

THE ANSO REPORT

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YOU NEED TO KNOW

- ANSF has assumed an increase presence throughout Kabul City in anticipation of a pre-election AOG offensive
- Election-related threat and violence is expected to increase in most regions of Afghanistan in the coming weeks.

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COUNTRY SUMMARY

Two major issue: the upcoming Presidential elections and International Military operations in the south dominated this reporting period.

As expected, election-related violence is increasing in most regions of the country. In the last two weeks provincial electoral candidates were threatened, beaten and murdered in the north, south-east and central regions of the country; a significant escalation from June when intimidation tactics were more common than serious acts of violence.

The number of AOG threats against election workers and

the number of night letters warning people against voting has also markedly increased since June; indicating that violence levels will likely continue rising in the coming weeks.

To date, election-related violence has been concentrated in rural and remote areas of the country, however it is widely expected to expand to urban centers in the coming weeks. Spectacular attacks by AOG in the coming weeks is also a concern.

Significant International Military operations in Helmand, designed to “clear,

build, and hold” areas under Taliban control ahead of the elections are ongoing. The number of direct IMF engagements with AOG was lower than expected but casualty rates among IMF have been high nonetheless.

July casualty rates among IMF are already twice as high as all of June with 39 killed and 74 wounded (country-wide); and more than 70% of all IMF casualties were reported in the south. IEDs account for approx 3/4 of IMF deaths recorded to this month.

NGO DATA & TRENDS

Twelve NGO incidents were reported in the last two weeks, many of them significant including the death of NGO staff (in Kapisa and Ghor); three abductions (in Khost, Paktika, Herat); an attack against an NGO clinic by a suspected private security company (in Wardak); and a complex attack against an NGO compound (in Balkh).

Although the number and the severity of incidents recorded this month is high, spikes in NGO incident numbers are common and the total volume of NGO incidents is comparable to past years. Four years of NGO incident data collection and analysis (by ANSO) indicates that although the timing and volume of NGO incidents is highly sporadic, the threat pattern is not. Incident data analysis has found that threat patterns are relatively consistent within districts but often highly variable between them due to the localized nature of many armed criminal, political and opposition groups. Therefore, tracking incidents by province is not usually sufficient for mapping and evaluating risk to NGOs. Although conflict migration can alter local threat patterns, they do not usually do so suddenly, so NGO usually have advance warning of emerging threats.

In brief, while it is important to monitor events at the regional/provincial level, NGO can manage their risk more effectively by carefully mapping and tracking incidents at the district/local level. This not only applies to project sites, but to routes as well. ANSO provides a weekly incident list which is broken down by district for exactly this reason.

KABUL


Although the planned first phase of the election security strategy for the capital commenced more with a whimper than a bang (no pun intended), there has been a discernible increase in the presence of the ANSF throughout the city. The numerous checkpoints and resultant stop and searches have led to a rise in the number of arrests for weapons violations and drugs. Phase two and three of the security plan envisages a greater ANSF presence on the streets, although the dates of implementation have yet to be made public.

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Complex attacks against high profile targets
- Armed Criminal Groups
- Abductions

	NGO Incidents
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On 7 July, an INGO driver in a six-month old 4WD with temporary plates was returning to the organisation's compound after dropping off a colleague when a Corolla vehicle pulled out in front of the vehicle forcing him to stop. The incident occurred around 2100hrs in the Taimani Projects area of District Four. A number of armed men exited the vehicle and a shot was fired through the side window of the car in order to gain access. The driver was physically assaulted and the car was then stolen, leaving the driver by the side of the road. Investigations are continuing and one suspect has been arrested, but it appears that the vehicle was targeted by a well versed criminal group. There is no indication that the



attack was deliberately targeting an NGO vehicle.

In Khair Khana and parts Karte Parwan, anecdotal reporting suggests that there have been several clashes between rival candidates that have occasionally led to the use of SAF. Electoral related violence will most likely be realised in the two weeks prior to the actual date, both in the capital and provinces, therefore early reports of clashes between rival camps are a concern which will be closely watched in the coming weeks.

KAPISA

An NGO worker from Kabul was on leave at his family home in Nijrab district, when armed men entered his house and killed him in the early hours of 11 July. The attack is believed to have occurred as a result of a personal dispute and there are no indications that the individual was targeted due to his occupation. The incident is a further unfortunate


KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Attacks on ANSF/IMF, especially in Tagab and Nijrab
- Spread of attacks to schools or other non security-related targets
- Rockets, IEDs, and mines

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	2
This Report Period	1

reminder that personal or family disputes have the potential to put the lives of local NGO workers at risk. Where possible, encouraging colleagues to share any information regarding threats from AOG, ACG or deriving from personal disputes is very much encouraged. In this instance, it is understood that there were no prior warnings to the event.

