

THE ANSO REPORT

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YOU NEED TO KNOW

- Record level incident volumes (AOG & NGO) reported in June
- Continued targeting of NSP related staff and projects
- Increasing instability along the Kabul-Jalalabad Main Road

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
COUNTRY SUMMARY

The conflict continues to escalate as 2008 develops. AOG attributed incidents are consistently trending upwards at a rate of an estimated 25% per month since the year began.

The most significant increases have been made in the last few months, with incident volumes recorded for July thus far indicating that this trend will continue, at least until the waning of the summer months.

AOG INITIATED ATTACKS PER MONTH—ANNUAL COMPARISON

(Shows combined suicide, indirect fire and close range attacks only)




NGO DATA & TRENDS

The Northern Region has recorded the 2nd highest NGO direct incident volume (behind Central Region) as well as the highest number of NGO staff fatalities (11) for 2008. This suggests that the combined factors of high NGO staffing levels and operational tempo, greater freedom of access and movement (in comparison to other regions), as well as an active criminal (and to a lesser extent, AOG) presence provides a potent mix that leads to a high level of staff safety and security issues.

Having said this, NGO staff fatalities (5, all of which occurred in Kandahar) are second highest in the Southern Region, while only accounting for the 4th highest overall NGO incident volume. The South's fatality rate can be attributed to the maturity of the conflict in this region and the pervasive presence of AOG elements operating there. While in the East, for example, AOG and NGO are more likely to cross paths than they are in the South, it is obvious that AOG elements in the South are actively targeting NGO staff, primarily due to the perceptions that their activities are furthering GoA goals.

NGO Direct Incidents By Region

(This includes all incident modalities as of June 2008)



KABUL

On 7 July at roughly 8:30 am a VBIED detonated at the main gate of the Indian Embassy, killing more than 40 people and injuring an estimated 140 more. Though there is considerable speculation regarding who was responsible, much of this debate has little direct relevance for NGO. For practical purposes, it was another example of a successful attack coordinated among the various national and international players that constitute the AOG threat in Afghanistan.

For NGO, what is important to note is that the incident highlights

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS


- Spectacular attacks against high profile targets
- Criminal incidents
- Suicide attacks

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	9
This Report Period	0

at least three vulnerable entities that are highly relevant to NGO operations and presence here.

1) Kabul City: Even with Kabul's immense security presence and prior intelligence that the embassy was at risk, the suicide bomber managed to drive to the gate of the target and detonate. While security is heavy in Kabul, it is also a high priority target for AOG. So, the threat of more such attacks in Kabul will likely remain significant in the coming months. In addition, as the areas around Kabul destabilize, the likelihood of attacks increases.

2) The general public: While attacks may be targeted, their impact is indiscriminate. And—as tragically demonstrated—they are devastating to those people unfortunate enough to be in proximity



of the event. The risk of NGO being in the wrong place at the wrong time can't be wholly avoided, but it can be mitigated through security planning and policy.

3) The international community: Like the attack on the Serena Hotel, this attack demonstrates that it's not just military targets that are considered fair game. Any entity that could be perceived to support the government or representative of its policies is a potential AOG target. For NGO, vulnerability may increase with visibility and/or misunderstanding of their work.

WARDAK

Wardak is the Central Region's most volatile province. From the beginning of June through the first nine days of July there were over 50 AOG incidents, more than the region's next two highest incident areas (Kabul and Logar) combined. By way of comparison, during this same period the Eastern Region's troubled Paktya and Khost provinces each had incidents numbering in the mid thir-

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS


- Clashes between AOG and security forces
- Attacks against DC
- Abduction/kidnapping

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	3
This Report Period	0

ties.

NGO should consider the risk of abduction to be extremely high in Wardak: Chaki Wardak, Bihsud, Saydabad, Jalrez, and Nirkh have all experienced abduction incidents since June.

Most of the province should be considered off limits for NGO operations. Though the road between Kabul and Maydan Sharh is still travelled regularly by NGO and some NGO operate from the district centre, there is risk of collateral damage from attacks on security forces and on the district centre. The road south of Maydan



Shahr is not safe for NGO travel.

