

THE ANSO REPORT

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YOU NEED TO KNOW

- Another NGO vehicle mistakenly targeted by an IED in the North
- NGO clinics and health workers targeted in the Western province of Farah
- Total decline in AOG attacks is consistent with seasonal downturn

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


NORWEGIAN MINISTRY
OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

COUNTRY SUMMARY

After months of turbulence surrounding the elections and the attack against the UN, this 2 week period was relatively calm.

As expected, the total number of AOG attacks is dropping across the country with the arrival of the winter season and will likely continue dropping until February; attack levels are currently on par with the same period last year.




The drop in incidents is not, however, evenly spread across the country. While most of the East and Southeast saw a significant decline in incidents, fighting in Kunar remains intense. In the North, the drop is mostly attributed to a reduction in fighting in the volatile province of Kunduz, with other provinces seeing only a moderate decline. In the West, the decline is more evenly spread, with all provinces dropping consistently since September. In the Central Region, the drop is mostly attributed to less fighting in Logar and Wardak and fewer incidents in Kabul.

NGO DATA & TRENDS

Another NGO vehicle was hit by an IED in the North after, it seems, being mistakenly targeted by AOG. The NGO vehicle was in front of a similar looking GoA vehicle when it was hit. As noted in the last quarterly report, IED attacks against NGO vehicles are twice as frequent and more deadly than last year, and all have been against high profile, white, or marked NGO vehicles travelling along roads that used to be safe but are now increasingly targeted by AOG. Another point of concern is the targeting of NGO supported clinics and health workers in the Western province of Farah. See the West section for details.

Percentage of Total NGO incidents by Region (2009)



KABUL

The last reporting period hosted a presidential inauguration, an attempted assassination of a member of parliament and former Mujahideen commander, and a rocket impact near the centre of Kabul. A number of AOG suspects were also arrested by ANSF throughout the province. For the previous three months, and despite a series of high profile attacks in Kabul City, AOG initiated incidents have decreased by a quarter (to 16) from the same period in 2008. The cause could be most likely be attributed to the uncertain political situation which led to an AOG 'wait and see approach', a robust ANSF presence, numerous arrests of AOG facilitators in recent months and a series of perceived successful attacks: the 8 September SVBIED targeting Kabul military airport; the 17 September SVBIED attack against an Italian IMF convoy; the 8 October Indian Embassy SVBIED and the


KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Election demonstrations
- Complex attacks against high profile targets
- Abduction

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	9
This Report Period	0

high profile 28 October attack on the Bakhtar commercial guest-house. Interestingly, the most recent series of attacks have all targeted international entities. Excepting isolated attacks on ANSF or GoA employees, there have been no further attacks on GoA facilities on the same scale as the complex attacks against the Ministry of Justice and the Prisons' Directorate on 11 February. The shift to targeting international entities, most prominently and frequently IMF, is partially an attempt to weaken the resolve of both individual nations and the broader international community.

President Karzai's inauguration on 19 November, held within the confines of the palace, occurred without security incident. The ANSF security plan virtually shut down all traffic in the centre of Kabul and was also comprised of a series of raids in Kabul Province, which led to the arrests of a series of AOG suspects in Mus-sayi and District 5 in the days leading up to the event. The 20 November RCIED attack on Abdul Rab Rasoul Sayaf, the current Member of Parliament and former Mujahideen leader, in Paghman



District, led to the deaths of five of his bodyguards as the charge detonated beneath a follow car and not the target vehicle. The following day it was reported that ten people were arrested in the district in relation to the attack. Which AOG group or faction undertook the attack remains an open question. Sayaf has traditionally drawn his support base from the area and therefore the brazenness of the attack is even more surprising. On 21 November, a single rocket impacted in the area between the Rabela Balkhi Hospital and the Serena hotel, which left two ANSF and two civilians injured. In Shakar Dara District, in the north of Kabul Province, approximately 90 rockets were seized in an ANSF raid, which also resulted in the arrest of two individuals. At this stage, the condition or age of the rockets is not known. NGO security planning remains primarily concerned with the fallout from the attack on the commercial guesthouse housing IO workers and its meaning for the greater NGO community. The anxiety has been exacerbated by a high level of cyclical threat reporting, which will unlikely subside until winter properly sets in.

NOTICE: Your input is invaluable for the production of this report. While we appreciate information on incidents, we also need general information on the security situation in your area. So please remember to call or email us regularly.

Contact details of ANSO staff are provide on the last page.

ANSO: “..by NGOs for NGOs..”