On 15 July, a district political campaign representative for one of the president candidates was also killed in Nijrab. Although the exact circumstances of the death remain unconfirmed at the time of writing, if the individual was killed by opposing political



factions, then such an incident could be seen as a precursor to targeted retribution attacks across the province.

Separately, Tagab continues to dominate the number of AOG-initiated incidents in the province. Two ANSF patrols were attacked on 3 and 6 July and an IMF patrol was ambushed in Sher Khel Area on 10 July. In all three incidents, no casualties were reported on either side.

PARWAN

Parwan experiences occasional AOG-initiated violence, however a number of attacks in Bagram, Ghorband and Sheikh Ali in recent weeks have raised concerns among NGO. Separately, a reported feud involving a former commander in Chaharikar has resulted in several attacks on ANSF, although no casualties have been reported. The latest

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Collateral damage from attacks on security targets, especially near Bagram Airbase
- NGO-targeted criminal abduction


	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	1
This Report Period	0

incident in the capital, involved an RPG attack on an ANP post.

In recent months, Parwan has been the preferred route from Kabul to Bamyan. This could make it an attractive target for AOG seeking to further control routes in and out of Kabul.

A further attack against the ANSF was recorded in the Ghorband valley, this time targeting the district chief of police (DCOP) on 4 July. Four ANP, including the DCOP were wounded.

Anecdotal reporting suggests a possible increase in AOG activity



in the northeast districts of Shinwari and Sheikh Ali. Also, the area itself is reported to have little or no security presence, nor medical facilities, in the event of the need for such services.

The road to Bamyan through Bagram, Chahrikar, Shinwari districts should be considered a potential risk area for IED attacks. However, so far this month only the one incident has been recorded.

DAYKUNDI

Large scale IMF operations in Helmand have had the unintended effect of displacing large numbers of AOG into the south of Daykunde, specifically Kajran and Gizab. In the Tamazan Valley just before Nili in Gizab, a number of AOG attacked an ANP post leaving no casualties on 6


KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- High AOG infiltration in Kiti, Gizrab, and Kajran
- Clashes between AOG and the local population, especially in the south

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	1
This Report Period	0

July. Separately in Kajran on 13 July, ANP responded to reports of an IED and were subsequently attacked by armed men when they arrived on the scene. Again there were no reports of casualties.

Considering the number of confirmed reports about AOG movements in the south, further attacks on ANSF could be envisaged in the coming weeks. What is perhaps surprising is that the previous series of IMF air raids and arrests which happened in Kajran in June has not been renewed de-



spite public reporting of AOG movements. There is the possibility that further engagements involving IMF may materialise in Kajran, especially if AOG are using the area as a safe haven. It is not believed at this stage, that there is an immediate threat against Nili City, however the possibility of stand off attacks remains a concern.

PANJSHIR

Two incidents of note occurred in Panjshir in the last reporting period. Traditionally, when the snow melts and the risk of avalanche subsides attempting to write on the security situation in the province becomes a difficult task due

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	0
This Report Period	0

to the absence of incidents. However, at the northern entrance of Panjshir on 8 July, two alleged AOG were arrested with explosives by the ANP during a vehicle search. At this stage, whether the

individuals were transiting the material or intended for it to be used in the province has not been made public. A separate and a believed unrelated incident occurred in Rukha on 11 July. An IED was thrown at the incumbent president's campaign office in the district causing no casualties and little damage. Sources suggest that the incident may be a matter of delinquency rather than an inter-factional dispute.

LOGAR

On 8 July, a clearly marked NGO demining 4WD was 'carjacked' by armed men in Mazin Village of Muhammad Agha. The driver was left unharmed by the side of the road. The concern – as expressed by a number of threat reports – is that the vehicle may be used in some form of AOG initiated attack. It is most likely that clearly marked de-mining vehicles may be subjected to an increased level of scrutiny by the ANSF.

In separate reporting from Logar, a truck is believed to have been


	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	1
This Report Period	0

deliberately overturned by AOG along the main Kabul to Puli Alam Highway in Shaikhak Qalai area of Muhammad Agha District on 9 July. Inside the truck, which was fully laden with firewood, was a large IED that was detonated when ANP arrived on the scene to investigate. The blast subsequently killed four ANP and 21 civilians, among which included school children and day labourers waiting along the side of the road for work.