In Hisa I Awali, Bisud, and Markazi Bihsud the level of AOG presence is unknown. The main concerns in those areas are local tribal clashes and the overall lack of a police/military presence. Violent clashes, such as those recently in Markazi Bihsud between the local population and Kuchis, can be anticipated to remain a security issue at least throughout the summer.

NOTICE: Your input is invaluable for the production of this report. While we appreciate information on incidents, we also need general information on the security situation in your area. So please remember to call or email us regularly.

Contact details of ANSO staff are provide on the last page.

LOGAR

Incidents reported during this period demonstrate this province's continued instability. In the last week, both Puli Alam and Mohammad Agha suffered AOG attacks on their district centres, and a member of parliament was abducted in Charkh.

The Mohammad Agha DAC attack included the burning of three


KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Decreased stability throughout the province
- Roadside IED
- Abduction

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	3
This Report Period	2

video shops. Such an incident may be indicative of the area's cultural conservatism. Logar appears especially susceptible to such incidents. As mentioned in the last report, in June a micro-finance INGO was burned in Baraki Barak. Since May there have been seven school burnings (in Charkh, Baraki Barak, Puli alam), with the latest occurring last week in Charkh. NGO should consider activities that may displease local conservatives vulnerable to threat.

While one incident does not indicate a trend, the MP kidnapping



highlights the possibility of abduction of high profile targets, which could include NGO staff. There have been reports that AOG monitor roads throughout the province, and the MP abduction was probably facilitated through such monitoring.

KAPISA

Despite significant military operations over the past couple of months, the districts of Tagab, Nijrab, and Alasay remain AOG strongholds. AOG incidents numbers have climbed steadily since the beginning of the year, and spiked at the end of June (Almost exclusively due to Tagab). So far in July, there have been limited

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS


- Attacks against DC
- Abduction/kidnapping

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	1
This Report Period	0

reports of AOG incidents.


Tagab continues to be the most volatile district. The AOG presence there is evidently very significant, as AOG demonstrate high confidence through frequent attacks on IMF forces and police.

The district centre of Mahmud Razi—the location most likely to be frequented by NGO—experiences periodic attacks, including one during this reporting period. Reportedly, there is limited local support for AOG in the




Kohistan districts, and NGO with operations those districts have not reported any major problems or concerns. However, information from the area is limited and, to our knowledge, only national staff can safely work in those districts.

CENTRAL REGION NGO DIRECT INCIDENTS 2008



CENTRAL PROVINCES - AOG INCIDENTS



BAMYAN

During the first week of June, an ANP vehicle travelling in Kah-mard district was struck by an RCIED. This is the first recorded IED attack in Bamyan since the end of March when an IMF convoy was struck in the same district.


KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Highway banditry
- Minimal threat of IED

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	1
This Report Period	0

At the end of June in Panjab district, armed criminals robbed a minivan and stabbed the driver. Also at the end of June, local conservatives in Shibar District threatened the headmaster of girls' school and forced it to close. The school reopened after mediation from the government and local community.

These incidents aside, Bamyan remains one of the central region's safest provinces. None of



these incidents currently appear indicative of any trends. However, NGO should note that highway robbery is a notable possibility in the province.

PARWAN

Parwan is a generally considered safe for NGO operations, with the caveat that (based on reports from NGO) few or no international staff work outside of Chaharikar.

Parwan has experienced a gradual increase in AOG activity each month since March. The trend


KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Collateral damage from attacks against military targets
- Weapon cache discoveries

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	3
This Report Period	1

appears to continue, as there were already four incidents recorded in the first week of July (versus seven for all of June).

Recent incidents include the murder of two local men in Kohi Safi who were working for a road construction project. They were reportedly accused by AOG of being government spies. While this incident does not indicate a trend in this area, NGO should take note of the potential for AOG targeting related to perceived as-



sociation with the government. This year in the Central Region there have been numerous reports of threat letters negatively associating NGO with government activity, including such an incident in Shinwari during this reporting period.

FARAH


Farah continues its distinction as being the most active AOG operational area within the Western Region. There was no significant change in incident volume and composition this report in comparison with the previous few reporting periods. A number of kidnappings have occurred, with

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- AOG activity
- IED

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	4
This Report Period	0

attackers in once instance stopping a public bus and pulling out an individual. It is unclear at this time why this particular person was targeted, though patterns indicate that they are usually associated with the GoA or security services. Complex attacks also occurred; with one involving an ambush on a private company's convey which led to the death of five guards and the destruction of five vehicles.



