

THE ANSO REPORT

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YOU NEED TO KNOW

- AOGs seek to maintain the initiative through armed assaults and lethal IEDs
- ANSF has assumed an increase presence throughout Kabul City in anticipation of a pre-election AOG offensive
- Clashes between ANSF and private armed forces, as well as fomenting tension with the APPF, will hinder peace

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COUNTRY SUMMARY

Despite ANSO losing a significant source of information during this reporting period, one can clearly perceive that AOGs are attempting to maintain the initiative, regardless of IMF desires to exterminate the opposition.

With this, AOGs display an unconscious vigor in their persistent but questionable reliance upon ambushes and close range attacks to confront ANSF and IMF.

Although AOGs may be generally reliant on close-range attacks, AOG IEDs appear to be maintaining their increased effectiveness, resulting in severe casualties.

AOG pervasiveness is now seen in past dormant regions, for example, in the strike on the Guzara District Centre, on the outskirts of Herat City.

In light of the upcoming electoral period and the increased AOG threat, ANSF publicly moved to secure significant targets in Kabul, assuming a marked presence in the city centre. IMF also took the initiative in their touted Operation Khanjar to penetrate AOG strongholds in Helmand.

Still, daunting cultural and environmental obstacles to the GoA effectively main-

taining the rule of law were evident in the well-publicized clash between US sponsored Afghan private security forces and the ANP that resulted in the Kandahar City Police Chief's death and the ultimate arrest of 41 of the private security guards.

While this matter may appear to be localized and specific to 'a few bad apples', in actuality it is emblematic of fomenting tension between ANP and another much triumphed armed force—the APPF—tension that will likely result in further erosion of the security situation.

NGO DATA & TRENDS

NGO incidents persisted in areas of burgeoning AOG intent—the Northern and Western regions. NGO staff fatalities garnered attention during the period, especially when two NGOs found themselves victims—one in Jawzjan, and the other in Kunduz—because their vehicles were confused as belonging to parties to the conflict. While the international community's outcries concerning NGO fatalities were justified, demonstrating the risk bystanders face in a conflict-affected environment, they also highlighted the inequitable attention NGO casualties receive, depending upon their associations with IOs. Several more egregious incidents this year in which NGOs were explicitly and individually targeted have not been so roundly condemned in the public sphere.

Old tensions also came to the fore, affecting NGOs, when an NGO vehicle was set ablaze in the restive district of Chaharbulak in Balkh Province, and a NGO employee was killed in an apparent criminal act in Herat City. Criminality also persisted in Ghor Province, when NGO staff were robbed in Chegharan, and in Faryab, when a former employee stoned a NGO office. And Ghor continued to demonstrate the hazards NGOs face in operating in areas where dissatisfied beneficiaries are willing to resort to violence, when a specific segment of an NGO office was set ablaze in Pasaband District.

KABUL

The last day of June signalled the beginning of the ANSF's official plan to secure the capital ahead of the 20 August elections. Although initial indications suggested that the approximately 30 checkpoints designed to protect the centre of the city would further affect the already troublesome traffic situation, journeys throughout the city were recorded as relatively normal. It is believed, at this stage, that the full implementation of the plan may have been delayed and is due to commence in the coming days.


KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Complex attacks against high profile targets
- Armed Criminal Groups
- Abductions

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	6
This Report Period	0

An area of future concern is the robust ANSF manner at checkpoints. Reports have already been received of aggressive searches and questioning regarding identification documents and radio equipment licences, as well as vehicle registration, all often aggravated by miscommunication.

Separately, security incidents against NGOs in the capital city have decreased for the year to date compared to 2008. For this year, there have been four robberies, three of them involving weapons, and two threats of violence against NGOs. For 2008 during the same period, there were ten recorded incidents, of which burglary of residences comprised the largest share with four occurrences.



Across the province, close range AOG attacks using SAF and RPGs have remained virtually in-line with 2008. In addition, standoff attacks, such as rocket, mortar and IED attacks, have similarly not shown a significant increase from 2008. Close range attacks have traditionally been used as a measure of AOG strength, with asymmetrical and standoff attacks a gauge of weakness, due to their inability to directly confront IMF or ANSF.

Thus, the fact that both standoff and close range attacks have remained constant in Kabul Province suggests that AOG operations and indeed strength have not evolved at the same pace as the rest of the country.

KAPISA

The general security situation in Kapisa Province remains relatively stable in the west and increasingly unstable in the east; however, there have been no significant changes in the overall threat environment, compared to recent reports. In Tagab on 19 June, AOG attacked the residence of a pro-government leader requiring the ANP District Commander to request support from IMF. AOG

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS


- Attacks on ANSF/IMF, especially in Tagab and Nijrab
- Spread of attacks to schools or other non security-related targets
- Rockets, IEDs, and mines

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	1
This Report Period	0

retreated and continued the engagement with rockets and mortars. Ambushes and IED attacks against ANSF and IMF are becoming increasingly common in Tagab, and to a lesser degree, Alasay.

