

THE ANSO REPORT

Inside this Issue

Central Region	2-5
Northern Region	6-8
Western Region	8-10
Eastern Region	10-12
Southern Region	13-16
ANSO Info Page	17

YOU NEED TO KNOW

- Allegations of election fraud increases potential for civil unrest.
- Higher potential for demonstrations when preliminary and final election results are announced in early and mid September.
- Decline in AOG attacks following the election, suggesting temporary resource exhaustion

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COUNTRY SUMMARY

Pre-election violence levels were lower than expected, with only a mild surge in incidents reported in the two days prior to the elections.

On election day, ANSO recorded 246 attacks by Armed Opposition Groups (AOG) across the country, which is roughly a 7-fold increase over the pre-election average. Most of these attacks were concentrated in the South (36%) and East (29%), with lower numbers recorded in the Central (16%), North/Northeast (13%), and Western (6%) regions.


After the election, the number of attacks dropped by almost half and remains lower than normal, suggesting that AOG expended much of their fighting capital on election day. It will probably take AOG only one or two weeks to recover.

For the first time, the number of AOG attacks is expected to


exceed 1000 per month this August (with 950 recorded as of August 26). Although much was made of election day violence in the media, it only represented a slight (16%) increase in the expected monthly total for August. Therefore, the general and broadening conflict, rather than the election, continues to drive incident levels to record heights.

Given the numerous and serious allegations of election fraud (2000+ complaints, 500+ of them deemed serious), and the temporary lull in AOG attacks, the main security concern is now the potential for civil unrest. The announcement of the preliminary election results, which could generate demonstrations, has reportedly been delayed from Sept 3 to Sept 6 or 7. The final election results and completion of the ECC investigation are scheduled for Sept 17, but this may be delayed as well due to the number of complaints the ECC must now investigate. As parties have vowed to abstain from protesting until after the ECC investigation, this appears to be the key date to watch in terms of civil unrest.

AOG INITIATED ATTACKS IN AUGUST



AOG INITIATED ATTACKS (2006-2009)



KABUL

Although expectations exceeded reality, Kabul Province still witnessed a discernible level of AOG initiated election violence. In the days prior to the election, a large SVBIED detonated outside ISAF HQ on 15 August, leaving more than a dozen dead and close to one hundred wounded, and a second SVBIED targeted an IMF convoy on Jalalabad Road on 18 August. These attacks, combined with rocket strikes in Kabul City on the 18th and 19th, raised the spectre that the election would indeed be a bloody affair in the capital. In the attack along Jalalabad Road, two staff members working for an international organisation (IO) were killed along with at least five others and approximately 50 were injured.


Several mitigating factors most definitely contributed to the lower

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Complex attacks against high-profile targets
- Armed Criminal Groups
- Abduction

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	8
This Report Period	0

levels of violence. Firstly, leading up to 20 August, ANSF arrested several alleged AOG cells and uncovered a number of weapons caches in Paghman and Districts 7 and 8 of Kabul City. Furthermore, anecdotal reporting suggests that numerous mid-to-senior level AOG commanders or technicians have either been killed or captured over the course of the year, tactical moves that have engendered a new generation of AOG leaders, perhaps one that lacks the expertise and planning capabilities of its predecessor. Furthermore, the robust ANSF presence, which ostensibly closed down parts of the city due to intrusive and repeated vehicle inspections, no doubt had the effect of driving AOG attacks to the outer districts, such as was seen on 20 August, with incidents mainly recorded in Districts 5, 7, and 8. In fact, the only recorded incident of note within the centre of the city was a rocket attack that impacted on the border of Districts 1 and 2. Two incidents in particular may illustrate the curtailed capabilities of AOG. On 19 August, several



gunmen, later attributed to AOG, seized a bank building in District 1 and subsequently engaged ANSF, resulting in their death and little strategic value gained. On election day, a similarly ill-planned operation in a multi-story building located near the District 8 ANP HQ, resulted in a confused small arms fire engagement and the deaths of several gunmen, again later claimed by AOG.

Since election day, attention has turned to the post-election period, where sporadic acts of violence or demonstrations, if realised, may threaten NGO operations in Kabul City. Allegations of fraud and non-acceptance of results have already emerged; however, large scale civil disorder is likely to be tempered by all parties wishing to adhere to a process, namely the Election Complaints Commission, which currently they believe may address their grievances. If, on the other hand, legitimate courses of action fail to provide an acceptable resolution, then demonstrations, with the propensity for violence, may become an alternative option.

ANNOUNCEMENT:

Please note, all future issues of the ANSO Report will require readers to have Adobe Reader 9.0 or higher installed. The latest version of Adobe Reader is available for free at www.adobe.com. ANSO apologises for any inconvenience incurred.

KAPISA

Previous arrests of alleged AOG, a high number of night letters, and several attacks on ANSF in the west of Kapisa suggested that a number of attacks on polling centres and staff might be recorded in Mahmudi Raqi as well as Kohistan 1 and 2 on election day. In the lead up to 20 August, two rocket attacks were reported on 18 August in Mahmudi Raqi and Kohistan 1; however, only two incidents were recorded on


KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- AOG-ANSF clashes, especially in Tagab and Nijrab
- Electoral-related violence
- Rockets, IEDs, and mines

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	2
This Report Period	0

20 August in the west of the province: a SAF exchange between AOG and ANSF in the Abdul Jamil Chopan area and a premature detonation of an IED in Deh Bala Area, both in Mahmudi Raqi.

