

THE ANSO REPORT

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YOU NEED TO KNOW

- AOG have voiced an intent to target organisations involved in the continuing election
- Civil unrest threatens to target those involved with the international community
- Circulation of uncorroborated suicide threats may be an attempt to inculcate fear

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COUNTRY SUMMARY

Through a prominent attack on UN personnel in Kabul City, AOG have signalled a significant shift in their intent to target the UN, purportedly for its involvement in the still questionable second round of the presidential election.

This attack represents another milestone in the escalation of the conflict, but the medium and long-term implications for the NGO and wider international community are unclear and will need to be further examined.

However, in the short term, NGO concerns about AOG intentions towards the NGO community should be tempered when considering that AOG statements indicate that the UN was targeted for its involvement in the election, and that AOG generally consider the organisation a party to the conflict because of its support to state institutions.

Several provinces experienced demonstrations that were spurred from educa-

tional institutions and possibly encouraged by local AOG in an attempt to draw ire towards IMF and the international community.

These events highlighted, once again, the sudden and spontaneous nature of demonstrations in city centres and the need to have contingency plans in place for this type of event.

NGO DATA & TRENDS

Incidents in the West were typical for the region, comprised of banditry in Herat and Ghor and a bomb threat against an INGO in Herat City.

In the South an INGO reported that a suspected BBIED approached its compound in Kandahar City, and in the East an INGO clinic in Kunar had its ambulance and driver abducted for an hour while AOG utilised the ambulance to conduct acts of crime and evade detection by security forces.

In the North, Balkh had two instances dealing with abduction. In one, locals attempted to abduct INGO staff after a heated community meeting discussing a development project—the staff escaped unharmed—and in the other an INGO staff member was abducted for a short period in a remote area of the province.

Badakhshan also experienced a few incidents. In one, men entered an INGO clinic that was being constructed and threatened people present over the construction of a well. In another, locals stoned an INGO facility because of discontent with the NGO's food distribution programme. Lastly, INGO staff were successfully evacuated after being involved in a serious traffic accident from a remote area north of Fayzabad.

VACANCIES:

ANSO is in search of a few good NGO workers.

Please see the last page for details.

KABUL

The attack on the Bakhtar UN guesthouse dominated a busy reporting period, which also included numerous protests in Districts 3, 7 and 9, as well as the withdrawal of Dr. Abdullah from the 7 November second round presidential election. The 28 October attack on the UN guesthouse in Shari Naw began at approximately 0545 hrs and resulted in the deaths of five UN international staff members, two ANSF, and one civilian after approximately an hour. The attack and subsequent claim of responsibility by the Taliban was the first direct attack on the UN community in the heart of Kabul City. At least three BBIEDs approached the guesthouse—well known as housing a large number of IO staff—gained entry, and then used SAF and grenades to attack all those inside. At least two IO staff directly fought the attackers and were most likely responsible for saving the lives of 21 others who managed to flee the onslaught. All three BBIEDs detonated, and the guesthouse was reduced to a concrete shell.


The attack has raised important questions as to the vulnerability of UN staff as well as that of the greater international community. In claiming responsibility for the attack, the Taliban stated that it specifically targeted those in-

	NGO Incidents
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involved in the election process and that ‘this is our first attack’. It appears from several reports that the attack was a deliberate assault on the UN and, more generally, organisations participating in or observing the election process. The UN is a highly visible representation of the international community in Afghanistan and has historically relied on its name to afford a degree of immunity from the conflict. More recently, however, the organisation has hardened its security posture and reduced its exposure across the country in response to a discernible shift in AOG sentiment towards the organisation.

The NGO community has, at the same time, largely taken the opposite approach for a number of reasons which are uniquely available to non-governmental humanitarian organisations. NGO’s have minimised their exposure to AOG attacks by using sanitised low-profile travel, reduced the number of international staff in the provinces, intensified community engagement, and lowered their visibility which previously afforded a notional level of protection. Reinforcing the message of impartiality is perhaps an NGO’s greatest defence against the encroachment of the humanitarian space by GoA and IMF, as well as AOG.

Even though it appears that Dr. Abdullah has pulled out of the second round presidential elections, the threat to organisations involved in the election will remain credible until after the elec-



tion, if indeed it takes place. AOG have clearly articulated their intention, with further threat reports received regarding a specific guesthouse in District 10. In the meantime, NGOs are advised to avoid IO compounds and residences as well as any election sites until at least mid-November. Considering that commercial guesthouses have so far been the subject of threats, it would be a prudent measure to avoid those areas where a large number of international staff congregate, which is not limited to restaurants and hotels.

The use of VBIED attacks, viewed as having been successful in Kabul, has a high probability of reoccurring during the election period. In addition, more targeted attacks, such as that which occurred against the UN guesthouse, rather than seemingly random standoff attacks, should be expected in the weeks ahead.

The issue of the alleged desecration of the Qur’an also reached Kabul with seven different protests starting from 23 October and occurring at educational establishments, mainly in Districts 3 and 7. The ANP were indeed admirable in their restraint. Although a protestor was killed in unknown circumstances along Jalalabad Road on 25 October, several warnings shots were fired in at least two demonstrations; however, there were no fatalities and the ANP themselves suffered several casualties. There had been a concern that the ANP would be unable to peacefully manage large demonstrations and resort extreme force in an attempt to quell the protest. If any election related demonstrations do occur, then there is a high likelihood that the resources of the ANP will be severely tested, and the same level of restraint may not be witnessed.

