

THE ANSO REPORT

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YOU NEED TO KNOW

- Increasing sophistication of AOG tactics
- 3 NGO staff fatalities during this period
- Decreased AOG activity within Kabul City

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COUNTRY SUMMARY

The increasing sophistication of AOG tactics was clearly demonstrated in the recent multiple vector/device suicide attack in Kandahar City (see inset picture). This trend has also been identified in other regions, including the North and West, which indicate the growing maturity of the conflict countrywide as well as the cross-pollination of tactics, techniques and procedures deployed.

The steady decline of AOG incidents within Kabul provide cause for cautious optimism and suggest an increasing efficacy of ANSF elements deployed within the city environs. This situation



could also point to a governing of efforts by AOG with a focus on 'spectacular attacks' as opposed to regular operations.

The developing situations in Wardak and Logar provide counterpoints to the effects of the 'surge' this year. While initial reports from Wardak indicate an


improvement in security, as well as cautious acceptance of the forces, Logar is a significantly different situation. Ultimately, the arrival of further forces has proven to be a destabilizing influence and have had a negative impact on the local population, primarily a result of methods utilized.

NGO DATA & TRENDS

With four incidents reported this period, April is situated to mark a slight upswing in volume following the downturn in March. Besides accounting for 3 out of the 5 NGO fatalities recorded this year, these incidents also represent both the full spectrum and geographic reach of risks associated with the present operating environment in Afghanistan.

The collateral NGO fatality in Kandahar resulting from suicide attacks at a GoA facility (the first such casualty); the criminal murder of a national staff member in Nangarhar; the national staff members death in an IMF air strike in Logar; along with the verbal threats issued in Herat bring into sharp relief the complexities facing NGO. This two week period provides a 'snapshot' of the types of incidents likely to be reported during 2009 and includes the ACG, AOG, IMF, and personal spheres.

Monthly NGO Incidents (AOG/ACG)



KABUL

The heightened ANSF security presence in Kabul City leading up to Mujahedeen Day on April 28th has resulted in an increase in the number of criminal related incidents during this reporting period. The ACG activity rate has almost doubled in the year to date in comparison to the same period last year. Whether the general level of criminality in Kabul City has increased is open to speculation as various reasons could be posited for the trend.

Firstly, the ANP is more visible


KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Abduction/kidnapping
- ACG activity

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	4
This Report Period	0

on the streets of Kabul with the number of checkpoints and random checks on the increase. Secondly, the efficacy of the ANSF, as witnessed during the February 11 attacks on the Ministry of Justice and by a series of raids against AOG leaders in the city and districts, has meant that more arrests and seizures are being made. Furthermore, the general decline of AOG activity in Kabul for the year has allowed the ANP to temporarily focus attention against ACG operations.

Of continued concern is the Police District Five area of Kabul city. The seizure of a prepared



VBIED, parked in a private compound, serves to illustrate the level of AOG activity in the area. For 2009, there have been five reported abductions in the district; a SVBIED attack against IMF; two escalations of force incidents in Company area; three standoff attacks and two other significant seizures of weapons, including a VBIED. Police District Five will continue to remain a concern considering its location as a strategic entry point into Kabul from Wardak and further south.

WARDAK

Although the introduction of IMF in Logar has resulted in an increase in the level of instability across a number of districts in the province, the reverse could be said to be true in Wardak.

The new IMF in Maydan Shahr have, for the moment, avoided fueling local resentment by limiting night time raids, intrusive inspections and most importantly civilian casualties. The IMF presence, including checkpoints, together with a prolonged winter


KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Overall instability
- Ethnic clashes

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	0
This Report Period	0

period and the increased capacity of the ANSF, has contributed to a greater degree of security in Wardak's provincial capital. A further differentiation with Logar is that AOG in the districts of Chaki, Day Mirdad, Jaghatu and Saydabad are from the same tribe in contrast to the more fractious tribal situation in Logar. Rival tribal factions in Logar are already adept at using IMF to settle disputes, as evidenced by a series of IMF arrests and subsequent releases.

Although far from an oasis of tranquility, the current situation may provide a counterbalance to



the argument that the introduction of IMF will inevitably contribute to a greater degree of insecurity. A possible future concern is the regular IMF patrols in the capital and convoys south to Saydabad and west to Jalrez. These convoys and patrols will likely attract AOG standoff or suicide attacks in the coming months. On April 6, an IED attack against an ANP convoy on the road to Jalrez, also compromising a secondary device, served as a reminder of the potential threat.