Given periodic military operations and reports of heavy AOG infiltration, Alasay, as well as Nijrab, should be considered unstable and potentially volatile. Mahmud Raqi, although considered stable, also witnesses the occasional rocket attack; however, NGO operations are not affected.

There is anecdotal reporting from Kohistan that suggests the possi-



bility of growing anti-government sentiment and the promulgation of a message that cooperation with the GoA is ant-Islamic. While such reporting currently falls in the realm of rumour, NGOs should closely monitor and assess their community support and local attitudes toward their work. So far there have been no reports of direct security problems for NGOs operating in the two districts.

PARWAN


The safety of the main route between Kabul and Bamyan, via Parwan, came into question following a direct RCIED attack on an eight vehicle IO convoy on 17

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Attacks on security targets, especially near Bagram Airbase
- NGO-targeted criminal abduction

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	1
This Report Period	0

June. The RCIED struck the first vehicle injuring the driver who subsequently required hospitalisation. Although three individuals were arrested in connection with the incident on 27 June, the motive for the action remains unknown. Further concerns were raised following another IED attack against the convoy of the



Ghor Provincial Police Commander on 27 June in Ghorband District—the blast left six ANP wounded.

WARDAK

Standoff attacks again consume the majority of security incidents emerging from Wardak. The heavily armed IMF, together with a more active ANA, have forced a reversion to rockets and IED attacks in avoidance of a direct confrontation. IEDs have as yet to translate to a direct threat to NGO operations, as the devices


KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Abduction
- Spread of attacks to schools or other non security-related targets
- Collateral damage from clashes

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	0
This Report Period	0

appear to be remotely detonated, targeting ANSF or IMF. For 2009, there have been no reported victim-initiated IEDs that failed to differentiate between belligerent parties and the civilian population.

In the last reporting period, there were four IED attacks in Wardak, the most serious along the Maydan Shahr Highway, killing two members of the APPF. This is the second fatal incident involving the APPF, following a similar IED attack in Nirkh that killed three and wounded three others on 26 April.



Of note, the Jaghatu DAC has been attacked four times in the past two weeks with a mixture of rockets, RPG, and SAF. Interestingly, each time the attackers have been repelled and there have been no reports of casualties, which suggests a combination of fortified defences and ill-organised assaults.

DAYKUNDI

The presence of IMF on the ground in Kajran has been confirmed by a recent operation on


KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- High AOG infiltration in Kiti, Gizrab, and Kajran
- Clashes between AOG and the local population, especially in the south
- Security vacuum

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	1
This Report Period	0

19 June, where a number of AOG were arrested and subsequently transported to Uruzgan. Although the recent airstrikes in Kajran at the beginning of June suggested a light IMF presence, the arrests indicate that IMF may continue to target the district over the coming weeks.

The rest of the province remains relatively calm with only limited reports of occasional banditry.



And with Kajran increasingly the focus of IMF, and Gizab under the nominal control of AOG, instability in the south should be expected to continue.

LOGAR


AOG incident levels have remained high and consistent in the last two months, with recent incidents indicating nominal AOG control of parts of the province. This second point is most clearly evidenced by AOGs' apparent ability to operate with near abandon during the night along the Kabul-Ghazni road in Puli Alam. In addition to the obvious intimidation benefit, AOG operations

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Spread of attacks to schools or other non security-related targets
- Attacks on ANSF/IMF
- Abduction

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	1
This Report Period	0

also appear to be facilitating attacks on security related convoys in Puli Alam, evidenced in a 17 June AOG ambush of an IMF patrol along a district road and a 22 June AOG ambush on an IMF convoy on the Kabul-Logar main road. Much of this activity has been centred in the Porak/Kalanger area, where also the ANP arrested one of its officers for distributing AOG night letters on 22 June. It would not be too much to assume, and anecdotal reporting supports the assumption, that other personnel are also either implicitly or explicitly involved in AOG activities.



The majority of recent incidents have occurred in Baraki Barak, Kharwar, and Charkh—areas that are reported to be effectively under AOG control. Prior to conducting operations in new areas of Logar, NGO should ensure complete community acceptance and support, and when travelling outside traditional areas of operation, local staff should be sanitised of NGO documentation. ANSO does not recommend expatriate programme staff travel to the province.

