

THE ANSO REPORT

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YOU NEED TO KNOW

- Abductions remain a consistent threat to NGO staff
- Deteriorating security along Kabul-Jalalabad road
- Ongoing high volumes of AOG initiated incidents countrywide
- Destruction of bridges and culverts along primary routes in the SR

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
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COUNTRY SUMMARY

There has been a steady upwards trend in abductions/kidnapping countrywide this year. The start of the upswing in abductions follows the early upsurge of AOG activity reported in May, though this is not the only cause. Incidents recorded include those kidnappings perpetrated for criminal purposes (primarily for financial gain), as well as those that are conflict related. Conflict related incidents occur for a broad range of reasons, including financial gains and as an intimidation measure.




NGO have also been affected by this trend, with abduction incidents up 29% in comparison between

2007-2008 year to date totals.

NGO DATA & TRENDS

Related to the above threat and as detailed the chart provided, abductions have accounted for 25% of all NGO related security incidents recorded in 2008. The recent countrywide increase of abductions and kidnappings have directly affected NGO staff, primarily national staff members. While abductions have occurred both from facilities as well



as during travel, in transit staff remain the highest at risk, both for targeted incidents as well as those that occur at illegal checkpoints. Fortunately, many of the recent incidents have been of the “catch and release” type and have resulted in positive outcomes, though the occurrence in Daykundi marks a new dynamic of this threat: that of a power broker utilizing international staff as leverage in order to resolve a local dispute.

KABUL

As of this writing, there were 18 AOG incidents in the province this month, up from 14 in June. The jump was mostly due to a rash of attacks in Surobi, where the incidents have more than doubled compared to last month (from 4 to 9). Most of these incidents were small arms attacks on

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS


- Suicide/IED attack threat
- Deteriorating security in Surobi
- Spectacular attacks against high profile targets

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	11
This Report Period	1

police and military check points or vehicles. For NGO these attacks indicate deteriorating stability in the area, which can have significant security implications for travel between Kabul and Jalalabad.

Kabul city experienced two suicide bombings and one IED attack, both of which should be considered viable threats in the coming month.

Threats to NGO staff are again notable, with two occurring in the province in July. While these inci-



dents targeted specific NGO, as mentioned in a previous report, for all NGO such threats suggest increased vulnerability for their operations.

NGO should also be conscious of the threat of crime in Kabul city, with abduction and armed robbery being the primary threats.

WARDAK

Wardak remains volatile with high incidence of small arm and IED attacks on military and police facilities and convoys.

For NGO, currently the most salient threat is abduction and hijacking. There have been six abduction incidents so far in July, including one direct NGO inci-


KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- IED
- Abduction
- Armed clashes between AOG and security forces

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	4
This Report Period	1

dent in which two INGO local staff travelling in a private car were abducted on the road in Nirkh. They were released after 24 hours, but the car was not recovered, suggesting a criminal rather than political motivation behind the incident. AOG are known to conduct surveillance along the road in Wardak and this likely also goes for criminals, who may be working independently or with AOG.

The Kuchi-Hazara incidents in the Bihsud Districts appear to



have quieted as a resolution was recently achieved. This resolution followed a demonstration in Kabul as well as a government directive. Kuchis have agreed to follow the directive and continue moving on to previous locations.

KAPISA

The western districts of Kapisa remain relatively quiet. While there was a rare rocket attack directed at the police headquarters in Hisa-i-Awaili Kohistan, we


KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Abduction
- Rocket attacks
- Attacks against DC's

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	1
This Report Period	0

have not received any recent reports of problems for NGO operations.

Tagab and Nijrab continue to experience the most incidents. While Alasay is reported to be heavily infiltrated by AOG, it rarely has recorded incidents; though it should be noted the low incident levels are indicative of a low secu-



rity presence, not a safe environment.