Please Note: Monthly graphs provided in this report are inclusive as of 15 April 2009.

LOGAR

IMF operations in Logar again predominate the reporting from Logar following the death of a local INGO worker in Tagab Village, Baraki Barak. AOG engaged IMF in the area for approximately an hour until an airstrike was called in on the believed location of the AOG. The airstrike struck a civilian compound, the home of the INGO worker, killing him and injuring members of his family.


KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- AOG freedom of movement
- Armed clashes
- Kidnapping/abduction

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	1
This Report Period	1

IMF reported the arrests of up to eight local nationals on suspicion of AOG activities following the incident.

Baraki Barak, Muhammad Agha and in the last week, Kharwar, have been the focal points for IMF operations throughout the province in the last two months. The operations are an articulation of the 'clear' phase of the clear, hold and build strategy which IMF are currently undertaking throughout the country. Engagements or kinetic activity between AOG and IMF/ANA, during this



first phase of operations, presents a clear risk to NGO staff and operations.

Within the central region, Logar remains the most active for AOG initiated attacks compromising approximately 80% in the last reporting period.

KAPISA

The tempo of IMF operations in Tagab seems to have slowed in April, following several months of IMF initiated incidents throughout the district. As previously discussed, rather than serving to attract AOG to Tagab, the IMF


KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- IMF operations
- Overall instability
- Significant AOG presence in

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	0
This Report Period	0

operations have displaced those elements to the adjoining districts of Alasay and to a lesser degree Nijrab.

Mahmudi Raqi, where the majority of NGO have provincial offices, remains relatively calm although the number of security incidents, both AOG and ACG, have more than tripled from the same period last year – although from a low base. On April 13, the



ANP discovered a weapons cache in the district that compromised over two dozen mortars and on 3 April, two rockets, believed to be targeting the DAC, failed to hit their destination and caused no damage or casualties.

DAYKUNDI


On 4 April a group of approximately 100 people breached the compound of a provincial judge in Nili, severely beating him and injuring a number of ANP guards. The incident, unusual for

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Minimal security force presence
- Banditry
- Local tensions

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	0
This Report Period	0

Daykundi, is believed to have started following allegations of the misuse of public office by the individual. Two days later a number of arrests were made in relation to the attack, which in turn led to the rising of tensions in the capital, as people demanded their release. Although the situation has returned to normal there is the possibility that a further violent dem-



onstrations could arise if the arrested men are not fully exonerated.

PARWAN

Parwan, containing the primary access to the north of the country, continues to remain a relatively safe transit and operational base for NGO. Although Bagram remains a security concern due to the IMF base, as illustrated by an IED detonation against a private


KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Limited IED threat
- Infrequent clashes

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	1
This Report Period	0

truck in Musazai village on 13 April, there have only been two reported attacks against the air-base this year.

Neighbouring Kohi Safi, represents a different picture. The district also borders Tagab in Kapisa, and is considered an AOG stronghold in the province. On April 10, an ANA/IMF operation discovered a large cache of weapons in the mountainous area bordering



Tagab, and subsequently destroyed it in an airstrike, although it is unknown whether they were to be used in Parwan or the more likely case in Tagab.

PANJSHIR

The threat of avalanches is receding in Panjshir as the winter snow slowly disappears. Excepting the extremely rare occurrence of an avalanche, the province remains operational for NGO with very

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	0
This Report Period	0

little reported ACG and virtually no AOG activities. Even with the warmer weather approaching, Panjshir is extremely unlikely to see a rise in either ACG or AOG activity.

NO GRAPH AVAILABLE

SAMANGAN


Samangan has been the scene of a great deal of political posturing in the form of an ongoing demonstration whose aim is to shape the playing field for the upcoming national elections. The sustained protests in Aybak, with demonstrators having numbered in the thousands, has managed to close the Puli Khumri – Mazar main road on a few occasions, both because of the protesters themselves and because of the high

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Political conflicts
- Criminal activity

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	0
This Report Period	0

ANSF and VIP presence. While the protestors have set forth a series of vague demands, the financing and organisation of the protest (evident in the housing of several hundred people in a tent city) suggest that it is in reality a calculated bit of political theatre designed to attract attention both locally and nationally. A major rival of the provincial governor is trying to aggregate more influence by demonstrating his ability to draw crowds (and thus votes) and potentially disrupt events. Even though negotiations were moved to Kabul, the likely intent of this



event is to not be an agreement but rather sufficient acknowledgement of the complainant's importance.

