

THE ANSO REPORT

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YOU NEED TO KNOW

- Targeting of Provincial Council candidates and members
- Further IMF surge in support of the upcoming election
- In light of increased IMF operations, the conflict continues to intensify
- Clashes expected along Highway 1, especially in the southwest

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COUNTRY SUMMARY

The announcement of certified Provincial Council candidates this week drew attention to efforts, whether diffuse or concerted, to target candidates and standing members throughout front-line provinces (see below chart). These efforts—orchestrated by AOG and political opportunists—will lead to further violence, especially in urban centres, where elections are seen as pathways to prestige and wealth.

Numerous threats, sometimes leading to withdrawal of candidates in Kunduz, Kapisa, Herat, Baghdis, and

Nimroz, forecast violence that is to come.

An additional surge of 10,000 IMF, dedicated to providing security in support of the election, is also set to take place in the near future.

According to present data, however, IMF increased offensives have at least temporarily lead to exponential increases in overall violence (see Southern Region).

Overall strife has led to increased casualties; for example, 22 IMF fatalities have occurred during this

period, as well as 79 civilian deaths, with the latter exceeding the average of 58 deaths during a similar time frame.

And in keeping with IMF's intent to deny AOG sanctuaries and secure Highway One, the touted Camp Leatherneck—a forward operating base for a US Marine Expeditionary Brigade in the vicinity of Lashkar Gah—will apparently play a large role in confronting AOG in the southwest, especially in the Farah-Helmand-Nimroz triangle.

Feb 7 – Nangahar - Dara-i-Nur – Provincial Council **Member** killed in small arms fire ambush
Apr 1 – Kandahar – City - 3 x Provincial Council **Members** wounded in a BBIED attack on Chambers
Apr 8 – Khost - City - IED placed outside Provincial Council **Offices**
Apr 12 – Kandahar – City - 1 x Provincial Council **Member** (female) killed in small arms ambush
May 15 – Kunduz – City – 1 x Provincial Council **Candidate** kidnapped & released
May 18 – Kabul – Surobi – 1 x Provincial Council **Member** attacked with small arms ambush
May 25 – Ghazni – City – 1 x Provincial Council **Candidate** abducted & murdered (Jun 4th)
May 28 – Khost – City – 1 x Provincial Council **Candidate** killed with magnetic IED

NGO DATA & TRENDS

Prevalence of the conflict in the Western Region was the cause of all 3 NGO incidents reported for this period, with one each in Herat, Ghor, and Farah provinces. All three incidents highlight the gamut of threats that NGOs face while operating in a burgeoning conflict environment: criminality, collateral damage, and possible targeted assassination by combatants.

Though only 3 incidents have been reported thus far, June is likely to trend in line with previous volumes (13 incidents/month-6 month average). And, as seen in last year, the highly volatile summer months will likely lead to a concomitant increase in overall NGO incident volume as NGOs suffer from mere exposure, putting them at the mercy of all combatants during the upcoming surge.

KABUL

Security measures in the capital have been significantly augmented in the last week as the election period will be officially launched on 16 June. All branches of the ANSF are visible on the streets of Kabul, as the government attempts to secure the capital from any AOG infiltration and attack. The arterial roads leading into the capital are also facing a rise in the number of vehicle searches as checkpoints are now in abundance in the district capitals across the province.

For the next two and a half months security measures will be tightened as the ANP assumes the lead role for the election security with support provided by ANA


KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Abduction/kidnapping
- Complex attacks
- Criminality

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	6
This Report Period	0

with IMF in an advisory role. A recent demonstration concerning the Kabul landscape's increasing domination by Hesco barriers, concrete blocks and road closures (only attracting an estimated 100 people) is unlikely to be addressed as the security architecture is set to evolve into a virtual 'Green Zone' in the upcoming months.

The relative calm which has enveloped Kabul over the past three months represents a lull that is most likely to continue in the short term as the ANSF bolsters its security presence across the city and IMF operations in the neighbouring provinces of Kapisa, Wardak, Logar and Laghman serve to disrupt AOG activities and supply lines. The recent silence from AOG is unlikely to extend to the Election Day itself, as the capital will be the object of considerable national and interna-



tional attention and present a lucrative target.

Laghman has seen an increase in the number of AOG initiated incidents and weapons cache discoveries this year. Although from a low base, the number of incidents has increased by over 100 per cent year to date as highlighted by the recent discovery of 600 kg of explosives on 1 June in Chawki Arghandi area. This discovery occurred after an ambush of an IMF contracted convoy in the same village, which left one driver injured and led to a brief accidental engagement between PSC guards and the ANP. A further IED attack against an IMF logistics convoy on 13 June occurred in Kotal Takht Arghandy Alya area, leaving three ANSF wounded.

DAYKUNDI

In Daykundi, the footprint of the ANSF remains extremely light with security largely imposed by local tribes who are able to limit AOG movements.