LOGAR

Logar is heavily infiltrated by AOG and should be considered risky for NGO operations. While Baraki Barak, Charkh, and Kharwar are likely to be under AOG control, Azra, Khushi, Muhammad Agha, Puli Alam are under heavy AOG influence. As has been common since the summer,


KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Abduction
- Collateral damage from attacks on security forces

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	2
This Report Period	0

there was another unconfirmed report suggesting an AOG checkpoint along the main Kabul to Gardez highway in the Porak area of Puli Alam during the night. All roads in Logar should be assumed to be monitored. Surveillance and tracking of vehicles should be considered especially active on the main road through the province from Kabul to Gardez.

Overall security incidents have decreased significantly since the height of the summer and will



likely remain at the current levels for the winter months. Security incidents in November are roughly a third the levels of August. It had been expected that Logar, due to its location and use as a logistical hub or path for AOG movements into Kabul, may not experience a similar downturn to other provinces, however this does not appear to be the case to date.

WARDAK


AOG activities in the last two months have only slightly increased from 2008. The vast majority of attacks occur in the south-eastern corner of the province, which remains under the nominal control of AOG. Attacks typically assume the form of IED strikes against IMF/ANSF and

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Abduction
- Rocket and IED attacks
- Intimidation efforts

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	5
This Report Period	0

rocket attacks against DACs during the night. Recently, attacks on DACs have become bolder especially in Jaghatu; however, stand-off attacks along Highway One remain the primary tactic of choice. With the exception of an AOG attack on an ANP checkpoint in Maydan Shahr on 29 November, all other AOG initiated attacks were conducted in Saydabad. Of note, in an ANSF operation in Yousfkhel Area of Saydabad on 16 November, three AOG were killed and two arrested during a house search.



Bihsud I and II, differentiated from the eastern provinces by an ethnic boundary, is a safe operating environment for NGOs. Reports have already been received of the partial closure of the Bihsud to Bamyan road due to snowfall. In the coming weeks, NGOs are reminded to take precautionary measures when travelling through mountain passes in the central region.

GRAPHS:

Please note, graphs in this report are current as of 24 November 2009

BAMYAN

Several attacks in the Shikari Valley, bordering Shibar, Sayghan and Kharmard in the northeast of Bamyan, raised the prospect that the trend may continue and effectively close the Baghlan to Bamyan road due to the level of risk. Since 1 November, there have been no repeat attacks, and it appears that the five attacks over a two month period may be a dispute between local factions, rather than a concerted effort by AOG. NGOs, however, should continue to monitor the security situation


KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- AOG/ACG threat around Ghandak Valley, Shibar

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	2
This Report Period	0

in both the Shikari and Ghandak valleys, which are liable to experience isolated attacks on ANP checkpoints over the coming weeks, although on a decreasing frequency due to the onset of winter.

Of concern is an arrest on 18 November in Mullian Village and the discovery of a recently laid IED in Mawlana area on 22 November. Both locations are between Bamyan Bazaar and the Red City. Two individuals were arrested with explosives and a remote control device in Mullian, and the IED was defused by IMF. The reason behind the two events has not been made clear in what could



traditionally be perceived as a relatively calm area.

Across the Central Highlands, especially, NGOs should take precautionary measures when travelling along the region's isolated roads and mountain passes. Significant delays can be expected, often with little or no notice, and supplies of food, water, blankets, medical provisions, as well as snow-chains, should be considered a minimum. Contacting local partners and ANSO prior to embarking on a long journey is strongly recommended.

KAPISA


Tagab, Alasay, Nijrab remain the primary areas of concern in Kapisa. AOG reportedly have substantial freedom of movement night and day in these districts. The Nijrab and Tagab districts have the highest incident frequency. However, Alasay is reported to be unstable, with the lack of incidents reflective of a limited security presence rather than a dearth of AOG.

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Attacks on security forces, especially in Tagab and Nijrab
- Electoral related violence
- Rockets, IEDs, and mines

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	3
This Report Period	0

So far in this reporting period only Tagab and Nijrab have recorded four overall AOG incidents. AOG incidents have dropped significantly recently with six incidents recorded so far this month, a level that is almost half of those reports last month and a third of those recorded in the summer months. Likely contributing factors for this are a reduced AOG presence as AOG members leave for the winter months. For NGO, while this reduced presence could increase security for travel and operations, the situation should be considered temporary possibly for the duration of



the winter and that the overall condition is still volatile.

Security incident reports from Alasay, Nijrab and Tagab should be differentiated from other (northwest) districts, due to a lesser degree of acceptance by the local population. However, anecdotal reporting suggests an occasional and, in some cases, intimidating AOG presence in these areas, thus suggesting the need for NGO to exercise caution and maintain a low profile.