Although reported widely in the national news and beyond as a suicide attack, an explosion which occurred in the vicinity of the governor's office was the accidental result of an unsophisticated attempt to dispose of UXO with a wheelbarrow.

TAKHAR


Political strife has led to serious outbreaks of violence in areas of Takhar. Six RPG rounds were fired at an ANP checkpoint on 12 April, an attack which was followed by a firefight in Yangi Qal'a district centre the following night. This firefight last a half hour during which several rockets were fired and a number of buildings damaged. Many details about this incident are still unclear, such as the source and direction of the fire and the exact culprit. Local rumours attributing the attack to "Taliban", however, are highly unlikely given the very low level of any sort of AOG activity in province. The likely source of

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Political conflicts
- Criminal activity

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	2
This Report Period	0

these attacks surrounds the fate of the local police chief, who was due to be fired and, as a result, manufactured a crisis in order to prove his utility; make his firing look like a plot; or as a suggestion that he too could resort to violence if not accommodated within the system. Such violent political posturing has been much in evidence in the NR, particularly in Jawzjan, and also a major factor behind this period's events in Samangan. An unrelated SAF and rocket attack on an ANP checkpoint in Bangi shows that low presence of AOG is no substitute for rule of law, which enables criminal activity and the extension of politics into violence. Such conflicts are like to occur more frequently in the run-up to the election and will centre on the



GoA, its assets, and political spoils. While NGOs can avoid targeting by staying clear of GoA both physically and in terms of association, the converse political jostling could lead to the *apparent* targeting of NGOs for the reason that development itself is considered a major political spoil. In this scenario the desire is to get gain attention but not cause any damage, and certainly not cause the cessation of NGO activities. Ultimately, individuals engaging in this sort of brinksmanship are more interested in their political careers than development, and hence are willing to engage in rather dangerous games.

BALKH


Chahar Bulak district in the west of Balkh is emerging as a centre of sustained and concerted AOG activity, with an increasingly frequency of attacks on IMF and ANSF rather than haphazard agglomeration of AOG sentiment that it has been in previous years. In Chahar Bulak district itself, an AOG mounted an attack on an ANP checkpoint and ambushed a joint IMF-ANSF convoy. In recent reporting periods AOGs showed increased sophistication in construction and control of

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Attacks against IMF & ANSF
- Criminal activity

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	3
This Report Period	0

IEDs as well as in the access to materials needed to construct them. In this reporting cycle they seem to have expanded their range by detonating an IED concealed in a car slightly east of Mazar city which targeted an IMF convoy. Although the information is not conclusive, Chahar Bulak based AOG groups are the most likely source. This IED shows an increase of ambition but not a geographic broadening of AOG sentiment because its concealment and detonation involved minimal acceptance from the immediate vicinity (the detonation occurred at a bus-stop which would have any number of unfa-



miliar individuals and vehicles at any given moment). Although AOG sophistication has increased this does not as of yet pose an increased threat to NGOs other than in terms of collateral damage, because the increase in sophistication means that they can more successfully hit their desired targets; IMF, GoA, and ANSF (which is how the situation in Kunduz has developed). As such NGOs ought to be more diligent than ever in avoiding all of the above.

SAR-E-PUL


Although not the scene of any incidents of particular note, Sar-e-Pul has witnessed confirmed upsurge in AOG presence in Sayyad district. Bands of AOG from outside the province have been observed by multiple sources and are able to operate by dint of acceptance amongst certain communities in this diverse district, while others still reject their presence entirely. Anecdotal reporting indicates increasing unwillingness to travel to Sayyad due to AOG activity, as well as a discomfort of GoA officials who are not always

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Increased AOG presence
- Impending ANSF operations

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	0
This Report Period	0

willing to remain in situ. The ANA is planning a large operation in the coming weeks to counter AOG activity and firm up GoA presence in the district making travel their potentially more risky. Although occasional reports of AOG sentiment and activity have been circulating for some time they have never been apparent enough to confidently confirm or draw outside response. Sayyad is the centre of a growing sphere of attempted AOG infiltration over a low-GoA-governance area that is equidistant from Maymana, Shibirghan, and Sar-e-Pul city. As well as Sayyad district this area consists of eastern areas of Bilchi-



ragh and Gurziwan provinces in Faryab and Darzab and Qoshtappa districts of Jawzjan.