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Election demonstrations
- Complex attacks against high-profile targets
- Abductions

TRAINING: CSD is offering security management training in mid-November. See the final page for details.

PARWAN

Shinwari and Ghorband have generated an increasing number of reports of AOG movements through local villages in the past month. It appears that the AOG strategy is to deter people from working for the GoA and establish alternative power structures to the government. Although there is a known AOG presence in the two districts, reports suggest an


KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Attacks on security targets, especially near Bagram Airbase
- NGO targeted criminal abduction
- Irregular IEDs targeting ANSF in the Ghorband Valley

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	1
This Report Period	0

attempt to have a greater degree of control of local affairs. Possibly related, although not confirmed, is the recent killing of a former prominent Jami'at-i-Islami leader by nine armed men in Kapshan Area of Shinwari on 18 October. These new developments have not threatened the Chaharikar-Bamyan Road and past incidents have overwhelmingly targeted ANSF targets, excepting of course the RCIED against an IO convoy in June.

Bagram IMF airfield was again the subject of a rocket attack on 20 August with no reported casualties. There was a distinct lull in rocket attacks in the first six months of the year; however, it



appears that the airbase is now being targeted roughly every three weeks by rockets, which often land in open spaces and only occasionally hit the actual base. Following the rocket attack, ANSF led a raid in the area of Qalai Jala, leading to one AOG being killed and two arrests being made. On 26 October, approximately 150 students protested in Chaharikar against the now discredited allegations of the desecration of the Qu'ran by IMF in an operation in Wardak mid-month. The protest remained peaceful, and NGO operations were not affected.

KAPISA


The last two weeks have remained calm in Kapisa with the only AOG recorded incident being an IED strike against an ANA convoy in Tagab during the middle of the month. Separately, a non-violent demonstration was held at Albiruni Univer-

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Attacks on security forces, especially in Tagab and Nijrab
- Electoral-related violence
- Rockets, IEDS, and mines

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	3
This Report Period	0

sity in Kohistan on 26 October involving several hundred students. The demonstration was linked to the now discredited story of IMF desecrating a Qu'ran in Wardak. The decision on whether or not there will be a second round election in November will dictate the security environment in the west of the province for the next reporting period. An election will most likely re-ignite low level factional violence which was experienced prior to the last election. For NGOs, this would



mean avoidance of travel in the night time hours as the majority of attacks occur against ANP checkpoints during the evening. In most instances, no casualties are recorded and there have been no reports of civilians being injured as a result of collateral exposure.

GRAPHS: Please note that graphs in this report are current as of 27 October 2009.

LOGAR


Similar to many provinces throughout the country, Puli Alam was host to two demonstrations against the alleged burning of the Qu'ran by IMF. The demonstrations on 24 and 26 October were non-violent. The crowd in each instance numbered into the sev-

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Abduction
- Attacks on security forces

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	2
This Report Period	0

eral hundreds. IEDs continue to be reported in the province with two devices being found along district roads in Baraki Barak and Puli Alam. IMF and ANSF convoys were also hit by IEDs in both districts during the last reporting period. If an election does occur on 7 November, then a similar level of violence can be expected to occur across the province – mainly standoff attacks against urban centres and IEDs



and ambushes along district roads targeting IMF and ANSF. In this case, NGO should ensure that staff are aware of a higher degree of risk from such attacks immediately before and following the election.

WARDAK

Wardak assumed centre stage in the minds of the easily mobilised following an allegation that IMF had desecrated a Qu'ran during an operation on 16/17 October. The report was erroneous, but as is often the case, rumour trumped the facts, and the allegation was used by AOG and political opportunists to mobilise anti-IMF protests in at least a dozen provinces around the country. The incident was a further example of the superiority of the AOG communication/propaganda campaign in comparison to the IMF and GoA. It took approximately ten days before a rebuttal of the allegations appeared in the mass media, which then involved an interview with the provincial governor as well as several senior elders from


KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Abduction
- Rocket and IED attacks
- Intimidation

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	5
This Report Period	0

the area where the incident is alleged to have taken place. A similar response time was recorded by IMF who issued a bland statement of denial. Virtually all of the protests around the country were based in or supported by tertiary education establishments for their obvious ease in mobilising large numbers of people in a short space of time.

Separately, the province continues to represent approximately half of all security incidents recorded in the central region. The majority of those incidents occur in Chaki, Jaghatu, Nirkh and Saydabad. Salar and Sheikhabad area of Saydabad District experienced the heaviest concentration of AOG initiated incidents with an ambush or IED occurring virtually every day, typically against either IMF or IMF contacted logistics convoys. The areas, despite being along Highway One, are under the nominal control of AOG, with



ANSF and IMF tending to avoid operations in the areas. During the last reporting period in Wardak, there were six standoff attacks (rockets, IEDs) against DACs and ANSF CPs and six close range attacks, usually ambushes against both IMF and ANSF. In addition, five logistics convoys were attacked along the main highway with varying degrees of damage being inflicted. On 17 October, AOG abducted two ANP and stole their Ranger vehicle from Saydabad and transferred both to Jaghatu. Some reports suggested that the vehicle may be used as a SVBIED in the coming weeks. The issue of ANSF uniforms being used in AOG attacks, the most recent example being the attack on the UN guesthouse in Kabul, is a distinct concern in Wardak. ANSF uniforms continue to be found in raids on known AOG locations and will most likely be used in future attacks to sow confusion in the minds of ANP.

