stabilised situation in NWFP will be, there is a consensus that it can only facilitate greater opportunity for AOG seeking to operate in Kunar. Coupled with AOG movement through Nuristan, and with additional IMF deployed in the province already resulting in a push of security forces into areas not accustomed to a significant IMF/GOA presence, the coming weeks will see increasing rates of incident reporting from across the province.

PAKTYA


With little activity reported since early January, levels are still approximately half of those recorded in the corresponding period of 2008. The most likely reason for this is the recent deploy-

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- IED on Gardez-Khost road
- IED on DAC routes
- Abduction/kidnapping

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	0
This Report Period	0

ment of IMF in neighbouring provinces outside the Eastern Region. Two IED incidents have occurred and give an indication of how AOG will pursue their objectives throughout Spring. A device was found and made safe in Chamkani on 02 March, and on 08 March a device exploded in Schwak, killing a member of a passing IMF patrol and injuring



two others. In the same district AOG attacked a road construction project for a short period on 13 March.

NURISTAN


Though no security incidents were reported in Nuristan during the corresponding period in 2008, in this reporting period AOG have mounted six direct fire attacks, all but one of which took place in Kamdesh. A joint IMF/ANA

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- AOG checkpoints
- Abduction/kidnapping
- Collateral damage from clashes

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	0
This Report Period	0

base was attacked on three occasions, each lasting approximately 30 minutes before AOG withdrew. An ANBP member was killed in an attack on a checkpoint close to Chapa Koh in Bargi Matal in the early hours of 01 March, and an ANA soldier in the first of two AOG attacks on Kamdesh DAC that took place in an 18 hour period over 06-07 March. As reported previously,



this level of activity this early in the year indicates that AOG have a more significant presence, across wider areas of Nuristan than has previously been the case.

NANGARHAR

The reporting period in Nangarhar concluded with a number of significant incidents. On 15 March an IMF patrol in Kot was attacked with an IED that killed several members of the patrol and injured a number of others. Earlier in the day a device detonated against a tractor travelling on a minor road in Muhmand Dara, injuring four people. On the same afternoon four children were killed in Lal Pur when a UXO they were playing with detonated. The month had started in a similar fashion, with the detonation of a SVBIED on the main Jalalabad-Torkham road on the outskirts of Jalalabad. As well as the driver of the vehicle, a child was killed and


KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Suicide attacks in Jalalabad
- IED on DAC routes
- Attacks against DAC

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	3
This Report Period	0

another 3 children were injured along with an ANA soldier. On the same day as this SVBIED incident, a traffic accident involving an IMF vehicle in Jalalabad killed a cyclist and an escalation of force shooting in the city injured a man travelling as a passenger in a car that inadvertently came to close to a joint ANA/IMF patrol. Another 5 IED incidents occurred between the start and end of the reporting period, including the use of a device against an IMF patrol in Hisarak on 02 March that injured two soldiers, and the use of a smaller device in an attempt against the life of a senior member of staff at Nangarhar University on 12 March.

Several direct fire incidents took place, the most significant being a sustained and coordinated attack on Dar-I-Nur DAC on the night of 05-06 March, in which at least



ten RPG rounds were fired at the DAC in an engagement that lasted approximately 75 minutes before AOG abandoned the attack. Nayan DAC was also attacked for a much shorter period of time in the early hours of 13 March. As in other parts of the Eastern Region, there are developing indicators that security forces, and IMF in particular, are increasing their patrol presence in parts of the province, particularly the southern and eastern districts, and that AOG are responding with attempts to limit and control the extent of security force activity through intense IED activity, coercion of local populations, and short attacks that may be intended to manage security force attention.

