

THE ANSO REPORT

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YOU NEED TO KNOW

- Electoral violence persists
- Conflict levels intensify with AOG reliance on close-range attacks
- Newly-issued Taliban Code of Conduct seeks to protect civilians and captives while submitting all AOGs to central control under Mullah Omar

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COUNTRY SUMMARY

Electoral related violence persisted writ-large and is expected to continue past the election. During the period, we witnessed an RPG attack, attempted assassination, multiple instances of intimidation, and attempts to locate election staff for abduction—all in relation to the country-wide electoral process. One growing area of concern for electoral security is now Kapisa, with AOG reportedly making efforts to target the process there (see page 2). There is also increased reporting of a possible “spectacular” attack against undefined target(s) in Kabul ahead of the election.

AOG offensive actions are increasing persistently in Wardak, Herat, Paktya, and Paktika. Increased AOG activity and an extended IMF/ANSF joint operation in Kunduz District are raising serious security concerns in Kunduz and surrounding provinces. In the south, Kandahar and Helmand appear to have hit a ‘saturation point’ in terms of AOG activity, but high IMF casualties continue to be reported.

Lastly, data show that AOG are reliant on conducting close-range assaults on targets in all regions, with the South being the only region

to experience an even split between this method and IEDs during this period.

Recent press headlines are touting the reported new issuance of the Taliban Code of Conduct. Preliminary information indicates that the document may be an attempt to influence international and domestic audiences, with particular emphasis set upon minimizing civilian casualties, protecting prisoners from execution, and establishing Mullah Omar’s dominance over the disparate group of AOG that claim to be Taliban.

NGO DATA & TRENDS

NGO incidents and casualty rates in July were the highest of 2009, with 23 NGO incidents reported, including 5 NGO staff killed and 5 more injured. 75% of NGO incidents in July were attributed to AOG. 15 NGO staff have been killed so far in 2009.

During this reporting period, 9 NGO incidents were reported, primarily in the Northern and Eastern regions. Incidents appeared to be both targeted and the result of unfortunate circumstances. In the case of the former, an NGO vehicle was ambushed in Balkh Province, with one staff member being executed and the other being seriously wounded.

Khost also did not escape the spate of incidents, with another clinic being set ablaze and an NGO ambulance being stolen in separate incidents. (Past arsons of clinics in Khost were attributed to the Haqqani Network).

Most NGO incidents, however, resulted from the general violence that occurs during an armed conflict. Thus, errant NGO rounds struck an NGO compound in Kunduz City; IEDs caused injuries and a fatality for NGO staff in Takhar and Samangan; and an NGO staff member was kidnapped in Samangan. Additionally, an NGO staff member was shot dead in Jalalabad City after a personal dispute, and another NGO employee in Badghis was shot several times when he resisted AOG demands that he provide them with transit, and he remains under medical observation.

KABUL

Although Kabul remains relatively quiet in terms of AOG-related incidents, there has been a noticeable increase in the amount of threat traffic being reported. Although expected, considering the upcoming elections and the propaganda victory that could be garnered from a spectacular AOG attack on the national capital, NGO staff should seek to avoid GoA buildings, election-related facilities, as well as organisations


KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Complex attacks against high-profile targets
- Armed Criminal Groups
- Abductions

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	8
This Report Period	0

assisting in the electoral process, which includes IO compounds. The most likely form of an AOG initiated attack will be a complex attack on a high profile target, one that is most likely involved in the electoral process. In addition, reporting indicates that the threat of kidnapping in the capital remains elevated. It is understood that AOG/ACG would intend to use both international as well as national NGO staff members as bargaining chips in any subsequent negotiations, or to simply distract attention from the elections and discredit the government.

Despite the calm, there remains an undercurrent of activity which



is difficult to differentiate between AOG and ACG origin. Two IED detonations have been reported in Districts 5 and 11, with a further device being also discovered in District 5. Three rockets also impact in the Qalai Abdul Rawof Area of District 9 on 24 July. In all instances there were no reported casualties.

NGOs are reminded to ensure that all SOPs are up-to-date prior to the election in case of a rapidly evolving security situation or in the instance of large scale civil disturbances.