The assassination of the top level of GoA leadership in the 20 March attack in Qoshtappa did much to foster both a vacuum of effective leadership and the perception of GoA weakness in these areas. The quality of GoA response to the challenge of organised AOG activity in Sayyad district could have far-reaching consequences over the political landscape in this area.

KUNDUZ


AOG activity in Kunduz has been very much in evidence during this reporting period, with ANSF and IMF being ambushed on four separate occasions. An ANP checkpoint came under SAF attack in Qal'ai Zal while an ANSF convoy was ambushed in Kunduz district. Increasing sophistication could also be seen in another incident in Kunduz district where an IED attack against ANP was fol-

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Increasing AOG activity
- Attacks against security forces
- IED

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	3
This Report Period	0

lowed up by a second IED twenty minutes later, which was probably meant to increase casualties by targeting first responders. In Chahar Darra, an AOG attacked an IMF convoy with both SAF and RPG. Rocket attacks on the IMF base south of Kunduz have been a common occurrence but have increased in frequency in the last two weeks. These attacks cause minimal damage due to the difficulties inherent in targeting simple and comparatively small missiles, but their increase is indicative of improved access to materiel and comfort with harassing IMF. De-



spite the frequency in AOG initiated attacks, it is equally important to note that their targeting has not changed and consists almost exclusively of IMF and ANSF. ANSF are currently conducting a major search operation in the Gortappa area of Kunduz district and the volatile Chahar Darra district, suggesting that AOGs are becoming more open and well-defined.

KUNAR

After a short period at the end of March in which AOG activity was concentrated in a few areas, significant incidents were recorded in 10 of Kunar's 15 districts during the first half of April. A smaller proportion of these than usual took place in Mano Gai, where security force positions and patrols come under regular and frequent direct fire attacks, though rarely causing any casualties. Similar incidents occurred in Ghazia-


KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Indirect fire attacks in Sirkaray
- IED on Nurgal-Asadabad roads

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	4
This Report Period	0

bad and Chapa Dara, and Narang all experiencing an increase in incidents during this period. As well as several direct fire attacks on ANA positions in the district, an IED was found on an approach road to Narang's DAC and a number of rockets were found close to the village of Lamatak.

Sirkaray DAC was again subjected to rocket attacks during this period, and indirect fire was also used against IMF and ANA bases in Mano Gai, Chawkey and Wata Pur. The effectiveness of such attacks continues to be limited,



with every projectile launched in this period missing its intended target. As well as the find in Narang, IED incidents in Marawara and Khas Kunar occurred in areas where IED have been used by AOG before and the devices are still used to a lesser extent in Kunar than other parts of the Eastern Region and usually, as in this period, with a low rate of detonations against targets.

KHOST

AOG in Khost maintained a high level of IED activity during this period, targeting IMF and ANSF on multiple occasions but also used devices to damage a television station facility and attempting to attack a local government office. As was the pattern in late 2008, most of these IED incidents occurred in a few districts, notably Khost City, Sabari, Bak, and Mando Zayi, and future activity can be expected to be concentrated in these areas also. Only three of approximately 20 IED incidents resulted in casualties. On 04 April an ANA patrol passing through the village of Molay in Sabari was struck by a device. No casualties were caused by the ex-


KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Indirect fire attacks against DAC
- IED on DAC approach routes
- Suicide attacks

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	0
This Report Period	0

plosion but members of the patrol reacting to the attack then shot a number of people who were running from the scene of the incident, wounding at least two people and, some reports have claimed, killing one. On the morning of 06 April a device in Bak DAC detonated, killing a member of the ABP and an ANP officer who were part of a joint patrol that was the target of the attack. On 10 April two people travelling in a vehicle belonging to a construction company were injured by an IED explosion in Tani.