In general, the northern parts of Daykundi Province present a safe operating environment while the south (namely Kiti, Gizrab, and Kajran) along with the western district of Khadir, represent areas which should be considered com-

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- AOG infiltration in Kiti, Gizrab, and Kajran
- Clashes between locals and AOG

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	1
This Report Period	0

paratively unstable. In Kijran, IMF launched an airstrike on 5 June, which reportedly killed five AOG. The action represents a clear acknowledgement of the infiltration of AOG from Uruzgan and the inability of the ANP, in the absence of the ANA and IMF, to address the evolving security situation. In Khadir, it was reported that AOG attacked the residence of the district NDS chief, which may be a continuation of the machinations between a local AOG leader, provincial authorities and the Kabul government, although this remains un-



confirmed.

AOG penetration of the northern districts is limited by ethnic divisions which inhibits any significant infiltration of both Nili and the north. Random banditry, however, does represent a direct threat to NGO movements in the Korga Pass heading towards Khadir and NGO should take necessary precautions.

PARWAN

Crime in the capital Chaharikar has noticeably appreciated in 2009, although local reports suggest that the majority of incidences remain a result of personal disputes. The influence of former commanders in many other districts of Parwan, at the expense of the rule of law, has left many incidents unreported and led to a culture of impunity. The rise in crime, from a low base, should be closely monitored by NGO in the event it begins to affect the secu-

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS


- Collateral damage, especially near Bagram
- Abduction/kidnapping

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	1
This Report Period	0

rity of staff or property.

In Ghorband, where traditionally ACG have been relatively indistinguishable from AOG elements, both types of activity have remained constant and do not represent a significant threat to NGO operations in the area or those organisations travelling to Bamyan along the main road. The situation is unlikely to change significantly as AOG would loathe for the ANSF to focus significant attention on the district.

A consensus is emerging in the province that increased IMF convoys will be a destabilising factor in the months ahead. The number



of convoys from the north has already markedly increased as well as movements emanating from Bagram Airbase. As has already been witnessed in the last two weeks of May, the number of IED attacks against logistic or military convoys will likely increase over the summer.

In expectation of the election period, the ANSF presence along the highway from Kabul has been noticeably bolstered and is likely to remain so for the next three months.

KAPISA

Following a distinct drop in the number of AOG initiated incidents in the east of the province following IMF operations throughout the winter, the level of activity has once again returned to 2008 levels in the last month. In fact, the number of incidents


KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Collateral damage, especially near Tagab and Nijrab
- Mines and IED

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	1
This Report Period	0

slightly exceeds last year's period and follows the same pattern of being largely confined to the eastern districts of Tagab, Alasay and Nijrab with almost monthly stand-off attacks using mortars against the DAC in Mahmudi Raqi.

Although ACG activity in Koh Band remains a concern, especially after dark as ANSF checkpoints seemingly evaporate, AOG have not yet established a signifi-



cant presence in the west as ethnic divisions have served to create a buffer.

TRAINING ANNOUNCEMENT:

Please see page 15 of this report for upcoming training opportunities being hosted by ANSO

LOGAR

In the last six weeks four schools have been attacked in Logar in four separate districts, perhaps representing a new campaign by AOG. A teacher was also shot and killed by unknown gunmen on 12 June in Charkh, which may or may not be associated. All the incidents have involved girls' schools and have been either attacked using SAF and RPGs or burnt down, causing significant damage. Certain AOG factions


KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Targeting of GOA related facilities
- Abduction/kidnapping

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	0
This Report Period	0

have made clear their opposition to the education of girls and the latest series of attacks may have been used to reinforce that message.

In the lead up to the election, and with the government's decision to utilise schools and clinics as polling centres, the number of attacks - not uniquely confined to girls' schools - will likely increase as they are viewed as intrinsically linked to the government and the election process. NGO may face an increased risk profile during this period due to their funding and support of schools throughout the province.



IEDs continue to remain a concern in the province with 33 reported discoveries of IEDs so far this year in contrast to the five discovered in the same period last year. Detonations are only slightly higher this year with a figure of 14 versus 9 in 2008. The data suggests that IMF/ANSF are becoming increasingly adept at discovering the devices and that simultaneously, AOG have increased the use of the tactic.

BAMYAN

Bamyan is consistently one of the Central Region's safest provinces. The primary security concern for NGO remains that of crime, most notably armed highway robberies. These can occur throughout the year, with March through June being the most likely time. Clashes resulting from land disputes between rival ethnic/tribal groups are also relatively common. While they do not pose a direct threat to NGO, the risk of incidental expo-


KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Banditry along roadways
- Mines and IEDs

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	0
This Report Period	0

sure may be viewed as increasing. Anecdotal reporting suggests a rise in AOG activity - particularly IED threats - in the northeast districts of Kahmard and Shibar. Also, the area itself is reported to have little or no GoA security presence, nor medical facilities in the event of the need for such services.

Neighbouring Baghlan Province is believed to be the provenance of AOG movements into Bamyan's Kahmard and Shibar districts. On June 5, 12 AOG reportedly came to the area to plan IED attacks against ANSF. An ANP check



post also came under AOG attack in Kahmard district on 9 June, but so far AOG activities remains limited.

