

THE ANSO REPORT

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YOU NEED TO KNOW

- Election-related threats and violence overshadow other concerns
- Sensational attacks meant to garner media coverage and discourage voting are likely
- Increased combat along past secure highways and AOG electoral-related threats are disconcerting

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COUNTRY SUMMARY

The upcoming elections and associated violence dominated the media during this two week reporting period, in some cases overshadowing other significant security developments in other parts of the country.

As expected, AOG carried out a devastating and high-profile suicide attack in Kabul, likely designed to disrupt the elections by frightening potential voters in the capital; more such attacks are expected in Kabul in the coming days.

AOG efforts to intimidate voters, candidates, and electoral workers remain widespread in the greater central region and much of the rest of the country; however, the overall number of attacks on discernible election targets, such as ballot convoys, campaign rallies, campaign staff, observers, and election agents has been lower than many expected. Still, incidents will likely increase around the August 20 election date.

In recent days, AOG have issued statements indicating their intent to target polling stations or centres, but it is not clear if this is propaganda, or a legitimate warning to Afghan civilians.

Other recent developments in the Central region include a complex attack against the Governor's office in Puli Alam in Logar, and worrying levels of AOG activity in parts of Daykundi, Kapisa and Wardak.

In the North, IMF/ANSF operations focused on Kunduz do not appear to be reducing AOG activity, and the ongoing conflict is having a serious destabilising effect on the province. Of note during this reporting period, AOG attacked a high-profile convoy near Aliabad which was later revealed to have been carrying former President Rabbani.

In the East, the only significant development was the worrying increase in combat reported along the Kabul to Jalalabad and Jalalabad to Asadabad highways, as these are routes still being used by NGO national and international staff.

In the West, ANSO reports indicate a two-fold increase in AOG activity over the same period in 2008, and Herat is now the leading province in terms of NGO incidents this year. Violence continues to creep from Herat's suburban districts into Herat City proper, made evident by the 3 August RCIED attack in the city which killed the District Chief of Police, caused significant civilian casualties, and damaged nearby NGO compounds.

The South, nonetheless, remains highly volatile due to the high volume of AOG and IMF/ANSF operations. Despite the latter actors' recent and ongoing operations, AOGs maintain influence or control over most of the south and the ability to conduct IED strikes and attacks almost at will (although not always effectively). AOGs in the south are issuing widespread and dire warnings to the population against participating in the elections. AOGs have also started broadcasting news and perspectives over the radio in parts of Ghazni. Numerous IED attacks and significant suicide attacks, including one attempt against an ANA base, were again reported across the southern region during this period. IMF airstrikes also caused more consternation and demonstrations.

KABUL

Kabul has remained relatively immune from the rising levels of AOG initiated violence experienced across the rest of the country this year; however, the rocket attack on 4 August and the large SVBIED outside ISAF HQ on 15 August served to shatter that illusion for some. The SVBIED is believed to have wounded over 100 people and killed more than a dozen. Windows, including in

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS


- ➔ Complex attacks against high-profile targets
- ➔ Armed Criminal Groups
- ➔ Abduction

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	8
This Report Period	0

NGO residences, were reportedly blown out in structures several hundred metres away.

The security climate across the capital will be dominated by the election, both prior to and following 20 August. There is an increasing likelihood, according to threat reporting, that AOG will attempt to undertake one or several high-profile attacks in the days before the election or in its immediate aftermath.

Although unlikely to directly target polling centres and polling stations, AOG may take advantage of the election-focused stance of the ANSF to attack 'softer tar-



gets', such as GoA and international facilities; a large scale attack in the capital would significantly undermine the confidence of voters to turn out on election day. Of further concern is the post election period where rumours and the election results themselves may contribute to a deteriorating security environment. In this environment, ACG activity is expected to increase as the political vacuum and specific security focus on the election detract from the ANP's crime fighting abilities.

KAPISA

Anecdotal reporting indicates that recent AOG attacks in the west of the province are largely attributable to a new AOG intent on disrupting the election. The east of the province continues to experience regular attacks on IMF/ANSF targets, with Tagab likely to face severe difficulties staging any polling centres in the


KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- ➔ Attacks on ANSF, especially in Tagab and Nijrab
- ➔ Rocket, IED, and mine attacks

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	2
This Report Period	0

district due to the associated levels of violence.

