

THE ANSO REPORT

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YOU NEED TO KNOW

- High volume civilian casualties in Farah
- Complex attack in Khost City
- High NGO incident volumes in Eastern Region
- Sustained AOG activity levels in Kunduz

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
NORWEGIAN MINISTRY
OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

COUNTRY SUMMARY

Recent events in the East and Western Regions dominated the reporting period.

The large scale complex attack against GoA facilities within Khost City; the dynamic occupation by AOG of an IMF/ANSF FOB in Kunar, along with 3 separate significant NGO incidents (also in Khost) clearly indicate the depth, scope, and capacity of the AOG presence within this Region.

The attack within Khost City appears to have been a clearly targeted attack against the GoA, (with multiple BBIED being utilized) with the security force response; success of the attack; as well as the size of the affected city responsible for the escalated significance of what was ultimately a standard complex



attack.

The civilian casualty toll from IMF air strikes following an AOG operation in Farah Province marks the largest yet recorded (est. 140) from a single incident. While the air strike was the direct cause of the casualties, the AOG occupation of a civilian centre facilitated the event. It should be noted, however, that the engagement had been bro-


ken prior to the airstrike.

Kunduz continues to be the most volatile province within the North, and will likely remain the AOG centre of gravity for same.

The recent escalation in events within Baghlan indicate that the expected AOG effort to influence the northern MSR is taking shape, with Pul-E-Khumri as the focal point.

NGO DATA & TRENDS

The Eastern Region continues to record the highest levels of NGO incidents countrywide. Khost was the loci this period (Kunar last period) with 3 separate NGO incident recorded. These events have the hallmark of AOG 'shaping operations' in which influential civilian/GoA 'soft' targets are attacked/intimidated to further their influence within the civil population.



KABUL

As has been the trend since the opening of 2009, criminality has been the predominant issue within this province, with a particular focus in Kabul City. Criminal events have been trending almost on par with AOG attributed activity. With ANSF focus shifted from conflict related efforts in the city and it's environs, they have concomitantly been able to concentrate efforts on basic policing. The criminal threat was highlighted by the collateral involve-


KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Criminality
- Suicide attacks
- IED

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	5
This Report Period	0

ment of an IO national staff member in a store robbery recently, as well as the physical assault of a second staff member also during this period.

In relation to this, criminal kidnappings continue to remain a key element of criminal activity, as witnessed by the recent high-profile arrests of kidnapping groups. However, the involvement of these same security forces in recent cases also serve to complicate this issue, as a recent kidnapping of a local businessman by a group wearing ANP uniforms on board an ANP vehicle was followed by the arrest of an ANP



officer of Chahar Asyab District suspected of involvement in this incident. Furthermore, ANP also arrested four ANA officers to be linked to a previous abduction.

In the conflict realm, AOG focus remains in the southern and eastern districts of the province, with the northern areas relatively unaffected.

WARDAK

Despite the increase of IMF (and the APPF) within this province, AOG have begun to assert their presence with greater authority. Incident levels, which had been relatively stable during the opening months of 2009, have begun to increase with this period being no exception. It is likely that there was an initial displacement/


KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- AOG intimidation efforts
- Abduction/kidnapping
- IED

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	0
This Report Period	0

assessment period of AOG following the "surge" and now that the environment has stabilised, they are seeking to re-consolidate the gains made during the summer months of 2008.

Thus far AOG incidents have been relatively consistent with past efforts and included attacks on IMF convoys and DAC, IED, as well as attacks against road construction elements. The most troubling development this period was the reported blockage of the main road in Jalrez in which AOG



threatened the local population. Of note, this incident occurred in the premier deployment site of the APPF.

The result of increased IMF in the province also manifested itself, with 2 separate Force Protection shootings being reported during this period.

Please Note:

Monthly graphs provided in this report are inclusive as of 13 May 2009.

KAPISA


An NGO national staff member (female) received a direct threat letter detailing her to cease employment with NGO or any other such “foreign” related organisation. This marks the first NGO related incident reported in Kapisa this year and is also a departure from the standard AOG actions reported which is fairly

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Ongoing military operations
- AOG intimidation efforts

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	1
This Report Period	1

limited in number and scope, generally restricted to attacks against security forces. It is unclear at this time if this event will indicate a greater effort on intimidation tactics, though this is fairly standard, particularly in areas where they are short on tactical capacity. In addition, the recent poisoning incident at a school (similar in nature to that of the Parwan incident) also suggests an increased will to engage in intimidation measures.