In the east of the province, Tagab, Alasay, and Nijrab continue to experience infrequent attacks on ANSF and, to a lesser degree, IMF. On election day, two ANP were killed in two different SAF clashes, one in Shahtor Village of Tagab, which also left one AOG dead, and another in Alasay, where the ANP district police commander was also wounded. There is a likelihood that the current level of instability in the west of the province may persist, con-



sidering several successful attacks on ANSF and the strategic value of essentially encircling the capital, with Laghman, Logar and Wardak all facing high levels of insecurity. Although it is almost certain that the west of the province, where the majority of NGOs are operating, will not see the levels of insecurity associated with the abovementioned provinces, low level attacks targeting ANSF and GoA facilities will most likely continue into the intermediate future.

DAYKUNDI

Daykundi Province remained calm without any significant change to the security situation during the election period. The ANSF had augmented their security presence in the south and the capital in expectation of election violence. The MoI had instructed Daykundi ANP to recruit 90 armed men for the election period and


KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- High AOG infiltration of Kiti, Gizrab, and Kajran
- Security vacuum
- AOG clashes with locals, especially in the south

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	1
This Report Period	0

around 40 ANA were posted to Kijran District to support ANP in maintaining security.

On election day, AOG fired two rockets on the Kijran DAC. No casualties were reported; nevertheless, the voting process was severely impacted as few voters ventured out to vote due to the strike on the DAC. In addition, local reports suggest that there were several small scale AOG and ANSF engagements on 20 August. Two polling centres, furthermore, were relocated due to AOG threats—one in Sayed Abad and one in Silminji, Kiti District—and no polling centre opened in Gizab



due to the area being under nominal AOG control.

Although there may be little chance during the post-election period that AOG will initiate any major offences outside of their usual areas of operation in Kijran and Gizab, other areas should not be assumed to be secure. With this, one should note that AOGs have relative freedom of movement, facilitated by the limited presence of security forces, allowing them to move unexpectedly into other areas.

LOGAR

The large number of election-related night letters issued across the province suggested that Logar may experience a high level of election related violence, and indeed this was the case. Even before election day, there were approximately 12 direct attacks on polling centres in Baraki Barak and Puli Alam. On election day, AOG attacks were concentrated in Puli Alam, Baraki Barak, and Charkh. In Charkh, five polling


KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Abduction
- Electoral-related violence
- Collateral damage from AOG-ANSF clashes

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	2
This Report Period	0

centres were burnt down, prohibiting voters from casting ballots at the affected sites. In addition to the arson attacks, 28 rockets were fired at other polling centres in the district, severely hampering the general public's attempt to vote.

The provincial capital, Muhammad Agha, was not immune from violence, with more than a dozen rockets landing on the outskirts of the city. In the vast majority of incidents, however, casualties remained noticeably low, as AOG standoff attacks were used to frighten voters into staying at home, rather than cause actual fatalities.



Although IMF have made a determined effort to reduce AOGs' ability to plant IEDs along district roads, including the arrest of a senior IED expert on 24 August in Takar Qala, Puli Alam, the risk to civilians and by extension NGOs remains. On 20 August, two civilians were killed and another two were wounded in Peyaro Khel, Puli Alam, following an IED detonation. And after the election, IMF conducted several raids in Baraki Barak and Puli Alam in search of AOG suspects; these raids resulted in a number of arrests and seizures of weapons and IED components.

WARDAK

An NGO driver for an implementing partner of an IO was reported abducted on 24 August after attempting to repair a tyre in the bazaar area of Maydan Shahr. Although initial reports suggested that the individual had been kidnapped by AOG following a phone call to the NGO, it is now believed that the incident was criminally motivated but made to appear AOG related. On 26 August, the individual was released in Abdara, Saydabad District, apparently unharmed and without the intervention of ANSF. The NGO vehicle taken at the time of the


KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Abduction
- IED and rocket attacks
- Intimidation

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	3
This Report Period	1

initial abduction, however, remains missing.

As was seen throughout the central region, AOG initiated incidents prior to the election were largely designed to dissuade voter turnout, rather than to produce civilian casualties. Interestingly, there were three times as many security incidents recorded on election day than on 19 August. Although voter turnout was reportedly at the lower end of national averages, it is surprising that the number of AOG initiated incidents were not higher prior to the election, as the intimidation value would have been even greater. AOG tactics prior to and on election day largely consisted of standoff attacks on polling centres and DACs and the use of IEDs along key district roads. In May-



dan Shahr, 20 rockets reportedly impacted on 20 August, with several apparently narrowly missing an NGO compound. If affecting voter turnout had been the intention, then AOG tactics could be viewed as being successful.

Minus attacks on ANSF vehicles, logistics convoys remain high value targets for AOG operations. Three separate convoys were attacked in Haftasya, Salar, and Baratkhel areas of Saydabad during the last reporting period. In each incident, vehicles were burnt and a number of PSC or ANSF were either killed or wounded. Highway One, through Wardak, remains a high risk environment, so NGOs should avoid travel along this route.