A number of electoral related incidents have already occurred in the province in what may be considered an illustration of the likely pattern of intimidation and assaults against individuals involved in the election process. At the end of June, night letters were published in Puli Alam warning local

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Abduction
- Spread of attacks to schools or other non security-related targets
- Collateral damage from attacks on ANSF/IMF



people of 'severe consequences' if they vote. On 8 July, ANSF discovered a rocket in Puli Alam which was primed to target the DAC, where an election campaign rally was taking place. Additionally, in both Muhammad Agha and Puli Alam, provincial council candidates have received night letters warning them not to participate in the election. On 13 July, a candidate in Zarghon Shahr area in Muhammad Agha was severely beaten for refusing to heed calls to withdraw from the race. The trend is set to continue in Logar and be replicated in other provinces. Other reports also suggest that recruiting officials for the election will be an extremely difficult task, as some candidates have withdrawn following intimidation threats.

WARDAK


Of distinct concern during the last reporting period was an attack on a PSC convoy in Saydabad on 13 July. The incident occurred in Salar area, approximately one kilometre away from an NGO medical facility. At this stage it is understood that one of the PSC was killed and another wounded in the AOG initiated attack and that they drove to the facility, forcibly entered and then proceeded to physically and verbally assault the staff as well as visitors. The exact reason for their entry into the hospital remains unknown, how-

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	1
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ever it is believed that either the PSC erroneously thought they were fired on from the hospital or they were seeking medical treatment for their colleague before he died. During their stay, a number of shots were fired by the PSC inside the compound, which resulted in damage to some property, including vehicles. The men left the compound half an hour after their arrival. Most of Wardak is high risk for NGOs. AOG threats are consistent with the previous two months: military and contractor convoy ambushes; IED attacks; abduction; nominal control of parts of the Kabul-Kandahar road; check points and surveillance; de facto control of any areas outside district centres and district centres vulnerable to attack, especially during the night.

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Abduction
- Collateral damage from rocket and IED attacks
- Use of terror tactics/intimidation



The number and intensity of incidents in eastern Wardak is an indicator of AOG strength, despite the introduction of new IMF at the beginning of the year. This period there were AOG incidents recorded in Chaki, Saydabad, Maydan Sharh, Jalrez, and Nirkh. Saydabad is especially volatile and subject to ambushes and IEDs and assassination of GoA officials. On 13 July in both Nirkh and Jaghatu, the DACs came under AOG attack with heavy weapons and small arms fire. On the same day in Jalrez, the District Chief of Police and three other ANP were killed in a targeted IED attack. It is generally acknowledged that ANSF have limited capacity to challenge the growing strength of AOG and in some districts, rarely move beyond the DAC.

BALKH


A complex attack on an INGO compound in Balkh showed one of the chief threats which NGOs will face in the period preceding and subsequent to the elections; their role as political capital. In this scenario, NGOs' value as a source of prestige and employment is contested by political actors who then perpetrate attacks on them in order to justify political narratives. This is problematic because the attacks themselves still remain quite serious and there is little that they can do to prevent them (often the very success of an NGO's acceptance strategy can

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Election-related violence
- IEDs
- Collateral involvement in violence

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	4
This Report Period	1

precipitate its value as political capital). While a few instances have occurred in the Northern Region and more are to be expected, they have thus far been few in number. NGOs should individually calculate their level of vulnerability and exposure and considering thresholding as a method of risk mitigation. However NGOs should also be aware that this is a threat that they always face due to the numerous appointments and reshufflings which occur outside of the election cycle. Another threat facing NGOs is that of collateral damage from attacks directed at election officials and campaigns. Election-related activity represents a dramatic increase of GoA exposure into areas where it doesn't other-



wise have a high presence and therefore presents a larger range of potential targets for existing and would-be AOGs. An attack in Chimal district showed this principle when an election official and a member of his police escort were killed by AOG members mounted on motorcycles with SAF, who apparently seized the opportunity as the official was passing by. AOG activity continued to target IMF in Balkh in the form of a complex attack on an IMF convoy in Chahar Bulak and the premature detonation of an SVBIED at Hayratan junction east of Mazar city which was targeting a passing IMF convoy.