As part of the recent increase of IMF within the province, there are ongoing military operations (joint IMF/ANSF) within the districts of Tagab, Nijrab, and Alasay all of which are typical operational areas for AOG elements in this province.

PARWAN


There have been few overt expressions of AOG presence within this province thus far, though the recent IED attack against IMF, as well as the RPG

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- IED
- Attacks in vicinity of Bagram Air-base

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	1
This Report Period	0

attack against the Kohi Safi DAC indicates that there remains an active, albeit limited, AOG presence. This presence is most often noted in intimidation efforts against GoA affiliated institutions, as seen in the IED attack against a school, as well as the mysterious poisoning incident at another.



DAYKUNDI

Following expressed intent to abduct IO and GoA staff members, the same local commander (along with 2 guards) visited an INGO field site in order to question the staff. While no staff was available, he did question the guard in regards to the NGO's activities as well as the number of expat staff in location. It is worth noting that


KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Abduction/kidnapping
- AOG infiltration/influence

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	1
This Report Period	1

this commander was responsible for the abduction of NGO expat staff in 2008 and has been recently attempting to solidify his involvement with AOG elements. While the initial threat of abduction did not expressly include NGO, considering the opportunistic nature of group in question, this threat should be accorded to include NGO.

As well, this group has been able to operate with relative impunity



within Nili and as such NGO should review staffing/travel plans to this province in order to limit the exposure of international staff to this ongoing threat.

FARYAB

On 3 May in Kohistan District, an unknown person tossed a grenade into an INGO compound, causing no casualties. While the exact actor remains unknown, the attack is believed to be resultant from a personal or professional grievance with the said INGO. NGO's should remain diligent, however, because of possible AOG bleed over from Badghis Province and ethnic tensions or migrations that


KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Local political disputes
- AOG activity in Western Districts

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	2
This Report Period	1

may inflame the situation in the province. Additionally, if NGO's continue to monitor the ANSO Weekly Incident List, they may note continual ANSF confiscations of communications gear and weapons, which lend credence to the postulation that AOG activity will continue to increase in the province.

Moreover, if NGO's are perceived as colluding with any local parties to the conflict—whether through known receipt of funding or actual interaction—they may find themselves deemed legitimate tar-



gets. Besides the abovementioned incident, Qaysar District proved to be the most disconcerting area during the period, with AOG attacks on ANP checkpoints. Additionally, ANP conducted a successful operation that gained the release of an elder in the district that had been kidnapped by AOG.

JAWZJAN

Jawzjan Province continues to be affected by elements of criminality, especially in Shibirghan District. Additionally, grenade attacks—probably due to personal grievances—continued to occur, and ANSF was usually occupied in response to normal crime, with a few AOG apprehensions being


KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Local political disputes
- ACG activity

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	0
This Report Period	0

the exception.

Regardless of the apparent lack of AOG initiated activity during the period, NGO's should be wary of future developments. For example, it is suspected that a prominent AOG supporter (or proxy) remains in the area despite IMF attempts to locate him. In the past, it was a widely held belief that this prominent personality was responsible for the majority of banditry and attacks on ANSF and infrastructure, usually after



provision of AOG financial incentives. Hence, this AOG proxy may be in hiding and have called only a temporary suspension to his supporters' activities.

TRAINING ANNOUNCEMENT:

Please see page 15 of this report for upcoming training opportunities being hosted by ANSO

BALKH

The prevalent hindrance to NGO activities in Balkh Province, as well as across the northern region, was flooding that continues to afflict residents. Flooding was reported in Sholgara, Kishindih, and Zari Amrakh districts, in the


KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Increased AOG activity
- Attacks against security forces
- Criminality

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	3
This Report Period	0

province, and in Dara-e Suf Bala and Dara-e Suf Payin in Samangan Province. With additional floods occurring throughout the region, NGO's travelling in the north should contact stakeholders or trusted parties in areas prior to travel to ensure that the areas are open to travel.

Other activity in the province entailed usual elements of criminality, mainly drug activity and theft.



And with the upcoming summer, NGO's should remain diligent to theft of items left in NGO vehicles, as well as opportunistic banditry.

BAGHLAN

Rumours of AOG activity in the province and the intent to utilise it as a springboard for future AOG operations persist. The increased precarious nature of the situation was brought to the fore on 6 May when it is believed that AOG successfully targeted the Dahana-e Ghor District Governor, killing him, the local NDS Chief, and guards that were escorting him


KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Instability in Eastern Districts
- Attacks along main routes

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	0
This Report Period	0

(one was his son).