BAMYAN

Armed robbery along the district roads leading from Bamyan City remains a rare occurrence. On 25 October, however, three individuals dressed as ANA stopped and robbed three trucks and a minivan in the Shibar Pass area. (It is understood that no-one was hurt in the robberies). It is likely that the men are from the Ghandak Valley area where intermittent skirmishes


KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- AOG/ACG threat around Ghandak Valley, Shibar

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	2
This Report Period	0

between AOG and ANSF are largely the result of local rivalries exacerbated by a coal mine and its proceeds.

Two further attacks on ANSF were recorded in the last reporting period. Both incidents occurred in the Skikari Valley Area, which straddles Sayghan and Kharmard. ANP checkpoints were attacked on 20 and 28 October. AOG attacks typically assume the form of badly aimed rockets and/or brief bursts of SAF before melting back into the area. AOG tactics seem to be becoming more resolute



following an attack that occurred from three directions against a checkpoint on 20 October. The second attack used both rockets and follow up SAF and lasted for reportedly two hours. In both instances, and as tends to be the case normally, there were no reports of casualties. Attacks in these areas occur irregularly, and NGOs' simple avoidance of the affected areas will mitigate any risk.

DAYKUNDI


Daykundi has experienced a very quiet month of reporting. Numerous reports of AOG infiltration into the southern districts of Kijran and Gizab following the IMF offensives in Helmand suggested that the province may experience an uptick in AOG attacks; how-

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- High AOG infiltration in Kiti, Gizrab, and Kajran
- Security vacuum

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	1
This Report Period	0

ever, this has not yet happened. Reporting remains scarce in both districts due to AOG nominal control, which is unlikely to change in the months ahead. The establishment of the PRT in Nili, although reportedly attracting the attention of AOG and listed in some threat reporting, is yet to translate into any attacks in the provincial capital. The rest of the province remains calm with no reported robberies along arterial



roads from Nili, as occasionally occurs. NGO operations are mainly centred in the northern districts of Sanghi Takht, Ishtarlay, Shahrstan and Khadir and currently face no major security concerns.

NOTICE: Your input is invaluable for the production of this report. While we appreciate information on incidents, we also need general information on the security situation in your area. So please remember to call or email us regularly.

Contact details of ANSO staff are provide on the last page.

ANSO: “..by NGOs for NGOs..”

BALKH

In a rare occurrence, two unrelated incidents of abduction and attempted abduction of NGO employees occurred in southern Balkh this period. The attempted abduction occurred early in the reporting period in Sholgara District and appeared to be related to grievances between NSP project beneficiaries, CDC members, and the advising NGO. The second incident occurred in Kishindeh District in Shamrak area, in which one NGO employee was abducted along with a taxi driver, two government employees, and


KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Kidnap
- Attacks on ANSF & IMF
- Factional and Local Disputes

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	10
This Report Period	2

the head of the area's Community Development Council (CDC) by a group of armed men, some of whom were allegedly foreign. The abductees were allegedly brought to an undisclosed location and were questioned by the AOG regarding their identities and employment. All of the abductees were eventually released without harm or injury. Because Kishindeh district is traditionally calm, with very few reported instances of AOG or ACG activity, the abduction may have been carried out by AOG infiltrating from neighbouring areas.

In Dawlatabad District, AOG attacked the DAC with an RPG. This kind of escalation is very unusual for the district given the



low level of indigenous AOG presence. In Chahar Bolak and Chimtal districts, a level of AOG activity persisted, with a few reported incidents in which IMF and ANSF patrols came under SAF attack. In Mazar-e Sharif City, a peaceful demonstration of approximately 1,000 students took place to protest the alleged IMF Quran-burning incident that took place on 16/17 October in Wardak Province. The protest was similar to that of demonstrations that had taken place in Shibirgan District, Jawzan, and throughout the country.

BADAKHSHAN

Two separate incidents directly involving NGOs were reported this period. The first occurred in Ragh District, when two men approached an INGO-run clinic that was under construction and threatened the construction workers and an INGO employee to cease drilling a well at the clinic. (The threat appeared to be related to disputes over the ownership of the property).

And in Kishim District, local residents demonstrated against an INGO over the distribution of food items and stoned the INGO


KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Safety hazards

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	4
This Report Period	2

building. The ANP subsequently intervened and dispersed the demonstration. No injuries were reported; however, the INGO building allegedly sustained light damages.

A third incident occurred when an INGO vehicle that had been returning to Fayzabad from a remote area in Kohistan District overturned and three INGO employees were injured. The INGO workers were able to be transported to a local clinic for first aid; however, weather conditions on the road did not permit a second vehicle to evacuate them back to Fayzabad. Furthermore, the area was not cleared for helicopter



landing. After several attempts to remove the injured patients over the course of almost four days, the INGO succeeded in coordinating an aerial evacuation. This particular incident emphasizes the dangers of travelling in remote areas during the cold season and the necessity of NGO preparedness.

In other areas, low-level AOG and ACG activity persist, including the robbery of a GOA vehicle in Ragh District and an RPG attack on an IMF-run radio station that had recently been established in Argo District.