KAPISA

Several incidents in the west of the province, where traditionally NGOs conduct operations unhindered by security concerns, have raised the possibility that there may be an increase in AOG-initiated incidents ahead of the election. In particular, three alleged suicide bombers were arrested in Mahmudi Raqi on 25 July. Unconfirmed reports suggest that the cell was intending to attack official election targets in


KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- AOG-ANSF clashes, especially in Tagab and Nijrab
- Electoral related violence
- Rocket, IED and mine attacks

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	2
This Report Period	0

the provincial capital. In addition to the latest arrests, AOG public statements in both Kapisa and Parwan concerning the election have resulted in a confused picture of any likely electoral violence due to their contradictory nature. NGO are reminded to avoid all official election sites and campaigning offices and residences in the weeks ahead.

Of further concern in Kapisa is an attack on an ANP vehicle on 29 July in Hisa-i-Awali Kohistan. Traditionally Mahmudi Raqi as well as Kohistan I and II have been isolated from AOG activities which have become increasingly prevalent in Tagab, Nijrab and Alasay. NGOs should maintain a



higher degree of awareness in the coming weeks as the arrests in Mahmudi Raqi and the attack on the ANP in Hisa-i-Awali Kohistan are unlikely to be isolated incidents.

In the east of the province, AOG initiated attacks continue against primarily ANSF targets, which include DACs, checkpoints, and convoys. Collateral exposure to attacks on ANSF and IMF remain a distinct concern in the east and NGO should avoid both government buildings and ANSF and IMF convoys.

PARWAN


Parwan experiences periodic AOG activity; however, the vast majority of the few recorded incidents are confined to the districts of Bagram, Ghorband, Kohi Safi and Sheikh Ali. These incidents typically assume the form of IED,

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- AOG-ANSF clashes, especially near Bagram Airbase
- NGO-targeted criminal abduction
- IEDs in the Ghorband Valley

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	1
This Report Period	0

rocket and RPG attacks targeting security forces. In the capital Chaharikar, an attack on an ANP checkpoint on 23 July and an IED attack on an ANP vehicle on 28 July are most likely linked to inter-factional feuding rather than AOG attacks. In both incidents, no casualties were reported. The two events follow a trend of random attacks on ANP checkpoints and convoys in the districts, one which has not yet translated into fatalities.



The main road through Parwan to Bamyan has been an expressed concern for NGOs following a direct attack on an IO convoy in June; however, since then there have been no recorded IED attacks against civilian vehicles in the province. NGOs are advised to maintain vigilance along the road, especially through the Ghorband Valley area.

DAYKUNDI


The districts of Kajran and Gizab remain a concern following the large scale offensives in Helmand. Although yet to threaten Nili, a number of incidents in the south of the province have served to

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- High AOG infiltration into Kiti, Gizrab, and Kajran
- Low security presence
- Clashes between AOG and locals, especially in the south

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	1
This Report Period	0

underline the growing number and strength of AOG in the area. On 16 July, AOG established a checkpoint in the Tamazan Valley of Gizab, which is located only thirty kilometres from Nili. AOG manning the checkpoint were believed to be looking for GoA and election officials, most likely with the intent to kidnap. In Kajran, three separate attacks on ANSF on 19, 20 and 24 July, involving two attacks on the DAC, and one against an ANP convoy, illustrate



the relative freedom of AOG movement in the south.

It is most likely that the level and frequency of AOG initiated violence will increase in the weeks prior to the election. Standoff attacks on Nili should also not be discounted due to the proximity of AOG to the capital.

NOTICE: Your input is invaluable for the production of this report. While we appreciate information on incidents, we also need general information on the security situation in your area. So please remember to call or email us regularly.

Contact details of ANSO staff are provided on the last page.

ANSO: “..by NGOs for NGOs..”

LOGAR


The security situation in Logar Province has not changed significantly since the last reporting period. The majority of incidents are comprised of stand off attacks on DACs and ANSF checkpoints, as well as roadside IEDs and ambushes on ANSF/IMF convoys along the Puli Alam-Kabul highway. A further discernible trend in recent weeks has been the level

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Abduction
- Electoral-related violence
- AOG-ANSF clashes

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	2
This Report Period	0

of electoral related intimidation threats against election workers and candidates. The effect of these threats has ensured that virtually all districts have failed to fill official election posts – mainly those administering the election itself. Although it is too early to speculate whether the posts across the province will be filled in time for the election, the ability of AOG to intimidate those intending to apply for election posts and earlier reported instances of general threats against the voting public could significantly disrupt



the organisation, as well as turnout, for the upcoming elections.