Reports of civilian casualties during IMF led search operations in March were followed by an incident in which at least four members of the public were killed during an IMF search operation in Ali Daya in the district of Gurbuz on the night of 08 April. One of the casualties, it has since tran-



spired, worked at a NGO funded school. Having initially claimed that all casualties were AOG members, within 72 hours IMF media sources had accepted claims that those killed were not linked to AOG and issued an apology. That this incident has attracted national and international attention has been attributed to the fact that at least one high profile local politician relies on a Gurbuz support base.

During this period AOG launched 19 rockets during five indirect fire attacks against the district centres of Bak, Sabari, and Jaji Maydan, as well as an IMF facility in Khost City. Of these 19 only a single rocket, one of six launched at Bak DAC on 06 April, hit its intended target. No casualties were caused in any of the attacks.

LAGHMAN


An attack on a fuel tanker convoy travelling towards Kabul on Route 1 at Khayrohkel early on the morning 09 April was evidence that while security around the main road had been improving, AOG have not been completely dislodged from the district of Qarghayi, and following last month's DAC attack, will con-

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- IED along main routes
- AOG checkpoints

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	1
This Report Period	0

tinue to pose a threat to those transiting the area. As was reported in March, there is now an ongoing threat of IED use through the Alingar Valley, and there were two detonations against targets during the first part of April. A vehicle belonging to a construction company was damaged in an explosion close to the village of Kor Mango in Alingar on the 02 April, and later on the same morning an ANP vehicle was damaged when a device detonated near to the village of Bes-



ram. On the same morning two devices were also found and made safe close to a teacher training facility in Mehtarlam. Little other activity has been reported in the province which continues to record fewer security incidents than most others in the Eastern Region.

NANGARHAR

The fatal stabbing of a national employee of a INGO while he stayed overnight in the organisation's office compound in Muhmand Dara on the night of 04-05 April illustrates the level of violent and criminal activity that provides a backdrop to, and is sometimes associated with, AOG actions in Nangarhar.


Eight IED incidents across the province did not include any detonations against targets or cause any casualties. The find of devices in the northern districts of Kama

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- IED on DAC approach roads
- Criminality
- Suicide attacks

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	4
This Report Period	1

and Kuz Kunar are examples of relatively rare AOG activity in those districts and may indicate future areas of AOG activity, despite the detention of a significant AOG personality in the other northern district of Dar-I-Nur shortly after these finds. It is increasingly possible that some recent finds of explosives and associated arrests at or close to the Torkham Border Crossing Point are related to the smuggling of materials for Nangarhar's quarry industry, and provide yet another example of the blurred boundaries between criminal and AOG activity in the province and region. Similarly, the two direct fire attacks that have taken place during



this period have been against ANBP locations close to the eastern border and may occurred in order to facilitate cross-border movement by either criminal or AOG materiel or personnel.

As in the preceding period, other incidents reported in Nangarhar during this period have included UXO detonations that have caused injuries, local disputes that have escalated into violence, numerous weapons and ammunition finds by security forces, and several drugs related arrests.

Please refer to Page 14 of this report for information on the latest training sessions being hosted by ANSO.

PAKTYA


Four IED incidents in the first part of April represent a gradual increase in AOG activity levels in Paktya, with the number of incidents similar to those in 2008. The first IED incident reported

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- IED along main routes
- AOG checkpoints
- Indirect fire attacks

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	0
This Report Period	0

this month was on 01 April, was the only detonation of a device, and caused minor damage to a private residence in Gardez. Other devices more readily attributable to AOG action were also all found and made safe in Gardez, in the areas of Itfaq Meena, Khataba, and Ghalgai, on the Gardez-Khost road. In the near future it is reasonable to ex-



pect more incidents in those areas most affected at the end of 2008, notably Zurmat and Schwak.

FARAH


Reports of AOG movements, plans to harvest poppy in Bakwa as well as planned attacks on poppy eradication units in Pusht Rod; are indicators of the strong

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Opposition to eradication efforts
- Suicide attacks
- Ongoing military operations

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	1
This Report Period	0

link between the drug trade and armed opposition groups. The ongoing movement of opiates through the various conduits running across the province identify the stakes for all those involved and raises the spectre of serious violence, which may erupt at the



slightest opposition encountered by the stakeholders involved in these efforts.