BAGHLAN


Early in the reporting period, AOG fired on the DAC in Baghlani Jadid and attacked an ANP patrol. Following these incidents, a ten day-long ANSF search and seizure operation in Baghlani Jadid District yielded a limited number of weapons, as well as a stolen ambulance. About two

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Local conflicts
- AOG-IMF/ANSF clashes

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	2
This Report Period	0

dozen AOG reportedly surrendered and about half as many were arrested during the course of the operation; however, it is unclear that the operation had any sustainable impact on AOG in the district. Two instances of AOG intimidation of the local population occurred at the beginning and the end of the reporting period; in one instance a civilian was shot and killed while trying to escape physical abuse. During the extent



of the ANSF operation in Baghlani Jadid, there was an increase in ANP checkpoints around the Pul-e Khumri area along the Mazar-Kabul Road. In Khost Wa Firing, a local community conflict temporarily disrupted access on the road between Nahrin and Khost districts.

JAWZJAN


In Jawzjan, a student demonstration took place in Shibirgan District to protest the alleged IMF Quran-burning. The protest was conducted peacefully, although

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Political disputes
- AOG activity in the south

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	2
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such demonstrations may indicate a growing resentment of the IMF and, by extension, the international community. AOG activity continues to affect the southern panhandle of the province. In Darzab District, AOG issued a letter to the community in Gardan Village, demanding 10% of their harvest, and elsewhere attacked an



ANP checkpoint. In Qush Tapa, an AOG checkpoint was set up in search of GoA employees.

FARYAB


The security situation in Faryab Province was characterized by joint IMF/ANSF search operations in Bilicharagh and Pashtun Kot districts, as well as continued roving AOG activity in Bilicharagh, Almar, Qaysar, Shirin Tagab and Pashtun Kot districts, consisting mainly of SAF and IEDs targeting ANSF and IMF vehicles and checkpoints. The

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- AOG activity
- IEDs in Maymana City

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	4
This Report Period	0

IMF/ANSF operations may be a concerted effort to suppress AOG activity and stabilize the districts ahead of the proposed run-off, when ANSF/IMF are likely to be occupied with election-related security. A rare IED attack also occurred in Maymana City. The IED was motorcycle-mounted, and detonated near Arabkhana Secondary School in the morning hours. While AOG activity is common in the surrounding districts, Maymana District has been stable in comparison, with sporadic attempts at



AOG infiltration from neighbouring districts. Prior to this, the most recent IED detonation in Maymana District occurred on 3 September on the Maymana-Airport Road, targeting an IMF convoy. The targets of these attacks, if they persist, will most likely continue to be the traditional AOG targets in Faryab, which are ANSF and IMF vehicles and checkpoints.

TAKHAR


In Ishkamish District, AOG carried out a rare attack on a police station in the DAC using RPGs and SAF. In previous months, indicators of an AOG presence in Ishkamish have been limited to the discovery and seizure of unexploded IEDs, as well as a few iso-

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- AOG-ANSF confrontation
- Weapons smuggling

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	3
This Report Period	0

lated armed attacks. Therefore, this attack may indicate an escalation of AOG-ANSF confrontation in the area. Similar attacks on the DAC occurred twice in January 2009, and sporadically in previous years. In Dashti Qala, ANSF seized two weapons shipments that were being smuggled via private vehicle. While the district itself has not reported any significant AOG activity, the weapons may have been in trans-



port northward to Darqad or Yangi Qala districts, both of which have seen AOG activity in the past three months; southwards toward Taloqan; or across the Tajikistan border into Kunduz.

KUNDUZ


Recent escalations in Khanabad District may indicate further AOG control of Kunduz Province. In Khanabad District, AOG fired rockets at an ANP checkpoint in the DAC, and ANSF discovered an unexploded IED in the area. Prior to this reporting period, the district had not seen any AOG activity since the 20 August election day, when AOG fired heavy artillery rounds on the DAC. This sudden increase in activity may indicate an attempt

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Attacks in Khanabad District
- Heavy Fighting

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	8
This Report Period	0

by AOG to infiltrate the last remaining district in Kunduz Province that is not under at least partial AOG control. Further destabilization of Khanabad would directly impact the security of the Taloqan-Kunduz Road, which could expect to see an increase in ANP and AOG checkpoints and IMF/ANSF-AOG clashes. In Kunduz and Imam Sahib districts, AOG fired on a combination of ANSF and GoA targets using SAF and RPGs; these incidents were almost consistently followed by AOG-ANSF confrontation. In Archi and Chahar Dara districts, AOG tended to employ standoff



tactics rather than direct fire. On two separate occasions AOG fired on the Archi District DAC, once with BM1 rockets and once with heavy artillery. (These long-range attacks on DACs and ANSF checkpoints are common in the district). In Chahar Dara District, ANSF discovered and defused at least three IEDs. As IEDs are uncommon in Chahar Dara, these discoveries could either indicate an AOG tactical shift, or an increase in ANSF reporting.

ANNOUNCEMENT:

In the coming weeks, ANSO will be deploying an incident mapping service through IMMAP to aid NGO management and security procedures. Registrants will receive further information as it becomes available.

SAR-E PUL


The situation in Sar-e Pul province was characterized by an AOG-ANSF/IMF standoff that occurred late in the reporting period. Prior to the AOG-ANSF/IMF standoff, the AOG had held hostage two civilians in Almalik Village, Sayyad District, under the suspicion that they had been spy-

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- AOG presence
- Abduction

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	1
This Report Period	0

ing for the GoA. One of the captives managed to escape, while the other one was later released by the AOG. A joint ANSF/IMF search operation managed to capture an AOG member in Almalik Village, while a second AOG member managed to escape. The targeted AOG was most likely the same group that had been trying to exert its influence throughout the west of the province, through intimidation as well as the NGO abduction reported in the last pe-



riod. It is unlikely that the ANSF/IMF search operation will have a mitigating effect on AOG activity in Sar-e Pul; the confrontation may push the group to areas outside of Sayyad District.

