

THE ANSO REPORT

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YOU NEED TO KNOW

- Significant deterioration in road security country wide
- Consistently high volumes of NGO security incidents
- Increasing severity of NGO related security incidents
- Continued escalation and spread of the conflict

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
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COUNTRY SUMMARY

One of the most important developments in the context of the conflict in 2007 was the significant deterioration of security along Hwy 1, primarily in the portion between Ghazni in the south and Farah in the west. 2008 has seen a furthering of this, with the section of this road immediately south of Kabul (through Wardak) now facing a similar reality. In addition, there has also been a deterioration in the security along other important routes, including the Kabul-Jalalabad road. This clearly indicates that the influence, and dominance, of security along these critical arterials has been an ongoing AOG operational focus and goal. Through regular attacks against secu-




rity forces and logistical convoys illegal checkpoints and abductions. AOG elements have effectively ensured their freedom of movement while denying the same to others; including the NGO community. Frequent attacks against

NGO vehicles in the north as well as the recent incident in Logar (and taking ACG activity into consideration) indicate that road travel can no longer be considered a routine matter in large portions of the country.

NGO DATA & TRENDS

June and July reported record levels of NGO related security incidents with this month trending similarly. The first 2 weeks of August alone already account for 15 such incidents. While this may be partially attributed to the general increase and spread of the conflict country wide, it also serves as clear support to the previous assessment that AOG are now actively targeting NGO activities and staff, a factor that is now part of the operational reality for those working in the development and humanitarian sectors. In addition, there has also been a concomitant increase in the severity of these incidents, as indicated by the 65% increase in NGO staff fatalities for 2008 in comparison to 2007 (17-for all of 07/23-by 14 August 08).



KABUL

The security situation in Surobi is deteriorating, with attacks on the Kabul-Jalalabad road becoming more frequent. During this reporting period three fuel tankers were burned in two attacks, and heavy fighting between AOG and security forces has occurred. There is every reason to believe such incidents will continue, as AOG reportedly now have two cells operating against the road: one to the north of the road based in Laghman and Kabul attacking near Surobi, and one based in Nangarhar attempting to operate closer to Jalalabad. Given the potential danger this poses to travel between Kabul and Jalalabad, ANSO recommends NGO cease road travel between Kabul and

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Collateral damage from IED
- Deteriorating security in Surobi
- Complex/spectacular attacks against high profile targets


	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	15
This Report Period	1

Jalalabad for at least thirty days. During this time NGO should monitor security reports to assess the status of the security situation on this route to determine if a longer moratorium is necessary.

A 2nd August RPG attack on an INGO medial clinic in the Sare Jegdalek area may signal a spread in AOG targeting activity in the Surobi area, and in the wake of recent events in Logar (see Logar assessment), any additional evidence of this must be taken with the requisite gravity.

IED attacks are a prominent threat, as demonstrated by the RCIED attack on the 3rd of August on a U.S. coalition vehicle in Hussein Khel, and an 11 August VBIED attack on an ISAF convoy on Jalalabad Road.

Criminal incidents in Kabul city are now on par with AOG attributed incidents, an anomaly when compared to other districts. As



might be expected with a large city, roughly 90% of provincial crimes recorded by ANSO this year were reported from within Kabul. In regards to this, there are two notable points: 1) the quality and availability of reports recording criminal incident levels may fluctuate more than AOG reporting levels, thus affecting the trend line and 2) many of the crimes recorded are relatively small crimes related to property, drugs, and personal disputes that pose little direct concern for NGO. That said, there have been criminal incidents directly affecting NGO which should be considered likely in areas with pervasive criminality, a situation that will likely continue for the mid to long term. Likely threats include street crime, armed robberies of residents and offices, and criminal abduction.

PARWAN

There were very few incidents recorded during this reporting period. NGO with combined operations throughout the province have reported no recent problems, with the exception of a 31 July burglary of an NGO office in Chaharikar.

Collateral damage from IEDs or rockets intended for security forces is a notable threat for NGO. Through the summer, there have been periodic attacks between Chaharikar and Bamyan,

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS


- IED along main routes
- Criminality

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	4
This Report Period	0

particularly on the main road, with the most recent incident occurring on 12 August when a policeman was killed in an IED attack in Ghorband.

There is anecdotal reporting that some communities in Shinwari District are concerned about the nature of some NGO work, finding it incompatible with local culture or community wishes. While this may not pose an immediate threat, deteriorating NGO support could presage future security problems, and warrants NGO monitoring.