BAMYAN


Bamyan continued to remain calm, although instability is still prevalent in the Northeastern parts of the province (the Shikari Valley of Shibar and Kahmard Districts) due to the presence of AOGs. Disputes over land and family issues and criminality are considered as the dominant factors of insecurity in the other districts of the province.

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Increasing IED/mine threat
- Armed robbery along roadways

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	1
This Report Period	1

Voter turnout in the province was perceived as being strong, without any major incidents affecting polling centres or staff. Bamyan recorded two stand-off attacks on election day. The first occurred near the polling station in Ghandak Village of Shikari Valley, Shibar District, when a rocket landed in the vicinity of the polling station, affecting the voting process for a short period. The other stand-off attack targeted an ANP CP injuring one ANP in Eshpushta area of Shikari Valley in Kahmard District. On a positive note, though, two ex-combatants



of Kahmard surrendered their weapons and munitions to IMF.

Additionally, the security situation in Shibar district has improved since the arrest of a prominent AOG commander, but reports of other AOG movement in the area may contribute to further instability in Kahmard and some parts of Shibar District. Criminality and disputes over land and family issues remain the prevalent factors of insecurity in the province.

PARWAN


Similar to the previous reporting period, Parwan produced few reports of election-related violence. On the election day itself, there

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Attacks on security-related targets, especially near Bagram Airbase
- ACG abduction of NGO staff
- Irregular IEDs targeting ANSF in the Ghorband Valley

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	1
This Report Period	0

were only two incidents recorded: a rocket landed near the DAC in Ghorband, and ANP arrested an alleged AOG member in Shinwari. Of possible concern for NGOs operating in Chaharikar, though, are anecdotal reports suggesting that the provincial capital may experience several demonstrations in the post-election period. Although unlikely to be widespread, the large number of allegations of nation-wide election fraud and the level of political



polarisation in Chaharikar may result in several demonstrations, venting frustration at the incumbent regime. This concern is also confirmed by the increase in ANSF in the area to deter any demonstrations which may turn violent.

NOTICE: Your input is invaluable for the production of this report. While we appreciate information on incidents, we also need general information on the security situation in your area. So please remember to call or email us regularly.

Contact details of ANSO staff are provide on the last page.

ANSO: “..by NGOs for NGOs..”

KUNDUZ

As seen in the 19 August incident where an INGO driver and vehicle were taken by an ACG that initially claimed AOG affiliations and intentions, the effect of ongoing volatility in the province may be benefiting criminal opportunists. Regardless, the bulk of concern remains AOG activity.

Kunduz-based AOGs managed to demonstrate an increasingly significant presence throughout the province. Of the 125 security incidents recorded in the NR during this time-frame, 50 of them took place in Kunduz Province, alone, and 21 of them on election day (all of which were AOG-initiated). Despite this impressive showing, notable AOG achievements include successful attempts

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS


- Broad AOG presence
- IEDs
- Military operations

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	7
This Report Period	1

to disrupt ballot collection to discredit the elections and demonstrations of expanded control and continued presence. The most notable disruption of ballot collection occurred when an AOG launched a successful assault on the Dashti Archi District Police Headquarters, which successfully deterred a GoA helicopter from collecting that district's ballots.

In sum, although polling day disruption was immense, AOG attempts to discredit the process through argumentation, intimidation, and outright control of some areas will likely prove more significant.

Elsewhere, AOGs have continued to press ahead with checkpoints at all hours of the day between Kunduz and Khanabad and Kunduz and Aliabad. Perhaps more significantly, unconfirmed rumours speak of yet more checkpoints. Even if not true, the belief in and



continued spread of such anecdotes indicate an apparently effective demonstration of presence by AOGs. On at least one occasion in Dashti Archi District, AOGs demonstrated not just presence, but control, in that they detained (and claim they would mete out justice to) two individuals accused of banditry.

Additional evidence suggests that Kunduz may indeed be receiving more focused and coordinated support from regional AOGs; in one IMF raid in Chahar Darra, for example, the target was found to be a number of foreign AOG leaders. The presence of these elements is significant, because AOGs in Kunduz have until recently been a primarily home-grown affair, benefitting from broader AOG networks but receiving little direct support and leadership from outside.

TAKHAR

Although relatively limited in scope, AOG activity in some western districts shows signs of emulating or being influenced by trends in Kunduz Province. Half of the twelve security incidents for this reporting period occurred in Taluqan, the most important of which involved the emplacement of IEDs. This is not necessarily the result of AOG sentiment in Taluqan, itself; rather, this trend may be resultant from AOG attempts to destabilise the area and


KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- IEDs
- AOG activity in the Northwest

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	2
This Report Period	0

take advantage of easy access from Kunduz along the short, paved road leading to Taluqan City.

Other incidents which occurred in Taluqan suggest that the perceived fairness of the election was of at least as much concern to residents as was its legitimacy. With this, challenges to its fairness occurred, for example, in one instance when apparent supporters of one candidate attempted to place an IED near the IEC office, and in another, when armed supporters of one candidate entered the office accusing the officials of bias.



In the northwest region of the province, specifically the districts of Khwajai Ghar, Dasti Qal'a, Khwaja Bahauddin, Yangi Qal'a, and Darqad, warnings not to participate in the elections seemed to have little impact. Such warnings had been distributed widely in letter form throughout the area, but few confirmed attempts to inhibit voting occurred.