BAMYAN


Kharmard District was again the scene of AOG activity with two recorded incidents involving IMF. Although IMF have been previously present in the district, a SAF engagement on 25 June and an IED attack on 28 June, leaving no casualties, suggest that the fre-

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Increasing threat of IED/mines
- Armed robbery along roadways

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	0
This Report Period	0

quency of such attacks may rise. AOGs have established a presence in Bamyan's northeast, largely as a result of their freedom of movement in Baghlan; however, their influence is largely confined to a series of valleys and does not extend across the whole district. Traditionally, AOGs in this area have uniquely attacked ANP checkpoints, using SAF or rockets, with the occasional use of IEDs. The recent attacks, there-



fore, may have the unintended, or indeed intended, effect of drawing in IMF, directly affecting stability. Still, these recent actions have not yet translated into a higher threat environment along the main road in Shibar.

Please Note:

Monthly graphs provided in this report are inclusive as of 24 June 2009 .


JAWZJAN

A large RCIED consisting of approximately 15 kg of explosives struck an NGO vehicle on a stretch of gravel road leading to Mardiyān, in the vicinity of Aqcha, killing all three occupants. Further investigation has not proved conclusive, but it seems that the likely target of the incident was a government minister who was staying in Mardiyān and due to be travelling along the road in question at the time of the attack. The NGO vehicle was high-profile and provided by the UN (it was essentially an unmarked UN vehicle) and could have easily been confused with an official GoA vehicle. Whether the target was the minister himself, or an attempt to simply cause a ruckus in his immediate vicinity, is inconsequential; it is unlikely the vehicle would have been hit were it less conspicuous. As discussed in previous bi-weeklies, AOG activity in the vicinity of Aqcha is sparse and well-planned. In another NGO incident in November of last year, the NGO appears to have been

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	1
This Report Period	1

targeted simply because it was the only relatively high-profile vehicle in the area. In this incident other vehicles had passed by the scene unscathed before the device detonated targeting the NGO fatally.

In background to this incident, ANSF has been warning NGOs of a possible direct threat, such as AOGs attempting to kidnap an international. ANSO North has not been able to independently substantiate the existence of such a threat, but it should be borne in mind that the desire is there and has existed for some time. NGOs should take this and all threats seriously, but it should not distract from the main risks of operating in the area, such as collateral damage in local disputes and in attacks targeting IMF and ANSF. The main ways that NGOs operating in Jawzjan can address these threats are by following established best practices in the form of SOPs. These include avoiding likely AOG targets, exercising control over information concerning movements, maintaining a low profile, and setting a firm threshold beyond which continuation of work is no longer acceptable. The specifics of each determination needs to be made by each organization owing to their particular circumstances.



Another subject that has come up with frequency in recent weeks is NGOs' individual response to the upcoming presidential elections. Violence internal to the political system is endemic to Jawzjan (rather than fully opposing the system's legitimacy). There is currently no firm evidence that violence has increased, decreased, or changed in nature of last year, and hence ANSO North recommends that NGOs in the NR take a broader view with regards to the elections. Most political positions are not elected at all in Afghanistan and are actually appointments. The result is that elections produce a long-term trickle-down effect as officials are appointed and in-turn appoint others. This process can last for many months after the elections per se and also rears its head at times utterly extraneous to the elections as other appointments, dismissals, and reshufflings occur. In any such instance, violence is used as a common means of levelling threats and/or justifying political narratives, and NGOs themselves always face the risk of becoming involved as a source of political capital. The upcoming elections are important, but should not lead organizations to lose focus on the broader political context.

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- IEDs targeting GoA, IMF, and ANSF
- Continued AOG presence in Darzab and Qoshtappa
- Local political disputes

TRAINING ANNOUNCEMENT:

Please see page 15 of this report for upcoming training opportunities being hosted by ANSO

BALKH

An NGO vehicle was set ablaze in the consistently active district of Chaharbulak. It does not seem that this attack was premeditated, but rather represents a target of opportunity and local hooliganism in an area with broad AOG sentiment. Unplanned, frequent, and small-scale incidents are common


KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- AOG sentiment in Western districts
- Attacks targeting IMF and ANSF west of Balkh city

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	4
This Report Period	1

in Chaharbulak and a distinguishing feature of Western Balkh that sets it apart from the norm, minus a few higher-profile incidents occurring in nearby areas of Jawzjan.

Balkh also saw two attacks on mobile communications towers, which is part of an apparent pattern across the north (see Baghlan and Kunduz). While such towers have been targeted frequently, there has been no accompanying PR strategy on the part of AOGs attempting to justify such attacks.



Last year, in the south, such attacks were accompanied by public threats designed to clearly establish an AOG presence and limit the connectivity of potential GoA supporters. Additionally, none of the mobile companies reported attempts at extortion, which would signify another possible motive.