There are limited official reports of criminal incidents, and those



reports received suggest no particular trend salient to NGO. However, there are unofficial reports of a notable amount of local crime, primarily various manifestations of extortion. While this is reported to be mostly confined to the local business community or other moneyed groups, an environment of criminality can affect NGO for their perceived value as a kidnap or extortion target.

WARDAK

Heavy fighting in eastern Wardak has made it the most volatile Central Region province. The threat to NGO operations in proximity to active combat areas was evidenced earlier this month in Maydan Sharh when an INGO guard was killed by a stray ordinance. While there are indications that the Bihsud districts are more secure than the restive eastern districts, it should be noted that the area has some AOG presence, and while reporting from the area is limited, fighting in the east could push AOG west, providing a further destabilising factor to this area.

Abduction also remains a prevalent risk in Wardak. On the 6th of August on the main road in


KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Ongoing clashes between AOG and security forces
- Abduction/kidnapping threat
- Overarching area instability

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	6
This Report Period	2

Nirikh, four NGO staff were mistakenly seized (and later released) by armed abductors seeking workers from a local road construction project. This incident furthers to highlight the inherent instability that exists along all main routes in the area. NGO should deem roads to be covertly monitored by AOG and in conjunction to this, and the abduction threat, should count on the possibility of AOG check points, especially in the late afternoon/early evening as such a check point was reported last week in the Haftasya area of Sayadabad.

In addition to the dangers within Wardak itself, the situation in the province needs to be viewed in the general context of the area, particularly in conjunction with Logar and Ghazni. Ghazni (to the immediate south) remains a volatile AOG stronghold with AOG incident levels second only to Kandahar and in line with



Kunar in the ER. Any progress in improving the security situation in Wardak, or any one of these provinces individually, will be temporary as long as the situation in the bordering provinces remains anything close to their present states. Currently, there is nothing to suggest solutions will arrive in the mid to long term. These factors, taken along with the inherent instability and volatility along the province's main roads, result in Wardak being assessed as high-risk for NGO operations. INGO and local NGO that have, or can be perceived to have, links with either the Afghan government or international donors should consider a moratorium in their operations there for a period of 30-60 days in order for them to further assess the prevailing security situation and allow for a re-evaluation of their security protocols and procedures.

KAPISA

There is active fighting in Kapisa, mostly in the District of Tagab though Nijarab and Alasay are also susceptible to clashes. Overall, the entire province should be considered unstable and high risk


KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Attacks against DC
- Collateral involvement in air strikes and other military operations

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	1
This Report Period	0

for NGO operations.

In Tagab there are conflicting reports of civilian casualties form an IMF air-strike, with ISAF claiming no civilian casualties and media and locals reporting up to 30 casualties. Regardless of the actual number, rumours of casualties may fuel enmity toward internationals in Tagab and other areas, thus increasing support for AOG.



Of a more immediate concern, the incident is indicative of the danger that military operations can pose to civilians and NGO.

LOGAR

On 13 August four NGO staff (3 female internationals and a local driver) were executed in an ambush on their vehicle in the Kolangar area of Puli Alam District. As in the abduction and subsequent (assumed) execution of the international INGO staff member in Kandahar in January, this incident may indicate a “threshold” event which indicates AOG intent to more actively target the humanitarian community, though at this time more data and analysis is required to support this possibility. As well, this incident, while significant in itself, also needs to be taken into context regarding provincial incident trends as well as the general security context of


KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Decreasing stability province wide
- Multiple threats along Hwy 1
- Abduction

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	7
This Report Period	3

the region it occurred in. Logar exists within the fertile AOG “triangle” of Wardak, Logar, and Ghazni. Wardak, with its heavy fighting, has been the most obviously dangerous Central Region province, and Ghazni is a volatile AOG stronghold with AOG incident levels second only to Kandahar (and in line with Kunar). Any progress in the security situation within Logar will be temporary as long as Wardak and Ghazni remain volatile. Currently, there is nothing to suggest any improvement is likely in the mid to long term.

Logar is also known to be highly conservative and maintains a considerable AOG presence. NGO have report a heightened uneasiness among local communities regarding the province’s current security situation, and reports



have indicated a high degree of AOG monitoring, as well as direct actions, along both the main road from Kabul and many of the provincial secondary roads.