BADGHIS


The deterioration of stability in this province was furthered this period by the numerous reports of AOG movements and threats. Reporting from Gormach, Muqur, and Qala-e-Naw all indicated planned attacks against security forces through a variety of vectors, as well as ongoing reinforce-

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Suicide attack threat
- Attacks against GoA/security forces

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	1
This Report Period	0

ment efforts. As well, an incident in Bala Murghab involving a food distribution effort indicates AOG efforts to further legitimise their presence in this area. While the full details of the incident have been difficult to confirm, it appears that an AOG positioned themselves next to the local community representatives in order to guide food supplies to the intended recipients. Fortuitously, the situation resolved amicably with all the parties being satisfied



with the proceedings. As this incident occurred in a drought impacted area, such access (and control) to food supplies can help provide both leverage and establish domain over impoverished populations by AOG elements.

FARAH

During this period a series of ambushes, IED strikes and kidnappings helped Farah maintain its status as the most volatile province within the Western Region. AOG activities and operations conducted by security forces contributed to the bulk of the security incidents while ACG remained active through attempted kidnappings and armed robberies. Highlighting the level of freedom of


KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- IED
- Prevailing criminality
- Abduction/kidnapping

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	1
This Report Period	0

movement and action AOG enjoy in this province, on the 1st of Mar AOG attacked a private construction company in Lash E Juwayn, setting its construction equipment on fire and abducting two staff and a driver. It is likely that this action served dual purposes; deliver a message of intimidation and an opportunity for monetary gain through ransom.

There were 3 ACG attributed kidnapping incidents reported from this province during this period alone. On the 9th of March in Bala Buluk, two locals were taken from a bus (though subsequently



freed by ANP) while in the same district on the 12th March an attempted robbery was similarly unsuccessful. After an ACG forced a vehicle to halt and proceeded to rob its occupants at gunpoint, the would-be victims resisted resulting in the ACG opening fire on the victims, killing one and wounding the other. Also in Bala Buluk, a local's son was released following the payment of a large ransom.

Please Note:

Provincial graphs provided in this report are current as of 11 March 2009.

HERAT


The happenings in Guzara district over the fortnight more than made up for the lack of AOG activity reported for the rest of Herat. Along with many reports of AOG movements and rocket attacks, on the 4th of March an AOG set up a check point between Dadhoshan and Salimi and proceeded to abduct three GoA officials transiting the route. The fact that these officials were employed on the task of registration of Afghan nationals for government record keeping, and may also have been associated with the

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Abduction/kidnapping
- AOG checkpoints
- Suicide attack threat

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	5
This Report Period	0

electoral process, do not have any further implications beyond their being the ideal targets of opportunity during such incidents. Post abduction it appears likely that the victims were brought to Siyoshan village - an act which hastened to precipitate an engagement between the ANP patrol responding to the incident and the AOG protection party outside Siyoshan. This also marks one of the first instances of an AOG commander being directly challenged by security forces, though there have been instances of indirect engagement. An aerial strike conducted by IMF on 17 Feb in the Kuchi area of Kari Sultan and the later counter bombardment by ANA of AOG rocket positions in Khurt



Nashin on 13 Mar. While these latest developments are indicative of an increased effort to secure the area, the full extent of the establishment's will, or capacity, to directly engage AOG in Guzara and Pashtun Zargun is unclear as earlier reports indicated that the areas AOG commander had been approached for reconciliation. It is yet to be seen if any of these efforts are being made in earnest, but stabilising this area would provide a security environment more conducive to NGO activities. In the reverse, an escalation could serve to bring the conflict closer to primary population centres.

KANDAHAR


The state of insecurity in Kandahar continues to be critical, with AOG-IMF/ANSF strife afflicting all districts, especially Kandahar City, predominately in the form of roadside IED strikes. Significant incidents were marked by the 10 March killing of a young, prominent personality in Kandahar City who occasionally served as a reporter for a foreign broadcasting

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Attacks against NGO staff
- Abduction/kidnapping
- IED

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	3
This Report Period	0

service and was rumoured to be involved in criminal activity. The most recent significant event occurred in the morning of 15 March in Kandahar City when an RCIED detonated. It appeared that the strike was a failed attempt to target the Kandahar City Mayor who escaped unscathed; two civilians were killed, though, and three wounded, by the device that was attached to a motorbike and staged along the road. Similarly, on 4 March, a RCIED targeted the Panjwayi District Governor's vehicle, again only causing civilian



casualties. An additional incident of concern was the 10 March AOG assassination of an IMF employed translator in Kandahar City. NGO should note that the province, as a whole, continues to be perilous due to AOG attempts to confront the GoA, IMF, and ANSF.