BAMYAN

There has been little notable reporting from Bamyan in recent weeks. There were no further episodes of IED attacks or robberies since the last report, indicating (as suspected) that those reported last


KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Isolated incidents of highway banditry

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	1
This Report Period	0

time were isolated incidents rather than initial trend indicators.

In the beginning of the reporting period, there were fears that the violent Kuchi-Hazara conflicts in Wardak would spill into Bamyan, and there were reports of internally displaced families entering Shibar District because of the fighting. However, the situation



now appears quiet, as the Kuchi have reportedly begun moving out of the area.

DAYKUNDI

Two French NGO workers kidnapped on 18 July were released on 2 August. It is likely the NGO was targeted because it had international staff. The workers were reportedly abducted by Commander Sedaqat, a local warlord who was using them for political leverage in a dispute with the district government.

Southern Daykunde is known to


KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Abduction
- Limited security force presence

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	1
This Report Period	1

harbour a significant AOG presence, but the northern part of the province has generally been considered relatively safe for NGO operations (with the caveat that the area is isolated with a minimal security presence). The “safety” of the north should be viewed as delusive. While in this case the politics may be local, the province’s isolation and the potential for AOG movement make it risky for NGO operations, in particular for international staff.

NGO with operations in



Daykunde (as well as any other regions that are readily accessible to AOG due to a limited security presence) should assess their environment and should conduct a thorough threat to benefit analysis in regards to operations and staff safety.

LOGAR

AOG activity remains extremely high, with over a dozen incidents reported in just the last week alone. While most incidents target police and military, they are geographically dispersed and tactically diverse. In addition to recent security force-focused attacks, over the last two weeks AOG hijacked an NGO vehicle in Puli Alam,


KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Abduction
- Roadside IED
- Decreasing stability province-wide

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	4
This Report Period	1

attacked district centres in Muhammad Agha and Khushi, and hijacked two Ministry of Education trucks in Azra. In some incidents—such as in the cases of the NGO and MoE vehicle hijackings—there appear to be a blending of AOG and criminal activity.

NGO should consider the threat of abduction and/or vehicle hijacking to be very high in Logar. There have been three abductions in July and five since June. The most recent abduction was of



NGO staff of a local de-mining NGO. The staff were released shortly after the abduction, but their vehicles were not returned. Such incidents are almost surely targeted and seem to confirm reports of significant AOG/ACG monitoring of the roads in Logar.


LAGHMAN

Laghman saw an increase in serious incidents this period. AOG attacks on Highway 1 continued with an ambush of a fuel convoy in Qarghayi on the 20th of July that resulted in the death of a driver and six other people who were passing by in a farm truck. This attack is one of a spate of incidents along the highway with most occurring in Kabul Province east of Sorubi. These attacks, which occur roughly every other day, have included ambushes on fuel convoys, harassing small arms attacks on police posts (often

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	3
This Report Period	0

from across the Kabul River) and an attack on the small Naghlo hydro-electric dam on Highway 1 near Sorubi. The chances of a low profile NGO vehicle being attacked are still slim but collateral damage is a risk. AOG have not established illegal check points yet probably due to the high chances they would quickly be discovered by security forces. Although ANSO has not advised against all travel on Highway 1, it would be prudent for NGOs to reduce travel whenever possible.

Laghman also saw an increase in activity in Qarghayi District with a direct fire attack on the DAC and also a foiled AOG plot to kill the provincial governor using three IEDs planted along the road leading to the facility. During operations to clear these IEDs the chief



of the district CID and another policeman were killed by a detonation. Five suspects have been arrested and admitted the details of their plan. Both Alishing and Alinghar Districts also reported IED attacks on security forces near the DACs. Dawlat Shah District was quiet this period following several incidents during the last which may have been warnings to local security forces not to interfere with AOG movement through the district.

The security situation in Laghman for NGOs remains manageable. Travel in low profile to Mitharlam remains medium risk but the southern district DACs should be avoided and travel to Dawlat Shah is not advised.