These factors, taken along with the inherent instability and volatility along the provinces main roads, results in Logar being assessed as high risk for NGO operations. INGO and local NGO that have, or can be perceived to have, links with either the Afghan government or international donors should consider a moratorium in their operations there for a period of 30-60 days in order for them to further assess the prevailing security situation and allow for a re-evaluation of their security protocols and procedures.

DAYKUNDI

Information with which to assess Daykundi’s security situation remains limited. Information received indicates that government control is limited and that there are local commanders who are able to operate with relative impunity.


KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- AOG presence in south of province
- Limited security presence and reporting

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	1
This Report Period	0

nity. This was evidenced in last month’s kidnapping of INGO staff members over a dispute with local government in Nili.

There are also limited security forces in the province and most security is imposed by local tribes who are reportedly able to control much of the AOG movement. However, AOG are known to move freely on the south and the extent of their presence in the



north is unknown. Given the absence of government control and information, NGO should factor this into their risk assessment for staffing in Daykundi.

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Contact details of ANSO staff are provide on the last page.

KAPISA

There is active fighting in Kapisa, mostly in the District of Tagab though Nijarab and Alasay are also susceptible to clashes. Overall, the entire province should be considered unstable and high risk


KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Attacks against DC
- Collateral involvement in air strikes and other military operations

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	1
This Report Period	0

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In Tagab there are conflicting reports of civilian casualties form an IMF air-strike, with ISAF claiming no civilian casualties and media and locals reporting up to 30 casualties. Regardless of the actual number, rumours of casualties may fuel enmity toward internationals in Tagab and other areas, thus increasing support for AOG.



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JAWZJAN


Local politics and criminality continue to be the main issues in Jawzjan, with both a major robbery and a political assassination of a village headman occurring during this reporting period. Additionally, there was in an incident in

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Political infighting
- Criminal activity

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	5
This Report Period	0

which a school was set ablaze. NGOs have not been targeted during the last few reporting periods, though this should not be taken as an indicator that existent threats have abated and should maintain their interest in the happenings within the local governance structures. Many of the recent incidents have been the result of a province-wide district gover-



nor reshuffling, the fallout from which will likely continue for some time.

BALKH

The NGO-related incidents for this period in Balkh reflect and compliment the pattern of random attacks against NGOs witnessed across the north. Both attacks featured assailants on motorcycles, in one case setting fire to an NGO vehicle and then threatening/admonishing the occupants to stop their work, and in


KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Criminal activity
- Attacks on NGO along main routes

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	8
This Report Period	2

the other attack NGO vehicles with targeted with small arms fire. In previous such attacks, the assailants have been unknown to the beneficiary community, therefore having no influence over them. These types of attacks most commonly occur along the main routes; primarily the inter-provincial routes. Along with these attacks, a school was also struck by an RPG.

While these types of attacks are by their nature unpredictable, NGOs



should review their movement protocols with the understanding that such incidents have become more prevalent and that they are likely to occur in the future. The Chaharbolak District is where the plurality of such attacks have occurred.

SAMANGAN


Samangan has been relatively quiet with the exception of complex attack on a police checkpoint which has been attributed AOGs. The location of Samangan as a

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Abduction threat

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	1
This Report Period	0

gateway to the north of the country continues to give rise to the concern that AOGs will seek to use it as a staging ground for further spectacular attacks, but no specific threats have been indicated at this time.



KUNDUZ

The first weeks of August have seen a dramatic upsurge in AOG activity. Aside from the usual threat of suicide and IED attacks on IMF, NGOs, and clinics have been threatened with more frequency, and there has been a major increase in attacks on schools. The school attacks have increased from the usual average of one a month to almost ten for the first half of this month. Some NGOs have been receiving regular threats in the form of night letters as well as verbal threats. Armed individuals also broke into an

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS


- Upsurge in AOG activity
- Increased threats against schools and clinics

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	4
This Report Period	2

NGO-run clinic with the aim of stealing drugs during this reporting period.

Traditional elites such as elders have been helpful in helping NGOs identify threats and point out the rationale behind them, but it remains to be seen how much latitude or interest they will have to influence the overall situation. Elders point out that NGOs are likely to be targeted as a result of their perceived association with the government.