For the year to date, there have been four reported AOG incidents in contrast to the three incidents in 2008. This suggests some increase in AOG activity, but it is still too early to gauge its effect, if any.

PANJSHIR

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	0
This Report Period	0

The isolation of Panjshir, due to topography and ethnic homogeneity, appears to be a stable deterrent for AOG or ACG activity. Consequently, the province remains an exemplar of stability and is open to travel and operations for NGO with activities in the area.

Additionally, despite the involvement of prominent local personalities in the upcoming presidential election, the province will likely continue to be a safe haven from AOG intents and activities.

WARDAK

The expansion of the APPF program to include the districts of Saydabad and Nirkh, following its positive reception by the local population in Jalrez and Maydan Shahr, will be closely followed. Reports from the province suggest that the APPF has had a discernible effect in the improvement of the security situation in the two districts where it has been operational. Of potential concern however is the security environment in Saydabad and Nirkh, which differ considerably from the more northern districts, and are further differentiated by their

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS


- Intimidation against population
- Abduction/kidnapping
- IED

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	1
This Report Period	0

tribal homogeneity.

Despite the introduction of IMF into the province, Highway One continues to represent the primary engagement point for AOG attacks. There has been an almost tripling of the number of roadside IEDs in the entire province (34 year to date) in comparison to 2008. The vast majority of these standoff attacks occurred in Nirkh and Saydabad.

Although IMF have claimed that they are winning every engagement with AOG in both Wardak and Logar, in the case of Wardak, the forward posture of the new force has most likely lead to a dispersal of AOG from southern Wardak to northeast Ghazni. The 100 per cent increase (to 73 inci-



dents this year) in the number of AOG initiated incidents in the seven northeast districts of Ghazni that border Wardak perhaps best illustrate this effect. Furthermore, the increase in kinetic activity between IMF/ANSF and AOG does not, as has been illustrated across the country, translate into a safer operating environment for NGO. On the contrary, the 'Clear' phase of the IMF strategy is generally accompanied by an increase in both IMF and AOG initiated incidents as has been evidenced in both Wardak and Logar with a significant rise in the number of engagements.

KUNDUZ


Kunduz has witnessed a continuation of violence similar to that seen in previous periods, with attacks directed mainly against ANSF and IMF. A few interesting developments have occurred, however, in targets and tactics. On two separate occasions IO offices have been directly tar-

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Attacks on GoA, IMF, and ANSF
- Increased AOG activity

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	6
This Report Period	0

geted, whereas previously, AOGs limited such activity to threatening phone calls. It is currently difficult to say whether the two attacks will end up constituting a pattern. One of the offices was situated west of Kunduz City in a relatively remote and easily approachable area near to the hot-bed district of Chahar Darra. The other IO attack reveals a new tactic (also seen in Baghlan), an attack by a lone gunman on the facility. Such incidents, up till now,



have involved combined attacks using small arms fire and RPGs and are usually not well coordinated. It is also currently unknown whether the IO was a target per se, or whether it was confused with a GoA facility.

Please Note:

Monthly graphs provided in this report are inclusive as of 31 May 2009.

BALKH


The wave of violence seen in the Spring has tapered off, with incidents in Balkh having resumed their usual pattern, focusing on Chaharbulak in the west. Attacks in this area continue to target

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- AOG activity in Western districts
- Attacks on IMF/ANSF
- Local political conflicts

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	3
This Report Period	0

ANSF and IMF with small arms fire and often poorly constructed IEDs. Of more interest, were the events in Sholgara where several rockets were fired in the direction of the DAC. The rocketing has since been revealed to have been the result of factional conflicts, resulting from administrative reshufflings in the area; however, a subsequent attack on a school



(not the first in Sholgara) showed that a certain measure of AOG sentiment is present in the area.

FARYAB


A few IED incidents along the road between Maymana and Andkhoy reveal increased AOG presence. Whereas previously IED emplacements were deterred or reported by local villagers, a few are managing to succeed. Along with the usual diet of assaults upon ANSF and IMF, a

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Increased AOG activity in Bilchiragh and Gurziwan
- IED

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	2
This Report Period	0

road construction company vehicle was targeted during this period. While slightly different from the usual targets, it should also be kept in mind that road construction equipment and crews have been subjected to frequent targeting along the stretch of road currently under construction between Qal'ai Naw and Maymana. Eastern Faryab is also of concern for its connections to roving AOG activity as discussed above in the Jawzjan section. While ANSO is



monitoring this region, however, this concern has not translated into many concrete incidents. Still, ANSO would like to re-emphasize that it encourages reporting of all incidents and concerns on the part of those NGOs operating in the area.

