

THE ANSO REPORT

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YOU NEED TO KNOW

- UN withdraws several hundred staff from Afghanistan due to security concerns
- Inaugural ceremony for President Karzai scheduled for Oct 19 in Kabul
- Direct threat to NGOs in Badghis

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COUNTRY SUMMARY

As a result of the October 28 attack against the UN guesthouse in Kabul, and due to concerns of more such attacks by armed opposition groups, the UN has announced the temporary withdrawal of several hundred of its international staff from Afghanistan. The Taliban stated that it carried out the attack because of the UN's involvement in the elections. Although the elections are now over, recent information suggests that some elements of the Taliban have not yet removed the UN from the target list.

There is still no information indicating that AOG intend to target NGOs, with the usual exception of those they perceive to be working in support of government or international military programs.

In the short term, one of the main concerns for NGOs is the risk of collateral damage associated with another attack against a UN facility, as NGO compounds are often located nearby. The accidental targeting of NGO vehicles, facilities and staff due to confusion with UN is another concern, especially in remote areas where the UN-NGO distinction may not be understood.

While it is certainly sensible for NGOs to distance themselves temporarily from the UN due to the immediate threat, there are more important strategic considerations that can be drawn from the Oct 28th attack. AOG have explicitly stated and repeatedly demonstrated their intent to attack organizations supporting government programs, regardless of whether they are an NGO, the UN, or any other development or humanitarian actor. In mid-2008, ANSO noted that NGOs and other organizations working on government related development programs were being more frequently targeted in the south and south-east of the country where the conflict was at its worst. As the conflict expanded, and AOG influence or control spread to the other regions, the same trend emerged with more NGOs being investigated or questioned by AOG about their programs, sometimes culminating in violent and repeated attacks.

As such, one could interpret the recent UN attack as a general warning and reminder to all organizations of the serious risks associated with supporting or working with one party to the conflict in a war zone.

The above is the opinion of the ANSO Director and does not necessarily reflect the opinion of any NGO or donor.

VACANCIES:

ANSO is currently recruiting for two Regional Safety Advisors.

See last page for details.


KABUL

Although tensions in Kabul remain high in the wake of the recent attack on the UN, incidents were not disconcerting when taken in respect to historical patterns. The manifest threat to NGOs, additionally, remains the risk of collateral involvement in an AOG attack on the GoA, IMF, or ANSF. This was demonstrated on 13 November when an SVBIED targeted an IMF escorted convoy near Camp Phoenix on Jalalabad Road in District 9, apparently causing three civilian fatalities and six IMF and two civilian injuries.

Current attention is now focused on the 19 November inauguration in which President Hamid Karzai is scheduled to be sworn in for his

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	9
This Report Period	0

second term at the Presidential Palace. A slew of uncorroborated reporting suggests that AOG are intent upon targeting IMF and GoA around the date. While similar reporting is often discounted, it is only reasonable to expect an attempt to disrupt the reigning calm through typical concerted armed assaults utilising BBIEDs and SAF, as well as the possibility of S/VBIEDs, especially in light of increased international press coverage on the day. At the time of this report's drafting, full or partial road closures are expected along Pul-e Mahmood Khan Square in the east of the city towards the Presidential Palace and south from the palace along the road to Chamani Huzuri (PD8). These road closures will occur between 0300 hrs to 0800 hrs. In addition, Park-e Zarnegar area, Shashdarak Road, and Zambaq Square are set to be closed between 0900 hrs and 1530 hrs. In-



formation also suggests that authorities are mandating cancellation of internal flights to Kabul on the 19th. Despite concerns of AOG conducting operations in the city limits, the possibility of civil unrest also remains since Karzai's challenger, Abdullah Abdullah, has expressed his intent not to attend the inauguration.

Four IEDs struck ANSF during the period in Khaki Jabbar, Kabul City, Bagrami, and Musayi. Additionally, one IED was discovered in District 9 of Kabul City. Despite the IED discovery, the predominate threat in the city remains criminality. The late night targeting of a fuel tanker in Surobi is also of concern, indicating AOG intent to continue disrupting IMF supply lines between the Central and Eastern regions.

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Complex attacks against high profile targets
- Criminality


KAPISA

The eastern districts of Tagab and Alasay, as well as Mahmudi Raqi, represent 70 percent of the security incidents recorded in Kapisa for 2009. The overwhelming majority of reports result from IMF/ANA operations or AOG attacks on ANP check-

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	3
This Report Period	0

points; for example, on 9 November, an ANP check post came under a brief AOG attack.

The western districts of Kapisa - Hesa Awal Kohistan and Hesa Duwum Kohistan - have few reported incidences beyond general low levels of criminality, largely as a result of a higher level of development and greater socio-economic opportunity. This, in turn, provides a more secure operational environment for NGOs. Of note, though, murmurs that religious personalities in the province are fomenting hostility to-



KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Attacks on security forces, especially in Tagab and Nijrab
- Hostility to NGO employment of female nationals
- Rockets, IEDs, and mines

wards women working in NGO programmes are indicative of possible further AOG inroads and intentions, or at least a possible push towards a more conservative stance that may seek to challenge external influences—a characteristic that is similar to Uruzgan.