Logar province maintains a strategically important location in the central region. Anti-government elements are using some of its districts as a logistics base to conduct operations in neighbouring provinces. The districts of concern in this province are Baraki Barak, Charkh, Khushi and Muhammad Agha.

WARDAK

Wardak continues to experience a rise in the number of AOG initiated incidents in all areas except the traditionally tranquil districts of Bihsud I and II. Although the vast majority of incidents are directed against IMF and ANSF targets – specifically along the Kabul to Ghazni highway – the risk to NGO operations remains significant.

A number of recent incidents suggest that AOG are moving beyond their traditional tactics in an


KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Abduction
- Collateral damage from rockets and IEDs
- Intimidation efforts

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	2
This Report Period	0

effort to exert a further degree of control over the local population. Two events in particular illustrate the point. On 19 July in Chaki Wardak, five local elders were abducted, and on 25 July in the same district, AOG reportedly publicly hanged a man who was accused of a number of recent abductions. The body was left hanging for three days following threats by AOG not to remove it and is the first recorded public execution in the province this year. Separately, in Jaghatu, Saydabad and again in Chaki Wardak, AOG, it has been reported, have warned locals to not to participate in the election process.

AOG attacks on DACs across the east and south of the province can



only be described as a concerted campaign to undermine the ANSF and GoA. In the last reporting period, five further attacks on DACs were reported. Typically, the attacks involved a mixture of small and heavy weapons fire and occur during the night hours. The effects of the attacks have virtually ensured a bunker mentality within the ANSF in the district centres, with freedom of movement being severely curtailed. The DACs of Day Mirdad, Jaghatu, Nirkh and Chaki Wardak are the most affected. The number of attacks on DACs, as well as electoral associated violence, is expected to continue over the following month.

Please note:

Graphs in this report are current as of 29 July 2009.

PANJSHIR

Traditionally, Panjshir has remained immune from AOG initiated incidents; however, on 22 July a RCIED struck an IMF patrol in Khenj District, leaving no

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	0
This Report Period	0

casualties or significant damage to the vehicle. Two days following the incident, eleven local suspects were arrested in relation to the

attack in Marz Area, where the initial attack took place. In light of the fact that the suspects were believed to be local, it could be presumed that the attack may have been the result of a grievance, rather than an AOG initiated incident.

BAMYAN

Most of Bamyan remains quiet and appears wholly amenable to NGO operations. Anecdotal reporting suggests an increase in AOG activity—particularly IED—in the northeast districts of Kahmard and Shibar. Also, the


KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Increasing threat of IEDs/mines
- Armed robbery along roadways

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	0
This Report Period	0

area itself is reported to have little or no security presence, nor medical facilities, in the event of the need for such services.

On 26 July, an ANP check post came under small arms fire in Kahmard Area, with no casualties being reported. AOG incidents in the northeast of the province tend to be more related to anti-government sentiment and dis-




putes over resources, rather than established groups with a national agenda. While Bamyan is mostly a safe district for NGOs, caution should be exercised in and around the Ghandak Valley in the northeast.

KUNDUZ

An INGO found itself affected by an airstrike that occurred near Kunduz City, targeting AOGs but being widely reported to have killed civilians. The INGO was affected when stray rounds landed in its camp while AOG conducted a raid on a nearby ANA camp near Khanabad. The centrepiece of an extremely busy reporting period for Kunduz, however, has been an extended IMF/ANSF joint operation which took place east, north, and west of Kunduz City, extending as far as the habitually problematic district of Chahar Darra. Overall, the military operation showed how the