HERAT

Finally, two INGO staff members abducted on 1 October in Guzara District were released, apparently due to negotiation efforts of their families. The NGO's car was also recovered.


During this reporting period, Chishti-Sharif District experienced two incidents of concern to NGOs. On October 24th, an INGO contracted truck, carrying food supplies from Herat to Chaghcharan, was stopped by a group of gunmen between Chishti-Sharif and Dara Takht (Herat Province). After the theft of two bags of rice, the vehicle and its occupants were allowed to continue unharmed. The following day, an NGO staff worker (off duty) who was travelling from Chaghcharan to Herat along with a member of his family and other passengers was stopped by a

	NGO Incidents
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group of about ten armed men in the same area. This time, passengers were relieved of their possessions then released unharmed.

It is worthy to note that Chishti Sharif (along with Shahrak District in Ghor Province) is known as an area under the influence of a prominent AOG commander who, in the beginning of September, announced a 'reconciliation with the government'. Yet, reporting indicates that this announcement has not been translated into practice as recent incidents show that this area still represents a concern for NGOs due mainly to criminal activity.

In another worrying development for NGOs, a threatening inscription was discovered on the front gate of an INGO guest house on 31 October in Herat City, District 3, warning about a threat of a 'bomb explosion'. The organization concerned has not recently received any intimidation threats, nor does it have reason to believe



that its facilities or staff may be targeted by AOG or ACG.

The security situation has improved in Guzara and Pashtun Zarghun following recent military operations (with another two important AOG commanders influential in these areas surrendering to ANSF). However, the situation in neighbouring areas has been affected by the fleeing AOG elements; for instance, in Gulran District, ANSF led a 26 October military operation reportedly to counter an AOG threat to attack the District Centre.

Also on October 26th, a peaceful student demonstration against the alleged burning of a Quran took place in Herat City.

The threat from IEDs remains a concern for NGOs even if the last significant incident occurred on October 7th. During this reporting period, an RCIED was discovered in Guzara District (Sarjangal Area) on the Herat City-Airport road on October 26th.

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- IEDs
- Criminal activity
- Abduction

BADGHIS

As seen before regarding AOG activities, Badghis was very active during the reporting period. Favourite AOG targets throughout the province remain ANSF/IMF convoys.

Traditionally, Muqur and Murghab districts continue to attract the largest share of security incidents in the province. In the present reporting period, three separate ANSF/IMF convoys were attacked in Muqur and an-


KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- AOG ambushes
- Military operations
- Civilian collateral damage

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	2
This Report Period	0

other two in Murghab District. Of note, on October 18th in the latter district, following an AOG ambush, air support was called to repel the attack. Reportedly, nine AOG were killed and four wounded. On the same day, but in Muqur, one local was killed in AOG-ANSF/IMF crossfire. Another civilian reportedly was wounded on the 16th, also in Muqur District.

The number and intensity of incidents in these areas is an indicator of AOG strength and their will to counter a series of setbacks that they have been dealt recently in Guzara and Pashtun Zarghun (Herat districts).



ANSF/IMF operations also took place during the last reporting period in the districts of Ghormach and, particularly, Muqur. For instance, on October 26th in the Darah-e-Boom area of Muqur, ANSF/IMF conducted a joint operation, supported by air assets, which killed nine AOG and wounded another seven. After leaving the scene of a firefight, though, an IMF helicopter crashed, killing ten persons.

FARAH

The rate of incidents in Farah has decreased during this reporting period, particularly in Bala-Buluk District, where clashes between AOG and IMF/ANSF were commonplace in the past, mainly because of recent military operations in the area.

However, AOG in this district have been able to demonstrate


KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Roadside IEDs
- Convoy ambushes

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	2
This Report Period	0

their presence by triggering an RCIED that hit an ANP vehicle as it escorted an IO contracted convoy on October 16th.

Sporadic AOG-initiated actions continue, mainly against IMF/ANSF targets. For instance, Gulistan District witnessed, on October 19th, an AOG attack on an IMF/ANSF convoy. Collateral exposure to AOG attacks remains also a distinct concern in the province. In Bakwa District, also on October 19th, an IED hit a



local passenger vehicle, reportedly killing one person and wounding another five. Of note, also, on October 26th AOG fired three rockets which impacted in an open area near the Farah Airport.

VACANCIES:

ANSO is in search of a few good NGO workers. Please see the last page for details.

GHOR


On October 21st, an NGO vehicle with two local workers which was carrying supplies to a health clinic together with another passenger's car was stopped by six armed men in Pasaband District. The passengers of the private car were beaten and relieved of their possessions, and their car's tyres were punched with knives. The NGO driver was also physically assaulted in the attack, and the gunmen stole some supplies from the NGO's car. Once again, this incident illustrates that armed robbery (either AOG or ACG-initiated), as well as abduction, remains a serious threat for NGOs in Ghor Province.

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	10
This Report Period	1

It should be noted that Pasaband District is known as an AOG stronghold and has already experienced four direct NGO incidents since the beginning of the year.

Attacks on food convoys also continue in the province. On October 30th, in Shahrak District, a group of armed men stopped an IO contracted convoy carrying food supplies and stole several bags of food.