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Increased threat of attack along Hwy 1
- Increased attacks on DAC
- Increased IED deployment in DAC vicinities


KUNAR

Kunar remains the most violent province in the region with 68 serious security incidents reported. The Manogai area of Dari-Pech was the most volatile district in the country. AOG-IMF clashes occur in the district daily with 20 serious AOG initiated incidents reported. Most incidents in the district are attacks on IMF bases and convoys. Armed clashes often result in harm to civilians and their property. This included the killing of six locals on 27 July in Ghaziabad. While salvaging scrap

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	2
This Report Period	0

metal from a previous attack on an IMF fuel convoy, the group of civilians were engaged by an IMF helicopter. AOG activity is heavy in all districts except Asadabad and NGO international staff are advised not to leave Asadabad City or travel off the main Jalalabad- Asadabad Highway.

Reports of AOG infiltration are constant with numbers of fighters totalling in the hundreds sited for most districts. These figures are probably exaggerated but nevertheless the rural districts of Kunar are very dangerous. Ghaziabad is the site of numerous attacks on convoys, particularly supply convoys for the IMF base located there. Sirkanay, in contrast, is the focus of most of the rocket fire



and the home to an IED cell, as indicated by the number of devices located on the road to the DAC. Road building efforts are being hampered in Chawkey and Chapa Dara Districts by IEDs and frequent attacks on construction companies. AOG attempts to infiltrate suicide bombers into Asadabad City continue with their targets being the police and Governor. Reports have been received of "foreign" IED experts coming in to the province to build bombs and provide training. An increase in the use of IEDs can be anticipated.

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Ongoing AOG infiltration
- Increased IED use in Sirkanay
- Clashes between AOG and security forces

NANGARHAR

The security situation in Nangarhar remains stable but there were several serious incidents this period. The most notable was the invasion of an office of an organization involved in road construction in Landi Saber Village in Pachir Wagram District on 29 July at 2230 hrs. 12-15 armed men attended the office, announced they were Taliban, and demanded entry. The guards refused which led to the gate being battered in. Some local staff escaped but four guards and an engineer were abducted. At the time of writing, one staff member had been released the following day. This matter remains under investigation with local elders working to secure the release of the hostages.


KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Suicide attack threat
- Increasing attack frequency along Hwy 1
- Increased AOG presence in south/south-east of province

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	2
This Report Period	0

In Chapahar District on 23 July the Chief of Police was assassinated with an IED as his convoy drove to Jalalabad. This event is one of an increasing series of attacks on government supporters and officials in the districts south west of Jalalabad: Chapahar, Khogyani and Pachir Wagram. There appears to be a slow escalation of intimidation in the low lying areas of the districts around Jalalabad with an IED found and an attack on ANP even reported in Rodat, a district recently noted for being quiet.

Reports of large numbers of AOG infiltrating the province continue with Achin District being the destination of many. The numbers of AOG reported range into the hundreds and although some reports are exaggerated or perhaps even false reports planted by AOG, the number of AOG in the province does appear to be rising. As of yet this has not translated into a significant in-



crease in the number of armed clashes with security forces one would expect to accompany such an increase in fighters, however, the chances of encountering AOG are increasing. ANSO recommends that international staff avoid the southern districts as much as possible.

Jalalabad City has been quiet with no increase in risk to NGOs. Highway 1 to Kabul has become worrisome with the number of attacks on fuel tankers and police posts having risen significantly in the Kabul and Laghman Provinces (see the Laghman report for more detail). The risk to low profile NGO traffic is still small but ANSO recommends limiting road moves if possible. Highway 1 to Torkham has not seen an increase in attacks but NGOs are advised to avoid road travel in Pakistan due to the unstable security situation in NWFP and FATA.