	NGO Incidents
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This Report Period	1

true nature and extent of AOG capabilities may not be revealed until IMF/ANSF increase their presence and hence their exposure to them. Increased AOG activity in Kunduz (which both precipitated the operation and came about in response to it) included complex attacks in Chahar Darra and Aliabad and an AOG successfully severing the power lines supplying electricity to Kunduz. AOGs presence was additionally felt in the establishment of checkpoints both between Khanabad and Kunduz and on the Kunduz – Puli Khumri road south of Aliabad. The IMF/ANSF operation reportedly focused a lot of attention on securing the Kunduz – Khanabad road; nevertheless, reports of new checkpoints in the area continue to surface. Whatever the result of these recent en-



deavours, they are likely to end in bolstered AOG sentiment and possibly heightened AOG activity. As a result, NGOs should avoid unnecessary travel within and through Kunduz District in the near term. The situation is more complicated for organisations based in and operating in Kunduz, with their range highly dependent on local contacts and acceptance levels. In another instance showing the extent of AOG presence in Kunduz, a few AOG members requested entrance to an NGO-run facility and requisitioned a motorbike for their use. Although the encounter reportedly did not entail large amounts of tension, it does demonstrate the confidence and acceptance of local AOGs.

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Military operations
- Widespread AOG presence
- AOG-ANSF clashes

BALKH


An ambush on an NGO vehicle driving between Sholgara and Mazar city resulted in the execution of one staff member and serious injury to the vehicle's other occupant. The attack seems to have been targeted at the organisation, because the attackers did not steal anything from the vehicle. Moreover, the same organisation suffered a complex attack about a week before for what seemed to be reasons collateral to local political disputes. The lack of reporting around the incident means that questions about the rationale

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	6
This Report Period	1

for the NGO's targeting may remain unanswered, but there are still some pieces of information that are relevant to NGOs' SOPs. The first is that the attack occurred at dusk (1900 hrs.) when it would have been easier for AOG members to take cover, and it also happened along the main Mazar – Sholgara Road, which the NGO vehicle might have been predictably following. Even though it sometimes means lengthier detours and uncomfortable roads, varying routes is extremely important for wrong-footing AOGs or ACGs that, for whatever reasons, may be seeking to target an NGO vehicle. Elsewhere in Balkh, AOG activity is still apparent in the west of the province, apparently focusing on targeting GoA.

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Targeting of GoA, IMF, ANSF
- IEDs
- Ambushes



In once instance, an AOG set up a checkpoint along the main road between Balkh and Aqcha with the stated aim of trying to find GoA officials and those related to the elections campaign. Because this checkpoint occurred late at night, they found none of their intended targets; however, they did succeed in waylaying a number of truckers and demonstrating that they were incapable of mustering such a show in the daylight hours. They were quickly dispersed by ANP but, taken together with the ambush, reinforce the dangers of travelling at night.

TAKHAR


An INGO incident in the western district of Baharak, bordering Kunduz, highlighted the risks facing NGOs working in this relatively stable province. An RCIED detonated along the road between Taluqan and Baharak, apparently targeting a marked INGO vehicle, killing one occupant and injuring three more. While the perpetrators have not been identified, the use of an IED is typical of AOGs indigenous to Kunduz, rather than Takhar; indeed the only two

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	4
This Report Period	1

other incidents in Takhar during this period involved attacks on ANP checkpoints. Kunduz-based AOGs, however, rarely target NGOs with IEDs, and one such recent case where they have (north of Kunduz on the road to Sher Khan Bandar) seems to have been a case of mistaken identity. Assuming that this is a Kunduz-based group that was continuing to choose targets consistently, the most reasonable explanation for the INGO's targeting would be identification with IMF. Targeting rationale aside, a decision regarding the organisation's profile and the management thereof and adherence to SOPs could also

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- IEDs in the west of the province
- Attacks on ANP checkpoints
- Criminal activity



have played decisive roles in averting this kind of incident. This particular RCIED strike is also indicative of the highly diffuse and localised character of threats facing NGOs throughout the Northern Region. A similar incident that occurred on the same day (see Samangan) superficially appeared to have much in common with this event, but in reality had only the broadest linkages to the Takhar incident.

BAGHLAN


Activity in Baghlan continues to focus on the Baghlani Jadid corridor with occasional disturbances continuing in remote areas. Most notably, an attack occurred on an

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Political struggles
- Targeted attacks on IMF/ANSF
- AOG-ANSF clashes

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	1
This Report Period	0

ANP checkpoint in Khinjan, a normally very quiet district. The area surrounding Baghlani Jadid is also sensitive, in that local AOG activity is heavily tied to that experienced by Kunduz and has itself been the scene of ANSF/IMF operations that have led to prolonged exchanges of fire. Both Baghlani Jadid and Dahanai Ghor are expected to see an up-



surge in AOG activity in the coming weeks due to political events surrounding the election.