The districts of Du Layna and Chaghcharan also witnessed instances of armed banditry against private vehicles, with the former




experiencing two instances. Past experience shows that NGO staff should expect to be treated brutally during cases of armed robbery, although recently none have been killed. (Not resisting an attack seems to be the best method to ensure survival).

Besides criminality, AOG manifested themselves in Shahrak District on October 20th when AOG attacked an ANP check post with RPGs and SAF. Of note, also, another case of a school burning occurred in Du Layna on 16 October.

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Armed robbery/ Hijack
- Kidnap
- Spread of AOG activities

WEST AOG INCIDENTS



LAGHMAN


The security situation in Laghman remains unpredictable with a periodic surge of AOG activities. With this, mainly the northern districts are being affected by IED and indirect fire, including an even mix aimed at IMF bases,

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Attacks along Highway 1
- IED threat near DACs

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	1
This Report Period	0

convoys, and supply trucks, and direct attacks on police posts. As usual, all AOG incidents occurred in Alishing and Qarghayi districts. Additionally, no local gatherings were held to address the possible second phase of the presidential election, but it is likely that elders will offer their full support to the process if it does go forward.



Highway 1 is still affected by AOG activity: reports of AOG actively operating in the area suggest that they intend to target IMF logistical convoys and ANSF/IMF vehicular patrols, and ANP CPs along the route.


KUNAR

Late on October 30th, AOG intruded into an INGO clinic located near the Chawkay Bazaar and asked the clinic's ambulance driver to give them a lift, commandeering the clinic's ambulance. While riding in the ambulance, the AOG stopped at a school a short distance away from the clinic, stole computers from the school, and abducted three school guards. ANSF, being alerted to the apparent abduction of the clinic driver and ambulance, emplaced checkpoints in an attempt to prevent the AOG from leaving the area; however, after liaising with an IMF vehicular patrol in the area, ANSF learned that the ambulance had passed by earlier with its sirens on—IMF did not challenge the ambulance because they did not want to delay it if it was responding to an emergency. (IMF indicated that the ambulance had entered the Dey-

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	7
This Report Period	1

wagal Valley). Approximately an hour following the AOGs' departure from the clinic, the clinic driver, ambulance, and guards returned to the district and indicated that they had dropped the AOG at an unspecified location.

Also of concern for NGOs is reporting, deemed credible by the UN, which asserts that AOG have been instructed to abduct UN staff employed in Ghaziabad District. With this, the UN is said not to have any staff located in the said district, meaning NGO staff could be targeted for perceived collusion, or merely erroneously. Concurrently, AOG activity in the northern area of the province, particularly in Ghaziabad, appears to have increased significantly, with uncorroborated reports of groups of Pakistani Taliban migrating to Afghanistan to escape ongoing military operations in Waziristan and, at the same time, to reinforce local AOG. Intimidation and the threat of abduction are serious for locals who may appear to be associated with or showing support for the GoA or



IMF in the central and northern parts of the province.

A total of 61 AOG-initiated incidents were reported during the period. Direct attacks on security forces were the most common AOG tactic: 46 direct attacks, evenly distributed through most of the districts, occurred. Additionally, seven indirect fire attacks were recorded, while three IED detonations, in Manogai and Wata Pur Districts, were also reported. AOG also continued to target IMF and ANSF facilities, especially ANP CPs and IMF static locations, primarily using direct fire. As noted recently, security along the Jalalabad-Asadabad Highway continues to deteriorate with more AOG activity near Patan, Nurgal District, where AOG have been ambushing IMF convoys and attacking police posts in the early morning. (If travel is necessary on the road, using it after mid-morning is recommended). Deterioration of security is likely to deteriorate, so NGOs are advised to limit their activities to Asadabad City.

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Spread of AOG operations onto the Jalalabad-Asadabad Highway
- Indirect fire aimed at IMF/ANP
- Increased combat operations

KHOST

Violence in Khost Province persisted, with a high level of AOG driven incidents during the period. A total of 14 AOG incidents were reported, including 5 direct attacks, mostly in Khost District (Matun), and 8 IED detonations (12 IEDs were also discovered by security forces, evenly distributed through most of the districts); with this, indirect attacks and the use of IEDs remain the preferred tactics for AOG in the province.

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS


- IEDs
- Kidnap
- Attacks on GOA and IMF

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	10
This Report Period	0

This may be due to an accessible and direct route between the province and FATA areas of Pakistan, where migration controls are nearly nonexistent. Whilst most hostilities are aimed at IMF and GoA elements, intimidation and attacks on the local populace are becoming more frequent.

A number of demonstrations were held in the area in protest of the now debunked, infamous Quran incident.

Of note, although tribal elders had issued public declarations that they would not lend support to an electoral runoff, elders voiced their intent to provide security at



polling stations and provide block-support for the incumbent president after holding tribal discussions on the contentious issue.

While the second round clearly still hangs in the balance, NGOs should consider avoiding areas outside of Khost City if the election goes forward because of probable AOG attacks to target election facilities, staff, and ANSF.

NANGARHAR

The security situation in Nangarhar remains stable; however a slight decrease in AOG initiated incidents was observed this period. Still, a total of 11 AOG-initiated incidents were reported across the province. Khogyani and Sherzad remain the districts with the greatest threat to NGO operations due to a significant increase in AOG movement and activities, marked by two IED discoveries in Khogyani and one direct attack against the Khogyani District Centre.