The remainder of incidents followed typical patterns that are usually seen in more active provinces, such as ANSF seizures of weapons and arrests of AOG suspects, AOG targeting of ANSF and IMF, and AOG desires—albeit unsuccessful—to further utilise IED's. Although information from the province is limited, NGO's should expect to see a gradual, yet steady, increase in AOG activity in the area. Assessments on the sustainability of



AOG operations, however, are dependent on further indications from IMF. Regardless, NGO's should not expect to see any exacting and effective IMF efforts to assert the GoA's writ and, hence, should continue to focus on local acceptance measures.

BADAKSHAN


Activity in Badakshan during the reporting period was overwhelmingly criminal in nature and lacked any IED incidents, in contrast to last period's pattern. With this, ANSF efforts predominately were taken in response to murders that

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Local political conflicts
- Infrequent IED

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	0
This Report Period	0

appeared not to be linked with any AOG's; however, because information is limited on the incidents, it is possible that some of the killings occurred because of other issues that afflict the region writ large, such as the poppy industry. Of note, though, was the 11 May arson of a girls' secondary school in Darayim District. According to ANSO records, this is



the first arson of a school since the August 2008 targeting of a tent school in Darwaz District.

KUNDUZ


AOG sustained activity in the province, primarily against ANSF. AOG conducted almost simultaneous attacks in Chahar Dara District against different targets—one an ANP checkpoint and the other an IMF patrol. In all instances of

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Increased AOG coordination
- Attacks against security forces

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	5
This Report Period	0

AOG armed clashes with IMF or ANSF, however, AOG sustained significant losses, compared to minor injuries of ANSF personnel. Regardless, IED attacks took a secondary role during the period, possibly due to ANSF IED discoveries in Kunduz and Archi districts. NGO's should also note the 4 May RCIED discovery on the Kunduz-Taluqan Road in Khanabad District. Regardless of



their lacklustre effect, NGO's should expect close-range ambushes to continue against ANSF in the province.

KHOST

The number of security incidents involving NGO during this reporting period reflects the high levels of violence experienced across the province, including a complex attack in Khost City that lasted an entire day. Having been closed due to a previous AOG action and two months after re-opening, an INGO clinic in Lakan, east of Khost City, was again attacked by AOG who assaulted staff and stole a generator in the early hours of 01 May, and who then returned to the property later in the morning and used two anti-tank mines to cause substantial damage to the clinic. The following evening a clinic in Khulbesat, Sabari, was also attacked by a


KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- IED
- AOG prevalence in Sabari
- Abduction along Gardez-Khost road

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	4
This Report Period	3

group that stole a large amount of equipment and supplies, including the compound's generator. In this instance staff were able to leave the compound before the AOG entered and were not harmed. In Qalandar District, in the west of the province, a rented and unmarked minibus being used to convey staff from an INGO clinic was stopped and stolen by a group of armed men on the afternoon of 11 May.

The most significant event in this period was the complex attack against the Provincial Governor's Office and Municipality Offices in Khost City that began in the morning of 12 May when about eight members of an AOG dressed in ANP uniforms and using a 'Ranger' marked as an ANP vehicle were able to gain access to the Governor's compound. Using several BBIED in the initial stages, approximately 20



people were killed and a similar number injured during the day which saw ANSF and IMF restore relative peace to the city by early evening. A SVBIED used outside the IMF base on the outskirts Khost the following morning killed at least nine people and reinforced widespread anticipation that several of those responsible for the previous day's attack were still at large in the city.

During this reporting period and without taking into account the 12 May complex attack, 21 IED incidents were reported, of which ten were detonations against targets, injuring approximately 30 people and killing at least ten. The use of IED in Khost is widespread and AOG have a broad targeting strategy. IED therefore remain a significant threat to all operating in the province.