KUNDUZ


The pattern of heightened AOG activity continued in Kunduz, with AOGs continuing their focus on targeting IMF. The largest such attack occurred in Khanabad district where a well-placed IED succeeded in destroying an IMF humvee and killing five IMF soldiers. Additional reporting suggests that the IMF were involved

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- IEDs targeting IMF and ANSF
- Military operations

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	7
This Report Period	0

in ANSF training and that knowledge of their whereabouts might have contributed to the attack's efficacy. The incident underlines the importance of NGOs avoiding IMF/ANSF, for some were in the vicinity at the time of the blast. Another cause for concern involves an IED emplaced on a bicycle which detonated, perhaps prematurely, in Kunduz city. Kunduz city has previously been largely free of the activity that effects much of the rest of the province. Concerns about rising



AOG activity in the city were apparently reinforced by an IMF search operation which occurred in Kunduz's Nawabad area. IMF and ANSF operations are an increasing throughout much of the province and NGOs should inquire locally as to the current status of activities when undertaking trips into the districts.

SAMANGAN

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Political violence
- Criminal activity

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	0
This Report Period	0

The sole incident involved an attack in Aybak on an ANP conveying which killed the chief of

police. The impetus for this event was likely political rather than AOG, as Samangan has a few centres of power, which have been brought increasingly to the fore in light of the upcoming elections.

TAKHAR


Trends already apparent in Takhar have continued in the present report cycle. AOG activity manifested itself in Bangi district in the south, with an attack on an ANP checkpoint, and in a few instances in Taluqan itself. The Bangi incident, reflects an extension of the general lawlessness which has continued to characterise much of eastern Baghlan. While attributed to AOG activity, the attacks on ANP there (currently running at

	NGO Incidents
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about one every two weeks) likely represent the nexus of AOG and ACG, with local AOG commanders having a number of more immediate interests than overturning the state. In Taluqan the clearest indication of AOG sentiment was an instance where a group of AOGs entered a mosque in order to promote their agenda. In another case a private construction company compound was attacked with SAF and RPG. In the northwest of Takhar, repeated threats, in the form of widely distributed night letters, have apparently been followed up upon by an attack on a provincial council candidate.

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Attacks on GoA
- Election related violence



Other instances of violence in northwestern Takhar, such as a sustained rocket attack on Yangi Qal'a district centre and attacks on checkpoints suggest that political stakes are high in the election locally. For NGOs, their only real course of action is to reinforce the perception of neutrality by remaining on the sidelines and avoiding GoA officials (particularly election-related) and campaigners.

SARIPUL


Activity in Sari Pul was limited this reporting cycle.

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	0
This Report Period	0

Sayyad district remains an area of concern due to recent AOG activity and ANSF operations there. The potential for criminal activity also remains in the province's many remote and isolated districts.

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Criminal activity
- AOG sentiment in Sayyad




FARYAB

Attacks on ANSF and IMF remain a fact of life in the province's western districts, but have not recently changed in their scope, consisting almost entirely of RPG and SAF attacks on convoys or checkpoints. A few incidents in the eastern district of

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	3
This Report Period	0

Bilchiragh (neighboring Darzab district in Jawzjan and Sayyad district of Sari Pul) highlight this area as a source of concern. In two incidents, ANSF uncovered significant stashes of bomb-making materials and in another case they engaged in an exchange of fire with an AOG whom they caught in the act of trying to collect illegal taxes from residents. The upsurge in activity in Bilchiragh should serve to reinforce the point that it is geographically tied to surround-



KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- AOG presence in Western districts
- AOG activity in Bilchiragh

ing districts which have been experiencing security problems of late, and increased AOG activity could be the result of ANSF/IMF success in pushing AOGs out of those areas but into new ones.

GHOR


Ghor is broadly divided into three zones of activity. The areas surrounding Chaghcheran are given to political strife, often combining political and ACG activity. In Pasaband and Taywara, the scene of two NGO-related incidents during this reporting period, AOG activity connected to larger groups in neighboring Helmand province to the south. The murder of one INGO national staff member at night in his house

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- AOG infiltration in Pasaband and Taywara
- Factional infighting
- IMF airstrikes

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	7
This Report Period	2

seems to have been the result of external factors that had little to do with the individuals involvement in NGO work. Another instance however shows how NGOs' sensitive positions can make them less costly targets even if the AOG in question did not have a specific grievance with the NGO. In this case an AOG broke into an NGO-run clinic for the sole purpose of stealing motorbikes. In remote areas like Pasaband, NGOs also serve as a rare source of capital where little might otherwise exist. The apparent presence of AOGs is reinforced by reports of night letters being distributed which discour-



age participation in or collaboration with the elections process. In the west of Ghor, factional fighting between groups that are to different degrees AOG or ACG has apparently escalated of late, in one case leading to an ISAF airstrike in Shahrak district. The remoteness and volatility of much of the area implies that NGOs use extreme caution and local contacts before attempting to work in or transit through such areas.