Due to this ongoing instability, Farah continues to be an unsafe environment for NGOs to operate in, particularly in regards to road movements in the southern portion of the province.

HERAT


The most important feature of this current reporting period in Herat is the threat of abductions and kidnappings. In total 4 individuals were kidnapped in 3 separate incidents. The victims in these incidents included 2 internationals working for a contractor, an employee of a private construction company, and a nine-

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Kidnapping/abduction
- Criminal activity

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	6
This Report Period	0

year-old. At present all of these incidents are attributed to ACG. These events have occurred in tandem with important discoveries by the authorities of significant weapons caches, also linked to ACGs. Of note, these weapon cache seizures have rarely lead to arrests, which brings into question the information sources and their motivations. It is possible that these have resulted from rival groups attempting to eliminate their competitors.



While none of the kidnapping or criminal activity of late has been directed at NGOs, they should nonetheless remain cognizant as it does have a general impact on their overall operational environment.

KANDAHAR

On the 7th of July 2008, an AOG element identified and abducted an INGO national staff member (who is also reported to have been working with/or having association with a GoA office as well) along with his 2 companions while they were travelling in a local taxi on the Kandahar – Uruzgan main route. (Note that the original threat warning issued indicated that this incident occurred in Uruzgan, though this has since been revised as the District of Nesh is officially administered by Kandahar.) The victims were subsequently taken into an unknown location in the area. The following day, the INGO staff member's body was found along


KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Steadily increasing AOG activity levels
- Abduction/kidnapping
- AOG targeting of NGO staff

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	8
This Report Period	1

the main route in the area, the victim of a beheading. The fate of the remaining 2 abductees remains unclear at this time. The executed staff member is reported to have been involved in the monitoring and evaluation of WATSAN projects (primarily well projects) in the area in which the incident occurred.

It is assessed at this time that this victim was selected for abduction and execution due to his associations to both an INGO and the GoA. While data clearly supports AOG intent regarding the targeting of GoA associated personnel, this incident further supports the earlier assessment that NGO staff are also now considered viable targets for such activities within the SR. This incident highlights the ongoing issue of instability along the primary routes within the SR and AOG ability to operate effectively along same as well



as furthering the inherent instability that exists outside of primary population centres throughout the south.

This incident also marks the 7th direct incident involving NGO staff as well as marking the 4th NGO fatality within Kandahar for 2008. Kandahar now accounts for the second highest provincial volume for NGO incidents within the country (behind Kabul) as well as having the second highest NGO fatality rate (behind the Northern Region). Of note, all of these fatalities have been directly attributed to AOG elements.

NGO are advised to continually re-evaluate staff safety in regards to project/program access areas due to the inherent risks that accompany operations that occur outside of primary population centres.

GHAZNI

The unprecedented levels of volatility Ghazni has been experiencing since April of this year has continued. Ghazni now accounts for the second highest monthly AOG incident volume within the SR, and is in fact one of the highest levels within the country. NGO operating in this province need to recognize this rapid deterioration in the security situation and modify their security protocols and procedures accordingly.


KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Attacks against DC
- Abductions/kidnapping
- Attacks against logistical convoys

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	2
This Report Period	0

Areas that were previously considered permissive may no longer be so, and as seen with the recent kidnapping incidents against NGO staff, AOG elements are steadily encroaching upon Ghazni City.

Previously, AOG elements restricted their actions to abductions/kidnapping along Hwy 1 and a limited number of ambushes and attacks against security forces. This year has witnessed more large scale actions (such as the attack and occupation of the Rashidan DC) and a dramatic increase in frequency for smaller events such as ambushes and at-



tacks against security forces. With the concomitant increase in military forces in response to these actions, a contiguous battlespace has been created that stretches from Wardak (CR) straight through to Farah in the West. Unsurprisingly, this follows the path of Hwy 1, a focal point of AOG activity throughout the SR. At present there are no indicators that the situation will improve in the short to mid term.