BADGHIS

Reports of AOG mustering in Ab Kamari with intentions of investing their operational resources in the Sabjak Pass area should not come as a surprise, as the tactical advantage of this high ground has been used for launching of successful ambushes on security


KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- IED
- Ambush against security forces
- Abduction/kidnapping

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	1
This Report Period	0

force convoys on earlier occasions. The possibility of mistaken and even intentional targeting of vehicles other than security force convoys places NGO at a risk when using this stretch to transit between Herat and Qala E Now.

The abduction of sixteen road construction workers in Ghor-mach adds to the number of previous such abductions of construction workers all along the international border in the prov-



ince. With a new leadership at its helm, the AOG in Badghis are likely to express with more vehemence their opposition to such development efforts. The possibility of this opposition extending to the sector of humanitarian aid may not be ruled out in the future.

HERAT

On the 9th of April two female staff employees of an NGO received threatening calls on their mobile phones, asking them to stop working for the NGO or be prepared to face the threat of being abducted. The calls were made from the same telephone number and possibly by the same individual claiming to represent AOG. No intimidations or threat warnings had been received by this agency or its employees earlier. An investigation of the incident revealed the high possibility of the threat calls having been engi-

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS


- Increased IED threat
- Suicide attack threat

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	7
This Report Period	1

neered by individuals within the family circle of one of the employees to further personal interests. The involvement of the second employee appears to be an effort of the engaged party to add credence to the initial threats.

NGO may remain aware to the possibility of these types of motivations in such incidents in order to mitigate resulting concerns.

Herat registered a number of cases involving IED emplacement on the major road axis running from Herat City onwards to Torghundy and Islam Qala. IED's were also placed on the secondary roads running within Injil and Zindajan, causing at least one civilian casualty. Considering that



nearly all these roads are being used by NGO, this development projects a serious threat – particularly on unsurfaced roads where IED's may be planted easily and as well as the use of victim operated (i.e. pressure plate) devices. This places NGO at a risk equal to other high profile targets using these roads. With the increasing number of incidents involving the smuggling of anti-tank mines into the province, there seems to be the likelihood of these devices being employed more extensively in the coming months than was undertaken in previous years.

ZABUL

As seen during the course of the reporting period, IEDs continue to be the primary security threat in Zabul. The sudden increase in the number of IED's, bolstered by a newly received threat of an IED cell that has arrived in the region, shows that this method of attack will likely continue to increase. The said cell is thought to have been well-trained outside of the province and perhaps includes foreign AOG actors that are operating within Qalat City and its surrounding areas.

In addition, the recent serious IED strikes on either IMF or


KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Roadside IED
- Armed clashes
- Suicide attacks

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	0
This Report Period	0

GoA convoys prove that the sophistication of the devices have also improved in comparison to the past. Furthermore, it has been reported that AOG's are planning to address reductions in their primary asset—manpower—by focusing on IED activity as opposed to confronting IMF and ANSF conventionally. For NGO's, the best defence against IEDs and possible ambushes set for military forces remains the use of low profile transportation.

The designation of a new provincial governor appears to have settled disputes between the local populace and government. The Governor has been arranging meetings comprised of local and tribal elders and IMF over the past two weeks. Additionally, he



has addressed the problem of corruption and promised to reopen all closed schools as well as to establish a stable environment in the region.

Clashes between IMF/ANSF and AOG's continued to occur throughout the province and resulted in air strikes that purportedly killed a large number of AOG members. In conclusion, NGO's should expect that the situation to further deteriorate with the approach of the summer and the close of the poppy cultivation season—with many AOG currently occupied with the latter.

KANDAHAR

The attack against the Provincial Council Chambers compound in Kandahar City marks a significant event for a variety of reasons.

Primarily, it marks the first NGO fatality (national staff member) resulting from a suicide attack, though the involvement of this individual, as well members of an IO, is purely circumstantial.

It also furthers the established AOG aim of destabilising governance as this marks the second attempt at attacking this facility and also follows a recent attack against the Dand DAC. The previous failed attempt (utilising a large SVBIED) on this facility not only indicates the value placed on the

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Suicide attack
- Abduction/kidnapping
- IED


	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	4
This Report Period	1

target but also the ability of AOG to extract 'lessons learned' and apply them to future efforts.