BAGHLAN

Incidents in Baghlan during the preceding period remained entirely restricted to Baghlani Jadid and Puli Khumri districts. Baghlani Jadid has seen security deterioration on par with that of Kunduz, with the most significant engagements occurring on election day. In one instance, AOG members succeed in killing the Baghlani Jadid District Chief of Police and keeping the district centre


KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- AOG activity in Baghlani Jadid
- ACG activity in Eastern districts

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	1
This Report Period	0

under a sustained attack which lasted much of the day. Even after a large ANA response, AOG members still managed to close off much of the road between Baghlani Jadid and Aliabad in the latter part of the day.

Also due to the strength of the AOG presence along the road between Puli Khumri and Aliabad, the risk of collateral involvement in confrontations between ANSF/IMF and AOG will remain high for the foreseeable future. Incidents in Puli Khumri



have been particularly focused on the area surrounding the cement factory west of the river, suggesting that they are resultant from only one ACG or AOG's activities. So far, the Puli Khumri – Mazar road has not been affected, though, with the exception of one night-time attack on a passenger car; in any event, travel at night is inadvisable.

FARYAB

As is evident writ large in Afghanistan, NGOs are often required to approach local AOG so that they can effectively and safely undertake aid or development activities. With this, NGOs are evermore at risk of being caught in the fray between AOGs and security forces; in an example of this, a major incident occurred when an INGO employee was killed after being collaterally in-


KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- IEDs
- Factional disputes

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	4
This Report Period	1

involved in a dispute between two armed factions in Gurziwan District. One of the individuals with whom the employee and four other staff members had been meeting with was a party to the clash. The four other NGO staff, who ultimately escaped unharmed, were unable to leave the area for quite some time as the armed clash continued.

Although it is highly unlikely that the unfortunate incident could have been foreseen by the NGO, the event underscores the importance of local situational awareness in remote places such as



Gurziwan, and that becoming enmeshed in local power/patronage networks carries immediate and long term risks.

Election-related activity in Faryab was high and particularly apparent in the usually more volatile western districts of Qaysar, Almar, and Pashtun Kot; however, attempts to disrupt the elections elsewhere were thwarted on a few occasions.

NOTE:

Please note that graphs in this report are current as of 26 August 2009.

BALKH


Activity in Balkh has remained relatively limited throughout the election period. Between attempts to discourage citizens from voting, AOGs made little attempt to disrupt the actual proceedings,

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- IEDs
- Factional disputes
- Civil disorder

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	5
This Report Period	0

with the exception of an attack on an IEC truck that was carrying ballot boxes in Nahri Shahi. Similarly, after the elections, AOGs managed to destroy a significant number of ballots being transported from Kaldar District after ambushing the truck that was carrying them. In spite of these mentioned incidents, the chief concern for Balkh province, given the possibility of a later run-off



election, is the chance of factional intimidation and other related activity. Conversely, the possibility of civil disturbance is also present should a run-off not occur.

HERAT

Since the last reporting period, events have been largely dominated by election-related violence. Still, the security situation during this period has remained relatively quiet compared to other main cities, such as Kabul or Kandahar; however, this is possibly because of increased IED seizures. The threat from IEDs remains a continual concern for NGOs operating in and around Herat City. It shows, as well, a scale of AOG/ACG activities in the area.

The large majority of recorded election-related incidents were confined to Herat City and Shindan and Guzara districts. In order to disturb the elections, as seen throughout the country, AOGs and ACGs used their preferred methods of IEDs and attacks on

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS


- IEDs
- AOG activity in Karukh and Kushki Kunha
- Criminality

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	12
This Report Period	0

polling stations; however, no casualties were reported in Herat City.

Regarding the pre-election period, three incidents of note occurred in the area of Herat City. On August 18th, an RCIED was found and seized in the vicinity of the Herat Governor's office. The following day, another RCIED was found and seized in Herat City in Badmorghan area. Also on 19 August, a school in Gazergan Dasht that had been designated as a polling station was targeted by an IED which exploded outside of the school.

On election day, Herat City was spared violence. Nonetheless, that day AOG activities manifested themselves in Shindan District, where, according to reporting, three percussion bombs exploded in the area of the DAC. In the area of Zir Koh, reports indicate that three election sites were set on fire, destroying election material. The same day, another inci-



dent was reported, this time in Guzara District, where an IED was found near an election site.

In the days following the election, further explosive devices were seized: two RCIEDs in Pashtun Zarghun District on August 21st, and on the same day, one in Herat City. Another RCIED was seized in Injil District on August 25th.

Besides election-related incidents, NGOs should note that prior to the election period, ANSF/IMF had conducted a joint operation in Guzara District, killing 9 AOG members plus 4 civilians and wounding 6 other civilians. In addition, on August 16th in Karukh District, AOG attacked with SAF an IMF convoy on the way to Herat from Qala-e-Now. This district (along with Kushki Kunha, as mentioned in the previous bi-weekly report) still represents an area of important AOG activities.

GHOR

One NGO-related incident occurred during this reporting period in Ghor on 29 August. Unidentified armed men abducted a local NGO worker in the Saghar District. He was taken to an unknown place and detained for about one hour. Afterwards, he was released, apparently un-

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS


- Abduction of NGO staff
- Election-related violence
- Roadside IEDs

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	6
This Report Period	1

harméd; however, his motorbike was stolen.