PARWAN


AOG incidents remain isolated in the province, with acknowledged AOG strength concentrated in the Ghorband Valley and parts of Shinwari. Previous isolated attacks against ANP in Chaharikar during

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Attacks on security targets, especially in the area of Bagram Airbase
- NGO-targeted criminal abduction
- Irregular IEDs targeting ANSF in the Ghorband Valley

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	1
This Report Period	0

the middle of the year, believed to be derived from a factional dispute, have subsided, and the main risk in the capital is that of a slight rise in criminal activity. On 23 November, an IED was found and defused in the Puli Lang area of Ghorband and on the evening of 28 November, two grenades were lobbed into the residence of an NSP worker in Chaharikar, which an unconfirmed report suggests is due to a personal dispute. Although a number of NGOs have ceased travel through the



Parwan on their way to Bamyan, in favour of air travel, NGOs taking the road option should start to consider checking with local contacts and ANSO when intending to travel through Shibar and the Salang passes—snowfalls have the potential to cause significant delays and/or risk to the lives of those travelling along isolated roadways.

DAYKUNDI

Few security incidents have been recorded in the last reporting period. The summer influx of AOG into the southern districts of Gizab and Kajran has not translated into attacks on the provincial capital and will unlikely lead to any realised threats in the coming months due to the challenging weather. Low level armed banditry remains a slight concern on


KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- High AOG infiltration in Kiti, Gizab, and Kajran
- Security vacuum

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	1
This Report Period	0

the arterial roads leading to Ishtarlay, Khadir and Shahrstan, although in virtually all cases individuals are relieved of their possessions without any associated physical violence.

IMF actions remain rare in Daykundi, despite the introduction of a PRT in August. IMF attacks typically assume the form of airstrikes against senior AOG figures as was the case on 21 October. In Celberina Area of Gizab, IMF launched an airstrike which killed the AOG District Administrator and left four of his body-




guards injured. The use of airstrikes is virtually the only tool available to IMF/ANSF in the district as there is no GoA presence and the district is under the notional control of AOG. The boundary of AOG control in the north of Gizab is demarcated by an ANP checkpoint located approximately 30 kilometres from the provincial capital, Nili.

SAMANGAN

In the first reported incident in Samangan Province since October, two teenage boys were shot dead in what appears to be a criminally motivated incident. Security in the province has been

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	2
This Report Period	0

relatively stable; however, a lack of reporting does not necessarily conclude a lack of security incidents.



BALKH

In an extremely rare incident on the Mazar-Shibirgan Highway in Balkh Province, an INGO vehicle was struck by an RCIED. The RCIED hit the front tire of the first vehicle of a two-vehicle convoy, causing minor damage. The intended target was reportedly the District Head of Security (Deputy Chief of Police), who was travelling approximately 50 metres behind the two vehicles. It is likely that the NGO vehicle was mistaken for the intended target, as both vehicles were somewhat similar to the DCoP's white pickup truck which had a security antenna. The NGO also reported that an IMF convoy had preceded them on the road by an unknown

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS


- IEDs on the Mazar-Shibirgan Highway
- AOG presence in Nahri Shahi

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	11
This Report Period	1

distance, suggesting the possibility of an alternative intended target.

AOG activity in Chahar Bolak and Chimtal districts has slightly curtailed this period. This may be due to the effects of the IMF/ANSF joint operation that occurred previously this month or the general downturn in AOG activity that typically occurs during the Eid period. In what appears to be an accident, four AOG were killed in Chahar Bolak District while transporting an IED which prematurely detonated in their vehicle. One of the AOG killed was an allegedly prominent AOG figure.

East of Mazar-e Sharif City, in Nahri Shahi District, AOG attacked an ANP checkpoint in Shaharak Turkmeniya Area, near the location of two attacks on ANP patrols reported last period. Attacks on ANP, IED discover-



ies, and arrests of foreign nationals have been reported occasionally in this area since June, revealing the presence of a local AOG with possible external support.

In southern Balkh, the AOG checkpoint and night letters in Kishindeh District which recently surfaced last reporting period have not seen any further developments. In Sholgara, IMF/ANSF uncovered an IED in Quland Khalil Area. The IED may have been connected to the local dispute in which an AOG commander was killed last month. No further developments have been seen with regard to this dispute, and reports suggest that the DCoP in Sholgara has been temporarily replaced for medical reasons.

BADAKHSHAN


Local AOG and ACG activity was reported this period in two districts which have shown AOG/ACG activity at sporadic intervals in the past. In Kishim District, where AOG activity typically surfaces every few months, an ANP checkpoint came under complex attack in Mahdaba Village. AOGs in Kishim District

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Local conflict

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	4
This Report Period	0

tend to employ RPG fire and occasional IEDs targeting the district centre, IMF, ANP and road construction companies. In Yaftali Sufla District, AOGs fired RPGs toward an ANP facility in the district centre, and a private car was stopped and robbed of its valuables in Dekha Village. The attack on the ANP facility was the first reported close-range attack in the district and only the second reported attack targeting ANP in



the past three years. In the past, AOG activity in the district has been defined by infrequent IED finds and detonations targeting IMF and IO convoys. These incidents may point to the further development of a local AOG/ACG presence in the district, specifically in conflict with the ANP.