The two most recent attacks in the west were believed to be targeting senior provincial and election officials; however, this has been difficult to confirm. In the Toghat Area of Kohistan, an IED attached to a bicycle detonated an hour after senior election officials had passed, injuring a local man on 6 August. Similarly, senior provincial officials were having lunch in Puli Sayad Area, when three rockets landed in the area, leaving no casualties on 9 August. Previ-



ous threats mentioning the election have been recorded across the province, and NGOs are reminded to avoid all election-related sites also on the day prior to and following the election. Although it is unlikely AOG will directly target polling centres, the recent spike in electoral-related violence means that the possibility cannot be discounted.

NOTICE:

ANSO has unveiled a new streamlined registration and amendment process for NGOs. For registration or amendment assistance, please email the Operations Coordinator Assistant, Wali Haqdot, at operations2@afgnso.org.

PARWAN

Parwan has remained relatively quiet during the election campaigning period with only low-level factional disputes being reported. Separately, the west of the province – of concern for NGOs travelling to Bamyan – experienced two rocket attacks against


KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Attacks on ANSF/IMF, especially near Bagram Airbase
- Irregular IEDs targeting ANSF in Ghorband Valley

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	1
This Report Period	0

the DAC in Shinwari on 1 and 9 August. AOG initiated incidents, since the attack on the IO convoy in June, have remained confined to attacks against ANSF and GoA targets, such as the DACs, and have not translated into a more general threat to civilian traffic.

The increased level of AOG activity in the west of Kapisa may have overflowed into the East of Parwan if an ambush on IMF in Hayat Khel Village in Sayed Khel could be attributed to AOG. Ambushes against IMF are extremely



rare in the district and also the province, where traditionally only standoff attacks are used against IMF in Bagram and Kohi Safi. The ambush on 5 August injured three IMF and drove ANSF to return to the village, culminating in the arrests of five men and the seizure of a number of IEDs and other weapons.

DAYKUNDI


The south of Daykundi remains a concern due to the frequency of reports about AOG movements, combined with sporadic attacks on ANSF checkpoints. In most reports, AOG intentions are to

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- High AOG infiltration of Kiti, Gizrab, and Kajran
- Security vacuum
- AOG clashes with locals, especially in the south

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	1
This Report Period	0

disrupt the election, with checkpoints set up looking for GoA officials. Attacks on GoA facilities in either Kajran or Gizab, before and after the election, are a distinct possibility. Further north in Khadir on 4 August, three people were abducted, and the following day one of the men was killed by local AOG. It is understood that the other two men remain in custody, and negotiations are ongoing for their release.



Banditry continues to represent a minor threat to NGO operations following a further robbery in Chawoosh Valley of Ishtarlay; local criminal groups are believed to be responsible for setting up a temporary checkpoint and robbing people of their possessions in minivans and trucks.

BAMYAN

On 4 August, an NGO medical facility was temporarily closed following a reported abduction threat against staff. Still, events in Bamyan have centred primarily around Shibar, following a rocket attack on the District Chief of


KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Increasing IEDs and mines
- Armed robbery along roadways

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	1
This Report Period	1

Police's convoy and a subsequent operation in the Shinkari Valley. The ANP-led operation resulted in the arrest of a senior AOG commander who was subsequently taken to the provincial capital. Several days later, a further AOG suspect was arrested in Bamyan City.

Although reports have emerged of low-level factional disputes deriv-



ing from the election, there have been no overt displays of violence, which is unlikely to dramatically change in the next several weeks.

LOGAR

International attention was focused on Puli Alam, on 10 August, when five AOG launched a complex attack against the Governor's office. After seeking refuge in an adjoining five story building following the initial attack, AOG then started firing from a vantage point. It is believed that the AOG used SAF and RPGs and were


KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Abduction
- Electoral-related violence
- Attacks on ANSF/IMF

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	2
This Report Period	0

equipped with BBIED vests. In response, IMF were deployed to the Bazaar Area in tanks, and helicopters were used to rocket the building that contained the remaining AOG. Reports have emerged that two AOG detonated their BBIED vests to avoid capture; three ANSF and two civilians were reportedly killed together with the five AOG.

The seeming success of the operation served to distract attention from the election and instead focused scrutiny on the overall dete-



riorating security situation across the country. This attack is likely to be replicated against other DACs and provincial capitals in the lead up to and following the election. Previously reported intimidation threats and the known strength of AOG in the province will ensure that attacks against electoral-related sites and GoA facilities will likely be recorded in virtually every district.

WARDAK

Highway One, together with the DACs, is the primary focus of AOGs in Wardak. Standoff attacks on IMF, ANSF and logistics convoys were unabated in Saydabad and Nirkh, with close range attacks favoured primarily against the DACs in Day Mirdad and Jaghatu; nonetheless, Chaki Wardak, Nirkh and the capital Maydan Shahr are not immune to these


KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Abduction
- Rocket and IED attacks
- Intimidation efforts

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	2
This Report Period	0

methods. In response, ANSF/IMF have launched several joint operations against AOG, especially in Chaki Wardak and Saydabad, where in the villages of Ambokhak and Kharyan a total of 111 people were arrested, ten were killed, and two wounded.