URUZGAN

Despite significant military operations in Uruzgan during the opening months of 2008, incident volumes had remained relatively stable until the beginning of June.


KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Increased infiltration of AOG
- Ongoing instability in districts surrounding Tirin Kot

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	0
This Report Period	0

Since that time, AOG elements have begun to increase their operational tempo, and recent reporting has indicated that further numbers are infiltrating with an intent of engaging security forces.

The recent incident in northern Kandahar highlights the extreme risk NGO staff face outside the confines of Tirin Kot City limits




as well as the inherent instability that exists along the Kandahar-Tirin Kot main road.

NIMROZ

An NGO national staff member (identified as NSP related) was abducted in Zaranj on the 10th of July following his attendance and private function. He was subsequently found dead, the victim of a stabbing, in Chakhansour 2 days later. While the perpetrators and

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	1
This Report Period	1

motive behind this incident is unclear at this time, some details lead to the assessment that this may have been a personally motivated event. This individual is reported as being from out of province and was only in Nimroz for the purposes of attending a private function, and was only in location for a few days. While it is unlikely that an AOG group would be able to target and abduct someone



with such alacrity, this cannot be ruled out, as it has been established elsewhere that AOG elements regularly target NSP related staff due to their perceived connections to the GoA.

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Suicide attacks
- Intimidation measures

ZABUL

The Kandahar – Kabul main route (Hwy 1) consistently reports a large number of significant incidents, highlighting the volatile security environment throughout Zabul, particularly in the District of Shah Joy, an ongoing focal point for AOG activity. Of primary concern for NGO activity remains the inherent dangers involved with travel along Hwy 1. AOG checkpoints, ambushes


KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Abduction/kidnapping
- Multiple threats along Hwy 1
- IED

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	1
This Report Period	0

against security forces and logistical convoys, as well as regular IED incidents all factor into this instability. This threat exists for both national and international staff members; though national staff are typically exposed with a greater regularity. NGO should continue advising all staff members to ensure they are “sterilized” prior to any movements in, or though, this province (be it for personal or professional purposes) in order to mitigate the inclement risks involved.

The recent arrest of a potential suicide attacker in the Shar-e-Safa



District by security forces followed regular reports of an increased threat of suicide attacks, primarily along Hwy 1, with a reported intent of targeting security force elements. It is worth noting that suicide attacks are still rare in this province, with only one previous suicide attack related incident recorded in 2008 thus far.

HELMAND

Reports continued to circulate over a substantial number of AOGs that have been positioned in the districts of Naw Zad, Musa Qala, Washer, Khianashin, Dishu and Baghran. Their alleged targets are said to be encompassing ISAF and Government assets, but the NGO community is advised to consider the complete cessation of their aid activities in the subject districts.


AOGs are reported to have considerably expanded their influence into the districts of Kajaki, Sangin,

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Ongoing AOG infiltration throughout the province
- Suicide attacks
- AOG/security force clashes

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	0
This Report Period	0

Garmser, Nawa-e-Barackzi, and Nad Ali. It has been reported that only the District Centers fall under the direct control of the GoA in these districts. Local anecdotal reporting indicates that AOG elements have been witnessed moving freely throughout these areas, having established and deployed mobile teams to reinforce their presence. These teams are detailed with enforcing strict compliance to Taliban Islamic rules and have utilized intimidation measures to facilitate this compliance. In support of these reports, a delegation of tribal and community elders from Naw Zad district recently arrived in Lashkar Gah City, intent on meeting with the Provincial Governor. The purpose of this meeting is to express



concerns over the security and the district governance inability to provide stability.

Further to this, incident volumes have been steadily increasing since April, with the month of June reporting the highest overall incident volume this year. Considering the considerable security force presence, along with the volume of reports detailing AOG infiltration throughout the province, the security situation is likely to further deteriorate in the short to mid term. Due to this, NGO are advised to continue limiting their movements and activities to within Lashkar Gah City limits.