SAMANGAN


Recent activity in Samangan is almost entirely based on ongoing political struggles, which express themselves in occasional emplacement of IEDs or small-scale rocket or grenade attacks. Two NGO-related incidents occurred during this reporting cycle: an NGO vehicle was struck by an RCIED driving between the two most important towns in the province, Darrai Suf and Aybak; and a local employee of an NGO was kidnapped. The attack, which targeted an unmarked but high-profile vehicle (white Toyota Landcruiser), injured the two occupants and was likely intended to vindicate a political narrative or embarrass other authorities. In

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Political conflicts
- Criminal activity

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	2
This Report Period	2

terms of intent, this makes the NGO's involvement collateral, but it points out risks that confront NGOs working in environments of political tension (as opposed to the other AOG vs. GoA dynamic). In such instances, the success of NGOs' acceptance strategies can pose its own problems in that it might serve to increase their value as political targets even while it deters AOGs. NGOs' responses are relatively constrained, but they can still mitigate exposure to risk by utilising low-profile transportation and setting clear thresholds for local involvement. Even though the Samangan incident occurred on the same day as the Takhar RCIED, it is important to emphasise the difference between them, with the Samangan incident being tied into a local struggle for posi-



tion with the GoA and the Takhar incident likely being related to increasing anti-GoA activity. The abduction in Samangan involved a national member of an INGO's staff who was heavily involved in local politics, and it is believed that this involvement most directly precipitated her abduction. This incident points to another way in which NGOs can be collaterally involved in political activity (in the event, the abductee was released unharmed with no discernable effects on the NGO's image or operations). Intelligent, qualified, and politically connected national staff have advantages in terms of the skills and opportunities they bring to the organisation but conversely also expose the organisation to risks associated with political entanglements.

ANNOUNCEMENT:

Please see page 15 for employment and training opportunities with ANSO.

HERAT


Much of the Herat countryside remains exposed to high levels of AOG and ACG activity, with robberies, attacks on ANSF, and kidnapping still commonplace. Two areas of particular concern remain Chisti Sharif and Karokh/Koshki

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Crime
- AOG activity on the Ghor Road
- AOG activity on the Qal'ai Naw Road

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	13
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Kuhna districts. Few incidents have been recorded in the last few weeks in the latter area along the road from Herat to Qal'ai Naw, apparently because of reduced exposure with NGOs and other organizations greatly reducing their travel along that route. In Chisti Sharif, a standoff between two AOG groups (reported in the last bi-weekly) is unabated, centering on the area of Darrai Takht. The AOGs have set up frequent checkpoints and closed the road to Ghor at irregular intervals,



meaning that this road is still generally not a viable option for NGO movement. Elsewhere in Herat, ambushes targeting IMF along the road from Herat to Turghundi are an apparent demonstration of increased AOG range and capability.

BADGHIS


An NGO employee en route from the Northern Region to the West was forcibly stopped near Qal'ai Naw and forced to return to Murghab and give the AOG members a ride. Upon resisting, the man was shot several times and is currently receiving medical treatment for his injuries. Al-

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Instability in eastern districts
- Criminal activity
- Ongoing military operations

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	2
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though the individual's NGO was not implicated in his capture (nor did the AOG at any point become aware of his employment status), the incident shows the danger of collateral involvement, because the employee did choose to travel through unstable areas; it also reaffirms that individuals caught in a situation where armed individuals are making demands should accede to them to minimize the potential for violent reaction.



Additionally, clashes continue in the eastern districts of Murghab and Ghormach. Furthermore, one instance of an IMF airstrike that seems to have mostly hit its target, killing AOG members, has since been capitalized on by AOGs as the scene of civilian casualties.

LAGHMAN

Laghman continues to be a relatively quiet province with only four AOG related incidents. Unusually, there were no IED incidents reported this period. Of concern to NGOs was an attack on a fuel tanker on the Kabul-Jalalabad Highway similar to the


KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Continuing IED threat near DACs

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	1
This Report Period	0

attacks that were common last year. There is now doubt about the exact nature of this event as it could have been part of a fuel theft, rather than an AOG attack. Still, the Kabul-Jalalabad Highway is considerably more secure than during this time last year.