This attack also marked the continuing sophistication of AOG attack methods, with the attackers utilising a combination of vehicle borne and body borne suicide devices as well as small arms fire. This increasing sophistication is partially in response to the increasing efficacy of ANSF to identify and counter such threats and attacks (as noted by the multiple failed detonations).

Also noted during this period were the identified possible attempts at covert surveillance of IO facilities within Kandahar City.

These incidents (the surveillance and suicide attacks) followed a general threat warning issued on the 1st of March which identified AOG plans to target such organi-



sations as well as the intent of conducting 'spectacular attacks' within the city.

As well, there was an attack against in International Development Organisation within Kandahar City in which an RCIED was utilised against their compound. There have been previous incidents involving this organisation, including an attempted abduction of an international staff member.

All of these incidents, taken as a whole, provide a clear picture regarding the prevailing threat levels that exists within this province and city, as well as the impact and involvement it has for the development community.

PAKTIKA


AOG continue to be the dominant actors in Paktika and appear to be making further inroads in encouraging instability that stifles development. Conventional attacks also occurred, as typical, with AOG pointed initiatives against political actors—likely in a desire to garner attention and actual substantive results—marking the only significant changes. As of 9 April, two AOG commanders were intent upon assassinating the

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- IED
- Abduction/kidnapping
- Armed clashes

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	0
This Report Period	0

Sharan District Governor; and information suggests that on the same day AOG attempts to convince the Turwo Governor to relinquish control of his district to AOG in the near future were successful. Sharan District also found itself the intended target of AOG plans to abduct GoA personnel. While the conflict in Paktika appears to be unabated, the Paktika Governor is attempting to concurrently work efforts with elders and IMF to bolster security and encourage IMF 'development' inputs into the community because of limited NGO activities; regardless, residents cite wide-



spread and long-term school closures, a lack of confidence in GoA and ANP capabilities, and unemployment as grievances. While locals assert that NGO's should be able to operate in the province, as long as they employ stringent mitigation measures, the likely desire by local AOG to achieve sensational results necessitates extreme caution before NGO's possibly consider expanding operations into the province.

NIMROZ

Activity in Nimroz was minimal in comparison to other provinces in the Southern Region. NGO's should note two incidents, though, both demonstrating the reach of AOG authority and GoA ability identify suicide attacks. In the case of the former, occurring on 12 April in Khash Rod District, AOG shot and killed a young unmarried couple in front of a local audience, because they had reportedly fled town together


KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Kidnapping/abduction
- Suicide attacks
- Security vacuum in rural areas

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	1
This Report Period	0

a month ago. An additional factor, demonstrating the cultural importance placed on adhering to these customs, is that the couple was reportedly furnished to the AOG by the affected woman's family, also possibly illustrating local willingness to submit to AOG rule.

And in Kang District on 1 April, ANP hindered a BBIED attacker who was able to still detonate his vest after ANP challenged him and reportedly shot him dead. In a related topic, NGO should note that information suggests local religious elders outside of Ghor Ghor, Khash Rod, Chakhansur, and Zaranj districts are involved



in training further BBIED attackers and, moreover, 'selling' would-be BBIED attackers to smugglers, or AOG facilitators; additionally, these elders are vehement opponents of local GoA authorities. Because of limited security, areas outside of Zaranj City and the above-mentioned three districts' centres should be considered as extremely hazardous to NGO activities and approached with extreme caution.

GHAZNI

AOG activity in the province comprises the primary threat to NGO activities. During this reporting period, NGO's bore witness to a few notable or atypical AOG events of varying degrees of importance. For example, on 6 April in Ab Band District, AOG attacked an IO contracted convoy, killing one driver, and on 10 April in Andar District, AOG attacked a road construction firm, kidnapping 9 employees.


Another significant AOG attack

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Indirect fire attacks
- Kidnapping/abduction
- Convoy ambush/IED strike

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	0
This Report Period	0

occurred on the 10th in Muqur District, when a man disguised as a woman unsuccessfully attempted to assassinate the District Mayor, and on 4 April in District 4 of Ghazni City, AOG conducted a grenade attack on a girls' school, causing damage to the facilities. Other 'out of the ordinary' events included a 9 April purported AOG attempt to rally demonstrators in Ghazni City against the GoA as a result of the latter party's decision not to replace the Ghazni Governor as well as the violence (stone throwing) that resulted from a clash between a total of 250 political supporters of different Afghan Presidential candidates that oc-



curred in Ghazni City on the 12th.