KHOST


Khost continues to be extremely volatile with IED incidents being the predominant method of AOG attack. 16 separate IED incidents were recorded this period including the use of a SVBIED to attack a road construction compound in Sabari District on 27 July that resulted in the deaths of four em-

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Increasing IED attacks
- Ongoing AOG infiltration
- Intimidation against NSP related activities

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	5
This Report Period	0

ployees. The bomber bluffed his way into the compound with a sedan rigged as a VBIED by saying he was delivering a rental vehicle. Once inside he detonated the bomb. Nine other civilians were killed in the province in other IED attacks with the devices detonating in approximately half the total IED incidents. A UN convoy was also attacked, without casualties, in Gurbuz District on 21 July. It is not known if this attack was directed at the UN or the armed police escorts accom-



panying the convoy. It is too early to make a pronouncement as to whether AOG in this province now consider the UN a legitimate target. Sabari District saw the highest number of serious security incidents recording eight of the provinces 20 for this period including seven IED incidents.

NURISTAN


Nuristan remains highly dangerous for NGO operations due to the large number of AOG at large, IMF air strikes in response to AOG activity, and a general lack of government control outside of DACs. Both Bargi Matal

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- High threat environment to international NGO staff
- AOG migration to west of province
- Frequent AOG/IMF clashes

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	1
This Report Period	0

and Way Gal Districts have recently been close to being “captured” for short durations by the AOG and an IMF base has been abandoned in Way Gal after the element posted there took very heavy casualties during a large scale AOG attack earlier in the month. Reports of AOG activity, including the first attacks in years in Parun, have been received from Wama District which may indicate the migration of AOG forces west. At present it does



not appear that sufficient security forces are available to create a stable enough situation in the province for NGO operations. ANSO continues to advise NGOs to employ only local people in Nuristan.

PAKTYA


Paktya continues to see AOG activity increase and expand within the province. Although the majority of incidents occurred in Gardez District, five serious events happened in Jaji District and a fatal IED attack on security forces and the kidnapping of two

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- IED along Gardez-Khost road
- Spread of AOG operations to Jaji and Sayid Karam Districts

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	0
This Report Period	0

ANP occurred in Sayid Karam District. Both these latter districts border Logar Province and these events may be connected with increases in violence there. Gardez District DAC remains a high priority target for the AOG with direct fire, rocket, and IED attacks this period. Swak and Zurmat Districts remain volatile with two successful IED attacks against security forces occurring in Zurmat. Although there have



been no NGO incidents reported this year, during this period there was an attempt to burn a school in Jaji on 27 July but locals prevented the arson and chased the AOG away.

TAKHAR


Takhar continues to express the same rate of incidents as at this time in previous years. Unlike some other areas in the north, the province is distinguished by the relative lack of ACG activity in favour of that of AOGs, and furthermore this has been a continual feature in past years. While IEDs

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- IED
- Low level AOG activity

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	2
This Report Period	0

and the occasional RPG are the main motifs for AOG expression, this month saw a complex attack mounted on an ANP checkpoint. Although the attack on the ANP was attributed to the Taliban, it is more likely a product of local organisation. The difficulties inherent in accessing Takhar from other areas of the country mean that such AOG incidents will continue this at this slow and steady



reporting rate unless there were a major upsurge in AOG activity in Baghlan and Kunduz, which would allow AOGs to move further afield.

JAWZJAN


The number of incidents in Jawzjan for the period of July has continued in a slow and steady upwards trend—two in July 2006, four in July 2007, and five this year. While the attack volume has increased, the tactics utilized and

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Political conflict
- Criminal activity

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	5
This Report Period	0

targets chosen have remained relatively constant—in this case, politicians and police check points. The recent reshuffling of district governors has produced perceived winners and losers resulting in violence that is related to these outcomes. Although such incidents don't target NGOs directly, there remains the inherent risk of



operating in a politically charged environment as well as the risk of being targeted due to a perceived political polarity.