PAKTYA


As was seen at the end of 2008, AOG in Paktya are well able to use a range of different means to pursue their objectives and a greater variety of incident types are seen in the province than elsewhere in the region. An IED in Chamkanay killed two members of an ANBP patrol on 09 May. A device used against an IMF supply vehicle in Schwak two days later

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- IED
- Attacks on DAC
- Abduction along Gardez-Khost road

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	1
This Report Period	0

did not cause any casualties. In Gardez a man transporting or placing an IED died when his device detonated prematurely on 02 May. Both Lija Mangal and Ahamabad (Sayid Karam) DAC were attacked during this period. The Ahamabad (Sayid Karam) attack occurred in the early hours of 09 May and continued for over two hours until IMF air support forced an AOG withdrawal, at which stage it could be ascertained that approximately 20 of the attackers had been killed. The only use of indirect fire in the province saw six mortar rounds



fired at Gardez ANP Regional Training Centre. The single round that landed in the compound injured six people. The find of a heavy machine gun in transit at a random checkpoint in the northern district of Jaji on 05 May can be taken as an indication of AOG desire to attack aircraft. Whether the weapon was intended for use by AOG in Paktya or elsewhere is not known.

LAGHMAN

With a slight increase in reported AOG activity levels compared to the corresponding period in 2008, this reporting period was punctuated by two high profile events in Mehtarlam City. An IED was used to kill the Mayor as he approached his office compound on 04 May and also killed four of his staff and a passer-by. At least ten other people were injured. The reporting period closed with an attack on the City's jail on 15 May. A late night firefight with those guarding the jail saw one prisoner


KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Attacks along Route 1
- Attacks against GoA/Security Forces
- Abduction/Kidnapping

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	1
This Report Period	0

escape and another die, and at least one of the attackers captured in the security forces' follow-up operation.

Other reported AOG activity in Laghman all occurred in Qarghayi, the province's southern district through which the Kabul-Jalalabad road passes for a significant part of its length. AOG in the district mounted three separate attacks, including two against security forces using the main road. An IED was also found close to the road in the area of Khayrokhel where one of the attacks occurred and where similar incidents are often reported. In response to the level of activity evident in the district ANSF conducted a search operation on 11



May, and encountered an AOG that engaged the security forces for approximately 90 minutes before withdrawing.

The lack of IED activity in the Alishing and Alingar Valleys is noteworthy, and, coupled with the incidents outlined above, may indicate a shift of modus operandi by AOG in the province who in this period have demonstrated two clear objectives; disrupt military and international traffic use of Route 1 and conduct limited attacks against high profile targets.

KUNAR


The release of two people, one of whom was a NGO employee, on 01 May followed their abduction by AOG on 20 April and is understood to be due to the efforts of local mediation, which was no doubt helped by a recognition that those taken were not the intended targets of the abduction. Elsewhere in Kunar AOG and security force activity continued in accordance with expectations with one significant exception. A coordinated attack by two sizeable AOG saw the groups takeover a combined ANSF/IMF position in Ghaziabad during the early hours of 01 May, killing several mem-

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Armed clashes
- Indirect fire attacks
- Abduction/kidnapping

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	6
This Report Period	1

bers of both the IM and ANSF. There followed a three day security forces operation across the district and into Nuristan as AOG were harried and counter-attacked, eventually releasing 12 hostages they had taken and breaking away from the attacking security forces. This incident comes after several weeks of increased incident reporting from Ghaziabad and after a renewed effort by security forces to exert control over the district. This incident aside, the distribution of events in Kunar during this period has followed recent trends. Over half of all incidents were short duration direct fire attacks, although as summer progresses the district of Mano Gai accounts for a smaller proportion as activity levels increase in districts such as



Narang and Chawkey. The use of IED in Kunar continues to be limited with two of five incidents being detonations against targets, neither of which caused casualties. As cross-border access has improved there has been an increase in the use of indirect fire, with seven reported incidents. None of the projectiles fired in these attacks, including the eleven rockets fired at Khas Kunar ANP HQ on 05 May, hit their targets. In two instances however the devices fired caused civilian casualties, including students and a teacher in Bar Kunar on 07 May when a projectile launched at the DAC landed in their school compound.

NANGARHAR


The use of IED in Nangarhar continues to be the main tool of AOG in the province. During this reporting period there were ten IED incidents, five involving detonations against targets, three of which caused a total of 15 casualties, including ten fatalities. The greatest loss of life occurred early on 06 May when an IED was used against a vehicle convey-

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- IED
- Attacks against DAC

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	4
This Report Period	0

ing staff to the construction site of an ANBP post in Dih Bala and resulted in the deaths of eight people. As well as attacks which caused ANSF casualties in Dih Bala and Goshta, two separate finds of devices close to the main Kabul-Jalalabad road in Darunta are worthy of note. An ongoing poppy eradication campaign, particularly in Nangarhar's southern districts has encountered resistance twice during early May, including an operation in Sherzad on 09 May where AOG engaged



those involved for almost three hours. Attacks against road construction crews and DAC accounted for most other uses of direct fire by AOG in the province during this reporting period.