JAWZJAN


The primary areas of concern in Jawzjan continue to be Darzab and Qoshtappa in its southern panhandle. The pattern established after the March killing of high-ranking Qoshtappa District officials remains in effect, whereby AOGs make use of a number of strategies to expand their influence. Such strategies

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- AOG infiltration of Qoshtappa and Darzab
- Local political conflicts

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	0
This Report Period	0

have so far included armed incursions, requests for support (sometimes threatening and sometimes not), requests for taxes, and short occupations of a few villages. Such AOGs have not assumed a hostile posture towards NGOs, but depending on AOG coordination, NGOs could still find themselves as a collateral target because of their possession of resources and their influence over their distribution. The viability of NGO projects then must be determined on a site-by-site and pro-



ject-by-project basis. NGOs operating in the area should also think about thresholds and their maximum level of acceptable risk. The activity in southern Jawzjan is linked, occurring over a much broader area that consists of Western Sari Pul and Eastern Faryab.

BAGHLAN


Baghlan's ongoing issues are continuing to concentrate along the Baghlani Jadid corridor with a number of AOG-initiated incidents directed at ANSF and IMF in the form of IEDs or direct-fire attacks. The situation escalated with an apparent joint IMF/ANSF operation in the vicinity of

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Collateral damage from AOG-IMF/ANSF clashes
- Unstable Eastern districts

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	0
This Report Period	0

the main road. The implications for NGOs are that they should make frequent use of ANSO's services when planning travel through this corridor. AOGs have not targeted NGOs along this route, but the prospect of future military operations is a source of concern. In a separate incident, a lone gunman entered a mobile phone facility and managed to do severe damage that impacted mobile availability



throughout the north. Reporting in the eastern district of Baghlan continues to be limited, and any NGO activity there should be predicated on in-depth and local situational awareness.

KHOST

As is usual, the level of IED activity in Khost is higher than other provinces in the Eastern Region. The effectiveness of their use in the province has however declined markedly in this reporting period, with only four of 16 reported devices detonating against targets, and, as is often the case, the only casualties caused being civilians. The first reported use of IED in this period was in Khost City on 2 June against a market area where music cassettes and CDs are sold. A similar attack in another market area in the city on 8 June killed a member of the public and injured at least two other people. An explosion in an area of pharmacy shops elsewhere


KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- IED on all main routes & DAC
- SV/BBIED in Khost City
- IDF in Sabari

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	6
This Report Period	0

in the city the following day did not cause any fatalities, but also injured two people. Other notable IED incidents in the province give further indications that AOG local capacity to produce and use the devices is not as it has been in recent months. On 5 June, two separate incidents, in Tere Zayi and Sabari, saw four AOG members killed in accidental detonations while transporting IED or IED materials. In the afternoon of 8 June, a man wearing a BBIED was identified in a crowd of people in Khost City who quickly cleared the area; unable to find or approach a target, the bomber detonated his device, causing no other casualties.

The few indirect fire incidents during this period caused both military and civilian casualties. At least one of 13 rockets fired at a



joint ANA/IMF base in Khost City in the early hours of 4 June hit a residential area and killed three women who had been sleeping in their home. An attack on Sabari DAC injured several members of both ANP and ANA on 10 June, while rockets fired at the same target three days later missed their target.

An AOG attack against a security force position in Khulbesat during the early hours of 5 June was only broken by the use of IMF aircraft after approximately an hour, during which two ANP members were killed and a further two were injured. At about the same time Bak DAC was also being attacked, but to less effect than in Khulbesat, with no casualties being caused.

PAKTYA

Incident levels in Paktya have risen sharply since late May with 8 of a total of 12 IED incidents causing casualties during this reporting period. On 2 June, IED detonations in Chamkanay and Dand Wa Patan killed members of an IMF PRT patrol and an IMF sponsored guard force. On 4 June, ANA in Zadran were targeted when five soldiers were injured in an explosion as they approached the DAC. Three ANBP members were injured in an attack on their patrol in Dand Wa Patan on 6 June, and three days later


KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- IDF, especially in Schwak & Zurmat
- IED

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	1
This Report Period	0

IMF soldiers were wounded when their vehicle detonated an IED in Schwak. On 12 June, IMF in Schwak were ambushed by AOG using an IED and small arms fire, but did not sustain any casualties. Devices also detonated against ANP in Sayid Karam and Gardez on 11 and 14 June respectively, the latter attack killing two officers. On 12 June, three ANA soldiers died when a device exploded close to their vehicle in Gardez.

AOG in the province used indirect fire on only two occasions, firing at, and missing, the ANA Corps HQ in Gardez on 8 June and again ineffectively firing at an ANA/IMF location in Zurmat on 13 June. Limited and sporadic



direct fire attacks took place in Gardez, Schwak and Jani Khel. An ANP member died in the attack on Jani Khel DAC on 4 June, and the driver of a vehicle in an IMF supply convoy died when his convoy was attacked in Schwak on 13 June. As AOG activity levels increase, so also will abduction become a risk on all main roads throughout the province, with the discovery of two beheaded bodies of abducted victims close to the Jaji DAC on 1 June, serving as an example of this threat.