HERAT


An incident involving the kidnapping of INGO local staff in Guzara district illustrates continuing AOG presence in the area. Although most kidnapping in Herat province targets wealthy locals and is criminal in nature, AOG threats continue to circulate warning of dire consequences for those in the employ of NGOs and their families. To the west of Herat a few attacks occurred targeting ANP checkpoints in the vicinity of the Islam Qal'a road and train tracks under construction. Travel along this road should be kept discreet and low-profile owing to ACG networks operating between Herat and Iran. Towards the east, Chisti Sharif

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- ACG activity
- Armed clashes in Chisti Sharif
- AOG presence in Karukh and Kushki Kuhna

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	12
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remains a source of concern as it has been the scene of repeated armed clashes, reportedly between an ACG and AOG centering on the bazaar area. The location of Chisti Sharif itself represents a confluence between commercial routes running predominantly from east to west and AOG networks moving between southern AOG strongholds and eastern Badghis. The road between Herat and Qal'ai Naw has shown itself to host a practically continuous AOG presence, centering on Karukh district but also extending back into Kushki Kuhna. Private, NGO, UN, and IHO convoys have all been subject to harassment along this stretch and additional reporting suggests that the AOGs alternate between full visible checkpoints and spotters who emerge when a vehicle is cited. The AOG active in this area also demonstrates structure and situational aware-



ness. An incident involving an IHO, whereby the IHO convoy was escorted to meet with higher-ranking officials showed that the AOG showed an understanding of the difference between various actors and suggests a degree of organization not usually seen. The individuals in the convoy were allowed to continue on their way because of their successful acceptance strategy (the AOG commander acknowledges the quality of their work). Despite this experience sources claiming to speak for the AOG in question have made repeated claims and warning against NGOs and NGOs thus should not expect gentle treatment whatever their policies or work. NGOs working elsewhere in Karukh or Kushki Kuhna should be aware that this network appears to be active throughout and take appropriate measures.

LAGHMAN


Laghman remains relatively quiet. As usual the majority of the incidents reported are IEDs found on the roads leading to the Alishing and Alinghar DACs. No IEDs exploded during this period. Re-

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- ➔ Continuing IED threat near DACs

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	1
This Report Period	0

ports were received of AOG infiltration from Dalwat Shah District into Alinghar with the aim of destroying bridges but so far this threat has not materialized. Highway 1 has remained free of AOG attacks and Metharlam City has also remained quiet. Government control remains limited north of Metharlam and international staff



are advised to limit their travel to the provincial capital.

NANGARHAR

This period has seen a normal level of activity in Nangarhar. The most significant NGO incident was the death in Khada Khel village, Sherzad District of an off duty INGO security guard during a fire fight between IMF and AOG/ villagers after IMF reportedly attempted to seize the body of a local AOG fighter, who had been killed in an attack on the Sherzad DAC, from a funeral in Balil Khel village. The villagers


KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- ➔ Kidnap threat
- ➔ Increased attacks on DACs in the run up to the election
- ➔ Increased AOG in the western

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	6
This Report Period	1

violently objected to IMF intentions and shooting broke out. It would serve no practical purpose to seize the deceased's body and is certainly against IMF policy to interfere with a funeral so it remains unclear what occurred at the funeral. An IMF element did enter the area to conduct a damage assessment on the DAC but the entire event remains murky. It is not known what part, if any the guard played in the battle or who shot him.

Most AOG operations were centered in the western districts with a series of ineffectual attacks on DACs in Sherzad and Pachir Wagram Districts and four attempts at ambushing security forces in



Khogyani. Highway 1 remains secure both to Kabul and Torkham. Local attitudes against IMF appear to be hardening in Sherzad and Khogyani and international staff are advised to avoid the area.

Political campaigning in the province has progressed peacefully with well organized and behaved rallies being held in Jalalabad with supporters often being bussed in to the city from outlying areas. Local NGO staff predict high turnouts in the rural areas for the election.

NOTICE: Your input is invaluable for the production of this report. While we appreciate information on incidents, we also need general information on the security situation in your area. So please remember to call or email us regularly.

Contact details of ANSO staff are provide on the last page.

ANSO: “..by NGOs for NGOs..”