Of note, no prior threats or warnings preceded this incident. While the exact motivation behind this incident is not clear, early reporting suggests that this may have been a criminally motivated event.

It is also worthy of note that besides this incident, Ghor witnessed 5 election-related incidents. Two of them occurred prior to election day, one on 19 August in Saghar District, where AOG attacked 3 polling centres;



and another in Chaghcharan, where an election campaign office was struck by a hand grenade. On election day in Taywara District, two rockets targeted a polling centre, and in Saghar District, AOG attacked three polling centres.

BADGHIS

The province remains highly volatile with a recorded total of 24 incidents during this reporting period, the highest score of incidents in comparison to other western provinces. (It is worthy to note that all of them were attributed to AOG activities).

The security situation in the area during this period has been marked by several trends which should be underlined.

The use of indirect fire (rocket attacks) as well as direct fire attacks with RPGs and SAF continues to be the main tool of AOG in the province. Nevertheless, during this reporting period, there were 2 IED related incidents,

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS


- AOG assaults on ANSF
- Rocket attacks
- Ambushes

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	2
This Report Period	0

both of them occurring in Muqur District. In evidence of the increasing toll that AOG attacks are taking on the civilian populace, the two IED incidents resulted in 13 civilians killed and another 12 wounded.

AOG initiated attacks continue principally against ANSF or GoA targets. It should be emphasized that collateral exposure to attacks on ANSF (and IMF) remains an important concern in Muqur District and that NGOs should continue to avoid both governmental buildings and ANSF/IMF convoys.

Turning to electoral-related violence, 12 out of 24 incidents occurred during the pre-election period, with 2 of them being directly related to the election: AOG attacked two polling centres with RPGs and SAF in Muqur District on 17 August; and the



following day, 2 helicopters transporting election-related document were attacked in Jawad District.

During the same period, Ghormach District experienced a rocket attack on 19 August, killing 6 ANP and wounding 3 others, including the district Chief of Police—a blow that will likely bolster AOG morale.

AOG were active on election day; however, contrary to the pre-election period, when the majority of AOG attacks were assaults on ANP check points concentrated in Muqur District, on 20 August the majority of AOG attacks (5 out of 8) occurred in Ghormach District. Additionally, 2 AOG rocket attacks struck polling stations in the area, wounding two civilians.

FARAH

Compared to the previous reporting period, Farah has witnessed a continuation of similar types of incidents. The main threats consist in a significant number of both IED and RCIED-related incidents and AOG ambushes on ANSF/IMF convoys; for example, there were 5 IED/RCIED related incidents, as well as 2 pre-

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS


- Roadside IEDs
- Ambushes

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	2
This Report Period	0

mature IED detonations that caused AOG casualties.

The district of Pusht Rod remains an area of concern due to AOG activities and ANSF/IMF operations. The last of these operations took place on 29 August, when ANSF/IMF, supported by helicopters, reportedly killed 6 AOG members and wounded 13 others.

Additionally, the road to Farah City should still be considered a potential risk area due to IED attacks.



During the period, though, only one definitive election-related incident occurred. On 26 August in Gulistan District, an ANSF/IMF convoy that was carrying election materials suffered an RCIED strike, killing 1 ANP and wounding 8 others.

PAKTYA


Paktya saw the only reported suicide attack (a failed attempt to target a polling station in Gardez

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Complex attacks in Gardez City
- Kidnap, especially along the Gardez-Khost Road
- IEDs, especially along the Gardez-Khost Road

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	1
This Report Period	0

City) in the country on election day but otherwise was surprisingly quiet with only two AOG incidents. During this period, AOG conducted seven direct attacks, fired 16 mortars or rockets at security forces, and emplaced five IEDs, one of which killed an IEC worker and his son in Jaji District and another that was used to assassinate the Jani Khel Chief of



Police while he was travelling in Lija Ahmad Khel District. International staff are advised to avoid road travel in Paktya.

LAGHMAN


Laghman remains stable but saw the largest spike in reported AOG incidents in the Eastern Region on election day. 13 of 128 polling stations were attacked in some fashion, but no voters or election officials were killed. AOG opera-

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Attacks along Highway 1
- IED threat near DACs

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	1
This Report Period	0

tions during this period were spread evenly across the districts with 10 direct fire attacks taking place, 26 mortars or rockets being fired at security forces or polling stations, and five IEDs detonating or being found. Highway 1 was quiet during the period and remains adequately secure for NGO travel; international staff are ad-



vised to limit travel to Mitharlam City and Highway 1, though.

NANGARHAR

Nangarhar remained stable in this period with election related violence being lower than most NGOs expected. AOGs attacked 23 of 507 polling stations in the province on election day, but no voters or election staff were killed and no incidents involving NGOs or local staff were reported. AOG efforts were concentrated in Western districts, with Khogyani seeing 14 of the province's 57 AOG incidents this period. These included an IED strike on a pickup truck belonging to a foreign development company that wounded five local employees and another IED that killed two policemen.


KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Kidnap
- Attacks on JAF and GoA facilities
- Increased AOG activity in Western districts

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	7
This Report Period	0

Jalalabad City saw a spate of incidents including IEDs (most of which seemed designed to frighten, rather than to cause casualties), shootings against security forces, and a direct assault on the Zone 1 Police HQ that killed two policemen. Nangarhar also saw the highest use of IEDs in the region, with 19 found or detonated; experienced 30 armed attacks that were concentrated in Khogyani and Chaparhar districts; and had 19 mortars or rockets fired at security forces or polling stations.

Despite this activity, eleven districts in the northeast, south, and east were very quiet with no incidents reported. And Nangarhar remains adequately safe for NGO operations, but care should be taken in Khogyani and Chaparhar Districts. International staff are advised not to go beyond district centres.



Flooding destroyed the Saracha Bridge on Highway 1 approx 1000 m east of Jalalabad, meaning NGOs can expect movement to the east to be hampered for a considerable period of time.

Additionally, the Torkham border crossing saw another BBIED attack with at least 22 Pakistani Khasdaran tribal security personnel killed by a suicide bomber while eating dinner. This event occurred approx 100 m on the Pakistani side of the border and coincided with increased reporting of attacks on IMF convoys in the Northwest Frontier Provinces. Of note, these events may indicate heightened danger for the many NGO staff who regularly travel to Peshawar on Highway 1.

KHOST


Khost remains volatile but saw a relatively low spike in AOG incidents compared to other provinces over the election period. Only five polling stations were attacked, and attacks on security

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- IEDs
- Kidnap
- Collateral damage from AO attacks on GoA/IMF

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	9
This Report Period	0

forces ran at normal levels. IEDs are still a major concern as three civilians and two ANA were killed in two separate bombings. Over this reporting period, 17 IEDs detonated or were found in the province, primarily in Khost City, and 15 rockets or mortar bombs were fired at security forces. (Most indirect fire took place in Sabari District). Only two armed assaults, both of which were assassination attempts, occurred in



the province, which may indicate that AOG elements that would normally conduct direct action may be preparing to launch complex attacks. NGOs are advised not to travel by road in Khost and to avoid GoA facilities.


NURISTAN

Nuristan continues to have limited government control and relatively large numbers of AOG. Reporting continues to improve, so NGOs will see an apparent rise in AOG activity, one that may not represent an actual rise in vio-

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	1
This Report Period	0

lence. During this period, 12 direct attacks on security forces were reported, which is well above previous averages.

The election was marred by several well publicized instances of intentional and accidental ballot sabotage, but no voters or election workers were killed and no reports were received of attacks on



any of the 73 planned polling stations. International staff are advised to avoid road travel in the province.

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Increased military operations
- AOG pervasiveness


KUNAR

Kunar remains highly volatile and saw a large number of attacks on security forces over the election period. Fourteen of 119 polling stations were attacked, although many in outlying districts did not open. Kunar saw the lone murder of a voter in the region when a

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	7
This Report Period	0

man was shot to death on his way to vote in Sirkanay District.

As usual, most AOG operations were armed assaults, with 41 launched this period. Likewise, Indirect fire was relatively heavy with at least 94 mortars or rockets fired, most of which occurred in Bar Kunar, Manogai, and Sirkanay Districts. IEDs remained rare, though, with only six reported; conversely, actual IED numbers could be greater, as IMF may not be fully reporting IED finds. The




Jalalabad- Asadabad Highway saw no AOG attacks, and it appears that security force efforts to clear the southern stretch of the road of criminals and AOG may have been successful. International staff are advised, regardless, to limit travel to Asadabad City.

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Spread of AOG operations onto the Jalalabad-Asadabad Highway
- IDF and airstrikes

COMBINED (ACG/AOG) 2009 DIRECT NGO INCIDENTS



PAKTIKA


While the province, as a whole, is considered extremely dangerous, Sar Hawza saw a number of disconcerting incidents during the period. The most significant incident occurred when IMF entered an NGO clinic in the district on 26 August while searching for a prominent AOG commander who was reportedly accompanied by 5 other AOG. After reportedly evacuating patients and detaining 6 people who had been inside the clinic, IMF attempted to approach the target who was said to be in a back room. A fierce clash conse-

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	1
This Report Period	1

quently ensued between the target and IMF, resulting in at least one IMF killed. Then, an escalation of force that is believed to have killed the target occurred, causing severe damage to the clinic. (While it is not clear, it is believed that one of the group was seeking treatment in the clinic, meaning the incident could have ramifications for NGO clinics in the East and South because AOG may feel they can no longer count on them for medical treatment.) In another lengthy attack in the district, AOG targeted an ANSF convoy for two hours, resulting in 5 ANA soldiers, 3 PSC guards, and 9 AOG killed, this time on 20 August.

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- IEDs
- Abduction
- AOG-IMF/ANSF clashes



AOG suffered other losses when they attacked a joint ANP/ANA convoy for one hour, resulting in 5 AOG and 1 ANP killed in Omna District on 19 August.

Election day incidents included attacks on ANSF convoys that were moving election materials and several assaults on polling stations in Ziruk, Yahya Khel, and Sar Hawza districts. IED strikes also persisted: an IED detonated near a polling centre in Urgun District on 20 August and another struck a civilian vehicle, killing 5 occupants in Yosuf Khel District on 24 August.