LAGHMAN


AOG activity persists in Qarghayi, the southern district through which the Kabul-Jalalabad road passes for much of its length. There were four attacks on or close to the road, including a rocket attack on an ANA facility that had been credited as part of the reason for the improvement in security along the route that had lasted until May. For the first time

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Abduction north of Alishing & Alingar
- IED on main routes

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	1
This Report Period	0

since late April, significant AOG activity has again been reported in the Alingar Valley with an attack on an ANP checkpoint in Khyber on 9 June and a more substantial attack on an IMF patrol in Salaw on 11 June that ended when IMF used air support. The first IED incident in the province since early May was also reported in Alingar when a RCIED was found on 13 June, and activity around Mehtarlam has continued with a brief and ineffective attack on a joint ANA/IMF base in Alikhel on the evening of 3 June.



The reappearance of IED and significant levels of general AOG activity in Alingar make it reasonable to conclude that more IED activity on the main road through the valley will soon be seen, likely to be followed by similar incidents further west in the neighbouring Alishing Valley.

NOTICE: Your input is invaluable for the production of this report. While we appreciate information on incidents, we also need general information on the security situation in your area. So please remember to call or email us regularly.

Contact details of ANSO staff are provide on the last page.

ANSO: “..by NGOs for NGOs..”

KUNAR


While Mano Gai continues to be the district where more security incidents occur than any other in Kunar, as summer progresses the proportion of activity drops as AOG in other districts undertake attacks against targets. Similarly, while the majority of attacks continue to be the use of direct fire against security forces, there have been increases in the use of IED and indirect fire across the province. With over 30 direct fire attacks reported in Kunar during this period, AOG inflicted casualties only once, when two ANA soldiers were injured during an engagement that lasted several hours in Chapa Dara in the early hours of 9 June. After a period in May during which AOG ceased using artillery and mortar fire, there has been a resurgence in IDF activity in this period, presumably due to an increased availability of ammunition. As is often the case, almost all of the rounds

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	6
This Report Period	0

fired by AOG in their ten IDF attacks missed their intended targets and caused civilian casualties on two occasions - in a rocket attack against an IMF base in Chawkay on 7 June, and in a mortar attack against an ANA checkpoint in Narang the next day. IMF counter-battery fire, directed against AOG rockets or mortars that were firing on their position in Mano Gai on the afternoon of 11 June, also hit a residential area, killing two people and injuring at least 8 others. Indeed, this reporting period has seen more accidental or disputed deaths involving IMF than is usual in the province and has resulted in some limited public demonstrations. In Nurgal on 11 June, a private car collided with an IMF convoy, as a result of which two of the car's occupants died and several more were injured. In Asadabad on the morning of 9 June, a grenade explosion in a group of people close to where an IMF vehicle was being recovered caused the deaths of two children and injured approximately 50 others in what was a crowded area. Numerous well

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Abduction, especially in Chapa Dara and Mano Gai
- IED and IDF around Sirkanay



reported eye witness statements that the grenade was thrown by an IMF soldier were countered by the release of a video taken from a nearby IMF observation balloon showing a group of people fleeing from a crowded area around IMF vehicles after a nearby explosion.

The increase in IED use in Kunar is a concern for all living and working in the province. In the previous year devices have been used often ineffectively and most frequently against those involved in road construction projects. In this reporting period, devices were used in Bar Kunar and Mano Gai, but the only three devices that detonated were all used in Sirkanay, where an RCIED was used to initiate an ambush on an ANA patrol close to Pashed on 1 June, injuring two children. Civilians were again casualties on 5 June when two people travelling to a wedding were killed by a device that detonated close to their vehicle in the Nawa Pass. An explosion outside a private medical facility in Barabat on 13 June did not cause any casualties, but did cause superficial damage to the targeted property.


NURISTAN

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	0
This Report Period	0

Reported AOG activity in Nuristan continues to be centred around IMF locations, and during this period, security forces in Kamdesh were attacked on three occasions. The joint IMF/ANA base close to the DAC was attacked twice on the evening of 9 June without causing any casualties, and rockets were used against security forces in Kamo on 8 June without hitting their target.

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Provincial-wide AOG prevalence
- Abduction/kidnapping
- Unstable Eastern districts



NANGARHAR


A recently constructed ANBP position and an IMF base under construction in Nazyan were attacked on the night of 12 June. Unfortunately, though, a nearby clinic operated by an INGO was damaged during the attack when at least one RPG round hit one of its buildings, causing some superficial damage to the facility.

Four of a total of 12 IED incidents in Nangarhar during this reporting period were detonations against targets and all four caused casualties. A RCIED explosion in Sherzad in the morning of 5 June killed six members of a passing ANP patrol. On the same day, a similar device used in Khogyani killed another four ANP officers. In Shinwar on 13 June, two mem-

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	5
This Report Period	0

bers of the ANBP were injured when an IED detonated close to their vehicle. On 15 June, a device detonated on the Darunta university campus, causing minor injuries to two people nearby. Other devices were found or detonated prematurely in Kot, Achin and Jalalabad. A device in Jalalabad was placed close to the site of the SVBIED incident that occurred in March, on the main road between Nangarhar's PRT and the main IMF base in the area, FOB Fenty. As also happened elsewhere in the region, an AOG member in the process of placing an IED was killed when his device detonated prematurely. In this case the bomber died while attempting to place an IED in a culvert in the grounds of the Pedagogy Institute in Jalalabad on the night of 4/5 June.