SAMANGAN


Along with the continuing threat of abduction in Samangan, the climate of fear surrounding this threat has been creating its own dynamic. As intelligence has filtered from one source to another, various elements of the threats having been altered and reinterpreted, and in some cases resulted

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Abduction/kidnapping threat

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	1
This Report Period	0

in “circular reporting”, something which in turn has amplified people's impression of the scope of the threat. Having said this, the threat has been reinforced by the kidnapping of a local man, though this incident is more likely the result of criminality and not tied to the more complex threats of late which have targeted NGOs. The abduction threat of the last reporting period has had an impact on local security forces how-



ever, and recently resulted in the longer-than-normal detention of one NGO worker. In addition, it has resulted in requests by local authorities for NGOs to declare their intended whereabouts.

BAGHLAN


The fact that Baghlan has been almost free of incidents during this period (the one incident being the confiscation of a weapons cache) belies the reality that it has been the subject of numerous threat warnings. These threats, including suicide attacks and abduction, share the commonality that they are intended to be more high-impact and high-profile incidents than what is usually seen in

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Suicide attack threat
- Abduction threat

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	0
This Report Period	0

the NR. The main suicide attack threat was aimed not at IMF but rather at a large local gathering where it would have featured prominently in the international media. Abduction threats are likewise constructed so that the event would be both complexly executed and attention grabbing. Of greater significance and concern is that the stability of Baghlan represents a gateway to the north, both literally and figuratively. AOGs need to maintain the plausibility that they can strike the north in



order legitimize their claim that they are able to operate throughout the entire country, a reality that would add legitimacy to their more political goals. It is exactly the relative inability of AOGs to mount such high-profile incidents that makes Baghlan an especially tempting target and the possible target of future efforts.

HERAT

Abduction has now firmly established itself as a regular ingredient in Herat's diet of predominant ACG activities. While abductions in the past have targeted private companies and individual nationals, an NGO recently suffered the abduction of two of its staff members in Farsi. Previous abductions have been rather widespread in


KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Abduction
- Criminal activity

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	8
This Report Period	2

that they have happened in both Herat city and other districts, mostly to the south and west of the province. The spread-out nature of the threat makes it difficult for NGOs to calculate the risk in a specific area, therefore making it prudent for NGO to review their movement and anti-kidnap protocols and procedures.

The large amount of ACG activity in Herat strongly suggests a symbiotic relationship between ACGs and AOGs. As the provinces



south of Herat have become more unstable, ACGs in Herat have been utilizing bolder and more lucrative tactics (kidnapping vs. theft). This activity has also included the hoarding of a considerable number of weapons and illegal substances, as highlighted by the frequent discoveries of weapon and drug caches.

GHOR


Reporting from Ghor remains limited. The primary source of concern for NGOs remains the Chaghcheran-Heart road, which

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Internecine conflict

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	0
This Report Period	0

runs through the heart of the province. Although this road has scene few incidents, sections of it west of Shahrak remain of concern as a result of tribal and local conflicts.



HELMAND


The volatility and instability within the districts of Nahri Sarraj, Sangin, Kajaki, Nawa, Musa Qala and Nad Ali continues. It had been previously identified that only the DCs of the abovementioned districts fall under direct governmental control, with the surrounding areas under the direct or indirect control of AOG elements. While it is difficult to as-

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Significant AOG presence throughout the province
- BBIED

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	0
This Report Period	0

sess the full scope of this situation, this reality is common enough throughout the SR and should be considered an accurate description when taken into the context of NGO access and safety in these areas. Supporting this assessment was the recent deployment of ANA into Nad Ali with the focus of reestablishing governmental control in the area as well as dislodging AOG elements insitu. In addition, there have been frequent utilization of air strikes, primarily targeting AOG safe havens, specifically, the AOG



command network. While this will likely have a short term effect on AOG capacity, trends indicate that the presence throughout Helmand is extensive and tenacious and neither of these initiatives will have any particular mid to long term impact on the overall security within the province.