There has also been a discernible level of electoral-related violence, although mainly confined to attacks on logistics convoys. Intimidation efforts have been recorded across the province, including threats against the voting public as well as against election workers



and GoA employees. The next two weeks will most likely witness a shift from intimidation to direct attacks on GoA facilities and returning election convoys and isolated attacks on polling centres and stations around election day. It is unlikely that direct attacks on the voting public will occur; however, with recent reports of direct threats to the general public, then the possibility remains.

FARYAB

Dynamics in Faryab have persisted in terms of AOG presence and incidents. The districts of

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- IEDs
- Attacks on checkpoints
- Electoral-related violence

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	3
This Report Period	0

Qaysar, Almar, and Pashtun Kot continue to see the bulk of AOG incidents, consisting of RGP, SAF, and IED attacks on ANSF and IMF as well as the ever-profitable tactic of kidnapping international road construction company labourers. The areas north of Maymana continue to see

AOG attempts to expand their presence, meeting with mixed success. In Shirin Tagab and Dawlatabad, AOGs mostly employ IEDs or attacks on ANP/ANBP checkpoints. While such attacks often produce AOG victories in the west of the province, in the north, their chance of success is inversely proportional to the amount of resistance put up by the ANP. In this reporting period, an AOG expanded the list of targets slightly by attacking campaigners for a presidential candidate in Shirin Tagab.

BAGHLAN


Criminal activity remains the chief concern throughout much of the east of the province and has continued to escape the GoA's capability to remedy it. An ACG checkpoint in Jilga served to harass travellers between Nahrin and Khost-wa-Firang for much of this reporting period, interfering with the travel plans of at least one NGO by causing them to delay a planned trip. ACG activity has previously been recorded in this

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	1
This Report Period	0

spot, which accounted for the sole recorded NGO incident of the year when an NGO vehicle was robbed. ACG groups in this area are pointedly apolitical and do not ask about the affiliations of those they detain, but their presence means that travel in the area should be based on up-to-date local information and acute situational awareness, to the greatest extent possible. Additionally, NGOs should carry as few valuables as possible in this area. Occasional reports have been received of AOGs in remote villages throughout the east of the province, but these have proved

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Criminal activity
- Political disputes
- AOGs in Baghlani Jadid



impossible to substantiate and are more likely to represent remote and conservative elements arming themselves and acting defensively instead of a coordinated AOG push, such as that is being seen in the Baghlani Jadid area. Other security incidents in Baghlani have been focused upon internal power struggles, particularly in association with real and anticipated reshuffles surrounding elections; for example, one such incident led to the Dahani Ghorri Chief of Police being targeted with an IED.


KUNDUZ

The ongoing joint IMF/ANSF operations, focused on areas north and west of Kunduz, have apparently not had the overall impact of reducing AOG-initiated activity in the province. AOGs operating in Kunduz have successfully been able to show their presence elsewhere, most significantly around the Puli Khumri – Kunduz road south of Kunduz and Dashti Archi District in the northeast of the province. South of Kunduz, an AOG orchestrated a significant RPG attack on a high-profile convoy near Aliabad which was later revealed to have been carrying former President Rabbani.

On at least two occasions, AOGs manifest themselves in the imme-

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	8
This Report Period	0

diating environs of the airport/PRT. An SVBIED detonated along the short road from the PRT to the main road, and an AOG also set up a checkpoint on the same main road not far south of the PRT cut-off, which was only displaced with some difficulty by ANSF. In Dashti Archi District, a major AOG attack succeeded in killing the District Chief of Police, who was politically important and well-connected, along with three other ANP. Although ANP showed strong resolve and discipline by holding the police headquarters during a three-hour clash, the authorities were ultimately only able to reassert control after irregular reinforcements were sent in from neighbouring districts. In the aftermath of this attack was an attempt by ANSF to reassert control that met with stiff AOG resistance, followed in turn by AOGs retaking the initiative and re-



launching an assault on the District Centre. The outcome is still unclear at the time of this writing, but it is clear that AOGs have demonstrated strong operational capabilities throughout the clash and in an area which has been relatively quiet in recent months (though pro-AOG sentiment has always been significant in Archi). While local support for AOGs will be important for the long-term sustainability of their activities, it is also likely that the assault on the Archi DAC was supported by an excess of AOG fighters who have been squeezed out of other areas by IMF/ANSF operations. Because of the amount and variety of threats throughout the province, travel through and within should be restricted to essential only, with the situation unlikely to change soon.