WARDAK

This month, AOG incidents have been lower in number and spanned the gamut of methods, including targeted killings of perceived collaborators; IED strikes against IMF, ANP, and PSC vehicles; an ambush of an IMF convoy; and rocket attacks that targeted IMF. Military operations are also prevalent, posing the risk of civilian casualties, as was the case at least twice this month when IMF fired on civilian vehicles.


KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Bullet point
- Abduction
- Rocket and IED attacks

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	5
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While most incidents in the past couple weeks have occurred in Saydabad, all provinces east of the Bihsuds are heavily infiltrated with AOG and subject to their control and to military clashes.

As of this writing, there were only 14 reported AOG incidents in November, compared to 40 in October and an average of about 30 per month from April to August. While relatively high for this year, the number is high compared to last November (five incidents). Wardak was by far the most volatile Central Region province this year, continuing a trend that started in 2008 when AOG activity and incident levels



increased dramatically. While the greatest destabilization began in 2008, AOG incident levels still increased about 40% in 2009 compared to 2008. NGO can expect a continued but short lull in incidents in the coming weeks though the province will remain highly dangerous. Even if NGO have AOG approval, the threats of collateral damage from active warfare and profit-motivated abduction will continue to make Wardak inhospitable for most NGO in the foreseeable future.

DAYKUNDI


To date, Daykundi Province has been calm for the month of November, although reports abound of AOG in southern Daykundi, especially in Gizab and Kijran districts. As of yet, local opposi-

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- High AOG infiltration in Kiti, Gizrab, and Kajran
- Security vacuum

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	1
This Report Period	0

tion to AOGs has served to hinder AOG infiltration. Regardless of the lull that exists in Daykundi, destabilisation in surrounding areas is of increasing concern. Banditry also presents a potential risk due to the minimal government presence throughout the districts, and as the weather improves, there is the potential for AOG to increase their level of control in



the south as supply lines of men and equipment arrive relatively unimpeded from Uruzgan.

NOTICE: Your input is invaluable for the production of this report. While we appreciate information on incidents, we also need general information on the security situation in your area. So please remember to call or email us regularly.

Contact details of ANSO staff are provide on the last page.

ANSO: *"..by NGOs for NGOs.."*

BAMYAN


Seven security related incidents were recorded compared to four for the previous reporting period. The majority of incidents were AOG related and occurred in north-eastern areas in the Shikari Valley of Shibar and Kahmard districts. All the incidents reported in Bamyan province signify an increase in activity in the unstable

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- AOG/ACG threat around Ghandak Valley, Shibar

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	2
This Report Period	0

areas of Shibar, Kahmard and Sayghan districts. AOG activities intensified in Kahmard and Shibar Districts of Bamyan; for example, an IMF convoy came under a coordinated attack in Shikari Valley, with AOG initiating the attack with an IED and following it with SAF and RPGs from three distinct locations. The sophistication of the attack is a clear indication that AOG are employing more re-



sources to enhance their operations, just as in the Southern Region.

Additionally, reports of AOG regrouping and establishing checkpoints in Sayghan District suggest that the checkpoints are likely serving as monitoring points to aid AOG in conducting attacks on ANP.

BADAKHSHAN

Reported incidents in Badakhshan point to the continuation of local conflict and smuggling throughout the province. An IED was discovered and defused in Wandian Village in the northwest corner of Shahri Buzurg District, about four kilometres southwest of the site of another IED discovery last August. The remote location of these IEDs and sporadic history of violence in the area are likely indicators of a local dispute. A second IED was discovered


KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Local conflict

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	4
This Report Period	0

and defused in front of the ANP headquarters of Yaftali Sufla District, between Shahri Buzurg and Feyzabad districts. Later in the reporting period, an AOG launched two RPGs in the direction of Feyzabad City, Shahri Now Area. RPG attacks in Feyzabad District happen approximately every two months, either detonating in the air or impacting open areas, as local AOG commanders are attempting to demonstrate their prowess without provoking confrontation.

With regard to smuggling, ANSF uncovered narcotics being smug-



gled through Darayim, Ishkashim and Khwahan Districts. Reported narcotic seizures and arrests increased significantly in Badakhshan in the past year, with 16 such reported incidents since January 2009, compared to the 4 total that were reported in 2008. It is not clear as to whether ANSF counternarcotics tactics and reporting have improved, or if smuggling has simply become more frequent.

NOTICE: Graphs in this report are current as of 10 November 2009.

BALKH

Balkh Province saw an unusually high number of incidents reported this period. Early in the reporting period, in Sholgora District, a local dispute between the District Chief of Police and a former Jihadi commander resulted in the injury of the DCoP and the death of the commander. While no other related incidents were reported for this period, incidents in Sholgora may be anticipated as parties may seek retribution. Further south in Kishindih District, two unrelated threats emerged to the east and west of Aqupruk, the District Centre. To the west of Aqupruk, at the Jar-e Khushk intersection of the Aqupruk-Zari Road, armed men reportedly stopped a civilian vehicle at a makeshift checkpoint, and asked the occupants if they had connections with an NGO. The armed men searched their vehicle and persons, but did not take anything. Notably, the site of the incident was the same as that of the NGO/GOA abduction reported last period.