ACRONYMS:

Please see the final page for a list of ANSO-utilized acronyms.

BAGHLAN


Events this reporting period emphasized the dangers of the Pul-e Khumri-Kunduz Highway. Three national INGO staff members went missing while travelling through Baghlani Jadid District from Pul-e Khumri to Kunduz on the main road. No information has been received about the circumstances of their disappearance; however, it is believed they were abducted. At least one AOG

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Local Conflict
- Collateral Involvement

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	3
This Report Period	1

checkpoint was reported in the Jar-e Khushk Area on the main road, where an INGO encountered an AOG checkpoint earlier this month. Baghlan Province was further defined by continued AOG attacks on ANSF/IMF in Baghlani Jadid District. Most significantly, AOG took over an APPF checkpoint in the Pul-e Kohna Qala Area, north of the District Centre on the main road, killing three APPF and capturing four others. AOGs also targeted the GoA, detonating an IED against a parked GOA vehicle in



Baghlan Old City and killing four ANP in an attack on a GoA office building. Outside of Baghlani Jadid District, AOGs attacked an APPF checkpoint in Nahrin District, Lakan Khel area, a few kilometres north of the main road. AOG-initiated incidents have occurred on occasion in Nahrin District in the past, and this was the first AOG attack targeting ANP since April.

KUNDUZ

One NGO-direct incident was reported in Kunduz Province this period. INGO construction equipment came under SAF while parked late at night near a remote area approximately ten minutes away from the Kunduz-Taloqan main road in Khanabad District. The incident may have been a random criminal act, or it may have been related to an increase in AOG attacks on construction companies which occurred this period, one in Chahar Dara District and one in Kunduz City. Construction companies may be targeted by AOGs as an attempt to disrupt government-funded or private development efforts in order to undermine non-AOG authority.

In Archi District, AOG members abducted and killed two Community Development Council (CDC)


KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- CDC abduction and killing
- Collateral involvement

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	11
This Report Period	1

leaders who were from the Qarlogh Area in the north of the district while the CDC members were visiting Kala Tarash Village. CDC members have not been targeted by AOG in Kunduz Province in the past, and this incident may represent a new AOG tactic. The Qarlogh Area community has reportedly been less susceptible to AOG influence than other areas in Archi District, and the incident was most likely aimed at intimidating and discouraging the community from participating in government-run development programs. Also in Archi District, indirect fire attacks on the District Centre were reported twice this period, including a BM1 rocket strike that injured three civilians. Attacks on the district centre involving long-range artillery or BM1 rockets were reported four times in October and twice in November.

IMF and ANSF operations were conducted in Khanabad, Kunduz,



and Chahar Dara districts. In Khanabad District, an ANSF operation early in the reporting period reportedly killed two AOG commanders in the area. No subsequent AOG activity was reported in Khanabad District this reporting period. In Kunduz District, a search operation was launched in Gortepa, Pacha Qalander and Chehil Chenar areas, northwest of Kunduz City. (An AOG attack on an ANP checkpoint was reported in this area later in the period.) In Chahar Dara District, AOGs attacked an IMF position in Nahri Shahi, southeast of Kunduz city. IMF and ANSF launched an operation in response, utilizing close air support and killing up to five AOGs. In Imam Sahib, one AOG-ANBP clash was reported along the Amu River, as well as an IED cache discovery in the Sherkhan Border Area. AOG-ANSF clashes are frequently reported in Imam Sahib; however, IED incidents have been rare.

TAKHAR


The main concerns in Takhar Province remain security on the Taloqan-Kunduz road and local political disputes. Two IEDs detonated in sequence on the Taloqan-Kunduz road, in the Baghmiri area, approximately 20 km west of Taloqan City. The first device was an RCIED targeting an ANP vehicle which injured one ANP. What may have been a secondary device detonated several minutes later, killing one civilian

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Security of Taloqan-Kunduz Road
- Local political disputes

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	3
This Report Period	0

and injuring two others. While it is not likely that the second IED was intended to impact a civilian target, this incident highlights the increased risk of collateral involvement along the road. This was the second IED incident on the Taloqan-Kunduz Road within Takhar Province reported in the past month, and the sixth this year. These incidents have all occurred on the main road between Cheshmashir Area to the east and Chenzahi Area to the west, targeting ANSF and GOA vehicles. This compares to 2008, when only three IED incidents were reported in that area, primarily targeting IMF convoys.



Regarding local political disputes, a well-known and politically connected former commander in Kalafgan District was killed in what appears to be an interpersonal dispute. This individual was also the head of the Afghan Red Crescent Society in the area, a position appointed by the central government. In Ishkamish District, a local AOG commander was killed by ANSF after he reportedly killed a civilian over a land dispute.