KUNDUZ


The apparently mistaken targeting of an INGO vehicle along the main road between Kunduz and Sherkhan Bandar was a particularly significant incident in that it represents a rare occurrence of an NGO-direct incident along the main roads of Kunduz. Circumstantial information corroborated by reports on AOG websites indicates that the AOG had mistaken the relatively high-profile NGO vehicle (a large silver pickup) for ANP or NDS. While the three

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- IEDs targeting IMF and ANSF
- Increased AOG activity

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	7
This Report Period	1

occupants emerged with minor injuries the size of the IED was significant and totally destroyed the vehicle and created a large crater in the road. From ANSO's point of view the main lessons to be learned are that the main threat still lies in collateral damage from attacks targeting IMF and ANSF. Consequent it should repeated that profile matters and low-profile transportation (a sedan as opposed to an SUV) significantly mitigates risk during travel. Other major incidents occurred when an attack left three IMF dead by causing their APC to fall into a river. There was an also an attack



on a communications tower (see Baghlan and Balkh) where no-one claimed responsibility. Directly attributable to local AOGs are confirmed reports of attempts of illegal tax collection in western Kunduz district. Such attempts to collect "Islamic taxes" are both an attempt to establish presence and simply extort money. It is unclear at this point how effective such requests are proving and what their general effect is on the local population.

ANNOUNCEMENT:

In the coming months, ANSO will be helping develop an incident mapping service to aid NGO management and security procedures. Registrants will receive further information as it becomes available.

TAKHAR


Activity in Takhar continues to be limited with no increase over previous periods. As of yet, there has been no follow up on the part of AOGs in reference to earlier agitations, including attacks on ANP and GoA in the northwest of the province and the distribution of

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	1
This Report Period	0

night letters discouraging participation in the upcoming elections. The main area of concern continues to be the road between Khanabad and Taluqan, which sees the occasional emplacement of IEDs. Such IEDs are probably the work of Kunduz-based groups who can easily operate along the road due to its proximity to Kunduz. Another area that could present issues is the area south of Ishkamish and abutting Baghlan. Scattered reports of AOG movements reinforce that this area suf-

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- IEDs along the Kunduz-Taluqan road
- Possible AOG sentiment in northwest
- GoA absence in the south



fers from the same issue plaguing much of eastern Baghlan—lack of GoA presence. This means that “AOG” activity might really be a manifestation of local disputes or local political dynamics and therefore also needs to be handled locally by NGOs wishing to be present in that environment.

BAGHLAN


Baghlan continues to consist of a region of stability along the road between Puli Khumri and Salang, bordered by organized AOG activity in the Baghlani Jadid corridor between Puli Khumri and Kunduz and large regions of low GoA presence bordering the main

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	0
This Report Period	0

road on the east and west. Important activity was centred in Puli Khumri with an attack on the Puli Khumri University campus for unknown motives and another attack on a communications tower which appears to be part of a wider trend (see Kunduz and Balkh). In the southwestern district of Tala-va-Barfak NGO activity was almost compromised by the return of a former commander with the possible intent of influencing dynamics ahead of the

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- IEDs targeting IMF near Baghlani Jadid
- Low GoA presence in the east, away from the Salang Road



election. Well-attended meetings by local representative units led to the commander and his fighters being thoroughly repudiated in what is considered by NGOs operating locally to have been a positive political development.

FARYAB


An attack consisting of an individual throwing stones at an NGO office in Maymana was apparently the work of a disgruntled former employee, serving as a reminder

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	3
This Report Period	1

that HR policy is also an integral component of an NGO’s security strategy. Elsewhere in Faryab, attacks continued apace against regular AOG targets, such as ANSF and IMF. The threat of IEDs targeting the aforementioned actors remains along the ring road between Dawlatabad and Maymana.

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- AOG presence in Western districts
- IEDs between Maymana and Dawlatabad



BADAKHSHAN


The tenor of activity in Badakhshan concerning NGOs continues to be highly localised and limited in nature. The only incident of note in this reporting period consisted of an IED planted in the vicinity of Fayzabad, probably targeting IMF. (It was found and

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	0
This Report Period	0

defused before it could detonate). Conversely, the low amount of AOG activity in Badakhshan is counterbalanced by the limited GoA presence. To the degree that AOG-initiated activity will occur, it will likely be directed at perennial favoured targets such as IMF and ANSF, which NGOs should continue to avoid. The remoteness of many districts means that localised disputes

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Occasional IEDs
- Local disputes



could be highly relevant to certain NGOs or projects and hence highly localised situational awareness is advised.