NURISTAN

A major event of this period was the capture of the Bargi Matal District centre by a force of AOG initially reported to be 4-500 strong. They held the centre for about 24 hours before security forces with air support recaptured it. Locals, including an INGO, have reportedly evacuated the village and combat continues. The remoteness of the area combined


KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Increased military operations
- Large numbers of AOG at large

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	2
This Report Period	2

with the weakness of local police make repetitions of this type of AOG attack likely. The poor communications in the area combined with the closing of the roads by security forces made it difficult for some of the NGOs who work there to confirm the status of their employees. NGOs are advised to avoid the province.

The another significant NGO event of this period was the robbery of a local INGO employee by five armed men in Waygal District. A large sum of money was



stolen but he was unharmed. It's likely they suspected he was carrying a large amount of cash. NGOs should keep their cash movements as confidential as possible.

KUNAR

Kunar remains a extremely volatile province with 65 AOG incidents reported this period. The vast majority were direct attacks on security forces in Manogai, Narang, Sirkanay and Wata Pur


KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Spread of AOG operations onto Jalalabad-Asadabad Highway in Narang District
- Indirect fire aimed at IMF/ANP missing and hitting civilians

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	7
This Report Period	0

Districts. Most of the attacks are ineffectual, consisting of inaccurate gunfire and perhaps RPGs followed by a withdrawal. IEDs remain rare in Kunar whereas most indirect fire attacks in eastern region occur there. AOG mortar and rocket fire remains very inaccurate and the amount of ammunition they have appears to be quite limited.

The Jalalabad-Asadabad Road is relatively secure and Asadabad



City is calm. International staff are advised to limit their travel to Asadabad City.

PAKTYA


The security situation in Paktya continues to deteriorate with the majority of incidents occurring in Gardez and Zurmat Districts. In this period there was a lethal IED attack on a road construction

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- High kidnap threat especially along the Gardez-Khost Road
- IEDs especially along Gardez-Khost Road

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	1
This Report Period	0

company in Wuza Zadran District with five people killed and 15 deminers were kidnapped and later released unharmed in Gardez District. The Gardez-Khost Road remains very dangerous with kidnapping and IEDs being common. AOG are conducting operations along the highway in both Khost and Paktya and it has become one of the most dangerous



roads in Afghanistan. NGOs are advised to avoid road travel in Gardez.

KHOST

Khost remains very volatile with the majority of incidents occurring in Khost City. The most significant incident this period was the kidnapping and subsequent safe release of two INGO local employees. They were stopped by AOG while travelling to Khost City from Gardez and were even-

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS


- Kidnapping
- IEDs
- Collateral damage from attacks on GOA and IMF

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	7
This Report Period	1

tually released unharmed for unspecified considerations.

The Gardez-Khost Road remains extremely dangerous and NGOs should avoid road travel in the province.

IEDs continue to be common in Khost with magnetic mines being used several times to attack vehicles. These devices are small IEDs with a short time delay that are attached to a parked or slow moving vehicle. High profile vehicles stuck in traffic jams are particularly vulnerable. Vehicles should



always be guarded whenever parked in public to protect against this threat.

Road construction companies continue to be targeted. An Indian firm was hit with an IED in Tere Zayi District and had six employees killed.

PAKTIKA

On 1 July, an NGO worker was returning home from work in the Chardiwal Sultan Bagh Area of Sar Hawza, when they were reportedly abducted by AOG. Information gathered since the incident indicates that AOG had been performing surveillance on the PRT base where the individual had held several meetings. Two hours after the initial incident and just before the cellular networks in the area were turned off for the evening, the abductors called the concerned NGO wishing to confirm that the individual did indeed work for an NGO and was working in Paktika for the benefit of the local people. The next morning the NGO worker was released unharmed.


KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Collateral from clashes
- Abductions/kidnappings
- IED

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	1
This Report Period	1

From the incident it is important to note several issues. Firstly, AOG perceived that the NGO worker was working with the PRT, therefore creating a legitimate target for abduction in their eyes. Secondly, the release of the individual was largely contingent on the benefits that the NGO bestowed on the local community – in this case, health services. Furthermore, the local communities, through the Shura and other local structures, were engaged to assist in the release of the individual. That the NGO had been transparent with the local community and had long established community acceptance strategies in place was crucial in the subsequent release of the NGO worker. Although NGO may find it necessary to visit PRT bases, prudent measures should be adopted to ensure that colleagues are not profiled arriving and leaving the area.