SAR-E PUL


In Sar-e Pul, the expatriate INGO employee who was alleged by local media to be implicated in the shooting of a young boy last reporting period was released without charge. Two other developments point to possible AOG infiltration from Faryab Province.

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- AOG presence

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	2
This Report Period	0

In Naimadan Village, Sar-e Pul District, on the Sar-e Pul - Shibirgan main road, four armed men believed to be AOG stopped a civilian passenger vehicle and searched for members of ANSF or the GoA. Upon finding no one associated with either entities, they released the vehicle. In Kohistanat District, two suspected AOG were arrested. AOG activity



that was typically seen prior to October's joint IMF/ANSF operation has not been reported in the past month.

JAWZJAN


Two atypical incidents in Jawzjan Province were reported this period. In a rare ACG incident in Shibirgan City, an NGO compound was robbed. Two to three armed men entered the compound, restrained the guards and

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Armed assault in Aqcha

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	3
This Report Period	1

broke into the safe, stealing a large amount of cash. In Aqcha District, the provincial NDS Logistics Officer was shot dead in front of his residence by unknown armed individuals riding on motorcycles. The attack was claimed by an AOG which does not have a sustained presence in the area; however, the actual perpetrators have



not been confirmed. In Qush Tepa District, AOGs killed two local Jihadi commanders.

FARYAB

Faryab Province showed the most significant decrease in AOG activity during the Eid period, report-


KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Targeted AOG attacks
- Roadside robberies

ing only one AOG-ANP clash in Pashtun Kot in the final week of November. This may be due to a decrease in reporting, rather than

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	4
This Report Period	0

an actual decrease in AOG activity. The first half of the reporting period saw an increase in armed roadside robberies – one each reported in Dawlatabad, Kohistan and Gurziwan districts – in addition to the more typical attacks on ANP checkpoints and ANSF/IMF convoys in Bilcharch, Pashtun Kot, Qaysar and Dawlatabad. In an unusual report, ANP arrested eight suspected AOGs in



Andkhoy District, which has of late seen a slight increase in AOG presence. Notably, there were no IED incidents reported this period.

KHOST

Khost had a violent period with 19 AOG-initiated incidents recorded. As observed in previous reporting periods, IEDs remain the preferred AOG tactic in the province with 13 detonated or located in Mando Zayi, Khost City, Tani, Tere Zayi, Ahmadabad and Gurbuz districts.


KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- IEDs
- Collateral damage from attacks on GoA and IMF

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	10
This Report Period	0

Different from previous reporting periods, AOG activities were quite evenly distributed throughout the province's districts. Next to the abovementioned number of IED incidents, six direct and five indirect attacks were recorded.

In a well-coordinated operation, AOG attacked an ANBP CP on November 28th in Tani District. The firefight continued several hours, reinforced by ANA and supported by IMF air strikes. According to information, twenty



seven AOG members were killed and one AOG—a Chechen—was captured.

Khost Province remains very dangerous for NGO operations, and NGO international staff are advised to limit their travel to Khost City.

LAGHMAN

On November 23rd in Mitharlam district, NDS discovered a large VBIED (a Russian truck) on its way to an unknown destination. Hidden under a load of sand, NDS found 2,500 kgs of explosives in fuel barrels that were covered by dozens of jerry cans of petrol. This is the first time that


KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Attacks along Highway 1
- AOG assaults on ANSF/IMF

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	1
This Report Period	0

local security forces have seized such a large device. Although according to ANSO records, there have been no SVBIED or VBIED incidents in the province for 2009, NGOs should take note of this incident for it shows intent of an unusual scale.

Besides the VBIED discovery, the security situation in Laghman Province remains unpredictable and has a relatively low level of AOG incidents with 4 reported



during this reporting period, including an even mix of IEDs and direct attacks on police posts or convoys. All AOG incidents occurred in Mitharlam, Alishing, and Dawlat Shah districts, only one incident occurred on Highway 1 (one attack on an ANP convoy).

KUNAR

With 45 AOG-initiated incidents being reported, Kunar Province continues to remain violent, exactly to the same extent as recorded during the last reporting period. In line with previous reporting cycles, direct attacks on ANSF/IMF were the most common AOG tactic – 35 direct attacks – quiet evenly distributed throughout the province. 5 indirect fire attacks were recorded, while three IEDs detonated in Shegal, Khas Kunar and Chapa Dara districts.


KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- AOG attacks on the Jalalabad-Asadabad Highway
- Collateral damage from attacks

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	7
This Report Period	0

Road security remains critical throughout Kunar. Especially IMF/ANSF supply convoys continue to be subject to deliberate attacks throughout the province. For instance, on November 18th in Ghaziabad District, AOG attacked a local supply truck carrying IMF supplies and set the vehicle on fire. The Jalalabad – Asadabad Highway is still of concern with significant AOG activity in Nurgal District, as was evident in the 19 November coordinated attack on an IMF convoy in this area.