ZABUL

The security situation within this province remains unstable and volatile and GoA/security force control of Hwy 1 (particularly between Ghazni and Qalat City) continues to be precarious. In response to this situation, it has been reported recently that there is an intent to increase the number of security forces patrolling along Hwy 1, though it is unknown the effect these forces will have. In addition, as AOG elements have continued to exhibit a singular confidence in the vicinities of Shahjoy, a recent joint operation was launched with the


KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Regular IED deployment
- Abduction/kidnapping
- Incidents along Hwy 1

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	1
This Report Period	0

intent of disrupting these activities. Reports from the follow on engagements between the two forces indicate that significant casualties have been inflicted upon AOG elements. While this will likely have a short term affect on AOG capacity in the area, the long term effects remain to seen.

The methods of deployment of IED in this province continue to develop. Present trends have the potential of having a deteriorating effect on both travel security and freedom of movement. One of the primary placement areas of these devices has become bridges and culverts along Hwy 1, with several detonations as well as discoveries and seizures reported in the past few weeks. The purposes of this tactic is likely twofold; the



first being that these locations allow for ease of deployment as well as the secondary effect of destroying important infrastructure following detonation. The primary targets of these devices remain security forces, both directly and indirectly through the disruption of movements. This will also impact NGO staff movements and safety in the same way. By-pass areas (generally traversing the soft shoulders or stream beds) are also common placement sites for secondary devices (including victim operated types) and pose a direct risk to those utilizing the by-pass.

GHAZNI

The overall incident volume, and concomitant volatility of this province has continued unabated since the initial upsurge in activity beginning in April. Since that time, Ghazni has consistently ac-


KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Attacks along Hwy 1
- Attacks on DAC
- Destruction of bridges and culverts

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	2
This Report Period	0

counted for the second highest overall incident volume from within the SR.

As in other provinces within the SR, AOG in Ghazni are frequently deploying IED at bridges and culverts, with at least three being destroyed in the last week alone. The spread of this tactic represents typical tactic migration in the south, and due to the success witnessed thus far, will likely



continue. For further information and analysis on this issue, please refer to the Zabul provincial analysis section.

NOTICE: Your input is invaluable for the production of this report. While we appreciate information on incidents, we also need general information on the security situation in your area. So please remember to call or email us regularly.

Contact details of ANSO staff are provide on the last page.

ANSO: “..by NGOs for NGOs..”

KANDAHAR


On the 31st of July, 5 to 6 masked men carrying AK 47s gained entry to an NGO guesthouse and subsequently bound, blindfolded, and beat the night guard. The victim stated that the perpetrators claimed to be Taliban and were constantly asking about the whereabouts of the female expatriates. The perpetrators spent only a short time insitu and subsequently robbed the guard, though it is unlikely that this was the prime motivation as this incident followed a recent report indicating an AOG element recently deployed to the city with the express purpose of abducting INGO staff members.

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- High NGO incident volume
- Ongoing AOG infiltration
- Heightened abduction threat within Kandahar city

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	9
This Report Period	1

The area in which this incident occurred is a relatively isolated in the southern portion of the city which has been utilised multiple times previously by both ACG and AOG elements to infiltrate/exfiltrate into Kandahar City limits. In addition, this area was the location of the previous INGO international staff member abduction in January as well as a previous attempt on an International Organisation in October of last year. This incident also illuminates further the nexus that exists between ACG/AOG and the use by AOG of criminal groups to conduct directed operations and the complexity of the threat as it exists within the southern context. NGO are advised to review their site physical security measures. In addition, NGO should ensure that they continue to observe all previously advised



counter-surveillance and anti-kidnap protocols. Due to the heightened threat of kidnapping and abduction presently within the city NGO are advised to limit all movements of international staff within the city, as well as cease any planned site visits for the immediate future.

This incident marks the 9th separate direct NGO security incident reported in 2008(not including the detention of an INGO staff member by IMF in March). Kandahar now accounts for the second highest NGO incident volume countrywide. Of note, Kabul, which hosts the highest concentration of NGO staff, in the country, accounts for the 1st (with 11 incidents). This fact highlights the significant risks incurred with operating in Kandahar.