To the east of Aqupruk, in Kishindih Bala area, two night letters were discovered placed in

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	10
This Report Period	0

mosques in the vicinity of an INGO office, demanding that residents refuse to cooperate with foreign organizations and GOA. A preliminary analysis of the letters suggested that they did not originate from an exogenous AOG, but rather may have been related to an ongoing dispute between members of the community and a specific construction company that recently had been attacked on 8 October in Ajar Village. To ensure their own protection, the reporting INGO responsibly convened meetings with local leaders and beneficiaries to reaffirm the community's acceptance and support for their work.

In Aqupruk itself, the acting Chief of Police and two other ANP were injured in an attack on their vehicle. While ANP targeting follows the general pattern of AOG attacks in the Northern Region, the coordinated nature of the attack and lack of regular AOG activity in Aqupruk indicates that this incident may have been motivated by a local dispute; however, it cannot be confirmed.

In the north of the province, the period was marked by an escalation of AOG activity and subsequent IMF/ANSF operations in Chahar Bolak and Chintal districts. Early in the reporting period, AOG attacked and damaged



a gas pipeline in the Arab Mazari area, leading to a fertilizer factory. The factory workers who were deployed to repair the pipeline, accompanied by ANP, were subsequently attacked by AOG, killing one worker. Furthermore, a series of successful IMF/ANSF IED discoveries in the districts culminated in an IED detonation in Arab Mazari Village that killed an IMF translator and wounded five soldiers. The following day, a joint ANSF/IMF search operation was launched in the area and is ongoing at the time of this report. The areas that will most likely be affected by the operation are Elman, Timurak, Arzankar and Aliabad Villages in Chahar Bolak District, and Alizai and Now Shahr Alizai Villages of Chintal District. While Arab Mazari has been the site of recent AOG operations, there is reportedly little indigenous AOG presence in that area.

In Mazar-e Sharif City, three apparently unrelated shootings have occurred within the past two weeks, all of which appear to be motivated by interpersonal disputes. Additionally, on the outskirts of Mazar, in Nahri Shahi, two ANP patrols came under SAF attack, one in Seyagard Dessert area, and one in Shaharak Afghaniya area. The aforementioned incidents are noted because they are rare; however, they do not necessarily have an impact on the broader security situation.

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Escalations in Chahar Bolak and Chintal
- Factional and local Disputes

Training: Armadillo At Large will be providing training in Herat City and Kabul City. See the last page for details.

KUNDUZ

Outside of the realm of AOG-military clashes, an NGO robbery was reported in Kunduz City. Armed men reportedly entered an NGO compound at 1900 hrs and locked the compound's guards into one room. The perpetrators then proceeded to stay through the night and empty the compound of all of its valuables, leaving at 0600 hrs the next morning in the NGO's rented vehicle.

Stand-alone ACG activity has become extremely rare in Kunduz Province in the past several months, and the calibre of this robbery makes it highly unusual in any circumstance.

The reporting period in Kunduz Province was dominated by a large-scale joint IMF/ANSF operation which lasted for approximately 4 days, beginning in north-west Kunduz District on 2 November 2009, and spreading to Qalai Zal, Chahar Dara, Imam Sahib and Archi districts. The operation allegedly resulted in 133 AOG killed, according to IMF/ANSF sources, including at least


five commanders and seven foreign fighters. One ANSF was reportedly killed and one injured, while no reports have surfaced regarding civilian casualties. An INGO-run medical clinic located near the Archi District Centre was directly impacted by an AOG BM1 rocket strike launched in response to the operation, causing one INGO injury.

As is common in asymmetric conflict, large-scale operations do not necessarily translate into sustainable gains for military forces; rather, a subsequent decrease in AOG activity may occur as AOG attempt to prolong the length of fighting by preserving their resources for a more forceful and strategic future resurgence. Regardless, a reduction of AOG activity in the province had not yet become apparent during this reporting period. AOG continued to attack ANSF/IMF targets prior to, throughout, and after the operation concluded. A few armed clashes between AOG and ANSF were reported in Chahar Dara, Kunduz, and Imam Sahib districts, and stand-off tactics were employed against APPF and ANSF/IMF targets in Archi, Chahar Dara and Qalai Zal districts.

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Heavy fighting
- IEDs

	NGO Incidents
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The Kunduz-Taloqan and Kunduz-Pul-e Khumri roads continue to be affected. Two attacks on fuel tankers on the Aliabad-Baghlan main road took place in the past two and a half weeks, as well as a direct fire attack on an IEC convoy. At least one IED detonated approximately 7 km north of the Taloqan-Kunduz road in Janat Bagh area, killing an APPF commander. Also in Khanabad, there has been a steady increase in IED and anti-tank mine discoveries and seizures, possibly indicating an increase in stand-off tactics targeting APPF in the district.


In Kunduz City, two IEDs detonated, causing no casualties, while at least one other was discovered and defused within the city. Sixteen IED detonations have been reported in Kunduz District since the beginning of this year, realizing a four-fold increase in IED detonations since 2008. RCIEDs are the most common type of IEDs used within Kunduz District, as AOGs have shown a strategic regard for maintaining local acceptance, and therefore honing their attacks as much as possible on ANSF, IMF and GOA vehicles.