NURISTAN


With minimal reporting from Nuristan, it is nonetheless possible to discern a pattern of increasing AOG presence across the province as incidents that are reported are occurring either in districts where they have not been previously, or at an earlier time of year than is usual. During this

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- AOG presence on main routes
- Abduction/kidnapping

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	0
This Report Period	0

reporting period only two incidents have been reported. None were reported in the corresponding period in 2008. The release of hostages taken in the attack in Ghaziabad happened on 06 May in Bargi Matal, and well demonstrates cooperation between AOG operating in different areas, particularly around the Kunar/Nuristan border. Elsewhere, the IMF/ANA base in Kamo was again attacked for a short period



of time on 09 May, although no casualties were caused. It is reasonable to assume an AOG prevalence across much of the province, and all intending to travel in Nuristan should assume AOG activity on major routes.

FARAH

Farah witnessed the single largest incident involving civilian casualties by IMF initiated air strikes since the arrival of foreign military forces. The incident seems to have been triggered by AOG attacks on the ANP check posts in Ganj A Bad and Garnai villages in Bala Buluk district, which galvanized ANSF reinforcements and the consequent taking up of firing positions by AOG within the populated areas. During night


KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Collateral damage
- Armed clashes
- Banditry

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	1
This Report Period	0

hours the ANSF cordon seems to have been withdrawn to allow for an air strike which caused up to 140 dead and 40 wounded - including many women and children. These figures also include a number of AOG casualties (presently 36). It should be noted that at the time of the airstrikes, the engagement had been broken (for whatever reason) and the AOG had clearly established their presence in a known civil population area. It remains unclear as to why airstrikes were nonetheless utilised.

Incidents of such nature are likely to help bolster the ranks of armed



opposition as close relatives of the dead seek alternative means to settling grievances. The subsequent violent demonstrations in Farah city and the still persisting air of anger and helplessness, add to the existing insecurity - considering the possibilities of crowds venting their ire on anything perceived as 'foreign'. NGO may consider reducing their presence and movements to a bare minimum until tempers are cooled and the situation stabilizes.

NOTICE: Your input is invaluable for the production of this report. While we appreciate information on incidents, we also need general information on the security situation in your area. So please remember to call or email us regularly.

Contact details of ANSO staff are provide on the last page.

ANSO: “..by NGOs for NGOs..”

BADGHIS


Badghis maintained the existing high levels of AOG activity during this report period. Since the reinstallation of the provincial commander in Feb 2009, AOG in Badghis have been reorganizing and planning fresh offensives. A considerable build up in the AOG rank and file has been reported along with a few cases of desertions from ANP units. Reports of AOG setting up check points and resorting to forced monetary collections have also been rife in the

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Significant AOG presence
- AOG check posts
- IED

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	1
This Report Period	0

previous two months. IED's are also being employed along roads in the districts of Murghab, Jawand and Qadis. In view of the ANSF and IMF planned military operations and enhanced AOG activity, the risks to civilians from being caught up in the conflict always remains high. There is also the strong possibility of air strikes being carried out in support of ground operations. NGO may remain forewarned to these developments and consider appropriate safeguards to mitigate any possible adverse effects onto their safety and functioning in the province.



The announcements by the umbrella AOG - of the 13 May ambush on an ANA convoy in Muqor - (along with the many other AOG offensive operations in Herat and Farah) as being part of the larger Operation Nasrat announced for this year, raises the spectre of AOG efforts being planned and coordinated at the highest levels. Such arrangements - if true and sustainable - may create enough synergy to pose serious challenges to the authority of the state in Badghis.

HERAT

On 6 May an IO national staff member was reported being waylaid in Gozara district at 6 AM while he was driving back to work after a night out with relatives. He described being accosted by three armed men who relieved him of his cash and identity card. The motive of the robbers pointedly asking for his identity document while allowing him to retain the car, remains to be a matter of conjecture at this point though if true, adds a compelling aspect to this otherwise pedestrian incident.

The ambushing of the convoy of


KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- IED
- Suicide Attacks
- Criminality

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	7
This Report Period	0

the police chief of Kushk and his subsequent kidnapping and killing (along with his bodyguard) by the AOG in Yaka Tut - throws up strong possibilities of AOG initiated revenge against poppy eradication efforts in the district. It is also an indicator of the growing strength and influence of the AOG in the area. With the increasing number of serious incidents; Kushk is soon likely to wind up being considered as one of the more insecure districts in Herat.