LAGHMAN


The anticipated reappearance of AOG in both Alishing and Alingar Valleys has materialised in IED strikes. An IMF patrol was targeted close to the village of Karnawa in Alishing on the morning of 19 June, injuring at least three of the patrol members. A device that exploded in Jalam in

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	1
This Report Period	0

Alingar on 27 June killed an ANP officer and a passer-by and injured two children nearby. And reports of AOG checkpoints being conducted in the Nari Rod area of Alingar on 27 June reinforce impressions of an increased AOG presence in the district. In the northern district of Dawlat Shah, an ANP checkpoint was attacked by AOG, possibly from Nuristan, on 18 June. One of the attackers was injured and subsequently captured. Although no significant

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- IED on main routes
- Abduction north of Alishing and Alingar




incidents have been reported on the Kabul-Jalalabad road during this reporting period, it is likely that AOG will continue to exert pressure on local security forces, and more attacks should be expected throughout July.

PAKTYA

AOG activity levels in Paktya have dipped slightly since the start of the month, but IEDs continue to be the preferred method of attack in the province, and a significant proportion of devices used in the second part of June resulted in casualties. ANP offi-

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	1
This Report Period	0

cers were injured in explosions in Gardez and Chamkanay on 22 and 23 June, respectively. Another device exploded on the Khost-Gardez road in Zadran on 23 June and injured several members of a road construction crew as they drove along the route. Police checkpoints close to the village of Zaw in Gardez were attacked with direct fire twice during this period—to little effect on both occasions—and an IMF patrol in Schwak was briefly attacked on



the morning of 22 June, again without causing any casualties. AOG used indirect fire only once, when mortars were fired at, and missed, ANP in the Stogan area of Zurmat on 22 June.

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Abduction
- IED on all main routes
- AOG presence on Khost-Gardez road

KHOST


AOG activity in Khost during this reporting period has again been dominated by the use of IEDs, and after a period in late-May/early-June, during which their effectiveness dropped, casualties are again being inflicted at high levels. Five incidents caused fatalities and a further two saw injuries sustained by people close to IED detonations in Khost during the second part of June. The single incident causing the most casualties occurred on the afternoon of 22 June when two devices detonated close to a mosque in Khost City, killing at least ten people and

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- IED on all main routes & in DAC
- SV/BBIED in Khost City
- Abduction on Khost-Gardez Road

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	6
This Report Period	0

injuring over 40 others. Other fatalities were sustained by IMF, ANSF and a PSC in explosions in Mando Zayi, Khost City, and Khost District. The detonation in Mando Zayi occurred on the morning of 20 June and, as is now being seen in other incidents reported in Paktya and Kunar, was used to initiate an ambush against security forces who went on to inflict casualties on the attacking force. At least three similar incidents have been reported in the region since early May and AOG seem intent on persisting with the tactic despite themselves suffering multiple casualties on each occasion. As well as being used against security forces and as occurs frequently in the province, devices were also used to damage a school



and a shopping area in Jaji Maydan and Khost City during this reporting period.

The use of indirect fire has furthered the decline started earlier in the month, with just one incident reported in which rockets were fired at, and landed in, Camp Salerno on the outskirts of Khost on the evening of 20 June.

AOG in the province continue to kill those they suspect of colluding with security forces or otherwise supporting the GOA, with three people accused of working on road construction projects killed in Bak and Khost City on 16 June.

NANGARHAR


The period concluded with a sensational BBIED attack on an ANP search booth only meters from the Torkham border in Muhmand Dara. At the time of this report, casualties remain unclear, but the AOG responsible for the attack surely accomplished its goal of gaining recognition for its strike. And towards the end of the period, on the afternoon of 26 June, an IMF soldier died when an IED detonated in Khogyani. (Another device was found in the district on the same day). On 19 June, an IED find in the district was also followed by a detonation against an IMF vehicle, which on that occasion did not cause casualties.

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- IED on approaches to DAC
- SV/BBIED around Jalalabad

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	5
This Report Period	0

ties. Security forces attending incidents can find themselves attacked by AOG who are all too aware of the limited number of routes in and out of many areas in the south of Nangarhar. Similarly, a SVBIED detonation that killed 4 ANP officers in the Canal 11 area on the outskirts of Jalalabad on 28 June is believed to have occurred when a security forces convoy was returning from a school's opening ceremony, again demonstrating how security forces are being selected and targeted for IED attacks in the province. Following, an incident in the last reporting period, there were a further two IED incidents within the grounds of an educational establishment in Zone #2 of Jalalabad City, neither of which caused casualties and which may be



linked to facilities within the campus having political patronage.

Other incidents of note included the accidental detonation of several tons of munitions collected under the DIAG process at an arms store in Behsud on 22 June. Two people died in the explosion, and about twenty others from nearby residential areas were injured. Another accidental explosion occurred on the edge of Jalalabad City close to FOB Fenty on the evening of 24 June, when a fire being used to cook a meal spread to the trailer of a fuel tanker, killing at least one person and injuring a nearby ANP officer in the resultant explosion.