Several direct fire attacks occurred in this period, and the ANBP



again came under attack in the early hours of 14 June in Pachir Wa Agam. More significantly, though, in Lal Pur on the morning of 6 June, an attack on a patrol developed into a firefight that resulted in ANBP sustaining several casualties and capturing one of the AOG involved.

The migration of local AOG leadership is thought to be responsible for recent activity levels in Sherzad; that, as well as the attack on ANP, has included the destruction of a school and the intimidation of villagers at another location also involved in building a school. Evidence of AOG movement into the south-east of the province persists, and security forces continue to increase their presence in some of these areas.

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- IED on approached to DAC
- AOG-Security force clashes along eastern border


HERAT

An INGO organized convoy carrying food supplies was challenged by an armed group during its transit from Herat to Ghor province at a makeshift road block along the Farsi-Tulak road. Though the convoy was escorted by armed ANP, permission for further passage could only be obtained after negotiations were undertaken with the aid of the Farsi District Governor. Comparing this instance to earlier incidents in Chisti Sharif and Ghor Province, it appears that the affected INGO

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	9
This Report Period	1

convoy fared better. On one hand, the incident reflects the active presence of armed groups that are sourcing funds through banditry, while on the other, it highlights how NGO must maintain relationships that can help negotiate such challenges.

Herat witnessed few AOG or ACG related incidents; however, the extension of AOG operations into Injil District during the period of reporting holds significance, considering the many NGO projects running in the district. The AOG assault on the Injil District Centre (located on the Herat City-Airport Road) during the night of 12 June heralded



the first of such attacks. Though no casualties were incurred by the ANP guarding the complex, the incident is an indicator of increasing AOG boldness and mobility when they possibly operate outside of their base in Guzara. The occurrence is also a pointer to the increased threat to NGO transiting the Herat City-Airport road, especially outside of daylight hours. NGO functioning in or transiting through the district may need to take into account this new development when undertaking a risk assessment of the area.

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- AOG attacks
- Banditry


FARAH

A female national staff member of a NGO employed as a community midwife, along with her husband, was found murdered in the area of Khor Malik village, on the outskirts of Farah City. The victim was residing in Farah City and regularly commuted to work along with her husband to Khor Malik village on a personal motorcycle. She failed to show up at the community health clinic after 10 June, and her body, along with that of

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	2
This Report Period	1

her husband, was discovered in the open, three days after their possible disappearance. The bullet wounds inflicted on the bodies suggest an execution style killing. Additionally, the possibility of the couple having been abducted prior to their murder may not be ruled out either. Because there is no information on the issuance of any threats against the couple or this NGO, at this stage it may be premature to speculate on the possible cause behind these killings.

During the fortnight of reporting, ANSF and IMF conducted a joint military operation in Gulistan Dis-



trict, where up to fifteen AOG members were reported to have been killed along with their commander. Although military operations by security forces against AOG in Farah province have been ongoing for quite sometime, there have been few earlier reported engagements reported in the district. Conversely, the large number of casualties suggests a major engagement and also the significant presence of AOG in the area.

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Attacks on NGO staff
- IED


BADGHIS

Military operations launched by security forces against AOG in Badghis continued unabated during the reporting period; however, AOG also conducted operations to counter the GoA offensive. ANSF and IMF conducted joint

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	1
This Report Period	0

military operations in Ludinha Village, Murghab District, where up to four AOG were reported to have been killed and eighteen wounded.

In view of the ongoing military operations and enhanced AOG activity, the risks to civilians being caught up in the conflict always remains high, and there is also the strong possibility of air strikes being carried out in support of



ground operations. NGO should heed these developments and consider appropriate safeguards to mitigate any possible adverse effects on their operations in the province.

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS


- Armed conflict
- IED
- Check posts

GHOR

AOG attacked an NGO office in Dulayna at 2300 hrs on 9 June, with a rocket propelled grenade. The shot failed to cause any casualties, and effected minor damage to the structure; however, it is

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	1
This Report Period	1

likely that the NGO was not the intended target of the attack, because AOG later announced the District Centre was the ultimate target, clearing the air of any misconceptions about the incident. Additionally, the NGO supports health care programs and presumably enjoys considerable acceptance amongst its beneficiaries,



only having the unfortunate circumstance of being located adjacent to the District Centre.

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Collateral damage from clashes
- UXO

KANDAHAR

Effects of the protracted conflict remain manifest in Kandahar, with the period witnessing a BBIED strike that killed five PSC staff in Spin Boldak; reports of large inflows of AOG elements into Arghandab, Ghorak, and Shah Wali Kot; and sustained clashes—sometimes as long as three hours—occurring in the province. Additionally, AOGs continue to enjoy freedom of movement and deem the presence of security forces not to be an adequate disincentive; for example, AOG killed one ANP and


KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Collateral damage from AOG-ANP clashes
- Roadside IED

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	4
This Report Period	0

wound two others on 2 June in a grenade attack that targeted the Governor's compound in District 4, Kandahar City, demonstrating that even in formidable areas, AOG are able to successfully operate and evade capture. Moreover, AOG activity for May has risen roughly 19% since the previous year's provincial high, and the occurrence of successful IED strikes has risen 43% (23 in May 2008 versus 33 in May 2009).