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- AOG activity
- Ongoing military operations
- IEDs

BADAKHSHAN

Badakhshan's usual milieu of criminal activity and localised political disputes was mostly unchanged. Anti-GoA agitation, however, has ultimately made its mark in the final run-up to the national elections. Previously, little such activity had been seen outside of the occasional anti-participation leaflet distributed in Fayzabad. In this reporting pe-


KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Electoral-related violence
- Criminal activity

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	0
This Report Period	0

riod, such leaflets have also been seen in Baharak, and in Shahri Buzurg, a local mullah urged followers not to participate in voting. In Fayzabad, anti-GoA sentiment took a more violent form when a candidate's campaign vehicle was set alight. The practical impact for NGOs, seeing that the GoA's sphere of operations has widened, is that there are more potential targets which ought to be avoided; the list of typical GoA targets such as IMF, ANSF, and GoA

BADAKHSHAN



personnel and facilities now also extends to election officials, campaign workers, and polling places during the actual polling. Aside from election-associated threats, other security incidents in Badakhshan consisted of small and isolated attacks on ANP, which are just as likely the outcome of ACG-related issues as they are of AOG sentiment.

JAWZJAN

Jawzjan as a whole has remained especially quiet in the pre-election period with the exception of the restive southern districts of Darzab and Qoshtappa. This dynamic reflects the fact that those two districts have a committed AOG presence while activity else-


KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- AOG activity in Qoshtappa and Darzab
- Political disputes

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	1
This Report Period	0

where is resultant from a quest within the GoA system for the spoils of power and influence. Roving AOGs in Qoshtappa and Darzab continue to exercise influence and intimidate at will, entering a village centre for a few hours in order to "collect taxes" or harassing passers-by along roads. They sustain themselves through such revenues or through other illegal activities, best exemplified by the kidnap for ransom of a

JAWZJAN



provincial council candidate recently. Alongside ACG ties, the groups active in southern Jawzjan have varying connections to groups further afield in places like Sayyad District of Sar-e Pul, eastern Faryab, and the highly volatile Murghab Valley of Badghis.

SAR-E PUL

Incidents in Sar-e Pul have been entirely confined to AOG responses to IMF/ANSF operations in Sayyad District. Such operations are meant to establish a GoA presence but have not yet


KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- AOG activity in Sayyad
- Criminal activity

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	0
This Report Period	0

been sustained long enough to have the desired impact, with ANA often recalled to back up their comrades in other more high-profile trouble spots. The results consist of scattered and generally ineffective attempts by some AOGs to engage the IMF/ANSF, after which they tactically retreat elsewhere until the operation has passed. The volatility of no singu-

SAR-E-PUL



lar party dominating the area means there have been few NGO incidents, as few NGOs are able to operate in such an exposed position.

FARAH


Threats in Farah are almost exclusively directed at GoA, ANSF, and IMF, with no NGO incidents reported due to their lack of exposure, low profile, or both. The main other source of concern in the province is the nexus between

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Ambushes
- IEDs
- Criminal activity

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	3
This Report Period	0

ACGs and AOGs, leading to occasional arrests and confrontations along the relatively desolate border with Iran. AOGs active in Farah have been able to continually demonstrate presence by ambushing IMF convoys and rocketing the governor's office. The rate of incidents in Farah has remained fairly constant but this is possibly a result of low IMF/ANSF exposure rather than lack



of AOG presence or motivation. Travel through or within Farah is still not recommended for NGOs.

HERAT

The most significant event to have occurred in the province was consistent with violence that has, until now, been only commonplace in the districts that surround Herat City; this time, however, a sensational RCIED attack occurred in Herat City. The explosion, which garnered a significant amount of media attention, took place at a busy intersection and succeed in killing the Injil District Chief of Police along with 13 ANP and 20 other bystanders; also, it caused significant damage to the compound of an INGO located nearby. The cause of the CoP's targeting was the typical combination of AOG methods mixed with political rivalries, and

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS


- IEDs
- Illegal checkpoints
- Criminal activity

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	13
This Report Period	0

the attack followed a number of failed attempts. While such major events rarely happen within the confines of Herat City, they are commonplace in its suburbs; these attacks, although not entertaining the same attention as incidents within the city, show that *this* attack posed no extra difficulties, logistically.

Looking at the province as a whole, with over twenty recorded AOG-initiated incidents, it easily trumps other known and recognized trouble spots, such as Kunduz and Badghis. Moreover, AOG activity in Herat appears unique in its scope and diversity. AOGs, and ACGs, have resorted to the time-tested methods of IEDs, illegal checkpoints, and SAF attacks.