NIMROZ

While the overall incident reported from Nimroz recently has been limited in volume, the severity of the methods used marks consideration, these being two attempted suicide attacks. The most recent, occurring on 14 March, was a foiled SVBIED attack that sought to target an IMF convoy in Nalaan, Khash Rod


KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Suicide attacks
- Security vacuum outside of population centers

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	1
This Report Period	0

District; however, being identified by IMF and subsequently engaged, the suicide attacker was the sole casualty.

The older incident, having occurred on 7 March in Zaranj City, occurred when a BBIED attacker approached the 1st ANP Substation and was also pre-emptively engaged by an ANP guard in front of the facility; in this instance, though, the attacker did kill one ANP and one civilian and wound three ANP and one civilian.



Suicide attacks continue to be one of the prevailing, and significant, threats within this province though the threat to NGO staff and activities can be mitigated by limiting their presence at target areas, primarily GoA and security force elements.

ZABUL

The recent tension that has arisen between local residents and local GoA officials is of serious concern, originating from the local GoA's destruction of a large number of private establishments located on the Kandahar-Kabul main route approximately one month ago. In reaction, a number of elders went to Kabul to voice their opposition against the Zabul Governor and Qalat City Mayor; however, due to a perceived lack of attention to their grievances, the elders returned with an intention to orchestrate demonstrations, resulting in the 10 March demonstration that consisted of 800 to 1000 participants close to the Governor's office in Qalat


KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Collateral damage from clashes
- Abduction/kidnapping
- IED

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	0
This Report Period	0

City. The protesters promised that they would not open their establishments and would continue to demonstrate until the removal of the Governor and Mayor. They also furthered that they would not participate in the upcoming presidential election until their demands are met.

The threat of offensive activity has been steadily increasing with the onset of Spring, as seen in the severity of four IED related incidents that resulted in casualties mainly to IMF and road construction company personnel. Additionally, the Kandahar-Kabul main route, particularly segments through Shah Joy District and Shahr-e-Safa, continues to be hazardous due to AOG movements. The lack of security along the route manifest itself on 6 March in Shahr-e-Safa when AOG established a checkpoint and proceeded



to stop all vehicles, searching for people who had an association with the GoA, or any other people of interest.

Moreover, with the onset of Spring, AOG infiltration routes will become more accessible, leading to further clashes. Additionally, insecurity will continue to reign, illustrated in the 22 February ACG abduction of two doctors as they were transiting through the Akhter area of Mizan District. While this was the first incident involving health staff in Zabul this year, there were several previous incidents affecting health facilities in both 2007 and 2008. Those clinics bore the brunt of AOG raids, attacks, and arson because they received IMF or GoA support.

HELMAND

As recent reporting suggests, NGO should expect to witness increased and more lethal AOG attacks, resultant from the infiltration of a large well-trained and armed AOG into Dishu District. NGO's should consequently consider refraining from transiting through or conducting operations in Dishu or its neighbouring districts for the time being. The increase in the number of incidents recorded during the reporting period may be due in part to the abovementioned threat and a continued strong AOG presence, particularly in Nad Ali District. As previously reported, though, AOG's are continuing to abstain


KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- IED
- Suicide attacks
- Collateral damage from clashes

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	0
This Report Period	0

from targeting NGO directly—a fact that should not lead to a reduction in diligence.