The major election related event in the province was the attempted assassination of the provincial



organizer of the Abdullah Abdullah campaign in Dawlat Shah District. The direct fire ambush has been attributed to AOG and came on the same day as a RPG attack on his campaign in Nangarhar Province.

NANGARHAR

In Jalalabad City on 18 July, an off-duty INGO driver and his son were assaulted, with the driver being shot dead in an apparent non-work related dispute.

Nangarhar saw a number of significant incidents/ trends this period. There are reports that AOG are short of funds in Nangarhar and plan to rob from or target NGOs for kidnap to generate cash. If true, this would increase the risk to international and local technical staff of NGOs working in the districts and caution is advised. International and senior

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Kidnap
- AOG attacks on JAF and GoA facilities
- Increased AOG numbers in the western districts


	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	7
This Report Period	1

local staff should not over night in the district offices if possible.

Important events for NGO operations were battles in Achin and Nazyan Districts between AOG and locals. The locals appear to be in conflict with AOG and are trying to expel them, which could lead to higher levels of violence and perhaps eventually to the migration of AOG from the area.

The western districts of Sherzad, Khogyani, and Pachir-Wagam continue to be the centre of AOG activity in Nangarhar. Attacks on IMF are common and a school that was designated as a polling station in Sherzad was destroyed with explosives. International NGO staff are advised to avoid the western districts.

AOG attempted a complex attack involving a VBIED and BBIED on the entrance to the Jalalabad



Airfield. The attack failed due to alert local security forces and posed only a minimal threat to NGOs. AOG seem set on attacking IMF, and there does not appear to be a specific threat to NGOs in the city. Caution is still urged and very low profile travel for all staff is advised.

Election campaigning has, with the exception of a RPG attack on an Abdullah Abdullah function in Dari-Noor, gone on without any serious security incidents. All local NGO staff questioned believe voters will not be targeted and none anticipate public disorder associated with the election. Violence targeted at specific campaigns, regardless, is likely to increase.

KUNAR


Kunar remains the most volatile of the eastern provinces with 59 AOG initiated incidents this period—25 of them occurring in Manogai District. Most incidents are direct action and indirect fire attacks against security force in-

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- AOG operations on Jalalabad-Asadabad Hwy in Narang Dist.
- AOG Indirect fire

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	6
This Report Period	0

stallations and convoys. IEDs continue to be rare in the province. Kunar remains the sight of most indirect fire in the region. The Jalalabad-Asadabad Highway and Asadabad District remain relatively secure. NGOs are advised to avoid Manogai, Wata Pur, and Ghaziabad districts and to limit international staff to Asadabad City.



In the only election-related violence reported, a primary school in Marawara District that had been designated as a polling station was damaged by an IED.

ANNOUNCEMENT:

In the coming months, ANSO will be providing inputs for an incident mapping service to aid NGO management and security procedures. Registrants will receive further information as it becomes available.

NURISTAN


Reporting from Nuristan remains infrequent. IMF combat operations continued this period after the short lived AOG capture of

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Increased military operations
- Large numbers of AOG at large

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	1
This Report Period	0

the Bargi Matal District Centre. Bargi Matal continues to be hit with sporadic fire, and one INGO has withdrawn its staff from the area. There continue to be large numbers of AOG at large in the eastern districts and NGOs can expect more combat.



PAKTYA

The security situation in Paktya continues to deteriorate. The capital area is particularly volatile with twelve of seventeen AOG initiated incidents this period occurring in Gardez District. Zurmat District had no incidents reported, which is unusual. The major event


KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Complex attacks in Gardez City
- High kidnap and IED threats, especially along the Gardez-Khost Road

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	1
This Report Period	0

this period was a coordinated attack by six AOG disguised as Border Policemen and armed with light weapons and suicide vests on GOA facilities in the city centre. Due to the alertness of local security forces, the attack was largely unsuccessful; however, it did point to the ability of AOG to infiltrate into the city and the problematic availability of security force uniforms.

The Gardez-Khost Road remains very dangerous with kidnapping



and IEDs being common. AOG are conducting operations along the highway in both Khost and Paktya and it has become one of the most dangerous roads in Afghanistan. NGOs are advised to avoid road travel in Gardez.

KHOST


The situation in Khost continues to deteriorate with serious AOG attacks on GOA facilities, IMF, and road construction companies. Two NGO incidents occurred, with an ambulance being stolen in Musa Khel District and a clinic being set ablaze in Qalandar District. The motive for the arson is unknown, but the ambulance is likely to be used for moving contraband or as a VBIED.