Road travel east of Herat, starting west of Pashtun Zargun, remains



inadvisable due to AOG control and rivalries. Kushki Kuhna and Karukh districts also continue to host AOGs, making civilian travel between Qal'ai Naw and Herat difficult, at best. Furthermore, AOGs have continued to show their regular ability to target the airport with rockets and disrupt air traffic in and out of Herat. The threat of airport closure is further underlined by frequent and awkwardly coordinated closures for maintenance. The location and subsequent susceptibility of the airport to AOG activity and closure means that organizations wishing to utilise it should leave a window of two to three days, both coming and going, to allow for cancellation and delay of their flights.

ANNOUNCEMENT:

In the coming months, ANSO will be providing input for an incident mapping service to aid NGO management and security procedures. Registrants will receive further information as it becomes available.

GHOR


The threat from AOG activity in the southern districts of Taywara and Pasaband has receded in this reporting period, with other activity in Ghor being mainly criminal in nature. The object of an attack

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Criminal activity
- Political disputes

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	9
This Report Period	0

on IEC workers seems to have been their satellite phones, rather than their role in the elections. In another instance, an ACG succeeded in robbing travellers along the road between Chaghcharan and Lal-wa-Sarjangan by donning ANP uniforms and posing as a checkpoint. Travel through Shah-rak and areas west along the route to Herat is still to be avoided due



to shifting allegiances between AOG and ACG leaders and other sundry local commanders that encourage further strife.

LAGHMAN

Laghman has seen a worrying increase in combat along Highway 1; for example, AOGs thought to be based in Mitharlam District have conducted three recent direct attacks on police posts in the Tengay Area. There have also been three IMF fuel tanker ambushes on Highway 1 closer to Jalalabad. (The latter perpetrators are believed to be based in

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS


- Attacks along Highway 1
- Continuing IED threat near DACs

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	1
This Report Period	0

Khogyani or Surkh Rod). In sum, the threat to NGOs in both areas is the possibility of being inadvertently caught in the middle of a clash between combatants.

To highlight this, there have been no reports of illegal check points or AOG targeting anything other than security force vehicles and posts.

Another development is a decrease in the number of reported IEDs in the province over recent months, with only one reported this period.



There was one election-related violent incident, however, reported this period: a Provincial candidate was ambushed in Mitharlam District. The candidate escaped unharmed, but one attacker was wounded and arrested. Lastly, election observers do not expect voting to occur in the three northern districts.

NANGARHAR

Despite instability elsewhere, Nangarhar has been stable and quiet this period. Most AOG activity has occurred in the western districts and has involved IEDs.


KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Kidnap threat
- AOG attacks on JAF and GoA facilities
- Attacks on DACs and polling stations

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	7
This Report Period	0

Highway 1 to Torkham is secure, and NGO local staff report the road to Peshawar is also quiet.

Additionally, political rallies have been held without incident in Jalalabad. With this, one should note that a mosque that had been designated as a polling station in Chaparhar District was attacked with an RPG during the evening of 14 August. (No casualties or damage were reported). Further-



more, election observers expect voting to be difficult in any district bordering Pakistan, but they do not foresee major problems in Jalalabad, or the central districts.

NURISTAN

Nuristan has been stable, but with improved reporting for both ANSO and the UN, statistically will appear to have more AOG activity. IMF combat operations continued in Bargi Matal, and there were four AOG attacks re-


KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Increased military operations
- AOG pervasiveness

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	1
This Report Period	0

ported this period in Bargi Matal and Kamdesh.

A major event occurred in Parun on 14 August when a demonstration voicing discontent with the governor's handling of the election turned violent, and police shot several demonstrators. While there are rumours that AOG fired from the crowd, these remain unconfirmed. On another note, election observers do not expect vot-



ing to be held in Nuristan, and due to the prevalent security vacuum, NGOs are advised to generally avoid the province.

KUNAR

The security situation in Kunar is largely unchanged. Combat is common in Manogai, Narang, Wata Pur and Sirkanay districts. Direct attacks on convoys and IMF/ANP remain the most frequent AOG tactic with the apparent lack of IED use being due more to IMF reporting proce-


KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Spread of AOG operation onto the Jalalabad - Asadabad Highway
- Inaccurate IDF on IMF/ANP

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	6
This Report Period	0

dures than a lack of AOG explosive devices.