While Herat registered few crime related incidents, the number of AOG related incidents have been disproportionately larger than ever. Of the total 54 incidents recorded during this period, 22



were attributable to AOG. The corresponding figures for 2008 reflected 4 AOG incidents against a total of 11; year 2007 stood at 3 AOG related incidents against 10; while during 2006 four AOG linked incidents were recorded against a total tally of 16. The figures for 1st to 15th May 2009 registered a 450% increase in AOG related incidents over the average for the previous three years. The occurrences are not only serious in nature but significant too; as they indicate a trend which points to a widening and deepening of the conflict within Herat.

GHOR

During the last fortnight Ghor recorded a total of eleven security incidents - of which five were attributed to AOG. This reflects an increase of 67%, from the three AOG related incidents reported


KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- AOG intimidation efforts
- UXO

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	1
This Report Period	0

the previous year for the corresponding period.

The return of AOG leaders from across the international borders and the issuing of diktats asking for closure of a girl's school in Shahrak is a sign of the hardening of AOG stance and possible offensive posturing. Going by the number of occurrences, Ghor still



remains the least insecure of the provinces for NGO activity in the western region.

URUZGAN

Although incidents in the province, even in Tirin Kot, were minimal during the period, NGO's should heed the security vacuum as a precautionary warning. Moreover, because AOG's are pervasive throughout the province, and in search of GoA or IMF collaborators, neutrality should be emphasized and collusion—perceived or actual—with antagonists should be avoided. Tirin Kot, Chora, and Dihrawud districts remain areas that NGO's can operate in; however, outside areas continue to be of concern due to the dominant AOG presence, or merely restive local populations that are highly sceptical of outside interference, thus necessi-


KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- IED along main routes
- Suicide attacks

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	2
This Report Period	0

tating deliberate steps while conducting even everyday tasks. Additionally, Chora remains semi-permissive due to the concluding poppy season in the province, increasing risk of AOG or ACG targeting, and IED emplacements in the area of the Chora crossing.

Additionally, NGO's should generally avoid areas where suspected AOG migration into the province occurs, mainly in Mirabad and Dihrashan, areas that border Helmand Province. AOG in the former district are reportedly relying on IED's and utilising them to channel local traffic through established AOG checkpoints. Khas Uruzgan, a past AOG logistical hub, also remains a precarious area for NGO's due to ANSF and GoA shortcomings. IMF and ANSF suggest that they have made limited inroads into further-



ing law and order in the district, though, asserting that AOG have primarily withdrawn from the urban centres. Likewise, Charar Chineh is extremely hazardous for NGO operations, and the Baluchi Valley is affected by poppy cultivation and IED emplacements, including tripwires that were seen in Kakarak.

Incident levels in Uruzgan province, unfortunately, do not presently allow for projections in relation to the conflict, because it appears that AOG may not be dedicating sufficient resources to the region. It is likely, however, if there will be any significant uptick in violence, signs will manifest within a month's time.

KANDAHAR

AOG and ANSF activity in Kandahar during this reporting period continued to have a destabilising effect on the province. Of significant note is a general threat conveying the AOG intent to target an IO's staff and Kandahar Provincial Council members utilising SVBIED's and IED's, with the latter devices probably actually referring to BBIED's on motor-bikes, as is typical in AOG suicide operations. Additionally, a separate, but possibly related, threat was received expressing the intent to target the Kandahar Governor's Palace, the Provincial Council Chamber, an office of the same IO, ANBP HQ, ANP HQ, NDS HQ, and the Indian Consulate with SVBIED/VBIED's. While the credibility of these threats is unknown, NGO's should continually minimise trips to likely AOG-targeted venues, including IO facilities, as a general practice.

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS


- IED
- Suicide attacks
- Armed clashes

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	4
This Report Period	0

Additionally, NGO's should consider these to be existent threats because of past AOG successful attacks on GoA facilities during multi-agency meetings, which ultimately will likely serve as future AOG exemplars.

Furthermore, a 10 May grenade attack occurred on a compound of the abovementioned IO in District 6, Kandahar City, demonstrating that small-scale, guerrilla style attacks are almost impossible to combat in such a non-permissive environment. There was also a spate of grenade attacks in Kandahar City during the period: on 11 May in District 2, a construction company compound and a PSC compound were both targeted in the evening; and on 12 May in the area of Arghand Abi Chowk, an ANP post was targeted in the evening.