JAWZJAN

An incident of intimidation reported in Darzab District accounted for the single AOG-initiated act this reporting period. Muted levels of AOG activity in Darzab and Qushteppa have continued to occur at a rate of approximately four per month in these districts combined, since June 2009. In what could have

been an AOG-initiated or interpersonal dispute, unknown armed individuals shot and killed a school teacher while he was travelling with his sister from Aqcha to Mardyan. Approximately one incident a month has been reported in Aqcha and Mardyan, including AOG attacks on GOA vehicles, ANP checkpoints, and

	NGO Incidents
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criminal shootings similar to these, seemingly motivated by interpersonal disputes.

BAGHLAN

Two NGO-related incidents occurred at the end of this reporting period in Baghlan Province. First, a group of INGO staff on a field mission in Khinjan District, Bajga area (on the road southeast of Doawi area) were assaulted by two men armed with AK-47s and robbed of their belongings. Following the incident, local police pursued the attackers. The men were eventually arrested and the INGO's belongings were returned. While ACG and AOG activity in Khinjan District is extremely rare, this incident highlights the general security risks involved in operating in remote areas. Second, an INGO travelling northward on the Pul-e Khumri –


KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Local conflict

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	4
This Report Period	2

Kunduz Road in a marked NGO Land Rover came across a suspected AOG checkpoint at Pul-e Khush (on the border between Baghlan and Kunduz province). The vehicle stopped about 300 metres short of the checkpoint, and while attempting to turn around, was fired at several times by the AOG. AOG checkpoints on this road have not been reported as frequently in the past two months; however, this may be due to a decrease in NGO travel on the road.

Aside from AOG activity in Baghlani Jadid, this reporting period revealed what appear to be several unrelated local conflicts in Baghlan Province. In Dih Salah District, AOG attacked the district administrator's residence, injuring his son. In Karkar Village of Pul-e



Khumri District, AOG members attacked an ANP checkpoint with SAF and RPGs. Also, a recent spate of violence on the Tala Wa Barfak-Pul-e Khumri Road continued this period, as two rival ACGs engaged in an armed clash, leaving one injured. Two armed clashes between AOG and ANSF were reported in Baghlani Jadid District, one in Fabrica area and one in the District Centre. Also in the District, AOG attacked a fuel convoy with SAF and RPG, injuring the driver and killing the passenger in Chahar Shanbeh Tapa area, which is en route to Aliabad District of Kunduz Province. This appears to be similar to the two other recent attacks on fuel convoys in the same vicinity, reported for Kunduz Province.

FARYAB


Typical AOG-initiated incidents have been relatively limited compared to last reporting period. It should be noted that AOG activity regularly fluctuates in Faryab, and this apparent reduction is not necessarily significant. The large number of AOG incidents last reporting period may have been due to the increased presence of ANSF and IMF targets in the

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Targeted AOG attacks

	NGO Incidents
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area. Small-scale joint IMF/ANSF and ANP operations appear to be ongoing throughout the province. Notably, an ANP operation was reported this period as having been successful in forcing AOG to withdraw from areas in Qaysar District, specifically Khwaja Kenti, Sinjitak and Gardan Borida. The success of the operation reportedly hinged on the support that it had received from the community. It is unclear what kind of support this entailed.



While AOGs in Faryab are very active, it is widely understood that they have very little acceptance among the local population. The success of the ANP operation mentioned could possibly inspire similar operations throughout the province.

TAKHAR


A credible VBIED threat in Taloqan City caused alarm at the beginning of the reporting period. This threat was one of several BBIED/VBIED threats that had emerged throughout the country during this time without coming to fruition, indicating a likely AOG strategy to degrade the energies of information networks and exacerbate pre-existing tensions without physically exhausting resources.

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Developments west of Taloqan

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	3
This Report Period	0

Developments west of Taloqan have signalled a continued degradation of security on the Taloqan-Kunduz Highway and in surrounding areas. A roadside IED detonated on the highway in Taloqan District, Aqmasjid area, targeting an ANA vehicle. This was the fifth IED detonation of this year on the highway, east of Kunduz Province. Also west of Taloqan, in Bangi District, AOGs attacked an ANP checkpoint near the Bangi Bridge. There has been a two-fold increase in direct fire attacks on ANSF targets in areas



west of Taloqan in the past year. This increase is likely due to occasional attempts at AOG infiltration from Kunduz; however, lacking indigenous support, AOG activity in these areas has not been sustained. In Ishkamish District an IED was uncovered, most likely linked to the local AOG activity described in the last reporting period.

SAR-E PUL

In Sar-e Pul, an expatriate INGO employee was implicated in the shooting of a young boy. The staff member has not been charged, and the situation is currently undergoing investigation. Following the initial media reports, no local reaction regarding the incident has been reported. It is possible that potential negative


KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Fallout from the alleged involvement of an INGO staff member in a shooting

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	2
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repercussions may have been mitigated by the INGO's level of acceptance in the community or an effective public relations campaign.

The joint ANSF/IMF search operation reported on in the last period allegedly killed 30 AOG in Sayyad District. As previously reported, the targeted AOG was thought to be related to cases of intimidation in the west of the province, and an NGO abduction that occurred in October. Since



the end of the operation, no direct incidents of AOG activity have been reported. However, it may be notable that an armed roadside robbery occurred in Kohistanat District; which could have possibly been AOG-initiated, as the group tries to reassert itself while simultaneously collecting resources.