The deterioration of the situation in Kunduz is already encouraging NGOs to rethink their missions and operations procedures and those NGOs who have not done so should now consider it. The proximate impetus for the recent



AOG upsurge is still unknown, and it cannot be ruled out that the major motivating factor is not provincial political disputes. Social and political units in Kunduz, as elsewhere in the north, tend to be rather highly structured and therefore even AOGs there may be more answerable to political considerations than elsewhere. Hence while it remains to be seen whether the situation will continue to deteriorate or the violence will face political limits, NGOs should exercise the utmost prudence with regards to security-related decision making for the time being.

SAR-E-PUL


Reporting from Sari Pul indicates limited activity in the province, although a few events in this reporting period raise concern over local support for the GoA. ACGs stole a significant sum of cash from a District Department of Education vehicle in Sangcharak District and also over 500 people

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- ACG activity

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	0
This Report Period	0

in Sari Pul District peacefully protested the government's dismissal of a local commander. The targeting of a government vehicle (with money for education, which is held in relatively high esteem according to surveys) is distinct in that almost all incidents in Sari Pul this year have been instances of petty theft or uncovering of weapons caches. It remains to be seen however whether these incidents



portend a more general trend development for the province or represent the more common aberrations in security reporting previously witnessed.

KHOST


The security situation deteriorated in Khost this period with approximately twice (15) as many serious incidents reported as last period. Nonetheless, this is volume is still below those reported last month which accounted for 28 incidents. Nine of the 15 reported incidents

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Increased IED in Sabari
- Ongoing AOG infiltration
- Attacks against NSP related facilities/projects

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	5
This Report Period	0

were IEDs of which four detonated killing a total of five civilians and one ANA soldier with the wounding of one other. Roughly half of the reported incidents were in Khost district with the large majority of those in the city itself. The Sabari IED cell remains active with three devices being set to target Afghan security forces. Intimidation of locals continued as illustrated with the murder of a judge in Khost and a tribal leader in Tere Zayi. NGOs



can expect the security situation to remain volatile, with NSP projects a likely NGO related AOG target. At present it is unknown if such attacks will remain limited to property damage or will escalate to include staff members.

KUNAR

Kunar continues to be the scene of high levels of violence with 31 serious security incidents reported this period. The most notable incidents were three kidnappings. A local employee of an INGO was kidnapped by AOG in Wata Pur District on the 2nd of August. As of this report he has not been released and it's believed that the motive behind this kidnapping is ransom. Another local, this one employed by a road construction company, was also taken at the same time, though from a nearby village.

The third kidnapping was of the Governor of Marawara District


KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Abduction/kidnapping threat
- Ongoing AOG infiltration
- Clashes between AOG and security forces

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	3
This Report Period	1

who was taken while returning from a wedding in Kuz Kunar District on the 1st of August. He was taken to Pakistan and ANP and locals who pursued the kidnappers engaged them in a fire fight in a failed attempt to rescue the Governor. As a result of this engagement, a policeman was killed and a local was wounded. The Governor was later reported to have been brought back into Afghanistan but his exact whereabouts remain unknown at this time.

The majority of violent incidents (19) occurred as usual in Pech District with the majority being ineffectual direct fire attacks on security forces. While IEDs continue to be rare in this province, with 3 reported this period, unlike other provinces they occur with a higher targeting and detonation



success rate. The three IED incidents this period resulted in the deaths of four IMF soldiers, a translator and a driver of a civilian construction vehicle. Of note, there was a direct attack against an ANP post on the 1st of August in Asadabad District. Over the past year Asadabad City has been the target of rockets and of suicide bomb plots, but has been spared the harassing small arms and RPG attacks on police posts that are common in other districts.

At present Kunar remains too volatile for widespread movements of international staff and these should be limited to the main highway and Asadabad City.

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NANGARHAR

The security situation in Nangarhar has remained stable this period. The most notable incident was the kidnapping of local employees of an International Development Organization (involved in road construction) in the Pachir Wagam District on 29 July. They were subsequently released unharmed on the 5th of August. In addition to this, there were multiple IED events as well as a dem-


	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	3
This Report Period	0

onstrations.

The deteriorating security situation in Pakistan has resulted in negative effects on the safety of NGO local employees who travel regularly to Peshawar. A number of murders were reported of Afghan citizens accused by AOG for “spying” and a list of Afghans working for IMF, UN and NGOs to be targeted is rumoured to exist, though this remains unconfirmed. Pakistani security forces exert limited control of the Torkam-Peshawar Highway and groups of AOG are known to operate freely in the area, some within sight of Pakistani police. International staff should not

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Threat of suicide attack against GoA targets
- Attacks along Hwy 1
- AOG presence in southern districts



travel by road to Pakistan and locals should limit travel while observing strict security precautions.