Additionally, AOG infiltration of Kandahar City continues, with ANSF finds of explosives, munitions, BBIED vests, ANP uniforms, communications gear, IEDs, grenades and weapons in districts 3, 4, 9, and 10. With the



prevalence of small arms, munitions, and explosives in the city, NGO's should consider the city to be very hazardous. Conversely, it is important to note that AOG operations during this period were not following the usual modus operandi of conducting sustained or lethal attacks on ANSF: most were fleeting attacks meant to harass ANSF and then evade capture or targeting. Thus, AOG may be intent upon conducting nimble and numerous attacks, versus concerted ambushes. This shift in tactics could be resultant from recent grandiose offensives and attacks in other provinces that required a shift in resources, or a new attempt to further erode ANSF morale by taking away the elements of safety and reprieve, a tactic that may prove successful. Additionally, it may be a new AOG method writ large, avoiding presenting a large target to ANSF or IMF and keeping possible losses, especially involving manpower, low. With the upcoming surge, it is possible this new approach will solidify.

GHAZNI

The state of the conflict in Ghazni Province during this reporting period was consistent with past AOG intentions to strike ANSF, IMF logistical convoys, and IMF patrols. The overwhelming majority of AOG spurred incidents occurred in Qarabagh District, followed by Andar, with the former


KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Indirect fire attacks
- Increased AOG presence
- Attacks along Hwy 1

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	1
This Report Period	0

having at least two incidences of above normal lethal IED attacks on ANP: on 7 May, 6 were killed, and on 6 May, 5 were killed.

In spite of data suggesting that AOG IED strikes are more favorable for AOG's, they continue to employ close-range ambushes, just as is seen in other provinces throughout the country. Furthermore, while these ambushes are generally successful against PSC's, almost all occurrences that involved ANP led to inordinate AOG casualties. Regardless,



NGO's should expect AOG to continue to employ coordinated ambushes against ANSF and others in the province, likely due to an overabundance of manpower in the province and a desire to force ANSF or IMF to address the attacks, spreading their numbers thin.

NIMROZ


Minus a few typical AOG attacks on ANP posts in the province, reported activity was very low during this period. The incident levels aside, recent news that demonstrates collusion between local religious clerics and those involved in the poppy industry

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Suicide attacks in Zaranj/Khash Rod
- Limited security force presence in rural areas

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	1
This Report Period	0

came to the fore in early May. Besides past revelations that local clerics were involved in encouraging suicide attacks in support of the opposition, new information now suggests that they are also encouraging suicide attacks against counter-drug efforts. By arguing that drug trafficking is a viable alternative to armed jihad (the argument suggests that drugs, like armed resistance, damage the lives of non-believers, especially on a global level) local mullahs



now assert it is legitimate to conduct suicide attacks to stymie counter-drug efforts. Although NGO presence in the province is limited, all steps should thus be taken to avoid being present during any poppy eradication or associated with any counter-drug efforts.

PAKTIKA

The disconcerting situation in Paktika persists, with a probable and notable escalation in violence looming over the horizon. Reports of an estimated inflow of 700 AOG members into Turwo District in early May support this, as well as AOG warnings to locals in Yahya Khel district that an attack on the local ANP HQ was imminent. Furthermore, the 13 May AOG attack in Sharan District was an example of AOG tenacity, when a two hour AOG


KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- IED
- AOG intimidation
- Increased AOG presence

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	0
This Report Period	0

attack on ANP close to the Governor's compound was only extinguished after IMF air support arrived.

The abovementioned incidents only distinguished themselves from typical patterns of violence, including multiple strikes on ANP, IED fatalities of PSC personnel, and executions, for example, as seen in the killing of the Urgun District Governor on 12 May. NGO's should also note that IED activity in the province, while usually not discussed because of its regular occurrence, is pervasive and of grave concern. NGO's should always heed this



threat, keeping a safe distance from typical AOG target subsets—IMF, ANSF, construction companies, etc. Furthermore, the threat of kidnap is omnipresent, as seen in the kidnap and later release of eight civilians in Turwo District, and the 5 May kidnap and execution of four purported IMF collaborators as they were travelling in Mani Kandaw, Urgun District.

HELMAND

The threat of AOG activity has been increasingly developing over the past few reporting periods in the province, with this reporting period noticing the continued intensification of a considerable deployment of AOG forces as well as the severity of AOG driven incidents.