The poppy eradication campaign was also predominantly active in Nada Ali District during this reporting period. AEF, consisting of 300 provincial authorities and an additional 1,300 personnel, including foreign troops, reportedly eradicated approximately 3,000 hectares of poppy fields in the last three weeks. While NGO's may usually not be concerned with these activities, it is vital to note that there were at least seventeen incidents aimed at the AEF during the reporting period, with most of them leading to fierce clashes and casualties on all sides. And because the campaign is expected to expand into other districts in the upcoming weeks, NGOs should consider a complete cessation of



activities in the areas where the poppy eradication is ongoing or scheduled to begin.

Additionally, IMF and ANSF continued to undertake operations in Nad Ali, Sangin, Nawa and Garmser districts, and another purported incident of civilian casualties from an IMF airstrike that sought to repel an ongoing AOG attack occurred, this time in Sangin: local estimates, above official recognised casualties, suggest thirteen civilians, including women and children, were killed, 8 others wounded, and several houses damaged. Presently, however, there are no signs of any planned civil unrest in response.

GHAZNI

AOG dominated offensive activity in the province, primarily utilising close-range assaults, and AOG offensive operations followed usual patterns, targeting ANSF, IMF, and the GoA. Of possible concern to NGO's, though, was the 2 March AOG attack on an IO convoy that was escorted by ANA and ANP as it was transit-


KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Direct fire attacks
- Ambushes against security forces
- Abduction/kidnapping

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	0
This Report Period	0

ing through Rashidan District. After a brief exchange of fire that resulted in zero casualties, the AOG withdrew.

NGO should also be cognizant of the tension that is arising due to an unfolding rift between the provincial counsel and the governor, with both camps asserting that corruption and the other's interference are hindering progress. Locals are especially concerned about the rift because of a probable erosion in security that will result from the discord. More-



over, this is compounded by the local belief that AOG plan to target provincial highways, including Kabul-Kandahar highway, and a likely uptick in AOG offensive operations will lead to further repercussions, all factors that NGO should be mindful of in preparing for an upcoming period of intensifying violence in the province.

URUZGAN


To date, activity in Uruzgan during this reporting period has been minimal, with the 12 March clash between ANP and ANA in Tirin Kot being the most significant for NGO. In the abovementioned incident that occurred in the Munar Chowk area, it appears that an

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	2
This Report Period	0

ANP working at a NGO food distribution site shot dead an ANA who may have queued in line at the site and touched a female who was also attempting to queue for aid. It is likely that the clash is demonstrative of a disdain that locals have for ANA who are generally perceived as outsiders and, consequently, those who may lack ardent conservative manners. NGO should note that Khas Uruzgan, Dihrawud, Kamisan, Kush Qadir, and Gizab continue


KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- AOG opposition to NGO activities
- Abduction/kidnapping
- IED



to be problematic areas that NGO's should use utmost caution in; ultimately all areas outside of Tirin Kot should be approached with extreme caution and only when necessary.

AOG Initiated Attacks per Region per Month -2009





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Deutsche Welthungerhilfe

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Board. If you have any
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ansoab@yahoo.com

ANSO ACRONYMS

IMF-International Military Forces / **AOG**-Armed Opposition Groups / **GOA**-Government of Afghanistan / **ACG**-Armed Criminal Groups / **ANA**-Afghan National Army / **ANP**-Afghan National Police / **IED**-Improvised Exploding Device / **AEF**-Afghan Eradication Forces / **RPG**-Rocket Propelled Grenade / **IDF**-Indirect Fire (ex: mortars) / **VBIED**-Vehicle Borne Improvised Exploding Device / **PRP**-Previous Reporting Period / **ANBP**-Afghan National Border Police / **SAF**-Small Arms Fire / **NDS**-National Directorate of Security (intelligence) / **PSC**-Private Security Company / **DC**-District Centre

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MISSING

This report ANSO could not provide analysis for the provinces of:

- Panjshir
- Samangan
- Sar-e-Pul
- Faryab
- Ghor
- Paktika

This is because we do not know enough about the area to comment on the significance of the incidents occurring there.

If you can help us understand the province better please contact us.

CUMULATIVE ABDUCTION INCIDENTS 2009 (ACG/AOG)