Over the past several years, the Jalalabad- Asadabad Highway has been secure enough that international staff travel to Asadabad was common; this may be changing, though. The most troubling development in Kunar during this period was a firefight on 8 August that blocked the Jalalabad- Asadabad Highway in Nurgal between security forces and people "dressed as ANP". With this, security forces recently arrested three groups of ANSF who had



been running illegal checkpoints north of Jalalabad, an action that will hopefully re-establish a high level of security on the highway.

Although no direct election violence was reported in Kunar this period, election observers, not surprisingly, do not expect voting to be possible in the most volatile districts.

PAKTYA


Paktya remains volatile with 17 AOG incidents reported this period. The incidents were a mix of IEDs and direct fire attacks on security forces, including eight successful ambushes or IED attacks. Gardez and Zurmat remain

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Complex attacks in Gardez City

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	1
This Report Period	0

the centres of AOG operations. With the threat of violence, there was an unusual lull in kidnapping, IEDs on the Gardez-Khost Road, and attacks on construction companies this period. In light of the violence, though, NGOs are advised to avoid road travel in the districts.



KHOST


Khost Province remains highly volatile with ten IEDs exploding or being found in Khost City. Sabari District was also active with a failed BBIED attack on the DAC

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- IEDs
- Abduction
- Attacks on GoA and IMF

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	9
This Report Period	0

and indirect fire attacks. Shamal District also experienced indirect fire attacks, distinguishing itself by being the site of the only direct fire attacks on security forces in the province. In spite of AOG attempts to utilise IDF and unconventional tactics, AOGs' preferred weapon remains the IED, and their ability to coordinate operations appears to be better than



in other eastern region provinces. Because of this reliance on IEDs, NGOs are advised to avoid road travel in the province.

PAKTIKA

Security incidents in Paktika were typical, minus a few exceptions. The most significant incident occurred in Sharan City on 2 August when AOG attacked the Provincial Governor's residence with heavy weapons from 2 directions. IMF air support responded to the scene, and the clash lasted for one hour with no reported casualties. AOG also demonstrated their intent to conduct prolonged attacks in the two hour siege of an ANP post and the Nika District


KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- IEDs
- Abductions
- AOG-IMF/ANSF clashes

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	1
This Report Period	0

Centre on 2 August that resulted in 4 AOG and 2 ANP fatalities. Additionally, AOG attacked an ANP post with heavy weapons and SAF, resulting in 2 AOG killed, again in Sharan City on 2 August.

Besides attempts to target accepted combatants, typical methods of intimidation, such as execution or abduction of perceived GoA collaborators, were evident in the killing of a school teacher in Nika District on 12 August and the 11 August abduction of the Gayan District Administrator, both occurring whilst the victims were on their way home.



The prevalent threat remains IEDs, however, with strikes occurring in several districts, including Yahya Khel, Omna, Khushamand, Khair Kot, Yosuf Khel and Sharan Districts; in total, 7 ANP, 1 civilian, 2 PSC guards and 3 employees of a road construction company were killed in the strikes. Additionally, NGOs should expect that AOG elements in the area would like to conduct further sensational attacks, usually against GoA, ANSF, or IMF facilities.

NOTICE: Your input is invaluable for the production of this report. While we appreciate information on incidents, we also need general information on the security situation in your area. So please remember to call or email us regularly. Contact details of ANSO staff are provided on the last page.

ANSO: “..by NGOs for NGOs..”

KANDAHAR

The state of insecurity in Kandahar continues to be volatile, with AOG-IMF/ANSF strife afflicting all districts, especially Kandahar City, predominately in the form of roadside IED strikes. Significant incidents were marked by the 5 August hijacking of an NGO mini-bus, with a group of deminers on board travelling from their daily work site to their office. The perpetrators bound them and appropriated the NGO's vehicle, but ANP deployed and pursued the perpetrators, later finding the vehicle abandoned. In a separate incident, an IED detonated prior to the arrival of a passing demining vehicle on 1 August, wounding 1 deminer.


KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Banditry/Hijacking
- Kidnap
- Roadside IEDs

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	5
This Report Period	1

And as should be expected, AOG distributed anti-election night letters in Districts 1 and 9 of Kandahar City; with this, on 13 August in District 2, ANP detained 4 AOG members that were riding on 2 motorbikes and possessed 15 night letters and a pistol.

NGOs should also note the demonstration that occurred on 5 August outside the Kandahar Governor's compound in response to purported civilian casualties that resulted from an IMF airstrike in Arghandab District the previous night. The demonstrators had transported the 4 corpses to the scene and demanded action; this all occurred, of note, while IMF conducted several operations and airstrikes in Kandahar City and Arghandab, Panjwayi, and Zhari Districts, reportedly killing 29 AOG and 9 civilians.