BADGHIS

Trends already apparent in the last reporting period have continued into the present reporting cycle. The Province remains highly volatile, especially in its Eastern districts, with AOG initiated ambushes on ANSF/IMF convoys still being commonplace in these areas. During this reporting period, Muqur, Murghab, and Qadis Districts experienced ambushes on ANSF/IMF convoys. Of note, also, on November 14th in Qala-i-Naw District AOG attacked an IMF/ANSF post with RPGs and SAF.

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS


- AOG/IMF-ANSF clashes
- AOG ambushes

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	2
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The risk of collateral damage is another feature of the security situation in Badghis: on November 6th, IMF aircraft mistakenly targeted an IMF/ANSF position in Bala Murghab area, killing 7 IMF soldiers, 3 ANA, 4 ANP and wounding another 18. Reportedly, 8 civilians were also killed in the strike.

Regarding Muqur District, reporting indicates that in three separate incidents, several ANP and ANA officials abandoned their posts taking with them an assortment of weapons and two vehicles.

Of concern to NGOs, NDS has undertaken a campaign to contact NGOs in the province, warning



them that the AOG Badghis Shadow Governor has recently instructed sub-commanders in the province to execute any NGO, IO or GoA staff that may be discovered in the province. Taking into account the 'safety first' principle, NGOs are advised to maintain a low profile in the area and ensure that vehicles and personnel travelling are sanitized of NGO-related material. However, for the time being, no further independent reporting can corroborate this affirmation.

HERAT

During this reporting period, Herat Province witnessed one NGO related incident. On November 5th in Shindan District (the District Centre area), two IEDs were placed in the vicinity of a local NGO staff member's private residence. One IED exploded, causing neither casualties nor damage, while the second one was found and defused by security forces. Information suggests that the latter incident was rather an act of personal grievance than AOG activity.

Besides this incident, the security situation in Herat Province was characterised by an increase of AOG activities using mainly


KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- IEDs/ RCIEDs
- Collateral damage
- Abduction

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	16
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IEDs/RCIEDs and assaults on IMF/ANSF targets. On November 1st in Injil District (on the Herat City-Airport road), a motorcycle-mounted IED hit a passing IMF convoy. Two people were wounded as a result of the explosion, and an RCIED targeted another IMF convoy on November 6th in Shindan District, wounding four IMF soldiers. On November 14th, in the same district, AOG attacked an IMF patrol with SAF. Of note, in Kushk District, an IED struck an ANBP vehicle, killing one ANBP and wounding another one.

As mentioned, during this reporting period, another target of AOG active in the province was ANSF facilities. On November 4th, Chishti Sharif District experienced an AOG attack on an ANP post. Worth noting, this district is



known as a transit point for AOGs moving between eastern Badghis and southern areas. However, over the last few months the situation there has remained relatively calm, suffering mainly from criminal activity.

A different incident of note occurred on November 6th in Seyawshan, Guzara District (the district had witnessed important IMF/ANSF military operations that resulted in the death of the key AOG commander in the area), when AOG attacked an ANP post with RPGs and SAF. The abovementioned incidents illustrate not only the mobility of armed groups active in the area but also the fact that the risk of being collaterally targeted still remains a concern for NGOs operating in the province.

GHOR

During this reporting period Ghor Province remained relatively calm. A few recorded incidents in the area were typical for the region, comprised of armed robbery, criminality and an armed clash.

Regarding the latter, on October 8th an armed clash erupted between two groups in Du Layna District (Seyachub Area). Reporting suggests that a land dispute


	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	10
This Report Period	0

triggered the clash. The same area already witnessed an armed clash on September 26th which led to the deaths of two local civilians in the cross fire.

Armed robbery continues to be a concern in the area; for example, an armed group stopped a private vehicle on the road to Chaghcharan City on November 8th. The passengers of the car were relieved of their possessions but released apparently unharmed. Of note, also in Chaghcharan District, on November 14th a group of armed men attacked a private residence of an ANP official.

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Armed robbery
- Kidnap
- Locale disputes



Another incident of note occurred on November 7th near the Taywara District Centre where unknown armed men shot and wounded a government employee. While the exact motivation of this incident is not clear, some reporting suggests that this may have been a personal dispute.


FARAH

AOG activity in Farah Province continued to target security forces, this time, in the form of assaults on ANP posts. For instance, on November 7th AOG targeted an ANP post in Pusht Rod District, then three days later another ANP post was attacked in Bakwa District with RPGs and SAF. Of note, during this report-

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	2
This Report Period	0

ing period an AOG presence was reported in Lash Wa Juwayn District, which so far has not witnessed any significant AOG activity. On November 5th, near the Lash Wa Juwayn District Centre area, an ANP post came under attack. During this clash, four AOG attackers were killed.

Another feature of the situation in Farah was police operations against criminal elements involved in drug trafficking in Shib Koh and Farah districts and AOG ac-



tivities in Bala Buluk and Khaki Safed. In Farah City, ANP engaged a group of criminals attempting to kidnap a local civilian, killing two suspects. Also regarding the threat of abduction, a group of armed men abducted an elder along with four other civilians en route to Farah City on November 14th.