URUZGAN


This reporting period in Uruzgan concluded with a number of significant incidents. The most significant one occurred on 18 August in Chora District when a BBIED attacker approached an ANA post, and an on-duty ANA guard in front of the facility identified the attacker as being suspicious, shooting the attacker dead; however, the BBIED still detonated, killing 2 ANA soldiers and 2 civilians and wounding 3 ANA soldiers and 3 more civilians. ANA reportedly responded in what could be perceived as a re-

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	2
This Report Period	0

prisal, killing 4 civilians and wounding another 3.

In the run-up to the election, voter-intimidation efforts were prevalent, with night letters that stated the elections were a US enterprise and warned residents not to vote or face death being distributed on 18 August in Tirin Kot. Of note, the following day, AOG attacked an ANP post for one hour, resulting in 10 AOG and 1 ANP killed.

AOG were active on election day, similarly, firing more than 40 RPGs or rockets that targeted polling centres. With this, AOG fired about 20 RPGs that struck in the surrounding areas of the Governor's office in Khas Uruzgan District. Additionally, AOG fired



5 RPGs that targeted the same district's DAC, and a RPG struck a residence located 100 meters from a polling centre.

And on 26 August, AOG attacked an IMF base in Khas Uruzgan, culminating in an IMF/ANSF counterattack that involved air support and killed 9 AOG. AOG suffered further losses, for example, in an IMF-ANP operation that killed 12 AOG on 27 August.

Because of the general security vacuum, NGOs should avoid travel to areas outside of Tirin Kot whenever possible.

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- IEDs
- BBIEDs
- AOG opposition to NGOs

KANDAHAR

The most significant incident occurred in Kandahar City on 25 August when a small Mazda truck laden with explosives and parked close to a foreign construction company prematurely detonated. The target was believed to have been the NDS compound located nearby. In the attack, 42 civilians were killed and a further 85 civilians were wounded. Nearby shops, stores, and houses, including NGO compounds, sustained severe damage.

AOG also conducted diffuse efforts to target the GoA and IMF. A few events of note include the successful killing of the Reg District Governor and a tribal elder on 19 August and the 25 August killings of the Khakrez District Governor and 4 IMF soldiers, all in separate IED blasts.

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Kidnap
- Hijack
- Roadside IEDs


	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	5
This Report Period	1

Multiple ineffective AOG attempts were also witnessed, for example, when a motorbike laden with explosives in District 9 and a VBIED in Spin Boldak District were discovered by ANSF. Another failure was the 22 August attack on an ANP post in Shah Wali Kot that ended in 8 AOG fatalities.

IMF persist in trying to rebuff AOG operations, for example, arresting the Daman District Shadow Governor on 28 August (the operation also killed his son).

As expected, electoral-related violence was common. In one example, AOG attacked a Shah Wali Kot polling centre with SAF for an hour, wounding 1 IMF and 1 ANA on 18 August, and in another, AOG attacked a centre in Maywand District, wounding an IEC worker.

And on election day, AOG conducted several stand off attacks against polling centres, as seen in RPG attacks on schools that were serving as sites in districts 8 and 5,



an IO compound polling site in District 6, and the Zhari DAC (40 RPGs were launched at the said DAC. When ANP arrived at the launch site, they located 4 dead AOG, suggesting that locals had taken action against them).

In sum, 28 IED strikes also occurred during this reporting period. For example, a roadside IED hit a vehicle carrying IEC personnel, killing 2 IEC staff in Shorabak District on 18 August, while another explosion occurred in a polling station in Masoom Ghar of Panjwayi. To conclude, NGOs should expect the security situation in Kandahar Province to further deteriorate, with continual IED/rocket and suicide attacks being conducted on targets by AOG residing inside and outside of their respective target areas.

ZABUL


For Zabul, the reporting period was marked by the 29 August BBIED strike in Shahjoy District when a bomber targeted an IMF foot patrol in the district's crowded bazaar, resulting in the suicide bomber and 2 civilians killed and 21 civilians, three IMF, and one ANP wounded.

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- BBIED attacks
- Roadside IEDs
- Attacks on ANP

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	0
This Report Period	0

Zabul also did not escape AOG desires to strike on election day when they engaged ANP providing security for a polling centre for 30 minutes and fired two RPGs that struck 400 meters from an IO compound polling centre—separate incidents that both occurred in Qalat District. Additionally, AOG fired one RPG, one rocket, and three mortars towards Shahjoy District centre, with one RPG striking a house, killing 2



civilians, and wounding a woman and 4 others including 3 children.

A number of IED strikes also occurred; for example, on 19 August in Mizan District, an IED hit an IMF vehicle, wounding 2 IMF soldiers and a national interpreter.

HELMAND

The security situation in Helmand Province remains perilous in all districts, with Sangin especially warranting concern. As elsewhere, locals were threatened not to participate in the electoral process prior to election day. And on 19 and 20 August, AOG targeted urban centres and polling stations, using RPGs, Rockets, and small arms, in multiple districts, including Nad Ali, Laskar Gah, Garmser, and Nawa-i-Barak Zai, to name a few. In sum, AOG fired more than a hundred rockets targeting different District Centres on 20 August.; in an extreme examples, AOG fired 82 rockets towards District Centres in Musa Qala and Sangin.