Additionally, reporting during the period was conspicuously lacking ANP actions, minus a few IED discoveries and the arrest of a BBIED attacker in Reg District. Despite usual trends, such as IEDs, school arsons, and ambushes, reporting demonstrated



the increased likelihood of innocents being wrongly targeted by armed parties—ANSF and private security—with four accidental or escalation of force shootings occurring. In sum, NGOs should only expect the situation in Kandahar to further deteriorate, because AOG are intent upon targeting installations and parties that are indicative of the GoA's writ (schools, road projects, collaborators, etc.), or external actors, such as NGOs, that are believed—albeit falsely—to portray an arm of GoA efficacy.

GHAZNI

The normal brutality of events in Ghazni was somewhat absent during this period, with typical, less sensational events encompassing the majority of clashes, including abductions of ANA and numerous attacks on convoys and facilities. Additionally, in a rare case of women being involved in suicide attacks, reporting suggests that a female suicide attacker relocated to Chandan District, but her intentions remain unknown.


KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Collateral damage from IEDs and convoy ambushes
- Abduction/kidnapping

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	2
This Report Period	0

During the reporting period, IEDs were the predictable preferred method AOGs utilised, and ANP discovered multiple IEDs in the vicinity of the Governor's office and the Refugee Department. AOG-spurred fatalities were also minimal, with an ambush that killed four ANP in Zana Khan on 10 June, an IED that killed three ANA in Qarabagh on the same day, and a possible IED attempt to kill the Gelan District ANP Chief that ultimately only wounded him.

By looking at trends in the province for the month of May, one can see that AOG activities have



only negligibly increased from 2008 to 2009: 78 occurred in 2009, 71 in 2008, and 15 in 2007. IMF/ANSF activities during the similar period, however, have increased by 64%, from 14 in 2008, to 23 in 2009. With this, it is clear that IMF/ANSF are probably having to dedicate inordinate resources to stifle excessive AOG increases, and moderate AOG increases will continue for the foreseeable future.

ZABUL

The overall situation in Zabul remains extremely tense. IED incidents and indiscriminate AOG attacks continued to occur throughout the reporting period, with a total of at least fifteen IED detonations or discoveries across the province; the targets of these attacks included PSC vehicles, construction sites, and IMF/ANSF convoys. The level of IEDs, BBIEDs, and SVBIEDs is

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS


- BBIED/VBIED attacks
- Roadside IEDs
- Attacks on ANP

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	0
This Report Period	0

still regarded as being very high, and there is an imminent threat of a SVBIED attack occurring against IMF and ANSF in the vicinity of Sainak, Qalat City.

As previously reported, a very small number of NGOs working in the province have already reduced their movements to a minimum; however, while there is no known direct threat of attack for NGOs, locals believe that there is a real possibility of an active cell of AOG waiting for a specific trigger to target an international humanitarian organisation.

Despite the abovementioned



AOG persistence, IMF and ANSF were also active during the period, claiming a certain degree of success in either killing or wounding and arresting a considerable number of AOG during an operation. Important to note, the large operation seems to have been conducted without causing any purported civilian casualties, with no parties raising the issue, to date.

HELMAND

There has been a definite increase in the threat level, presented by the type of AOG driven incidents, the level of sophistication entailed, and the types of devices that are now being used; for example, approximately fifteen IED related incidents were reported to have occurred in various districts of the province, with a number of IMF, ANSF, and civilian casualties. Furthermore, one can perceive that AOGs are now drawing their attention to conducting a concerted bombing campaign in Lashkar Gah City. Two planned strikes—the first caused by a timing-device that had been placed in a water drainage ditch close to Kotar Chowk, and the second


KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Collateral damage from clashes
- Significant AOG threat
- Roadside IEDs

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	1
This Report Period	0

being a foiled SVBIED attack close to the northern entrance of the city—confirm the aforementioned desire to target Lashkar Gah City. Thus, NGOs are advised to be cognizant of any suspicious vehicles parking near their office compounds or guesthouses and to never leave vehicles unattended outside of guarded compounds.

And when trying to ascertain the state of AOGs in the province, one should recognise that AOG morale is suffering due to the killing of several senior AOG members during an ongoing IMF/ANSF operation in the districts of Nahri Sarraj and Nawa; the deceased commanders were believed to have been strong leaders and recently involved in numerous serious IED, suicide, and complex attacks throughout the south. Furthermore, one can see a correla-



tion between the abovementioned fatalities and this period's drop in incidents, when compared to the previous period's numbers. This decline may be temporary, however, if one takes into account reports that a considerable number of AOG infiltrated into the country through Dishu District; although it is not clear, information suggests that they intend to deploy to isolated districts of the province where they can dominate local populaces that are less likely to challenge their ideological calls for attacks on IMF and ANSF. In conclusion, despite IMF and ANSF inroads, AOGs continue to assert themselves throughout the province, a situation that necessitates minimizing contact with IMF and ANSF.