Reports of large numbers of AOG in the southern districts have not resulted in an upsurge of attacks on security forces pointing to the conclusion that the reports were exaggerated. The rural districts of Nangarhar, however, should still be avoided by international staff and local staff should continue to observe low profile travel protocols.

LAGHMAN

Laghman continues to lead all other provinces in IED incidents with 16 devices planted by the AOG being located and safely defused. The IEDs were evenly split between Mitharlam, Alishing and Alinghar Districts with the majority being planted along roads leading to DAC. Dawlat Shah recorded no incidents of any kind

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	3
This Report Period	0


this period in conjunction with reports of heavy AOG traffic transiting through the district, leading to the conclusion that AOG freedom of movement here may occur with the complicit agreement of local authorities. Serious AOG attempts to disrupt traffic on Highway from bases in eastern Laghman have not yet materialized, with most attacks on police and fuel convoys occurring in the Sorubi District of Kabul Province. In addition, IMF interdiction of AOG infiltration routes



from Nangarhar into Laghman appear to have been successful during this period, though it is unclear what long term effects this may have on the overall security of the province. NGO are advised to continue limiting their international staff operations to within Mitharlam City.

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Increased threat of attacks along Hwy 1
- IED along roads leading to DAC



PAKTYA


The security situation for NGOs within Paktya has deteriorated sharply during this reporting period. On 2 August two INGO local employees were kidnapped for ransom by AOG in Jaji District. They were freed safely on the 7th after the families arranged for their release with intervention of local elders. Much more serious were murders of four INGO staff

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Threat to NGO staff along Gardez-Kabul road
- Spread of AOG operations to Jaji and Sayid Karam Districts

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	1
This Report Period	1

and the wounding of a fifth on the Gardez- Kabul Highway on 13 August in Logar Province, Puli Alam District (see the Logar Province report for more details). When taking into the context of general road insecurity, it would appear at present that safe passage for humanitarian workers along this route and throughout this area is gone. NGOs are advised to restrict their international staff operations to Gardez City and local staff should observe low profile travel measures when moving outside city limits. Alternate travel options (i.e. air move-



ments) are recommended for international staff for movement in and out of Paktya.

Security incidents continue at a high level (25), half of which occurred in Gardez District and another six in Zurmat. Gardez City remains quiet while the Gardez-Khost road continues to be the target of IEDs.

BADGHIS


Even though Badghis only had four reported incidents for this month, previous years have never had more than one incident noted during this same period. One

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Violence erupting from personal disputes
- Attacks against police installations

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	0
This Report Period	0

attack was on a police check post, two were the result of personal disputes, and the last was an accidental weapons discharge. While it is presently assessed that these incidents have no direct impact on NGO safety and security, the continued maintenance of situational awareness for insitu NGO staff is recommended.



HERAT


As in previous reports, criminal activity continues to be a major element within the security context of Herat. In recent weeks the province (and the city itself) has seen multiple robberies, the dis-

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Criminality
- Abduction/kidnapping
- Deterioration of security within Shindad District

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	8
This Report Period	0

covery of large weapons caches, arrests of counterfeiters, and the kidnapping of four Afghans (staff of the Herat attorney general's office). The Shindad District in the south of the province has been directly impacted by the volatility of neighboring Farah, with an increased AOG presence there resulting in ongoing clashes with security forces. NGO are advised to limit their movements



and activities in this portion of the province as it is likely that this present insecurity signals the beginning of a long term reality.

GHOR


Ghor province witnessed its first NGO-related incident in the form of an RPG attack on an NGO clinic. In an unrelated incident, there was also the occurrence of a hand grenade being thrown into a local doctor's residence. Ghor saw an unusual spike in violence

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Upsurge in AOG activity

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	1
This Report Period	1

overall during this period, with ten incidents reported as opposed to the average of one or two. The incidents were nearly all AOG in nature (attacks on police checkpoints and district headquarters), with the exception of one that resulted from a dispute between Kuchis and villagers. It is unclear at present if this represents an aberration in reporting or the sig-



nal in an increase in AOG activity and ANSO will monitor the situation and advise NGO accordingly.