Whilst most hostilities are aimed at IMF, GoA and ANSF, civilian casualties are frequent. Civilians employed or associated with official entities continue to be subject



to AOG hostile activities, and so do private road construction companies working in the eastern and northern parts of the province.

Due to the frequency and intensity of direct attacks on ANSF/IMF, civilians are prone to be harmed by collateral damage. For instance, on November 29th in Mano Gai District, AOG attacked a joint IMF – ANA base and injured three civilian bystanders. This incident underlines that the risk of being collaterally targeted remains a critical concern for NGOs operating in the province.

NANGARHAR

The dramatic surge in IED deployment within Nangarhar Province, as recorded in the last reporting cycle, continues during this reporting period. A total of 16 IEDs were emplaced throughout the province, of which two actually detonated: one in Chaparhar district on November 20th and one in Jalalabad City on November 24th. In keeping with historic trends in the province, the majority of discovered IEDs were located in its southern districts, in particular Pachir Wa Agam and Sherzad districts.


KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- IEDs
- Indirect fire aimed at IMF/ANP and DACs

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	8
This Report Period	0

Next to the IED incident on November 24th, the security situation in Jalalabad City and surrounding districts remains stable and relatively calm with only a few minor criminal incidents and the occasional rocket fired ineffectively at the Jalalabad Airfield. However, in line with previous reporting cycles, the southern and eastern regions of the province have been exposed to a significant level of AOG activities including numerous IEDs and three indirect attacks, mainly targeting district centres.

During this reporting period, two AOG direct attacks were recorded, namely on November 20th in Bati Kot District – where AOG attacked a fuel convoy and



set one tanker on fire – and on November 25th in Dara-i-Nur District where AOG attacked the District Administration Centre with direct fire.

The province-wide increase in criminal and narcotic activity observed in the last reporting cycle continues during this period: a total of 17 farmers were arrested for involvement in poppy cultivation in Khogyani and Hisarak districts. Additionally, two suspects were arrested for illegal possession of narcotics in Bihsud District.

GHOR

Ghor continues to register a decrease in the number and seriousness of incidents throughout the province. Unlike other western provinces, this trend is mainly related to climatic and geographical specificity of the area and is usual during the winter months.


Similar to the previous reporting period, criminal activity continues in the area. On 22 November in Saghar District, an armed clash

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Criminal activity
- Armed robbery
- Local disputes

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	10
This Report Period	0

between villagers and an ACG occurred when the ACG attempted to rob villagers. As a result, one villager was wounded and another one was abducted by the ACG. Two days before, but in Pasaband District, an AOG broke into a private residence of a school teacher and stole some valuables. Interesting to note, on 16 November in Chagcharan District, ANP discovered an assortment of weapons and munitions as well as one VHF radio hidden in a vehicle en route to Badghis Province. This incident illustrates that probably, for the time being, AOG activities in Ghor



(compared to other western provinces) are relatively limited not only because of the hostility of the population but also because Ghor is mainly used as a transit route towards the northern provinces. Regarding past practices, an increase in AOG activities normally leads to an increase in ANSF presence in the area, which consequently would jeopardise the AOG passage through the Province.

HERAT

Herat Province witnessed one reported NGO-related incident from the previous reporting period. On 14 November, an explosion occurred in a delivery room of a health clinic in Gulran District, killing one woman and wounding three other people, including an NGO health worker. At this stage, the reason behind the explosion remains unclear. Some reporting indicates a possibility of AOG action, whereas others suggest that an accidental explosion should not be ruled out.

Another feature of the last reporting period was an AOG attempt (as in Farah) to target telecommu-


KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Collateral damage
- IEDs/RCIEDs
- Abduction

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	17
This Report Period	0

nication facilities. On 16 November in Shindand District, security forces discovered an IED placed inside a telecommunications antenna. Additionally, an interesting development was witnessed in Zindajan District on 20 November when a group of armed men, most likely AOG, attacked an ANP post with RPGs and small arms, wounding one ANP—this was the first significant incident experienced by this district since August. Worthy to note, during a search operation on 19 November in Koshan District, ANP discovered a variety of weapons and munitions as well as one suicide vest.

AOG attacks on ANSF continue in the Province with the 28 November ambush on an ANBP vehicle in Kushk District in the



Ganj area, which occurred on the Herat-Turgundi Road.

Furthermore, a prominent AOG commander influential in Pashtun Zarghun surrendered to ANSF along with around 95 other AOG members.

As for Herat City, the situation remained calm. Of note, on 19 and 20 November, shopkeepers staged two peaceful demonstrations against the municipality's decision to evict petty traders from the city. The city also witnessed an 'escalation of force' incident on 23 November when IMF fired with small arms on a civilian car approaching too close to an IMF convoy on the Airport Road, wounding one person.