Two particular incidents in the last reporting period illustrate the



strength of AOG throughout Paktika. Both incidents occurred on 4 July in the northeast of the province bordering Khost. In Ziruk, a fuel truck SVBIED detonated at the entrance of a joint IMF/ANA base, killing two IMF and one civilian and wounding several others. The attack may have been a prelude to a complex attack on the DAC, located close to the IMF base, as shortly after the incident IMF helicopters encountered large numbers of AOG in the area and an engagement between the two sides is believed to have lasted for several hours. Although difficult to ascertain, the number of AOG casualties is conservatively estimated at 12. The second incident occurred in the neighbouring district of Nika, where AOG attacked and overran the DAC, forcing the ANP to flee and enabling AOG to seize two vehicles and several dozen weapons.

KANDAHAR

Kandahar City continues to attract the largest share of security incidents in the province. In a similar manner to the rest of Kandahar, the vast majority of AOG attacks target the ANP and assume the form of close range assaults on checkpoints, IED attacks on convoys or the assassination of off duty policeman.


For July-to-date in Kandahar, there have been eight IED detonations and eight discoveries of devices as well as one premature detonation (which killed the AOG and two of his family members). Of these incidents, only one IED resulted in civilian casualties,

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Roadside IED's
- Collateral damage from AOG-ANP clashes
- BBIED/SVBIED attacks

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	4
This Report Period	0

which occurred in Qala-e-Shamir Area of Maywand District killing one and injuring two. The overwhelming number of IEDs appears to be remote-controlled (RCIEDs) targeting ANSF/IMF convoys, or static devices targeting GoA facilities. Although the IED risk to NGO continuing to operate in the province should be a significant concern, maintaining significant distance from all ANSF/IMF convoys as well as facilities will lower your organisation's risk profile. In the last reporting period there have been two BBIED detonations in or around Kandahar City – in both instances targeting ANSF. On 6 July, ANSF are believed to have engaged a BBIED as he approached the main entrance to the Kandahar airfield; however the detonation occurred killing two



civilians and wounding four ANSF and ten other civilians. In a further BBIED attack on 13 July against an ANSF/IMF base on the outskirts of Kandahar City in Dand, three BBIED drove a car towards the entrance of the base using SAF in an effort to subdue the guards and again were spotted and fired on by ANSF. One or several shots are believed to have detonated one of the vests, killing the three BBIED and wounding 5 ANSF. A further BBIED accidentally detonated himself on 2 July, while riding a motorbike in District Four to his reported target of a nearby ANP post. Similar to the IED threat, the avoidance of all ANSF/IMF facilities can reduce the risk of collateral exposure to such forms of attacks for NGO.

GHAZNI

Events in Ghazni in the last reporting period have been largely shaped by IMF offensive operations in the districts of Andar, Geran, Giro and Muqur bordering Paktika in what could be seen as a deliberate attempt to reduce AOG in the area as well as infiltration from Paktika into the rest of the province. Ghazni City remained relatively quiet with only two recorded incidents - an attempted IED attack on the Provincial Governor on 10 July, which left two of his bodyguards wounded,


KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Continued targeting of ANP/Civil sector elements
- Roadside IED threat and convoy

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	2
This Report Period	0

as well as a standoff attack against the ANP HQ leaving no casualties.

Recorded IMF offensive operations have doubled compared to the same period in 2008, which is primarily a result of new forces entering territory where previously there was very little if any ANSF presence. Between 7 and 10 July, IMF operations in Giro and Gelan involving the use of air assets resulted in the reported deaths of 36 AOG and 11 civilians. The high number of civilian casualties has yet to result in public demonstrations against IMF; however the incidents will no doubt create further tensions between IMF and the local population. ANSF/IMF



operations are preliminarily scheduled to cease across the country around 10 August in time for the elections, therefore virtually ensuring an increase in the tempo of such operations up to that date.

Ajristan, bordering Daykunde and Uruzgan, witnessed two separate attacks on the DAC on 4 and 8 July. Unconfirmed reports suggest that there remains an AOG presence in the area indicating further attacks on the DAC cannot be discounted.

HELMAND

The two stage IMF operations, which commenced by an airborne assault on Nad Ali and to a lesser extent Nahri Sarraj on 19 June and followed by a significantly larger operation on 2 July targeting the southern districts of Nawa and Garmsir, have resulted in the expected AOG ammunition finds as well as resultant casualties. In both operations the numbers of engagements were lower than expected, with AOG resorting to asymmetrical attacks rather than conventional confrontations with the superior force. The IMF offensive is ostensibly designed to 'clear' the target districts prior to the upcoming election.


KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Significant AOG threat
- Roadside IEDs
- Collateral damage from clashes

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	1
This Report Period	0

With AOG resorting to standoff attacks - primarily IEDs - in an effort to disrupt the offensive, the number of IMF fatalities reached 17. The high number is largely a result of IMF leaving their armoured vehicles and performing foot patrols. In an IED detonation in Nahri Sarr and two in Sangin, seven IMF were killed while conducting such patrols. AOG casualties remain notoriously difficult to ascertain, however 27 AOG were reportedly killed by IMF in an engagement in Spin Masjid Area in Nahri Sarraj on 7 July. The effect of the operation has already been felt by the displacement of AOG into other districts of Helmand and wider afield into Daykunde, Uruzgan and Farah.

During the last reporting period, two suicide bombers were ar-



rested prior to detonation in Nawa-I-Barak Zayi and the capital Lashkar Gah, with the first intending to target an ANP post. The use of suicide bombers (BBIEDs) will likely increase in the coming weeks at the expense of close range assaults on fortified ANSF/IMF targets.

The ANSF continue to suffer a large share of casualties. On 2 July, the Deputy District Governor of Musa Qala's son was killed in an IED attack. At the funeral the following day, AOG attacked the ceremony killing four ANP and losing six in the process. Further assaults against ANP posts and convoys were recorded across the province.

ZABUL


Zabul has witnessed an almost thirty percent increase year-to-date in the number of AOG initiated incidents from 2008, which is virtually identical in the growth rates of such attacks in neighbouring Kandahar and Ghazni. Shinkay District and Sori Area, south of Qalat City, have been the primary flash points between AOG and ANSF/IMF for the

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Roadside IED's
- Attacks on ANP

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	0
This Report Period	0

month so far. In the Pashe Band area of Shinkay, AOG attacked an ANA post and following an hour-long engagement, one ANA and six AOG were killed and a further five ANA and 11 AOG wounded. On 8 July, an ANSF/IMF joint operation involving air assets in the Sori area bordering Qalat, reportedly led to the deaths of 15 AOG and a further ten wounded. The tempo of such operations is unlikely to subside in the following weeks as each side attempts to restrict the movement of the



other. Across the rest of the province, asymmetrical attacks in the form of IEDs are the primary AOG instrument to restrict the freedom of movement of ANSF/IMF, rather than close range assaults.

ANNOUNCEMENT:

In the coming months, ANSO will be helping develop an incident mapping service to aid NGO management and security procedures. Registrants will receive further information as it becomes available.

URUZGAN

In the traditionally unstable area of Char Chino, IMF have been undertaking a series of operations which resulted in a reported 19 AOG fatalities and the seizure of several weapons and explosives. The operations were undertaken in the Charam Yar, Karez and Khoni areas. An airstrike on 10


KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- AOG opposition to NGO operations
- IEDs

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	2
This Report Period	0

July in Khwajamand Village of Tirin Kot is also believed to have killed a senior commander and five other AOG.

In Tirin Kot City, only two recorded incidents were reported since the beginning of the month, both involved IEDs. One was defused by ANP, the other detonated wounding two IMF. Unconfirmed reports indicate that AOG may have moved to the districts of Dihrawud and Shahidi



Hassas, following the IMF operations in Helmand, however this has yet to be translated into a higher level of incidents in the area.

NOTICE: Your input is invaluable for the production of this report. While we appreciate information on incidents, we also need general information on the security situation in your area. So please remember to call or email us regularly. Contact details of ANSO staff are provide on the last page.

ANSO: “..by NGOs for NGOs..”



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ansoab@yahoo.com

ANSO ACRONYMS

IMF-International Military Forces / AOG-Armed Opposition Groups / GOA-Government of Afghanistan / ACG-Armed Criminal Groups / ANA-Afghan National Army / ANP-Afghan National Police / IED-Improvised Exploding Device / AEF-Afghan Eradication Forces / RPG-Rocket Propelled Grenade / IDF-Indirect Fire (ex: mortars) / VBIED-Vehicle Borne Improvised Exploding Device / PRP-Previous Reporting Period / ANBP-Afghan National Border Police / SAF-Small Arms Fire / NDS-National Directorate of Security (intelligence) / PSC-Private Security Company / DC-District Centre

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MISSING

This report ANSO could not provide analysis for the provinces of:

Nimroz

Jowzjan

Farah

Bamyan

Baghlan

Badghis

Badakhshan

This is because we do not know enough about the area to comment on the significance of the incidents occurring there.

If you can help us understand the province better, please contact us.

VACANCIES

ANSO is in search of a few good NGO workers. If you have NGO experience, an analytical background, and the desire to be challenged, all while being part of a close-knit team, pass your CV to operations@afgnso.org

This month, ANSO is recruiting for a **Regional Safety Advisor** (roving).