During the morning of October 28 in Dih Bala District, AOG ab-

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Kidnap
- AOG attacks on JAF and GOA facilities
- Increased AOG activity in the western districts


	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	8
This Report Period	0

ducted fourteen young boys, ranging in age from 10 to 15 years old, who were apparently in the area to forage for firewood.

Information during the reporting period suggested that a small group of AOG were intent upon conducting a complex attack against the Governor's office; reportedly, though, security forces killed one perpetrator and arrested a second.

Despite past concerns, Jalalabad City was relatively sedate, with 14 minor incidents—crime and IED/UXO discoveries—being reported.

On October 22 2009 in Jalalabad city the Governor of Nangarhar chaired a peace conference at his palace. All four governors from the eastern provinces (Kunar, Nuristan, Nangarhar and Laghman), together with a large number of local and tribal elders, par-



ticipated. The purpose of the conference was to discuss the presidential run-off and promote peace and prosperity in the eastern region and Afghanistan.

Still, the local penchant for demonstrations was displayed; for example, a number of demonstrations were held, predominately by students from different institutions, to condemn the now infamous alleged Quran burning, and Provincial Council candidates staged a peaceful demonstration over the delay in provincial council election results.

It is likely that AOG-initiated attacks will increase in the coming days if the second round of the presidential election goes forward. Of note, highway 1 saw only one AOG-initiated incident this period.


NURISTAN

Violence, mainly due to limited GoA control, persists in the province, and similar to Kunar, reporting suggests that a number of Pakistani Taliban have been seen in Nuristan, mainly in Kamdesh. With this, reporting from the re-

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	1
This Report Period	0

mote province is still extremely lacking.

In light of the security vacuum, ANSO encourages extreme caution while operating in the province.



PAKTYA

In the morning of October 17th, AOG abducted 15 labourers working for an Indian road construction company from Wuza Zadran District. AOG claimed responsibility for the abduction and furthered that they had issued warnings to the local community not work for or support the mentioned company. According to the


KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Complex attacks in Gardez City
- Kidnap and IEDs, especially along the Gardez-Khost Road

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	2
This Report Period	0

AOG statement, AOG intended to retain the victims until they finished 'investigations'. Consequently, the Wuza Zadran District Governor held a meeting with local elders to establish a committee, during which he tasked them with finding the whereabouts of the victims and securing their safe release. After 12 days of captivity, ultimately, the elders successfully gained the victims' release.

In sum, though, the province was relatively quiet, experiencing only 5 AOG-initiated incidents. Of



note, the Gardez-Khost Road remains a likely place for IED employment.

Overall, road access to main cities within the region remains limited and is considered to be of high risk, with a number of incidents occurring along main routes.

GHAZNI

The security situation in Ghazni remains volatile. A group of AOG members were about to carry out an assault against the DAC of Giro, but IMF was informed of the issue and deployed air assets that killed 8 AOG members on 28 October. Also, AOG briefly attacked the Zana Khan DAC with SAF on 21 October, and AOG targeted an IMF logistical convoy that was escorted by PSC guards.


KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Abduction
- IEDs or ambushes on convoys
- Rocket/RPG attacks

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	2
This Report Period	0

6 AOG, 1 PSC guard, and 4 civilians were killed; 2 PSC guards were wounded; and eight trucks were set ablaze during the attack. In addition, AOG attacked an ANA convoy in Andar District on the 18th, leading to the death of 1 ANP and the injury of another. AOG also targeted an ANP post in Sinjetak, Ghazni, resulting in 3 AOG and 1 ANP killed and 1 ANP wounded.

PSC guards detained 8 AOG members in Jum Juma, Muqur District, on 19 October, and IMF conducted an airstrike, killing 6 AOG members near the Qara-



bagh District Centre on 24 October.

Several IED strikes were reported during the period; for example, an IED placed under a culvert hit a civilian vehicle, killing 2 occupants and wounding 5 others in Mushakai, Qarabagh, on 19 October, whilst 4 AOG dies in a premature IED detonation in Andar District on 24 October.

HELMAND


The most notable incident in Helmand during this reporting period was the abduction of 9 electricians while they were working in Band-e-Timor, Nahri Sarraj District, on 18 October. Following the incident, community elders negotiated with the abductors and, eventually, the 9 abducted electricians were released unharmed on 21 October in exchange for an unknown amount of money. In Lashkar Gah City on 28 October, uncorroborated reporting asserted that an AOG member working in

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	1
This Report Period	0

an IO in the city had been in contact with an AOG commander, and that one of the parties intended to conduct a suicide attack against an IO in the city. No specific location was cited in the report; however, apparent separate reporting suggested that the threat was meant to target an IO location which is in front of the rear side entrance to the Governor's office. Additionally, no time period for the purported attack was stipulated. In another incident, AOG shot and killed 3 people working for a private construction company after AOG found construction related documents on the victims in Nahri Sarraj Dasht on 19 October.

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Suicide Attack
- Roadside IEDs
- Significant AOG presence



IMF/ANA conducted a joint operation and purportedly killed 20 AOG members in Nahri Sarraj District on 27 October. The following day, in Karta-e-Lagan, Lashkar Gah, NDS arrested three AOG members who were in possession of a suicide vest, weapons and IEDs. In sum, several IED strikes were reported during the period; for example, an IED hit a civilian vehicle, killing 2 occupants in Durahi, Nahri Sarraj, on 19 October, whilst another one hit an IMF soldier who was on a foot patrol, killing him in the same district but on 23 October.