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Attacks on NGO facilities
- Kidnapping
- AOG attacks on GoA and IMF

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	9
This Report Period	2

The Khost-Gardez Road may be the most dangerous stretch of highway in the country, with information received that IEDs are so numerous that some police have stopped reporting them up their chain of command. Seventeen IEDs were reported to have been found or detonated across the province during this period. NGOs can expect more complex attacks on GOA installations with a serious risk of collateral damage. Sabari District, in particular, saw a rash of direct attacks on security forces, with most indirect fire attacks occurring in Bak District;



however, indirect fire continues to be highly inaccurate across the region and is far more of a danger to civilians living nearby than the intended targets. In Wuza Zadran District, the third serious attack on road construction companies along the road this summer occurred with three employees killed and 13 abducted. NGOs should limit their activities to Khost City and fly in and out.

HELMAND


The province experienced typical activity, displaying the expansive nature of the conflict. Although activity kept to typical patterns, the lethal nature of IEDs and their effects on IMF came to the

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Roadside IEDs
- AOG-IMF/ANSF clashes
- Significant AOG threat

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	1
This Report Period	0

fore during the period. In sum, at least nine IMF soldiers were killed and ten were wounded as result of IED blasts (one during an attempt to defuse an IED) in the districts of Reg, Nahri Sarraj, Garmser, Nad Ali, and Sangin, according to ANSO records. Reported IMF activity in the province was low during the period; however, IMF detained 20 AOG members and



reportedly killed five others during an operation in Garmser on the 20th.

PAKTIKA

As has been the norm for strife-ridden Paktika, AOG confronted IMF and ANSF, often engaging in lengthy clashes. On 16 July in Urgun District, AOG engaged an IMF convoy for two hours, resulting in two IMF and two AOG dead. AOG engaged ANA, also on the 16th, in Sar Hawza District, resulting in four AOG killed after a two hour clash. Additionally, five ANP and three AOG were killed following a three hour


KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- IEDs
- Abduction
- AOG-IMF/ANSF clashes

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	1
This Report Period	0

siege of the Gomal DAC on 17 July. NGOs should particularly note activity in Sorobi District: on 17 July, AOG targeted an ANP convoy, ending in four AOG and two ANP dead; and on the 18th, a RCIED killed four PSC guards when it detonated against them as they were travelling in the district.

The abovementioned clashes display the persistent nature of the conflict—despite the higher casualties AOG incur when compared to ANSF or IMF, they continue to muster—and it is clear that AOGs wish to effect their will and intimidate the populace; for example, during the reporting pe-



riod, AOG shot dead accused GoA/IMF collaborators in Sar Hawza and Khair Kot. The province also did not escape the typical spate of electoral-related violence: an IED was discovered in a presidential candidate's campaign office in Sharan District on the 29th. Civilians were victimised, additionally, in the province: three, including a child, died in an IED blast in Barmal District on the 17th.

NIMROZ


Information from Nimroz is conspicuously lacking, in part due to the cessation of GoA reporting on country-wide incidents, and due

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Suicide attacks in Zaranj and Khash Rod
- Kidnap
- Prevalent security vacuum

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	1
This Report Period	0

to the overall absence of reporting sources. The few incidents that did reach ANSO's radar suggest that AOG are challenging the GoA's writ, especially in Khash Rod District. Regardless of this lack of information, NGOs should consider the province to be extremely hazardous, even in perceived GoA-controlled areas.



KANDAHAR

Kandahar, province-wide, is devoid of any general semblance of security. While ANSO analyses of AOG, IMF, and ANSF activity in the province usually only highlight specific extraordinary activities, NGOs should note that the state of the conflict in the province is perilous, and there are no areas that can be considered safe havens for blanket-NGO activity—the 18 July killing of two ANP in District 7, Kandahar City, and their subsequent public hanging serves as an exemplar of this void. Additionally, one should recognise that AOG planning and prepara-


KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Roadside IEDs
- AOG-ANP clashes
- BBIED/SVBIED attacks

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	4
This Report Period	0

tions often occur within the actual areas that the activities will take place in the province; in an example of this, ANBP discovered 3100 kg of Aluminium powder and 400 kg of gunpowder for sale in a public market in Spin Boldak District on the 18th (both elements are common additives for IEDs).