ZABUL

On the 25th of July an INGO national staff member (engineer) travelling in his personal vehicle on Kabul-Kandahar main route went missing in the vicinity of Hazartak area, Shar-e-Safa district of Zabul province. The whereabouts of this staff member was unknown for a period of 9 days, after which the INGO main office was contacted by telephone, confirming that the staff member had been kidnapped. Though the staff member was travelling on personal business, the ACG responsible had clear information regarding his movements, indicating the possibility that he had been under observation prior to the abduction. At present, security force operations have been underway in attempts to free the staff member. Recent information indicates that the individual has changed custody, and is now under the con-

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	2
This Report Period	0

trol of a different group, though the affiliation of this group is unknown at this time. Operations to secure release remain underway.

ANSO SR strongly advises the NGO community to observe and maintain anti-surveillance/anti-kidnap protocols. In addition, staff members should also be briefed on how to implement these protocols as the threat extends beyond their place of employment. NGOs are also advised to ensure that all staff are 'sterilised' prior to travel, particularly on Kandahar-Kabul main route. While this protocol will have the greatest impact on mitigating the threat of opportunistic abductions/kidnappings (which generally occur following on site identification of a person of interest), it can also limit personal risk levels to the individual affected, particularly in those incidents perpetrated by AOG. This incident also supports previous analysis which indicated that engineers are a prime target for financially motivated kidnappings due to their perceived value.



There has been a considerable escalation in complex attacks on the Kandahar-Kabul main route during the reporting period. The most significant events encompassed a series of IEDs detonations/recoveries under bridges along Highway 1, though there was also a significant attack against a PSC convoy in the Hazartak area of the Shar-e-Safa District. These incidents, coupled with a number of other serious attacks (that have been undertaken by AOGs against ANP, IMF as well as PSC elements during this reporting period) highlights the extreme risk to all the high profile movements along Hwy 1 in this province. It is believed that AOG attacks of this nature will continue at their present pace, or increase due to the regularity of their success. The scope of AOG activity, which includes ambushes, IED, destruction of bridges and culverts, as well as abductions and the establishment of illegal checkpoints, makes any travel along Hwy 1 extremely hazardous.

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Abduction/kidnapping threat
- Instability along Hwy 1
- Destruction of culverts/bridges

KANDAHAR


The issue of Force Protection shootings have once again come to the fore within Kandahar. A spate of such shootings in the past few weeks have highlighted the threat this poses to NGO safety, particularly in regards to movements within Kandahar City. For 2008 thus far, ANSO has recorded 24 separate incidents, 80% which are attributed to ISAF with the remainder to ANSF elements, accounting for the deaths of at least 15 local nationals. Of these

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Force protection shootings
- Consistently high volumes of AOG activity
- ACG/AOG abduction threat

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	10
This Report Period	0

incidents, 70% have occurred within Kandahar City limits, further illuminating the risk it presents to NGO staff members as they are primarily concentrated to within the city. While no NGO staff have been directly involved in such an incident this year, ANSO continues to advise all NGO staff to strictly observe all security force movement protocols. Maintaining distance from security force convoys, following all issued directions at either checkpoints or from convoys, and maintaining an awareness of surroundings (early identification of such convoys can allow for adequate time to pull over) are all



measures that can be utilised to mitigate the risks.

Overall incident volumes within Kandahar have continued at the considerable rates which began in late May-early June. At present there are no indicators of any abatement of these rates for the short to mid term. Geographically, the Zhari District and Kandahar City account for the highest incident concentrations, with Panjwai, Shah Wali Kot, and Arghandab maintaining their established high levels of volatility.

GHAZNI

On the 15th of August the Nawa DC was occupied by a large force of AOG. As the District Governor and insitu ANP were forewarned of this action, they had previously departed, allowing the AOG to occupy the location unopposed. This is the second such occupation within Ghazni during the past few months. While in the previous incident they were dislodged by a responding force of


KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Attacks on District Centers
- High levels of AOG activity
- Instability along Hwy 1

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	2
This Report Period	0

ANA/IMF, the occupation is the goal and it has been very clear from previous such occurrences that the AOG have no intent to hold the ground. Instead, they will displace in the face of heavy opposition, allowing them to conserve manpower and resources after already achieving their primary tactical and operational goals.

These types of attacks will likely continue as the volatility level in Ghazni has remained extremely high, and there have been no indicators that it will decrease in the short to mid term. NGO should



consider any activities outside of Ghazni City extremely hazardous and adjust any service delivery plans accordingly. In addition, NGO should cease any road travel between Ghazni and Kabul along Hwy 1, not only because of the inherent instability of this province, but due to the deterioration of the security context within Wardak (as well as Logar), areas which need to be transited through in order to reach Kabul.