URUZGAN

AOG attacked the Khas Uruzgan DAC for one and a half hours on 27 October. Also, AOG attacked ANA/ANP for 3 hours on 21 October, which purportedly ended in 9 AOG fatalities in Tirin Kot on the Kandahar-Tirin Kot Road. Likewise, IMF/ANSF conducted several operations against AOG; for example, ANSF/IMF


	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	2
This Report Period	0

conducted a joint operation supported by IMF air assets, reportedly resulting in 58 AOG fatalities and 28 other AOG members, 3 IMF soldiers, and 5 ANP officials injured in Chora District on 18 October. On the same day, but in Khas Uruzgan District, IMF/ANSF conducted an operation against a high-level AOG commander which ended in the escape of the commander and the death of 8 other AOG members.

In sum, several IED strikes were reported during the period. An

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- IEDs
- AOG/local opposition to outside parties



IED hit an ANA vehicle, killing 1 ANA and wounding another near Khlybar, Tirin Kot, on 19 October. In a similar incident, an RCIED hit an ANA vehicle, killing 1 ANA soldier and wounding another, again in Tirin Kot but on 21 October.


KANDAHAR

On 28 October, a suspected BBIED attacker was confronted by armed guards at an INGO compound in Kandahar City. Important to note, it is not clear if the suspect was outfitted with a suicide vest; however, the guards suggested that it appeared the suspect had a vest on under his clothing and that he stated he was scheduled to attend an interview with an organisation at the site (there was no such organisation located there). After being challenged by the guards, and the guards signalling that they intended to use deadly force, the suspect turned and fled the scene. Besides the abovementioned disconcerting incident, a prominent attack occurred on 30 October when a VBIED targeted the Kandahar Deputy NDS Chief's vehicle, killing 3 NDS and wounding 3 others, including the Deputy NDS Chief in Shorandam, Daman. And on 31 October, uncorroborated re-

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	7
This Report Period	1

porting suggested that suicide attackers were in search of targets in District 7, Kandahar City; this reporting furthered that the perpetrators may desire to target the Indian Consulate, and that they may either employ BBIEDs or SVBIEDs. While the veracity of the information is unknown, one can expect multiple suicide threats to be promulgated to encourage fear and lead to complacency within security forces.

Just as seen country-wide, 2,000 students staged a peaceful demonstration inside the Kandahar University compound. They condemned the recent IMF operation in Wardak Province in which IMF were accused of burning a Quran and chanted anti-US slogans. The university students also burnt an effigy of the US President, Barak Obama, and the US flag. They demanded that IMF soldiers involved in the respective operation be prosecuted for the alleged offense, that IMF withdraw from Afghanistan, and that the Kandahar University student who was said to have been arrested by IMF in Paktika Province about 7 months ago be released. Also, in




Spin Boldak on 18 October, an estimated 7-8,000 demonstrators navigated from the Spin Boldak Bazaar to the Wesh Bazaar as they voiced their discontent with a possible election runoff and support for the incumbent president.

IMF/ANSF conducted several operations and airstrikes during the period; for example, IMF conducted an airstrike that ended in 9 AOG fatalities, including the Shadow Governor for Arghandab District. ANP conducted an operation, killing 8 AOG members and detaining another in Makwan, Zhari, and IMF/ANSF conducted a search operation which led to six AOG members being killed in Houz-e-Madad of the same district.

In sum, 28 IED strikes were reported during the period. An IED hit a patrolling IMF vehicle, killing 7 IMF soldiers and 1 interpreter and wounding 1 IMF soldier in Arghandab, and an RCIED hit an IMF vehicle, killing 2 IMF soldiers and wounding 4 others in the same district but on 23 October. (The notable substantial IMF casualties indicate a possible increased sophistication in local IEDs).

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Suicide attack
- Roadside IEDs
- Kidnap





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ANSO is managed by an NGO
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feedback, good or bad, let
them know on:
ansoab@yahoo.com

ANSO ACRONYMS

IMF-International Military Forces / **AOG**-Armed Opposition Groups / **GOA**-Government of Afghanistan / **ACG**-Armed Criminal Groups / **ANA**-Afghan National Army / **ANP**-Afghan National Police / **IED**-Improvised Exploding Device / **AEF**-Afghan Eradication Forces / **RPG**-Rocket Propelled Grenade / **IDF**-Indirect Fire (ex: mortars) / **VBIED**-Vehicle Borne Improvised Exploding Device / **PRP**-Previous Reporting Period / **ANBP**-Afghan National Border Police / **SAF**-Small Arms Fire / **NDS**-National Directorate of Security (intelligence) / **PSC**-Private Security Company / **DC**-District Centre

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MISSING

This report ANSO could not provide analysis for the provinces of:

Panjshir

Paktika

Nimroz

Zabul

Samangan

This is because we do not know enough about the area to comment on the significance of the incidents occurring there.

If you can help us understand the province better, please contact us.

TRAINING

The Centre for Safety and Development will be conducting security management training 15-17 November at the ANSO HQ. Check www.centreforsafety.org for more information and to register. (ANSO-registered NGOs received a discount).

VACANCIES

ANSO is in search of a few good NGO workers to fill its Mobile and South RSA positions. If you have NGO experience, an analytical background, and the desire to be challenged, all while being part of a close-knit team, pass your CV to director@afgnso.org.