KUNAR


During this period, five incidents out of approximately 40 reported in the province resulted in casualties. In each of those five cases, the casualties caused were civilians. In two instances, on 16 and 20 June, IMF artillery fire directed at AOG in Mano Gai landed in or close to residential areas, killing a combined total of four people and injuring at least 11. Mano Gai continues to be the district that experiences more AOG activity

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Indirect fire – particularly around Sirkanay
- Abduction
- Security Force-AOG clashes

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	7
This Report Period	0

than any other in Kunar, but as reported previously, during the summer months activity in other areas increases, and Mano Gai accounts for a lower proportion of activity than earlier in the year. As usual the majority of activity in the district during this period was short duration direct fire attacks against security forces, none of which caused any casualties. An attempt to use mortars against an IMF position near the village of Wardish on 20 June failed when all three rounds fired missed their target, again illustrating the hazard posed by indirect fire in the province. Mortars and rockets were used in six other districts across



the province, on occasions in salvos of 5-10 rounds, but inflicting casualties only once, when a woman living close to Bar Kunar DAC was injured by a mortar round that landed close to her home on the afternoon of 23 June. There has been no significant use of IEDs in Kunar during this period and the risk of indirect fire collateral damage continues to be one of the most significant hazards for those living and working in the province.

NURISTAN


Despite limited reporting from Nuristan, AOG activity in the west of the province again illus-

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Abduction
- AOG-Security Force Clashes
- AOG prevalence across the province

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	0
This Report Period	0

trates AOG prevalence across the province. An IED detonation in Nurgaram on the afternoon of 25 June injured several members of an IMF patrol and further illustrates AOG presence on routes south into Laghman.



URUZGAN

Security incidents in Uruzgan again remain largely confined to the capital Tirin Kot, where both IMF and ANSF have the largest presence. AOG attacks, whether ambushes or IEDs, are almost


KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- AOG opposition to NGO operations
- IEDs

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	2
This Report Period	0

exclusively directed at either IMF or ANSF. There have been three incidences in the past three months where civilian vehicles, in one instance an IO car, have been struck by IEDs, which have left one local national dead and two wounded.

The last reporting period confirms the trend with two IED attacks against IMF/ANSF and a third



ambush of the security forces by AOG. (Two of the three incidents occurred in the Chinarto area of the capital).

KANDAHAR

As is typical, a phone threat was issued to a local staff member of an IO in Kandahar City during the reporting period. The staff member was warned to stop working with the organization or suffer grave consequences. Coincidentally, a night letter authored by the dominant AOG in the SR circulated, notifying all people in the city to avoid being deceived by any false warnings from groups that falsely operate under the name of the AOG. The letter went so far as to list specific phone numbers that would be used to provide verbal warnings when the legitimate AOG sought to threaten victims. Taking the letter at its word, the above-stated phone threat to an IO staff,


KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Roadside IED's
- Collateral damage from AOG-ANP clashes
- BBIED/SVBIED attacks

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	4
This Report Period	0

probably like many, was given out of personal enmity.

The escalating level of IEDs, SBBIEDs, and VBIEDs continued to persist during the reporting period. On 22 June, a BBIED attacker on a motorbike targeted an ANA foot patrol in Zhari District, Sanzari Bazaar area. The affected ANA team had just left their vehicles to inspect a culvert for any suspected IEDs when the incident occurred. 2 ANA soldiers were killed, 5 were wounded and 2 female passers-by were wounded. With that in mind, NDS announced the apprehension of another BBIED attacker who was loitering around the Provincial Council Chamber during the reporting period. Another VBIED threat has been recently received in the city: a suicide attacker who has rigged a motorbike as a VBIED is reportedly planning to attack any perceived valu-



able convoy or asset in either District 1 or 4 of Kandahar City.

Another sign of AOG capacity is their constant use of close range attacks, rockets, and IEDs against ANSF/IMF convoys and establishments within or in the vicinity of the city limits. There were more than 20 IED related incidents solely in the city during the reporting period. As usual, most of these devices missed their targets and caused casualties to civilians, rather than ANSF/IMF forces. As previously advised, NGOs should consider minimising their trips to likely AOG-targeted venues, including IO facilities. Additionally, NGO's should consider these to be existent threats because of past AOG successful attacks on GoA facilities during multi-agency meetings, which will serve as exemplars of AOG modus operandi.

GHAZNI

As previously seen, AOGs continue to concentrate their efforts mostly on the following two districts: Gelan and Qarabagh. Reporting suggest that 35 AOG members have recently deployed to Qarabagh, disguised as ANP or ANA, with the intent to undertake suicide attacks against IMF.


KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Continued targeting of ANP/Civil sector elements
- Roadside IED threat and convoy

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	2
This Report Period	0

And while it is not certain, it is possible that the recent SVBIED strike against an IMF patrol in Ghazni City, Ashraf Qala area, could be attributed to the aforementioned threat. (The attack was apparently unsuccessful due to the a premature detonation that killed two civilians).

In addition, the persistent threat of IEDs and small-scale clashes resulted in multiple strikes against ANSF, IMF, and PSC convoys.



Without doubt, these consistent AOG attacks seek to degrade support for and the effectiveness of both local ANSF and IMF. Therefore, NGOs should expect more instability due to an extreme influx of AOG into the province.

HELMAND

The last reporting period has been marked by the large IMF airborne operation in Nad Ali to directly confront AOG ahead of the August election and to clear the Lui Mandey Wadi crossing, Nahr-e-Burgha, and the Shamalan Canal. The IMF operation has been met with an increase in the number of IEDs and incidences of harassing SAF to limit their advance in the district. And it has been reported that in many incidences AOG actively confronted IMF in extended, well coordinated engagements.

The events in Nad Ali seem to have had very little effect on the number of security incidents


KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Significant AOG threat
- Roadside IEDs
- Collateral damage from clashes

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	1
This Report Period	0

across the rest of the province, however, with Nahri Sarraj, Lashkar Gah, and to a lesser extent Garmser, all witnessing a rise in the number of standoff and close range attacks. The ability to both confront IMF in Nad Ali as well as maintain existing operations throughout the province is testament to the current AOG strength. In Sangan, anecdotal reports, supported by recent attacks on the DAC, suggest that AOG are concentrating forces in the area and are intent on targeting the ANA.

Of continuing concern is the number of IED attacks resulting in civilian casualties. In the last month, there have been four incidents that have killed eight local nationals and wounded a further six – all of them on the district roads leaving Lashkar Gah.



Separately, eight ANP were killed at an ANP checkpoint, allegedly by one of their colleagues while they slept in the Pir Sabz area of Lashkar Gah. (The victims may have been poisoned and killed while sedated). The incident is a reminder of AOG infiltration of the ANP and the vulnerability of ANSF checkpoints in the region.

The last quarter has seen an almost 45 percent increase in the number of AOG initiated attacks across Helmand compared to the same period in 2008, with the largest increase in close range attacks on ANSF and IMF convoys and patrols. Lashkar Gah, Nahri Sarraj, and Nawa-I-barak Zayi have compromised almost 75 percent of the total attacks.


ZABUL

The anti-narcotics campaign that had reportedly commenced in the districts of Shari Sufa, Mizan and Arghandab in the past reporting period ended during this reporting period. The campaign continued for two weeks, with an unknown amount of poppy cultivated lands reported as destroyed. Local information contradicts with the allegations made by ANP that they have destroyed all poppy lands in the aforementioned dis-

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	0
This Report Period	0

tricts, however; the report says that only those poppy lands that the ANP have had easy access to and lie close to DACs were destroyed.

As well, IED strikes and recoveries continued to occur throughout the province at a very large scale. These recent IED incidents confirm the previously reported belief that all the routes that connect Qalat City with its neighbouring districts are plagued with IEDs. Due to AOGs' poor capacity to employ IEDs, though, civilians continued to bear the brunt of



casualties. On June 20, a civilian vehicle ran over a roadside IED and it exploded; 8 occupants of the vehicle were killed and an additional 13 were wounded. As is now typical, civilians keep incurring casualties from both sides—IMF and AOG—despite the latter group's repeated emphatic statements that they would put all their efforts into avoiding civilian casualties.

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Roadside IED's
- Attacks on ANP

NIMROZ

The threat of AOG activity has been harshly developing specifically in the district of Khash Rod, with this reporting period receiving numerous threats of significant AOG migrations. The specific threats outlined that as many as 225 AOG members, including 2 suicide attackers, have deployed and are planning to conduct ac-


KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Suicide attacks in Zaranj and Khash Rod
- Missile Attack

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	1
This Report Period	0

tivities in the region. These threats can be credible, as Khash Rod District has seen a number of significant incidents compared to other districts in the province. Key incidents during the reporting period included the firing of 13 rockets against various GoA facilities, attacks that reportedly caused no casualties.

And in keeping with the trend of targeting the field of education, an elementary school's furniture was set ablaze. Additionally, ANP HQ was attacked, leading to an hour



clash that saw Auxiliary ANP deploy to counter the assault.

Lastly, in light of the reported migration of an AOG into Khash Rod District, NGOs are advised to consider cessation of all aid activities until the security situation stabilizes.