The most recent AOG deployment has been reported in Lashkar Gah City and its neighbouring district, Nad Ali. The AOG are reportedly equipped with vehicles and motorbikes, and they are planning to attack ANP posts, emplace IED's, and possibly engage in other offensive activities, such as ambushes, to hinder the use of major routes. Furthermore, as seen in other provinces in the SR during this period, locals in some villages of Nad Ali have already been warned to leave their residences for possible imminent AOG attacks on GoA facilities. In


KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Suicide attacks
- Attacks against ANP
- Ongoing military operations

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	1
This Report Period	0

addition, AOG's have purportedly divided into teams of five or six members, with each team containing one or two BBIED attackers—a method that AOG hope will prove successful in striking prominent targets within populated areas.

The recent three BBIED attacks in Nahri Sarraj District reinforce the abovementioned theory, signifying a possible shift in AOG tactics that may promulgate through the entire SR. The first BBIED attack was against a joint ANP and IMF foot patrol, which led to the death of 5 IMF soldiers, 2 ANP, 20 civilians and an additional 12 civilians being wounded. The second suicide attack was comprised of 2 BBIED attackers who were on motorbikes and approached an ANP vehicle that contained an ANP commander. To initiate the attack, one BBIED attacker dismounted and detonated himself at the rear of the vehicle. Following this, ANA, ANP and civilians responded to the scene, after which the second BBIED attacker detonated him-



self. Reported casualties from both detonations were as follows: 3 civilians, two ANP, and two ANA killed; and ten civilians, nine ANP, and one ANA wounded. The commander, who is a former warlord and is reportedly not held in high regard by the local populace, escaped unharmed from the explosions. The abovementioned attack is the latest in a string of such attacks within the SR to strike prominent targets through a staged multiple BBIED attack.

Despite the AOG initiatives, IMF and ANSF continued to actively engage AOG's in Nada Ali, Nawa, and Nahri Sarraj districts during the reporting period. With this, AOG's reportedly continued to suffer a large number of casualties from these unabated operations.

As reported in the past, and highlighted by recent incidents, AOG's are consequently more likely to resume an active assertion of their presence in response to increased successes by ANSF and IMF forces in the region.

ZABUL

The previously reported threat of IED's has been sharply developing throughout the province. In this reporting period, as many as eighteen IED related incidents, both detonations and recoveries of the devices, have been experienced across the province. With the consistent employment of IEDs, AOG had sought to em-


KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Prevailing IED threat
- Attacks against ANP

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	0
This Report Period	0

phasize that their preferred and intended targets are GoA personnel and IMF, as opposed to civilians; however, this week's most significant incidents included the targeting of two different innocent civilians' vehicles—in Qalat City and Shinky District—which resulted in the death of fifteen civilians and the wounding of two others, with the victims including women and children.

Additionally, ANSO South continues to receive additional IED



threats from credible sources, indicating that AOG have emplaced a large number of IED's along routes that connect Qalat City with its neighbouring districts. NGOs are thus advised to take any sensible precautions in order to minimise the risk of being caught in the fray.



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ANSO ACRONYMS

IMF-International Military Forces / AOG-Armed Opposition Groups / GOA-Government of Afghanistan / ACG-Armed Criminal Groups / ANA-Afghan National Army / ANP-Afghan National Police / IED-Improvised Exploding Device / AEF-Afghan Eradication Forces / RPG-Rocket Propelled Grenade / IDF-Indirect Fire (ex: mortars) / VBIED-Vehicle Borne Improvised Exploding Device / PRP-Previous Reporting Period / ANBP-Afghan National Border Police / SAF-Small Arms Fire / NDS-National Directorate of Security (intelligence) / PSC-Private Security Company / DC-District Centre

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MISSING

This report ANSO could not provide analysis for the provinces of:

- Logar
- Panjshir
- Sar-E-Pul
- Samangan
- Takhar

This is because we do not know enough about the area to comment on the significance of the incidents occurring there.

If you can help us understand the province better please contact us.

TRAINING ANNOUNCEMENT:

Please note that ANSO will be hosting **The Armadillo Group** for the following training sessions:

Personal Safety and Security Course: 25-27 June 2009, Kabul, Afghanistan, ANSO Main Office

Security Management Course (including Crisis Management): 28 June-2 July 2009, Kabul, Afghanistan, ANSO Main Office

For further details and registration for these courses, NGO are encouraged to contact **The Armadillo Group** directly at the following address:

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