NIMROZ

While there has been no significant shift in overall incident volume, the conclusion of the road construction efforts in Khash Rod has resulted in a shift in AOG efforts and the nature of incidents reported. The primary targets of AOG activity had previously been the road construction crews (and escorting security forces), and AOG elements had deployed ambushes, IED, as well as suicide attack vectors. These types of


KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Decreased volatility in Khash Rod
- Suicide attacks against high profile targets

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	1
This Report Period	0

incidents had been occurring at a frequency previously unseen before in this province.

It is assessed that this represents a short to mid term situation however, as AOG elements insitu are likely in a period of redirection of efforts and focus. While attacks against ANP will continue, AOG will probably shift resources onto attacking GoA personnel and facilities, targets which they have shown previously willing to engage. If this proves correct, it will represent a challenge to NGO operating in this province as most of these targets are concentrated in Zaranj City. It is also likely that



the nature of these attacks will include suicide attack vectors, as there have already been two suicide attack attempts against the Governor and third one against a senior police official. These three event all occurred within Zaranj City.

NGO are advised to reduce their exposure to this threat by minimising their presence in the vicinity of such high profile targets.



ANSO is hosted by
Deutsche Welthungerhilfe

To Register with ANSO
contact:
operations2@afgnso.org

ANSO is managed by an NGO
Board. If you have any
feedback, good or bad, let
them know on:
ansoab@yahoo.com

ANSO ACRONYMS

IMF-International Military Forces / **AOG**-Armed Opposition Groups / **GOA**-Government of Afghanistan / **ACG**-Armed Criminal Groups / **ANA**-Afghan National Army / **ANP**-Afghan National Police / **IED**-Improvised Exploding Device / **AEF**-Afghan Eradication Forces / **RPG**-Rocket Propelled Grenade / **IDF**-Indirect Fire (ex: mortars) / **VBIED**-Vehicle Borne Improvised Exploding Device / **PRP**-Previous Reporting Period / **ANBP**-Afghan National Border Police / **SAF**-Small Arms Fire / **NDS**-National Directorate of Security (intelligence) / **PSC**-Private Security Company / **DC**-District Centre

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MISSING

This report ANSO could not provide analysis for the provinces of:

- Parwan
- Panjshir
- Badghis
- Farah
- Sar-E-Pul
- Balkh
- Badakshan
- Faryab
- Kunduz
- Paktika
- Uruzgan

This is because we do not know enough about the area to

HOW TO AMEND ADDRESSES ON ANSO MAILING LISTS

(1) NGO – ANSO COUNTRY LIST:

- **TO ONLY DELETE AN ADDRESS:** send an email to operations2@afgnso.org requesting that your address be deleted.
- **TO CHANGE ONE ADDRESS FOR ANOTHER:** submit a hard-copy letterhead to the Operations Assistant at ANSO HQ (House 3, St 5, Qala-e-Fatullah, Kabul) indicating the address to be removed along with the name, position, phone, and email of the address to be added.
- **TO ADD AN ADDITIONAL ADDRESS WITHOUT DELETING ANY:** If you have not used your maximum allowance (5 emails per NGO) then submit a hard-copy letterhead to the Operations Assistant indicating the name, position, phone number and email of the address to be added.

(2) NGO – ANSO REGIONAL LIST:

- **TO ONLY DELETE AN ADDRESS:** send an email to your regional ANSO office requesting that your address be deleted.
- **TO CHANGE ONE ADDRESS FOR ANOTHER:** submit a hard-copy letterhead to your regional ANSO office indicating the name and address to be removed along with the name, position, phone number and email of the address to be added.
- **TO ADD AN ADDITIONAL ADDRESS WITHOUT DELETING ANY:** If you have not used your maximum allowance (5 emails per NGO) then submit a hard-copy letterhead to your regional ANSO office indicating the name, position, phone number and email of the address to be added.