HELMAND


AOG operational capacity has continued unimpeded despite the ongoing security force operations to counter their presence. This reality is supported by the attack, and subsequent destruction, of the Nad Ali District Centre by a considerable force of AOG on the 14th of August. In addition, previous reports indicating an in-

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	0
This Report Period	0

creased focus by AOG elements on Lashkar Gah City was illuminated by the 6 August assault against an ANP checkpoint in the Safiyano area of the city which resulted in the death of at least 10 police officers. Having said this, security forces have reported success in interdicting IED cells intent of deploying devices in the vicinity of the city. These devices were primarily targeted at bridges and culverts, a trend that has developed throughout the SR, though without the regularity or

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS


- Security force operations
- Significant AOG infiltration
- IED threat



success seen in Zabul and Ghazni.

Due to the overarching volatility of the majority of this province, as well as ongoing security force operations in multiple areas, NGO are advised to continue limiting their activities to within Lashkar Gah.

AOG Initiated Attacks per Region per Month -2008





ANSO is hosted by
Deutsche Welthungerhilfe

To Register with ANSO
contact:
operations2@afgnso.org

ANSO is managed by an NGO
Board. If you have any
feedback, good or bad, let
them know on:
ansoab@yahoo.com

ANSO ACRONYMS

IMF-International Military Forces / **AOG**-Armed Opposition Groups / **GOA**-Government of Afghanistan / **ACG**-Armed Criminal Groups / **ANA**-Afghan National Army / **ANP**-Afghan National Police / **IED**-Improvised Exploding Device / **AEF**-Afghan Eradication Forces / **RPG**-Rocket Propelled Grenade / **IDF**-Indirect Fire (ex: mortars) / **VBIED**-Vehicle Borne Improvised Exploding Device / **PRP**-Previous Reporting Period / **ANBP**-Afghan National Border Police / **SAF**-Small Arms Fire / **NDS**-National Directorate of Security (intelligence) / **PSC**-Private Security Company / **DC**-District Centre

CONTACT ANSO

CENTRAL REGION OFFICE (KABUL)

Blake Kehler - central@afgnso.org - 0799 323 792
Hedayatullah - central2@afgnso.org - 0799 322 116

NORTH REGION OFFICE (MAZAR)

Scott Bohlinger - north@afgnso.org - 0799 404 617
Firoz Fahez - north2@afgnso.org - 0799 408 252

EAST REGION OFFICE (JALALABAD)

John Binns - east@afgnso.org - 0799 248 362
Khisrow Shohar - east2@afgnso.org - 0798 778 014

SOUTH REGION OFFICE (KANDAHAR)

Nathan Ronaldson - south@afgnso.org - 0797 414 100
Mohammadi - south2@afgnso.org - 0700 300 730

WEST REGION OFFICE (HERAT)

Vacant - west@afgnso.org - 0799 322 192
Najma Fazly - west2@afgnso.org - 0799 446 820

COUNTRY MANAGEMENT (KABUL)

Nic Lee - director@afgnso.org - 0799 325 349
Nathan Ronaldson - operations@afgnso.org - 0797 165 017
Chona Bollos - administration@afgnso.org - 0797-093-073

MISSING

This report ANSO could not provide analysis for the provinces of:

- Panjshir
- Nuristan
- Farah
- Takhar
- Badakhshan
- Faryab
- Baghlan
- Paktika
- Nimroz
- Uruzgan

This is because we do not know enough about the area to comment on the sig-

THE ANSO MANDATE

Scope of Services, P.1, 2008

The community of NGOs has established ANSO in recognition of their interdependence and shared responsibility towards security management.

They have acknowledged that ANSO is important in maintaining the impartiality, independence and political neutrality of NGOs by allowing them to be free from dependence upon security information originating from political or military sources.

They have also recognized the need to avoid association with the military in the complex Afghanistan environment and have therefore perceived a valuable role for ANSO in protecting NGO from direct contact with the military.

The community recognizes that the success of ANSO in fulfilling these functions is dependant upon the willingness of NGOs to cooperate with one another in the area of security management and to support ANSO in delivering these objectives.

In so forming ANSO then, the NGO community has accepted the inherent obligation to contribute and participate for the effective management of their own security.