The AOG intent to plan and orchestrate attacks inside Kandahar City was again made evident, this time in the seizure of 500 kg of explosives and other IED manufacturing items in District 9 on 4 August. The reliance on IEDs was concurrently seen in the numerous IED strikes that occurred during the period; for example, 8 IEDs hit civilian vehicles in different locations, killing a sum of 13 civilians, including children, and wounding an additional 26. Also, 4 IEDs hit IMF vehicles, killing 4 IMF soldiers and wounding 9 others, including 2 international journalists. NGOs should note that the province, as a whole, continues to be perilous due to AOG attempts to confront the GoA, IMF, and ANSF.

NIMROZ

AOG continue to dominate offensive operations in the province. Recently, on 13 August, ANP shot a suicide bomber riding in a vehicle rigged as a VBIED after the suicide attacker failed to heed given warnings to stop at their post, resulting in the death of the suicide bomber.

And on 6 August, three armed men entered a medical clinic in


KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Suicide attacks in Zaranj and Khash Rod
- Kidnap
- Prevalent security vacuum

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	1
This Report Period	0

Ghor Ghor, Khash Rod District, assaulted the staff, and stole one motorbike. In addition, on 8 August in the same district, five armed individuals attacked the house of a local civilian nurse working for a health clinic, wounding the nurse's daughter.

Just as elsewhere, AOG distributed warning letters to Khash Rod residents, stating not to participate in the upcoming elections, or they would face death. Additionally, AOG attacked the Khash Rod ANP HQ on 1 August for three hours, resulting in 10 AOG killed. Also, on 9 August in the district, AOG had set up an illegal check



post, searching vehicles and looking for GoA and foreign workers.

The majority of incidents in Nimroz, however, continue to be resultant from its access to cross border areas, mainly entailing illicit operations by criminal and opposition elements, including human trafficking and drug smuggling - a situation that will likely continue due to the province's relative isolation.

HELMAND

This reporting period in Helmand concluded with a number of significant incidents. The most significant one occurred on 14 August in Laghman Jada, Lashkar Gah City, when a Toyota Corolla rigged as a VBIED approached an ANA base and was engaged by an on-duty ANA, causing the device to detonate and kill the suicide bomber. The VBIED detonation was followed by two rockets, with one striking the base, and the other striking a residence. Anti-election activity persisted, also, with the 1 August distribution of night letters in Garmser District

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS


- Suicide attacks
- Roadside IEDs
- Significant AOG threat

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	1
This Report Period	0

that instructed residents not to vote. On the same date, reportedly, five civilians were killed and a further 12 were wounded during an IMF airstrike in Sangin District. And 7 AOG were reportedly killed during an IMF airstrike in Nad Ali District on 10 August.

AOG were also active on the same day, killing 2 IMF and wounding an additional 3 in a convoy ambush in Reg District. With this, AOG conducted several armed assaults on checkpoints and IMF/ANSF patrols; for example, AOG attacked a joint IMF/ANA patrol, killing 3 ANA soldiers and wounding 1 IMF on 9 August.

Furthermore, a significant number of IED strikes occurred during the reporting period: a roadside



IED hit a local tractor carrying civilians that were participating in a wedding party in Garmser District on 5 August, killing 5, including women and children; another IED struck a civilian vehicle, killing 5 occupants in the same district the following day; and a third IED again struck a civilian vehicle, killing 11 in Nahri Sarraj District on 12 August. As well, three IED incidents occurred against ANP vehicles, killing 10 ANP and wounding a further 4; and 4 IEDs struck IMF vehicles on separate occasions, one which was followed by an AOG ambush that reportedly killed 8 IMF.

GHAZNI

AOG maintained the initiative in the province, and demonstrated determination and ingenuity; for example, AOG activated a mobile radio station by the name of "Shariat Ghag Radio" (Voice of Islamic Law) in Qarabagh District. The radio is broadcasting AOG news and perspectives, and broadcasts can be heard in bordering districts. Tensions in Qarabagh are likely further flamed with information that approximately 90 AOG members have migrated to the district.

Of note, a major clash ensued on


KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Abduction
- IEDs & convoy ambushes
- Rocket/RPG attacks

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	2
This Report Period	0

10 August when AOG attacked a joint IMF/ANSF convoy in Ajristan District for one hour; reported casualties included 1 IMF, 3 ANA, 4 ANP, and 9 AOG killed and 1 IMF, 6 ANA, 3 ANP and 7 AOG wounded. Also during the period, IMF purportedly killed 18 AOG in an airstrike in Nawa District on 12 August.