BADGHIS


Compared to the previous reporting period, Badghis province remained relatively calm with only a few ANSO-recorded incidents. However, this decrease in incidents, especially those initiated by AOGs, is probably due to less exposure of ANSF/IMF in the area and should not be considered noteworthy.

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- AOG ambushes
- Armed clashes
- Abduction

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	2
This Report Period	0

During this reporting period, the single AOG-initiated act was an abduction. On November 21st in Muqur District, AOG stopped an IMF contracted truck and abducted the driver. The truck was also stolen. It is interesting to note that besides AOG ambushes on ANSF/IMF forces or armed clashes in the area, abduction is another important factor of insecurity in Badghis. Of note, since the beginning of this year there have already been six cases of abduction in Muqur, five in Murgab and also five in Qala-i-Naw targeting mainly GoA employees.



Regarding the latter district, another incident of note occurred on the 23rd in Qala-i-Naw City where an unknown individual riding on a motorbike hurled a grenade into a compound of a senior ANP officer. The reason behind this incident is unclear, but recent reporting indicates a possibility of AOG action.

FARAH

The Province remains highly volatile with a significant number of AOG initiated incidents. However, during this reporting period, the area experienced an unusual number of serious incidents, including two that were NGO-related and occurred in Farah. On 17 November in Khaki Safed District, a group of armed individuals (later confirmed as AOG) riding in a Toyota Corolla broke into a health clinic supported by an NGO. They threatened the staff to stop working in this clinic and abducted an NGO health worker. A few hours later, in the same area, two NGO vaccination team members were abducted along with their vehicle, apparently by the same AOG. Khaki Safed Dis-

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS


- Targeted AOG attacks
- IEDs/RCIEDs
- Abduction

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	4
This Report Period	2

trict has already witnessed an NGO staff worker abduction in June this year. The NGO worker was released after mediation. This incident highlights the risk for NGOs operating in remote areas to be seen as 'soft targets' for AOG or ACG, especially those having no links with the local population.

During this reporting period AOG activity manifested itself mainly in Farah, Bala Buluk, and Pusht Rod Districts.

In Farah City, on 20 November, a BBIED attacker riding on a motorbike detonated his explosives in a crowded bazaar area. Reporting indicates that 17 people were killed and 36 were wounded as a result of the explosion. The next day, in Bala Buluk District, an SVBIED targeted an ANP base. Both incidents represent a new development in AOG tactics in the province. To date, the main



threat in the area was from IEDs or RCIEDs and ambushes on ANSF/IMF convoys. This marks the first reported use of suicide attacks in this province. Regarding other AOG activities, on 15 November AOG destroyed a telecommunications tower in Pusht Road District.

Another feature of this reporting period was an AOG ambush on a PSC convoy in Bala Buluk District on 21 November, and on the 26th an RCIED struck an ANP vehicle in Farah City, wounding a prominent ANP official.

Lastly, the deteriorating security situation in the province was also illustrated on the 16th when AOG beheaded the local elder and one of his relatives who were abducted a few days before.

KANDAHAR


Along with all manner of incidents involving direct confrontations between AOGs and IMF, activity in Kandahar continues to involve civilians collaterally, though sometimes on the ground of suspected collaboration. In Kandahar City, attacks on the DAC have often missed their target, affecting civilians, while frequent attacks on ANSF and IMF in populated areas have also resulted in injury and death, writ-large. Assumed AOG members

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Roadside IEDs
- Suicide attacks
- Collateral involvement

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	8
This Report Period	0

killed an interpreter for IMF and also an NDS official. A number of other incidents in Kandahar City involve violence motivated by apparent personal disputes, serving as a reminder that the wider atmosphere of violence and intimidation distracts from the ongoing occurrence of regular criminal activity, which continues while belligerents focus on higher-value targets. Arghandab continued to see a mix of AOG and IMF-initiated incidents including IEDs and attacks on patrols. A 13-year-old boy was killed by an IED, and IMF shot and killed a civilian. Panjwayi and Zhari also remain important centres of activ-



ity. In Panjwayi, a large number of IEDs and sundry attacks on IMF and ANSF were met with airstrikes. Additionally, an incident in which IMF killed a local civilian occurred under disputed circumstances in Ghorgan Village, sparking a local protest. Along with widely scattered IED attacks throughout Zhari, a rocket attack on an IMF base in the district centre resulted in six IMF soldiers wounded.

GHAZNI

Ghazni, Qarabagh and Andar host the lion's share of security incidents for the province in 2009 with the three districts representing 23, 20 and 16 per cent, respectively, of the approximately 600 recorded incidents for the province. In the last reporting period, IMF operations in Badarkee, Totakhel and Wali villages of Qarabagh District led to the arrest of thirteen suspected AOG and the death of another. IMF offensive operations have increased in Qarabagh in the last several


KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Abduction
- Ambushes
- IEDs

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	2
This Report Period	0

weeks, most likely in response to repeated IEDs, ambushes of ANSF, and to a lesser degree IMF and their logistic convoys.