Moreover, because of the deleterious instability, civilians are evermore being confronted with the psychological and physical repercussions of established violence that has quietly settled in the south. As is often publicised in the press, some of the civilian casualties during the period were due to IMF and ANSF operations: a total of at least eight civilians were killed in the province,



including a 12 year-old girl that failed to heed IMF warnings to stop in Panjwayi District. AOGs in the south, however, also caused numerous civilian deaths, albeit targeted ones: the corpses of three abductees from Shah Wali Kot were found; and nine civilians, including five children, were killed in an IED detonation in Spin Boldak District. In conclusion, NGOs operating in the province should continue to ensure that exacting security protocols are adhered to for the unforeseeable future, and there is no indication that IMF increases will further assuage concerns over incident levels.

GHAZNI

Just as public media are currently highlighting, civilian casualties are mounting, especially in areas where IMF seek to contest AOG dominance. Despite a reduction in reporting sources, it does not appear that the state of the conflict in Ghazni will take a turn for the better. In an example of the haz-


KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Abduction
- IEDs or ambushes on convoys
- Rocket/RPG attacks

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	2
This Report Period	0

ards that civilians must face during an ongoing conflict, two women and two children died, while six other civilians were wounded, in an apparent AOG attempt to target the Gelan DAC with a rocket—a common occurrence in the South and East.

AOGs in the area also are seeking to minimize civilian casualties, just as in the past, by issuing warnings to residents, possibly also with the desire to intimidate collaborators or those who would seek to chal-



lenge AOG personalities; for example, on 19 July, Andar District residents were warned to stock up on essential items, because IEDs would be emplaced by early to mid-August in light of upcoming elections.

URUZGAN

While reporting from the area has decreased significantly, it appears that Uruzgan is likely to experience further erosion of its security, primarily on the outskirts of the developmental centre of Tirin Kot. Most importantly, IMF and ANSF have recently been inundated with IEDs. This continues to be a critical threat, especially in the area of the Tangi Pass, Mirabad, Garmab, Deh Rafshan, Lan-


KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- IEDs
- AOG opposition to NGOs
- Suicide attacks


	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	2
This Report Period	0

gar, and Charmestan. Further emphasising the IED threat, IMF have recently reported large discoveries of cannibalised rockets that were missing ‘nose cones’—an essential element of well-

designed IEDs. In sum, NGOs operating in the province should consider operations outside of Tirin Kot to be high risk, necessitating extensive liaison and development with parties in these external areas before conducting travel or operations. Reportedly, AOG continue to face resistance from locals in the outlying areas, similarly, because



of the well-known circumspect nature in which residents look upon outsiders. Still, locals possess only so much ability and desire to resist AOG inflows and dominance, and AOG along the western border with Helmand have apparently been challenging locals to some effect.





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ANSO ACRONYMS

IMF-International Military Forces / AOG-Armed Opposition Groups / GOA-Government of Afghanistan / ACG-Armed Criminal Groups / ANA-Afghan National Army / ANP-Afghan National Police / IED-Improvised Exploding Device / AEF-Afghan Eradication Forces / RPG-Rocket Propelled Grenade / IDF-Indirect Fire (ex: mortars) / VBIED-Vehicle Borne Improvised Exploding Device / PRP-Previous Reporting Period / ANBP-Afghan National Border Police / SAF-Small Arms Fire / NDS-National Directorate of Security (intelligence) / PSC-Private Security Company / DC-District Centre

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MISSING

This report ANSO could not provide analysis for the provinces of:

Sar-e Pul

Farah

Badakhshan

Jawzjan

Faryab

Ghor

Farah

Zabul

This is because we do not know enough about the area to comment on the significance of the incidents occurring there.

If you can help us understand the province better, please contact us.

VACANCIES

ANSO is in search of a few good NGO workers. If you have NGO experience, an analytical background, and the desire to be challenged, all while being part of a close-knit team, pass your CV to operations@afgnso.org

TRAINING

ANSO will be conducting its free 1-Day Basic Guard training for NGOs in Kabul during the month of August starting on 12 August. Please note that registration for the training will be closed as of 9 August 2009. Email operations2@afgnso.org for registration details.