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
NANGARHAR

Although the number of serious AOG incidents remained stable over this period, an IMF air strike on a wedding party recently in Dih Bala has further strained relations with locals. Although initially reported as a successful strike against foreign fighters, Government of Afghanistan officials now report that 47 civilians were killed and many others injured or missing. Despite this, a meeting of three local tribes on 13 July in Dih Bala resolved to support the government and punish those aiding the AOG. In other districts NGOs report local support for IMF as well as GoA associated projects is decreasing as a result of civilian casualties. In conjunction with these events, hundreds of AOG are regularly re-

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	2
This Report Period	0

ported to be infiltrating the province, though these numbers are likely exaggerations. Many of the AOG entering the province have the initial aim of establishing good relations with locals in order to secure safe havens before commencing operations and to reinforce the notion that they control the rural areas, particularly at night. The chance of NGO staff encountering AOG is steadily increasing and international staff should avoid rural districts as much as possible.

A major event within Jalalabad City was the discovery on 3 July of a VBIED outside of the main jail. A sedan rigged as a VBIED had been left running with several flat tires outside the jail. The bomber, who fled the area, may have intended to launch it towards the gate as it had been rigged for a timed detonation. The vehicle was subsequently destroyed by an IMF EOD team, resulting in several buildings being damaged as a



result of the subsequent explosion. It is not clear as what the primary aim of the attack was, although some sort of jail break is likely. On 6 July a substantial discovery of explosives occurred in Durunta where 450kgs of explosives were found hidden in a truck bound for Kabul. On 15 July a VBIED was found in Shinwar District 300 meters off Highway 1. Its target is still unknown. Despite the ongoing efforts of security forces the AOG continue to demonstrate an ability to smuggle large amounts of explosives into the Jalalabad area, thus further attacks on Government of Afghanistan and IMF targets are likely. Road travel to Kabul is also increasing in risk as an AOG cell has begun to attack police posts and IMF fuel trucks along Highway 1 in Laghman. NGOs are advised to reduce travel on this road to minimise their exposure to collateral involvement in such an incident.

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS


- Increased suicide attack threat
- AOG presence in south-east districts
- Abduction/kidnapping

LAGHMAN

The key concern in Laghman is the increase in attacks along the Jalalabad-Kabul Highway in Qarghayi District. An AOG cell has moved into Qarghayi with the aim of launching attacks along Highway 1. To date the attacks have been limited to police posts and civilian fuel convoys contracted to IMF. The aim of these attacks

	NGO Incidents
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appears primarily to intimidate the police as these attacks on checkpoints have been primarily of a harassing nature rather than actual attempts at occupying or destroying the positions. Continued high profile attacks on this critical route would certainly send a signal of diminishing government control and would probably lead to diversion of security forces from other areas. Should these AOG operations expand to include attacks on civilians or result in the establishment of frequent illegal check points, the effects of NGO



operation in eastern region would be considerable. For the time being ANSO recommends NGOs reduce road travel for international staff and ensure local staff are "sanitized" and have stories about their employment and reason for travel "rehearsed" so as to withstand inspection by AOG as they should be for travel anywhere in the region.

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Increased threat of AOG activity along Hwy 1
- Attacks against Qarghayi Airfield
- IED

KHOST


Khost continues to be volatile with serious incidents spread throughout the province. IEDs continue to be used in substantial numbers with 10 separate incidents reported this period. Though Tere Zayi District saw two direct attacks against Afghan

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	4
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security posts, most AOG activity was limited to bombs and intimidation. Two incidents involving schools were also recorded: a RPG attack on a high school in Khost and the abduction of the Head of the Education Department of Sabri District. There were no new reports of incidents involving NGOs or NSP, and the INGO national staff member (driver) previously reported as having been abducted by AOG

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Frequent attacks on NSP projects
- Deployment of IED
- Ongoing AOG infiltration



was released unharmed. This last incident remains under investigation. The threat to NSP projects in Khost remains high and NGOs involved in them are urged to heed AOG warnings.


KUNAR

Kunar remains one of the most volatile provinces in Afghanistan. Pech, Sirkanay and Chawkay remain the most violent districts with attacks on security forces, IMF supply convoys and district centres occurring regularly. Arguably one of the most successful AOG attacks on IMF since the conflict began occurred in Pech on 13 July. The information currently available suggests that a large number of AOG, perhaps including suicide bombers, attacked a recently established IMF base approximately 3 km south of the Kunar-Nuristan border. IMF

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	2
This Report Period	0

report that nine US soldiers were killed and 15 wounded. Accurate Afghan security force and AOG casualties have not yet been divulged. While this incident is not strategically significant, it does represent a major propaganda victory for AOG. This attack also demonstrates that AOG elements have also developed the capacity to successfully attack an IMF base, something that was previously viewed as futile and extremely unlikely to succeed.