And as to be expected for an AOG-contested region, AOG warned Andar District residents not to participate in the upcoming election with the penalty of death. The threat was apparently voiced directly to shopkeepers, amongst others, causing them to shut down their shops. Further instability in the district should be expected, for example, because



AOG were said to have emplaced IEDs in the district and to have procured BBIED vests for later use, also within the district.

Electoral-related threats persisted, furthermore, in the reports that 40 AOG members infiltrated Waghaz District with the supposed intent to attack polling centres, and an unknown armed person shot and wounded an ANP providing security at a campaign rally for a presidential candidate. In sum, NGOs should expect that there will likely be an upcoming period of intensifying violence in the province.

URUZGAN

To date, activity in Uruzgan has been minimal in comparison with other provinces in the south; the 10 and 11 August AOG attacks against IMF/ANSF convoys in Char Chino District that resulted in the death of 10 AOG and wounding of 6 others were of note, though. Also, AOG shot and killed an off-duty ANP official whilst he was visiting his family in Dihrawud District.


KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Possible increase in IEDs
- AOG opposition to NGO operations
- IMF erroneous employment of

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	2
This Report Period	0

Moreover, tensions between IMF and ANSF should be heeded in Tirin Kot because of the IMF shooting and consequent killing of an ANP while he and others were on patrol in the town. IMF may also find themselves the object of further ire because of the two civilians that were killed during an airstrike in Chora District on 9 August. Furthermore, IMF fired a rocket that struck a civilian house, killing 3 children, on 7 August in Khas Uruzgan.

Of special note to NGOs, though, was the prevalence of IED strikes during the reporting period; for example, an IED hit a patrolling IMF vehicle, wounding 2 IMF



soldiers on 7 August in Chora District, and 2 IEDs targeted IMF vehicles in Char Chino District on 12 August, ending in the deaths of 2 IMF and the wounding of an additional 6. In addition, another IED struck a patrolling ANP vehicle in Tirin Kot, and another IED targeted an ANP vehicle in Dihrawud District, wounding 3 civilians. Because of the general security vacuum, NGOs should avoid travel to areas outside of Tirin Kot when possible.

ZABUL

During this reporting period, a person outfitted with a BBIED targeted an NDS vehicle, killing himself, 1 NDS official, and 4 civilians and wounding 2 NDS, 1 ANP and 16 civilians. In sum, a number of IED incidents have also occurred during the period.


KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- BBIED attacks
- Roadside IEDs
- Attacks on ANP

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	0
This Report Period	0

As a result of 13 IED explosions in various locations, 6 AOG (due to premature detonations), 3 civilians, 5 ANA, 1 NDS and 1 ANP were killed; and 3 civilians, 7 PSC guards, 10 ANP, 3 ANA, 1 NDS official, 4 IMF and an unknown number of AOG were wounded.

AOG conducted prolonged armed assaults during the period, one being a four hour exchange of fire with a joint IMF/ANP patrol



in Atghar District on 2 August, and another being an hour clash with PSC guards in Qalat on 10 August; of note, though, is that these ambushes both resulted in low casualties.

PLEASE NOTE:

The charts enclosed in this report are current as of 12 August 2009.



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ANSO ACRONYMS

IMF-International Military Forces / **AOG**-Armed Opposition Groups / **GOA**-Government of Afghanistan / **ACG**-Armed Criminal Groups / **ANA**-Afghan National Army / **ANP**-Afghan National Police / **IED**-Improvised Exploding Device / **AEF**-Afghan Eradication Forces / **RPG**-Rocket Propelled Grenade / **IDF**-Indirect Fire (ex: mortars) / **VBIED**-Vehicle Borne Improvised Exploding Device / **PRP**-Previous Reporting Period / **ANBP**-Afghan National Border Police / **SAF**-Small Arms Fire / **NDS**-National Directorate of Security (intelligence) / **PSC**-Private Security Company / **DC**-District Centre

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MISSING

This report ANSO could not provide analysis for the provinces of:

Panjshir

Balkh

Samangan

Takhar

Badghis

This is because we do not know enough about the area to comment on the significance of the incidents occurring there.

If you can help us understand the province better, please contact us.

NEW RSA

ANSO would like to introduce its new West RSA, Patrick Malach, to the Western NGO community. Patrick will be in place at our West office in the coming weeks.

TRAINING

ANSO will be instituting a new training module for NGO national staff involved in communications, with a pilot session occurring in Kabul City after Ramadan. Further information will be provided to registered NGOs.

REGISTRATION and AMENDMENTS

ANSO has unveiled a new streamlined registration and amendment process for NGOs. Email the Operations Coordinator Assistant at operations2@afgnso.org for details.