In a move which is unlikely to endear IMF to the local population, reports emerged of flares from an IMF aircraft landing in a building market in Maidan-e-Hawee Area of Ghazni District, which subsequently set seven shops alight on 16 November. The damage is believed to amount to several million Afghans. Two IMF raids in Ghazni City on 16 and 19 November led to three individuals being killed, two arrests and one other suspected AOG being wounded. If the new IMF strategy across the country



does result in a shift to the urban centres to 'secure the population' and to put AOG on the offensive, any belief that the blame for resultant casualties will be placed on AOG should be largely disregarded. IMF will continue to conduct operations in urban centres to arrest or kill suspected AOG. By default, IMF will also be blamed for any civilian casualties arising from engagements between AOG and IMF. Both issues will severely undermine efforts at local IMF engagement with the population.

HELMAND


Incidents in Helmand remain highly correlated with the presence of AOGs' primary targets, IMF and ANSF. The remainder of incidents, initiated by either IMF or AOG, suggest that involvement of other parties is collateral. For the current reporting period, most security incidents occurred in either Nahri Sarraj or

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- IEDs
- AOG presence
- Heavy weapons attacks

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	1
This Report Period	0

Sangin districts. The majority of attacks in Nahri Sarraj consisted of IEDs targeting IMF and ANSF, but a few incidents involved sustained AOG assaults on IMF with heavy weaponry. In Sangin, likewise, most activity was AOG-initiated and similar in nature, with the notable exception of an IMF airstrike in Malmon area which lasted 30 minutes and left 3 suspected AOG members dead. Musa Qala and Nad Ali recorded three and four incidents, respectively, also almost exclusively



AOG-initiated and a mix of IEDs and sustained attacks on foot and/or vehicle patrols. Although apparently more secure than other areas of the province, the risk of suicide attack remains in Lashkargah, where an AOG member was arrested in possession of a BBIED vest.

URUZGAN


Suicide bombings are a rare occurrence in Uruzgan, although they do occur. In the afternoon of 19 November, a BBIED approached the ANP district HQ in Dihrawud and detonated, killing ten civilians and wounded 13 others. It was the third such incident for the year, following five suicide attacks in 2008. There have been 17 suicide attacks in the province since the beginning of 2006, of which 11 have taken place in the

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- IEDs
- AOG/local opposition to outside parties

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	2
This Report Period	0

capital Tirin Kot. Separately in the province, IEDs remain the number one security incident for November. For the month, there have been 17 IED finds or detonations; the majority occurred in Tirin Kot, probably due to the rich target environment. The IEDs have led to the deaths of two ANSF and two civilians as well as the wounding of 9 ANSF, three IMF and seven civilians. In an incident which is sure to further engender a degree of animosity between the ANP and the local population, in Garm Aab Area of Tirin Kot, the ANP fired on a congregation of locals following



their vehicle being hit by stones. One civilian was killed and two were injured. For the last two months there has been a more than doubling of the security incidents compared to the same period in 2008. Although a seasonal slowdown may be expected, it is unlikely to be as differentiated from the so called 'fighting period' as in previous years.

ANNOUNCEMENT:

In the coming months, ANSO will be unveiling a new mapping service through IMMAP to aid NGO management and security procedures. Registrants will receive further information as it becomes available.



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ANSO ACRONYMS

IMF-International Military Forces / **AOG**-Armed Opposition Groups / **GOA**-Government of Afghanistan / **ACG**-Armed Criminal Groups / **ANA**-Afghan National Army / **ANP**-Afghan National Police / **IED**-Improvised Exploding Device / **AEF**-Afghan Eradication Forces / **RPG**-Rocket Propelled Grenade / **IDF**-Indirect Fire (ex: mortars) / **VBIED**-Vehicle Borne Improvised Exploding Device / **PRP**-Previous Reporting Period / **ANBP**-Afghan National Border Police / **SAF**-Small Arms Fire / **NDS**-National Directorate of Security (intelligence) / **PSC**-Private Security Company / **DC**-District Centre

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MISSING

This report ANSO could not provide analysis for the provinces of:

Panjshir
Nuristan
Paktya
Nimroz
Zabul
Paktika

This is because we do not know enough about the area to comment on the significance of the incidents occurring there.

If you can help us understand the province better, please contact us.

NOTICE:

Your input is invaluable for the production of this report. While we appreciate information on incidents, we also need general information on the security situation in your area. So please remember to call or email us regularly.

Contact details of ANSO staff are provide on the last page.

ANSO: “..by NGOs for NGOs..”