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- RCIEDs/IEDs
- Convoy ambushes

PAKTYA


Paktya province continues to record the lowest incidents during the reporting period; however,

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Complex attacks in Gardez City
- Kidnap, especially along the Gardez-Khost Road
- IEDs, especially along Gardez-Khost Road

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	2
This Report Period	0

this is not an indicator that the province is necessarily stable. AOG maintain a permanent presence in the province, and Gardez City, the provincial capital, is subject to complex suicide attacks as well as other forms of AOG tactics. Threats within the province, much as elsewhere, include SVBIEDs, BBIEDs, and IEDs. The Gardez-Khost Road especially remains a likely place for IED employment.



Overall, road access to main cities within the region remains limited and is considered to be of high risk, with a number of incidents along the main routes.

KUNAR

On November 6th in Wata Pur District, a Norwegian journalist along with his local interpreter who had transited from Asadabad City to the district did not check in with local ANP. Authorities and interested parties were unable to contact him, and multiple parties conducted searches for him in the mountains. The next day, AOG claimed responsibility for his abduction and presented their demands: the withdrawal of Norwegian forces from Afghanistan, or the release of 10 AOG from prison. Authorities in the district established a committee of local and tribal elders who then started looking for the missing journalist and his interpreter in remote areas of the district, while local elders approached the AOG and com-

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS


- Attacks on the Jalalabad-Asadabad Highway
- Indirect fire
- Combat operations

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	7
This Report Period	0

menced negotiations that lasted circa 6 days and resulted in the victims' release on 12 November.

Kunar Province continues to remain violent in comparison with other Eastern Region provinces. With a total of 45 AOG-initiated incidents being reported, Kunar had a very violent period. In keeping with historic trends in the province, direct attacks on security forces were the most common AOG tactic—35 direct attacks—evenly distributed throughout most of its districts; six indirect fire attacks were recorded, while three IEDs detonated in Sirkanay and Wata Pur districts.

In a display of AOG pervasiveness, approximately 30 AOG members attacked the Marawara DAC with heavy weapons and small arms fire on 2 November at 2300 hrs. AOG used overwhelming force to gain access to the DAC but fled in two stolen ANP vehicles after reserve ANP and IMF deployed to the area. Ultimately, despite the apparent AOG



success, five AOG were killed, while only one ANP was killed and another six were injured. The IMF/ANSF operation was on-going for at least two days.

Despite recent military operations, AOG activity in the northern part of the province, particularly in Ghaziabad and Wata Pur districts, persists. Whilst most hostilities are aimed at IMF and GoA elements, civilians employed by or displaying any form of support for these entities continue to be targeted violently and are at risk of abduction. Private construction companies that are carrying out roadwork in the Eastern and Central-northern parts of the province are also subject to AOG targeting. The Jalalabad-Asadabad Highway is still of concern with more AOG activity near Patan, Nurgal District, where AOG have been ambushing IMF convoys and attacking police posts in the early morning.

LAGHMAN

The security situation in Laghman Province remains unpredictable, with 11 incidents being recorded during this reporting period, 9 of which were AOG initiated. Given the geographical location of the province, there is no apparent general AOG 'temperament'. For instance, Mihtarlam has proven over the past three reporting periods to have gained renewed attention from an AOG which is operating out of the district's Western villages—this group is believed to be responsible for the attacks along Highway 1 between Khayro Khel and Tangi Valley. Because of this, the routes into Alishing District and Dawlat Shah continue to be prone to IED Attacks. A rise in AOG activity, in particular in Alingar District, has also been


KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Attacks along Highway 1
- IED threat near DACs

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	1
This Report Period	0

observed. Consequently, this area may be prone to such activities for at least the next couple of weeks.

Fuel supply convoys continue to be subject to deliberate attacks throughout the province, as was evident in the 8 November coordinated attacks on IMF-contracted fuel tankers as they proceeded through Qarghayi District. As is evident in the Eastern Region, as well as the Southern, IMF are at least displaying an intent to pursue AOGs after the latter have conducted brazen or substantial attacks on IMF, ANSF, or logistical convoys. With this, one can expect further AOG strikes on targets, albeit from more advantageous positions which will ease AOG efforts to escape IMF/ANSF confrontations. In the case of this attack, it is likely that AOG from northern parts of Surkh Rod District or-



chestrated it. This AOG uses the terrain to its advantage, for example, relying on a formidable terrain feature—Tur Ghar (Black Mountain)—which they can negotiate with ease to facilitate their escape. Significant events for the week include.

Due to the intermittent and costly nature of air transportation to Jalalabad City, many NGOs often contemplate conducting road travel on Highway 1. With this, reports of AOG actively operating in the area with the intention to target logistical, ANSF, and IMF convoys and ANP CPs along the route persist. NGOs are encouraged to contact ANSO East before travelling on the road at least one day prior to travel. Avoiding morning travel, as well as parties to the conflict, is the general advisory when travel must be undertaken on the highway.

NURISTAN

Nuristan Province continues to be isolated and volatile with only two reports emanating from the province. (Only one was AOG initiated). While reporting is quite limited, it is evident that the AOG


KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- AOG prevalence
- Increased military operations

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	1
This Report Period	0

presence is quite high. IMF operations are quite frequent as well as AOG paramilitary activities, involving regular and ad hoc forces.

In light of the security vacuum, and because of the lack of information, ANSO would greatly appreciate any information, however trivial, regarding any known inci-



dents, threats, or possible rumours from this province.