Despite what appears to be sustained AOG activity, locals assert that AOG operations have been curtailed by IMF/ANSF; with this, though, local perceptions of a decrease in high profile AOG activities (such as assassinations) have actually allowed AOG to gain some favor with locals. Additionally, AOG are said to still maintain control of Nawa District in the south, all factors NGO should keep in context if deterioration continues in surrounding provinces.

HELMAND

Violent incidents continue to plague Helmand Province. On 9 April, a person outfitted with a BBIED device targeted a passing ANP convoy that was assigned to safeguard tractors heading to eradicate a poppy field in the vicinity of Sarkar, Lashkar Gah City. Reported casualties included the deaths of 4 ANP, one child, and the BBIED attacker, and more


KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Suicide attacks
- Armed clashes

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	1
This Report Period	0

than 10—ANP and civilians—wounded. Likewise, another BBIED attacker who attempted and failed to detonate himself was shot and killed by ANP in the Garmser DAC (ANP reported that the attacker's trigger mechanism failed). These suicide attacks coincide with the credible, numerous threats that have cited a constant deployment of AOG's to the region.

And once again, both IMF and ANSF actively engaged AOG members in the region. A large



number of AOG's were reportedly killed in an operation, with parties claiming that at least some of the dead AOG were of foreign origin, which, if true, could confirm previously reported information that foreign fighters had infiltrated from Afghanistan's eastern neighbour.

URUZGAN

IMF inroads in Tirin Kot continue to be challenged by AOG attacks on ANSF, demonstrated in the foiled BBIED attack on 1 April against an ANP post—the attacker was shot dead by ANP. NGO should also note that suicide bombers have reportedly in-


KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Kidnapping/abduction
- AOG opposition to NGO efforts
- IED

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	2
This Report Period	0

filitrated into Tirin Kot City and Darafshan. They are said to possess a Toyota Corolla that is laden with explosives and intend to target IMF/ANSF facilities and convoys.

IMF and ANSF also were active during the reporting period, conducting a joint ground and air operation on the 10th that reportedly killed 4 AOG, including a local commander, and wounded 4 AOG and 3 civilians. Although



limited, NGO should be attentive to any possible local discontent due to the IMF airstrike's targeting of three residences during the operation.

NOTICE: Your input is invaluable for the production of this report. While we appreciate information on incidents, we also need general information on the security situation in your area. So please remember to call or email us regularly.

Contact details of ANSO staff are provide on the last page.

ANSO: “..by NGOs for NGOs..”



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ANSO ACRONYMS

IMF-International Military Forces / AOG-Armed Opposition Groups / GOA-Government of Afghanistan / ACG-Armed Criminal Groups / ANA-Afghan National Army / ANP-Afghan National Police / IED-Improvised Exploding Device / AEF-Afghan Eradication Forces / RPG-Rocket Propelled Grenade / IDF-Indirect Fire (ex: mortars) / VBIED-Vehicle Borne Improvised Exploding Device / PRP-Previous Reporting Period / ANBP-Afghan National Border Police / SAF-Small Arms Fire / NDS-National Directorate of Security (intelligence) / PSC-Private Security Company / DC/DAC-District Administration Centre / BBIED-Body Borne Improvised Explosive Device

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MISSING

This report ANSO could not provide analysis for the provinces of:

- Nuristan
- Faryab
- Jawzjan
- Baghlan
- Badakshan
- Ghor
- Bamyan

This is because we do not know enough about the area to comment on the significance of the incidents occurring there.

If you can help us understand the province better please contact us.

TRAINING ANNOUNCEMENT

Please note that ANSO will be hosting [The Centre for Safety and Development \(CSD\)](#) for the following training session:

May 12-14, 2009, Security Management Country Level Course, Kabul, Afghanistan, ANSO Office.

Please note that NGO registered with ANSO will receive a 200 Euro discount from [CSD](#) when applying for this course.

This Security Management Course will improve participants' knowledge, insights and skills regarding security management. Participants will be able to contribute to reducing organisational security risks, by learning to develop and maintain a relevant and proportional security plan on country/project level.

NGO are encouraged to contact [CSD](#) directly at the following address if interested in attending: ebe@centreforsafety.org