URUZGAN

During this reporting period, activities in Uruzgan were markedly higher; however, IMF and ANSF asserted themselves much more than in the past. In an example of this, IMF, reportedly having forewarning, shot dead a suicide bomber in Amur Abad, Tirin Kot, on 1 June. And in another attempted suicide attack, a BBIED attacker sought to target an ANP base in Tirin Kot on 11 June, but ANP shot him dead. Charchino was another location for a significant incident, with IMF/ANSF claiming to have killed 36 AOG and to have seized heroin and explosives from the scene of a 5

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS


- AOG opposition to NGO operations
- IEDs

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	2
This Report Period	0

June operation. NGOs should note one remaining reported threat within the district of Tirin Kot, however: AOG are intent upon utilising a VBIED to target the Uruzgan Governor, Chief of Police, or the ANP Reserve Commander.

For NGOs that are already present or considering establishing operations in the province, examining trends in Uruzgan is still hindered by poor reporting and the lack of a significant, definable pattern. Additionally, the absence of security forces in regions outside of Tirin Kot will allow AOG sanctuaries that further inhibit information on AOG activities. Still, according to ANSO records, it appears that the semblance of stability that the province enjoyed

URUZGAN



is now eroding—although only slightly—with May 2009's AOG incidents surpassing all levels: 8 in 2006, 4 in 2007, 5 in 2008, and 10 in 2009. Similarly, IMF activity has quadrupled to 8 incidents in May 2009, versus the previous high of 2 reported incidents in May 2008. While incident levels are low and insufficiencies in reporting are inherent, data suggest that there is at least a nominal escalation in the conflict. Additionally, NGOs know all too well that AOG attempts to intimidate the populace, as seen in summary executions of purported GoA/IMF collaborators, continue to occur unimpeded.

PAKTIKA

Just as witnessed writ large, AOG operating in Paktika are more reliant upon IED strikes—to date, for June, 60% of AOG attacks have been IEDs. AOGs are also still diversifying: on 1 June, a SVBIED targeted ANP near the Barmal District Centre, and AOG conducted multiple ambushes on ANSF, IMF, and a PSC, with four PSC staff dying in the 11 June Yosuf Khel antitank mine attack. Furthermore, if reporting serves as a good indicator, NGOs should expect the AOG monopoly of violence to persist, because IMF/

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS


- Collateral from clashes
- Abduction/kidnapping
- IED

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	0
This Report Period	0

ANSF have only been responsible for roughly 22% of incidents during this period. Similarly, when one looks at historical trends for May, IMF and ANSF were responsible for only 32% of incidents in 2009 and 26% during the same month in 2008.

And as seen in other provinces in the Southern Region, if one notes the subsequent rise in AOG and IMF/ANSF incident levels, when paired with the abovementioned rises in the IMF/ANSF share of events, one sees indications that a purported 'surge' in combatants will not help ameliorate conflict levels, rather, only lead to further clashes (AOG and IMF/ANSF incidents rose by 86% for the month of May when comparing

PAKTIKA



2009 to 2008). Moreover, it is probable that IMF/ANSF pressure, if increased exponentially, would only lead to a situation in which IMF/ANSF become the dominant actors; however, the resources dedicated to cause such an effect, as well as the resultant incident levels (AOG levels will still probably climb in concert with IMF/ANSF levels, with the latter surpassing AOG levels, eventually), suggest that bringing about this decline will be extremely adverse for the general populace and the overall security situation.



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ANSO ACRONYMS

IMF-International Military Forces / AOG-Armed Opposition Groups / GOA-Government of Afghanistan / ACG-Armed Criminal Groups / ANA-Afghan National Army / ANP-Afghan National Police / IED-Improvised Exploding Device / AEF-Afghan Eradication Forces / RPG-Rocket Propelled Grenade / IDF-Indirect Fire (ex: mortars) / VBIED-Vehicle Borne Improvised Exploding Device / PRP-Previous Reporting Period / ANBP-Afghan National Border Police / SAF-Small Arms Fire / NDS-National Directorate of Security (intelligence) / PSC-Private Security Company / DC-District Centre

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MISSING

This report ANSO could not provide analysis for the provinces of:

- Badakhshan
- Takhar
- Samangan
- Sar-e-Pul
- Nimroz

This is because we do not know enough about the area to comment on the significance of the incidents occurring there.

If you can help us understand the province better please contact us.

TRAINING ANNOUNCEMENT:

Please note that ANSO will be hosting **The Armadillo Group** for the following training sessions:

Personal Safety and Security Course: 25-27 June 2009, Kabul, Afghanistan, ANSO Main Office

Security Management Course (including Crisis Management): 28 June-2 July 2009, Kabul, Afghanistan, ANSO Main Office

For further details and registration for these courses, NGO are encouraged to contact **The Armadillo Group** directly at the following address:

steve@armadilloatlarge.com