NANGARHAR

During this reporting period, a significant number of IEDs were emplaced in Nangarhar, with a total of 12 IEDs being emplaced, of which 5 actually detonated. The dramatic surge in IED deployment within Nangarhar Province is believed to be a result of new IED cells forming in the North-eastern part of the province, as well as the continuation of existing cells in the Southern region of

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS


- Kidnap
- Attacks on JAF and GoA
- AOGs in western districts

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	8
This Report Period	0

the province, in particular Sherzad District. (IED emplacement is likely to remain at a high rate in the future in those sectors of the province).

Whilst the districts around Jalalabad City offer a permissible and accessible environment, the southern and eastern sectors continue to suffer from hostile AOG activities. With this, Khogyani and Sherzad remain the greatest threat to NGO operations due to a significant increase in AOG-initiated movement/activities, marked by detonation of one IED and the finding of two RCIEDs in Khogyani, while Pachir Wa Agam, Deh

NANGARHAR



Bala and Achin districts continue to be dealing with a notable AOG presence.

An increase in criminal and narcotic activity has been observed throughout the province as a result of numerous law enforcement efforts. During the reporting period, a total of 35 local farmers were arrested for involvement in poppy cultivation in Goshta, Hisarak and Sherzad districts. (The crackdown was continuing as this report was being drafted).

HELMAND

Illustrative of international concerns over AOG infiltration of Afghan security services, an ANP shot and killed five IMF soldiers and wounded four other IMF soldiers and two ANP at a training compound where the IMF were cohabitating with ANP in Nad Ali on 3 November. While the dominant AOG was quick to claim responsibility for the attack, several factors could have driven the ANP to attack his comrades, including family or social pressures resultant from Pashtun Wali.

AOG conducted several assaults against IMF/ANSF during this period; for instance, AOG attacked an IMF patrol with heavy

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS


- Conventional attacks on ANSF/IMF/GOA
- Significant AOG threat
- Suicide attacks

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	1
This Report Period	0

weapons and SAF for 30 minutes, wounding two IMF soldiers in Sarwan Kala, Sangin, on 6 November. On the same day but in Nahri Sarraj District, AOG attacked an ANP post with heavy weapons and SAF, overrunning the post and abducting one ANP.

Likewise, IMF conducted an operation, killing two AOG members and arresting three others in Khuskawa, Lashkar Gah, on 5 November. In sum, several IED strikes were reported during the period. In an example of a coordinated attack involving an IED, a method that appears to be rising in popularity with regular AOG forces, an IED placed under a culvert struck an ANP vehicle that was passing the area and was followed by an attack from nearby houses for 10 minutes in Maktab, Nahri Sarraj, on 10 November. Of note, though, the incident appar-

HELMAND



ently resulted in no ANP casualties and in 2 AOG arrests. However, an RCIED hit an ANP vehicle, killing three ANP and wounding three others in Nahri Sarraj on the 4th, and another struck an IMF vehicle patrol, killing one IMF soldier and wounding another in Sangin on the 6th.

Lashkar Gah City, the scene of much activity, served as a venue for locals to voice dissent about continual civilian casualties when a group of 60 people, including community elders, went to the local PRT, then to the Governor's office, and after that to the Bost Hospital. The group asserted that nine civilians were killed by an IMF rocket on the 4th in Baba Ji, Lashkar Gah City. (The strike reportedly also killed eight AOG).

GHAZNI


On 9 November in Shah Khog, Andar District, ANP opened fire on a Toyota Surf that was rigged as a VBIED and had two individuals in it after the driver ignored signs to stop at the ANP post, which caused the VBIED to detonate, kill the two individuals inside it, and wounded one ANP that was manning the said post. (While the VBIED's ultimate target is unknown, it was heading towards Ghazni City). And on 4 November, AOG attacked an IMF logistical convoy that was escorted by ANP for 10 minutes, killing one ANP and wounding

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Abduction
- IEDs or ambushes on convoys
- Rockets/RPGs

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	2
This Report Period	0

another in Spandi, Ghazni City. Additionally, on 10 November, AOG attacked a convoy of trucks that was carrying IMF supplies, resulting in two killed and two other AOG and two PSC guards wounded in Shahbaz, Ghazni City. Also, AOG attacked the Ghazni City Chief of Police's convoy on the 13th when he was on the way back to Ghazni City after a visit to Qarabagh District, wounding one ANA as they were transiting through the latter district. (Of interest, IMF had detained the former Ghazni City Chief of Police for six hours on 6 November). On 14 November, AOG again targeted ANP, this time in a two hour assault on a patrol, culminating in two AOG and one ANP killed and two ANP



wounded in Nahri Sayed Abad Village, Waghaz.

Qarabagh District also experience IMF operations. On 11 November, for example, IMF purportedly killed five AOG, including three foreigners, in the district. Another IMF operation, supported by an airstrike, occurred in Qarabagh on 14 November. IMF apparently sought to target an AOG commander. The commander's residence was destroyed; however, he was not present at the site of the attack. Only one IED strike was reported during the period, and it targeted an ANA vehicle in Jum Juma, Qarabagh, on 6 November.