A steady influx of reports has been received of large numbers of AOG infiltrating into the province. The numbers cited in these reports are in the hundreds and in many cases are clearly exaggerations or the result of circular reporting. Regardless of the accuracy of the head counts there is an increase in AOG in Kunar- linked



to a similar increase in Nuristan- that is eating away at government control of the rural areas. For example Dangam District officials report large numbers of AOG and worry that it may come under AOG control. This concern over losing control of districts is mounting among Kunar officials. It is likely that AOG have decided that the remoteness of northern Kunar and eastern Nuristan and lack of security forces located there gives them an opportunity to "capture" districts which would have significant propaganda value. NGOs are advised to limit international staff to Asadabad and the main Jalalabad-Asadabad highway and to avoid rural areas.

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Significant AOG presence in Pech, Chawkay, and Sirkanay Districts
- Increased clashes between AOG and security forces

NOTICE: Your input is invaluable for the production of this report. While we appreciate information on incidents, we also need general information on the security situation in your area. So please remember to call or email us regularly.

Contact details of ANSO staff are provide on the last page.

NURISTAN

The most notable incident during this reporting period was the killing of three INGO local staff members (along with approximately 13-18 other locals) and the wounding of a fourth by IMF on 4 July. The victims had been warned to evacuate the area by IMF ahead of an imminent operation and were in the process of departing the area when the incident occurred. The NGO staff


KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Clashes along border region
- Criminal threat in western districts
- Increased risk to NGO national staff

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	3
This Report Period	1

were travelling in local transport when it was attacked by a helicopter. IMF claimed the victims were AOG, a claim that was subsequently proven incorrect.

The security situation in Nuristan has deteriorated rapidly since Governor Nuristani's removal from office due to his perceived ineffectiveness with dealing with AOG. Related to this, Afghan officials in Bargi Matal District reported large numbers of AOG were on the verge of capturing the district and appealed to the government for more forces and ammunition. At least two police posts were captured in the fight-



ing that ensued. The situation in Nuristan can be expected to worsen. A heavy IMF response to the attack in Kunar can be expected with an intensification of operations in Way Gal District. NGOs should reconsider any plans they have to operate in the province especially in the border districts of Bargi Matal, Kamdesh and Way Gal. The western districts remain generally lawless but with more criminals than AOG at large.

PAKTYA


The security situation continues to worsen in Paktya with 22 serious security incidents reported during this period. Zurmat and Swak Districts remain the most volatile

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Attacks against DC
- AOG intimidation of local population
- IED along main roads in Zurmat

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	0
This Report Period	0

but with attacks also increasing in and around Gardez City. These incidents included four IEDs and an attack on a police post. The AOG group in Swak District continues to execute ambushes against Afghan security force convoys while the group in Zurmat is more likely to use IEDs. Intimidation of locals suspected of assisting the government continues, as



highlighted by the kidnapping and murder of a man in Zurmat.

BADAKHSHAN


Badakhshan has witnessed very few incidents over the previous few reporting periods, though there were two separate IED incidents, both targeting IMF elements. While Badakhshan histori-

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Criminal activity
- Limited IED threat

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	5
This Report Period	0

cally tends to be relatively stable, this year is evolving to be more in comparison to this time frame from previous years. NGOs should however keep in mind that the summer months provide the opportunity for reengagement in local disputes which are otherwise frozen during the winter.



KUNDUZ


The threat of sporadic suicide attacks continues in Kunduz unabated. There was one successful strike during this reporting period with more credible threats reported in the subsequent days, although at this time none of these threats have achieved fruition. IEDs likewise have re-

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- AOG/ACG attacks on NGO facilities
- Suicide attacks

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	2
This Report Period	0

mained a source of concern. While the focus of these efforts is focused on the stretches of road between Kunduz-Puli Khumri and Kunduz-Khanabad, the most reliable predictor of risk remains proximity to an IMF convoy, which have been the sole targets of late. As a consequence, NGOs should always keep their distance from IMF as well as ANSF and GoA installations where possible, and travel with a low profile so as not to present a target of opportunity.