BADGHIS


Badghis remains beleaguered by the ongoing armed conflict in the eastern districts of Murghab and Ghormach, making them extremely dangerous areas for NGO activity. The cycle of IMF operations and AOG reprisals has continued in this area unabated. In Murghab, an IMF patrol in one instance, and in another a joint

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- AOG activity in eastern districts
- IEDs
- Ambushes

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	1
This Report Period	0

ANSE/IMF patrol, came under combined SAF and RPG fire from AOGs. IMF were also targeted with a roadside IED in Murghab. Although the western half of Badghis has been consistently more stable, it too is not without issues. ANP had an armed clash with an AOG in the vicinity of Qala-i-Naw and western districts have occasionally been subject to intimidation and ACG activity. Activity of this sort suggests that NGOs working in Badghis maintain a low profile



and mind local acceptance practices. NGO staff should additionally be sanitised of information identifying them as NGO employees and thus exposing them to an increased risk of extortion, intimidation, or detention.

NOTICE: Your input is invaluable for the production of this report. While we appreciate information on incidents, we also need general information on the security situation in your area. So please remember to call or email us regularly.

Contact details of ANSO staff are provide on the last page.

ANSO: “..by NGOs for NGOs..”

GHOR

Two NGO incidents marked the last reporting period in Ghor. On 21 June, an NGO office in the Sangani area of Pasaband District was set alight; the NGO is believed to have had its administration and filing system specifically targeted (other equipment and offices were left relatively untouched), with the nature of the


KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Banditry
- AOG freedom of movement

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	5
This Report Period	2

incident suggesting some form of dispute with beneficiaries.

The second incident involved an armed robbery along the Herat City - Chegcharan City Road in the Bara Khana Village Area of Chegcharan District. A motorbike two NGO workers were using, as well as cash and mobile phones, was stolen by two armed individuals. Reported ACG incidents across the province have more than quadrupled for the year to date in comparison to 2008,



with Shahrak comprising a quarter of all incidents for the province. Banditry remains a distinct concern; however the robberies, in virtually all cases, only resulted in the theft of valuables rather than harm to the victims.

HERAT

On 18 June, a local national working for an INGO was shot and killed in what was believed to be a personal dispute in the Karte Amin area of Herat City. Personal disputes, often deriving from family or business disputes have had the unfortunate propensity to


KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Growing security vacuum in Zinda Jan
- Increased AOG activity surrounding Herat City

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	11
This Report Period	1

manifest themselves into overt hostilities often with little or no warning. NGO senior staff are advised to inform their staff of the need to report any threat, whether concerning a personal or organisational threat.

For the year to date there has been an almost tripling of the number of IED and weapons cache finds across the province, suggesting both the efficacy of the ANP in discovering the devices and munitions as well as the in-



creasing use of IEDs as an AOG tactic. Herat City has been host to the largest share of the discoveries with slightly more than a third of the reported 112 recoveries, which should come as no surprise considering the concentration of ANSF and IMF.

STAFFING ANNOUNCEMENT:

ANSO is in search of a few good NGO workers. If you have NGO experience, an analytical background, and the desire to be challenged, all while being part of a close-knit team, pass your CV to operations@afgnso.org and reference the international positions of either Mobile or West RSA.



ANSO is hosted by
[Deutsche Welthungerhilfe](#)

To Register with ANSO
contact:
operations2@afgnso.org

ANSO is managed by an NGO
Board. If you have any
feedback, good or bad, let
them know on:
ansoab@yahoo.com

ANSO ACRONYMS

IMF-International Military Forces / **AOG**-Armed Opposition Groups / **GOA**-Government of Afghanistan / **ACG**-Armed Criminal Groups / **ANA**-Afghan National Army / **ANP**-Afghan National Police / **IED**-Improvised Exploding Device / **AEF**-Afghan Eradication Forces / **RPG**-Rocket Propelled Grenade / **IDF**-Indirect Fire (ex: mortars) / **VBIED**-Vehicle Borne Improvised Exploding Device / **PRP**-Previous Reporting Period / **ANBP**-Afghan National Border Police / **SAF**-Small Arms Fire / **NDS**-National Directorate of Security (intelligence) / **PSC**-Private Security Company / **DC**-District Centre

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MISSING

This report ANSO could not provide analysis for the provinces of:

- Panjshir
- Samangan
- Sari Pul
- Paktika
- Farah

This is because we do not know enough about the area to comment on the significance of the incidents occurring there.

If you can help us understand the province better, please contact us.

TRAINING ANNOUNCEMENT:

Please note that ANSO will be conducting free 1-Day Basic Guard Training for NGOs in Jalalabad during the month of July, starting on 19 July 2009. (The course will be conducted in the local language).

Preference will be given to NGOs who have not yet received guard training from ANSO, and registration will be closed as of 17 July.

If you would like the ANSO Trainer to conduct this course at your office for your guards, then please contact Wali Haqdot at operations2@afgnso.org.