ZABUL

For Zabul, the most prominent incident during the period was the suicide attack when an SVBIED collided with a passing IMF convoy close to an ANA base, killing the suicide bomber and a local woman and wounding two IMF soldiers and four other civilians in Shahjoy District on 11 November. Indirect fire proved to also be prominent during the period. In one instance, AOG fired eight mortar rounds towards the Naw Bahar DAC on 7 November. Following the mortar fire, IMF/ANSF conducted a joint air and ground operation in Musazai Vil-


KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Roadside IEDs
- BBIEDs
- Attacks on ANP

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	0
This Report Period	0

lage of the said district for two hours that ended in a 33 purported AOG fatalities. Also, AOG used mortars to strike an IMF base in Shahjoy on 13 November and fired five missiles towards the same district, again on the 13th, with two of them striking an IMF base and wounding three IMF soldiers and one local interpreter. Again on the 13th, AOG fired rockets toward an IMF post, wounding two IMF soldiers and one local interpreter, but in Daychopan District.

On 8 November, ANP clashed with AOG for three hours, killing two AOG members and wounding another in Takatoo, Arghandab. In the same district, and on the same day, IMF/ANSF conducted a joint operation which



concluded in two AOG fatalities and three AOG injuries. Of note, ANA located 20 IEDs and ammunition during an operation in Qalat District on 2 November. Also in Qalat, but on 6 November, IMF carried out a raid on the GoA Department of the Red Crescent, killing one ANP and arresting one suspected AOG member and 2 other personnel of the apparent department.

Only one IED strike was reported during the period: the device, an RCIED, was placed on a tree and struck an ANP vehicle that was passing, wounding five ANP in Kakarano China, Qalat, on 7 November.

KANDAHAR


On 10 November, about 350 political inmates in the Kandahar Prison went on a hunger strike for the past three days due to improper medical care and poor behaviour by officials towards visitors. The inmates broke their hunger strike, though, after six days when high-level GoA officials visited and assured them that their problems would be resolved.

AOG fired three rockets from Charsang village towards the Khakrez DAC on 7 and 8 November. Also, on 10 November, AOG fired two rockets towards the Shah Wali Kot DAC. On 3 November, AOG posted a night letter on the wall of a Deh Khwaja mosque (District 4, Kandahar City), warning locals not to leave their houses on the 4th. Additionally, in District 2 on the 2nd, an IO staff member received a threat letter to stop working with foreigners. (He also had received a

threatening phone call a month ago).

Likewise, IMF/ANSF conducted several operations during this reporting period. For example, in Chinarto, Miya Nishin on 2 November, IMF conducted an operation which led to a firefight with AOG, concluding in the death of six AOG members. In Shah Wali Kot on the same day, IMF conducted another operation which led to a firefight with AOG, with this one purportedly ending with nine AOG fatalities and the wounding of four other AOG members and two civilians. And the following day in Maywand, an IMF airstrike targeted a vehicle, killing four civilians. IMF/ANSF seized two AK-47s and arrested two AOG members in District 9, Kandahar City on 10 November. In another incident, IMF killed three AOG members during an airstrike when they were planting a roadside IED in Nakhoni, Panjwayi, on 6 November.

And in illustration of continual AOG ability to construct and plan complex attacks from within Kan-




dahar City, 5,000 100 pound bags of fertilizer (ammonium nitrate based), as well as IED components were seized by a joint IMF-ANSF raid in districts 2 and 4 on 8 November. (The raid also resulted in the arrests of 15 suspects). In addition, IMF sized 2,500 kg of hashish during an operation in Rabat, Spin Boldak, on 10 November. ANP were also active, detaining five kidnappers who had kidnapped two teenagers on 4 November for ransom and freeing the said victims.

As typical, several IED strikes were reported during this reporting period. Premature detonations also persisted; for example, three AOG members were killed in District 5, Kandahar City, when an IED they were placing under a culvert detonated prematurely on 7 November. Similarly, two other AOG members were killed when an IED they were planting exploded prematurely in Maywand on 9 November. Successful IED strikes were seldom, apparently, causing only one civilian and three ANP fatalities in Tor Kotal, Daman, on 8 November.

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Roadside IEDs
- Kidnap
- Suicide attacks





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ANSO ACRONYMS

IMF-International Military Forces / **AOG**-Armed Opposition Groups / **GOA**-Government of Afghanistan / **ACG**-Armed Criminal Groups / **ANA**-Afghan National Army / **ANP**-Afghan National Police / **IED**-Improvised Exploding Device / **AEF**-Afghan Eradication Forces / **RPG**-Rocket Propelled Grenade / **IDF**-Indirect Fire (ex: mortars) / **VBIED**-Vehicle Borne Improvised Exploding Device / **PRP**-Previous Reporting Period / **ANBP**-Afghan National Border Police / **SAF**-Small Arms Fire / **NDS**-National Directorate of Security (intelligence) / **PSC**-Private Security Company / **DC**-District Centre

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MISSING

This report ANSO could not provide analysis for the provinces of:

Logar
Parwan
Panjshir
Khost
Samangan
Uruzgan
Nimroz
Paktika

This is because we do not know enough about the area to comment on the significance of the incidents occurring there.

If you can help us understand the province better, please contact us.

VACANCIES

ANSO is in search of a few good NGO workers to fill its Mobile and South RSA positions. If you have NGO experience, an analytical background, and the desire to be challenged, all while being part of a close-knit team, pass your CV to director@afgnso.org. Applications accepted until Dec 1.

TRAINING

Armadillo at Large will be offering training in Kabul City during late November and in Herat City during December. Registration and further details are available at www.armadilloatlarge.com.