No attacks or threats against NGOs have taken place in this period, but NGOs should still be particularly attentive to the possibility. Such attacks are typically spread out both geographically and temporally, minimizing the likelihood of the local population becoming aware of and interdicting any attacks.

SAMANGAN


The strategic importance of the normally tranquil Samangan was brought into full view during this reporting period. Credible information indicated a threat of a complex attack, employing 15 well trained attackers and a range of weaponry, was being organized aimed at kidnapping INGO staff

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Abduction/kidnapping threat
- Localized conflicts over resources

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	1
This Report Period	0

along the Mazar-Puli Khumri highway. While at the time of writing no incident has materialized, concern for such an attack remains high due to the high-value nature of such activities. The accomplishment of an attack, and the subsequent publicity, would be a coup for AOGs allowing them to support claims that they have the ability to influence political events in the north, such



as those made following the Baghlan bombing in November 2007. NGOs should consequently be extra attentive and vigilant when using this route in the near future.

BALKH

The specter of random attacks against NGOs, specifically schools and clinics, struck early this month in Chahar Bolak District. A group of eight armed men attempted to attack an NGO-administered clinic, but were successfully repulsed by villagers, managing only to set a motorcycle alight. The local resistance points to the difficulty faced by spoilers in the north and underlines why


KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Attacks on NGO facilities

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	4
This Report Period	1

AOG attacks on NGOs are so widely and randomly distributed (so that locals are not prescient). For NGOs however, it also underlines the need for constant vigilance and maintenance of situational awareness (i.e. through sound liaison with the local population) in that the wide dispersion of attacks makes it hard to predict where the next one will occur.

The assassination of an elder in Chimtal district over what appears to be political reasons highlights



the need for NGOs to thoroughly understand their local context. The details of this incident are strikingly similar to previous assassinations within the NR, as this one involved armed men on motorcycles.



ANSO is hosted by
Deutsche Welthungerhilfe

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ANSO is managed by an NGO
Board. If you have any
feedback, good or bad, let
them know on:
ansoab@yahoo.com

ANSO ACRONYMS

IMF-International Military Forces / **AOG**-Armed Opposition Groups / **GOA**-Government of Afghanistan / **ACG**-Armed Criminal Groups / **ANA**-Afghan National Army / **ANP**-Afghan National Police / **IED**-Improvised Exploding Device / **AEF**-Afghan Eradication Forces / **EOD**-Explosive Ordnance Disposal / **RPG**-Rocket Propelled Grenade / **IDF**-Indirect Fire (ex: mortars) / **VBIED**-Vehicle Borne Improvised Exploding Device / **PRP**-Previous Reporting Period / **ANBP**-Afghan National Border Police / **SAF**-Small Arms Fire / **NDS**-National Directorate of Security (intelligence) / **PSC**-Private Security Company / **DC**-District Centre

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MISSING

This report ANSO could not provide analysis for the provinces of:

- Daykundi
- Panjshir
- Ghor
- Badghis
- Faryab
- Jowzjan
- Sar-e-Pul
- Baghlan
- Takhar
- Paktika

This is because we do not know enough about the area to comment on the significance of the incidents occurring there.

If you can help us understand the province better please contact us.

THE ANSO MANDATE

Scope of Services, P.1, 2008

The community of NGOs has established ANSO in recognition of their interdependence and shared responsibility towards security management.

They have acknowledged that ANSO is important in maintaining the impartiality, independence and political neutrality of NGOs by allowing them to be free from dependence upon security information originating from political or military sources.

They have also recognized the need to avoid association with the military in the complex Afghanistan environment and have therefore perceived a valuable role for ANSO in protecting NGO from direct contact with the military.

The community recognizes that the success of ANSO in fulfilling these functions is dependant upon the willingness of NGOs to cooperate with one another in the area of security management and to support ANSO in delivering these objectives.

In so forming ANSO then, the NGO community has accepted the inherent obligation to contribute and participate for the effective management of their own security.