Violence did not subside in the wake of the election, though, illus-

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	1
This Report Period	0

trated by the 29 August ambush of de-miners who were responding to IED finds in Kuchnai Karez, Lashkar Gah District. As the event concluded, 1 de-miner would be dead, two wounded, and four abducted.

Demonstrating AOG desires to challenge IMF in Sangin District, a Chinook helicopter that had reportedly made an emergency landing was ultimately destroyed by IMF after AOG struck it with RPGs on the 19th; similarly, another Chinook crash-landed in Sangin on 30 August, this time for unknown reasons.

IMF/ANSF also conducted several operations during the period. On 21 August in Nad Ali District, IMF conducted an airstrike and killed 12 AOG members whilst 6 AOG were killed during another IMF airstrike in Nahri Sarraj District on 24 August. Also, ANP conducted an operation against purported drug smugglers in



Lashkar Gah on 23 August that concluded in the seizure of 880 kg of opium, weapons, and explosive devices.

Likewise, AOG conducted assaults against IMF/ANSF, such as the 16 August two hour attack on a foot patrol that killed 3 IMF in Sangin. Also, AOG attacked an ANP patrol, killing 7 ANP on 21 August. In an example of the typical overwhelming ratio of AOG that are killed in AOG-initiated assaults, 12 AOG, versus 2 ANBP, were killed when they engaged a joint IMF-ANSF convoy in Musa Qala on the 18th. Several IED strikes also occurred during this period, including an IED strike that killed 7 AOG members in Musa Qala District on 20 August, another that killed 8 civilians in Nad Ali District on the same day, and one that killed 3 children and wounding 4 others in Nahri Sarraj on 25 August.

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Suicide attacks
- Roadside IEDs
- Significant AOG threat


NIMROZ

In an attempt to stifle voter turnout, AOG distributed night letters in Zaranj during the reporting period, warning locals not to take part in the elections and to stay clear of polling centres, GoA installations, and IMF convoys, as they would be attacked on election day. And on election day, AOG fired 2 RPGs at a private

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	1
This Report Period	0

vehicle that was carrying voters from a village to the polling centre in Chakhansur District, attacked ANP for 30 minutes in Khash Rod District as they were escorting an IEC convoy, and fired 4 rockets targeting polling centres in Chahar Burjak District.

Post-election related violence was also reported in Nimroz; for example, an IED hit ANP that were escorting an IEC convoy, and another IED hit an ANP vehicle carrying ballot boxes, both on 21 August. Additionally, AOG instituted checkpoints in the province:



one on 27 August in Khash Rod and another on 28 August in Zaranj. In the case of the latter, ANP challenged the AOG, resulting in a 30 minute exchange of fire.

One should note, despite low incident levels, the lack of security makes travel and operations in Nimroz extremely hazardous, even inside purported GoA-controlled areas.

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Suicide attacks in Zaranj and Khash Rod
- Kidnap
- Prevalent security vacuum

GHAZNI

According to ANSO records, AOGs were the dominant actors in Ghazni Province. On 16 August, 350 AOG members, including 10 suicide bombers, reportedly migrated into Pir Shah, Shahliz, and Desh Hai Arzo areas of Ghazni. The suicide attackers were said to be planning to target crowded roads in the city, but this threat did not manifest itself. AOG did, however, place IEDs on city roads and warn locals that they would be killed if they voted. With this, 16 August brought forth what may have been concerted AOG anti-election activity.

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS


- Abduction
- IEDs
- Ambushes of IMF/GoA convoys

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	2
This Report Period	0

For example, AOG conducted searches and confiscations of voter registration cards throughout Gelan District that persisted for 3-4 days; infiltrated into Zana Khan District to dissuade locals from voting; and issued night letters in Ab Band District that warned locals not to vote.

As elsewhere, AOG fired numerous RPGs and rockets that targeted polling centres on election day. AOG, for example, fired 2 RPGs that targeted a polling centre in Ghazni City and 21 rockets towards the Muqur DAC.


While AOG operations may appear to be robust in the province, one should note the often neglected fact that AOG are incurring continual losses due to premature IED detonations: 15 AOG were accidentally killed



while planting roadside IEDs in Ab Band and Waghaz districts on 17-18 August. These losses are also paired with continual overwhelming AOG casualties; for example, a 20 August attack on an ANP convoy resulted in 4 AOG killed versus 1 ANP.

While ANSF and IMF may be holding their own, mounting casualties and fratricide will likely hurt morale. A few incidents illustrating ANSF losses during the period include the destruction of 3 ANA vehicles and theft of 4 others by AOG; killing of 4 ANP and wounding of 2 others by IMF airstrikes; and the killing of 3 ANP and wounding of 16 others in an ambush.

AOG INITIATED INCIDENTS





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ansoab@yahoo.com

ANSO ACRONYMS

IMF-International Military Forces / **AOG**-Armed Opposition Group / **GOA**-Government of Afghanistan / **ACG**-Armed Criminal Group / **ANA**-Afghan National Army / **ANP**-Afghan National Police / **IED**-Improvised Exploding Device / **AEF**-Afghan Eradication Forces / **RPG**-Rocket Propelled Grenade / **IDF**-Indirect Fire (ex: mortars) / **VBIED**-Vehicle Borne Improvised Exploding Device / **PRP**-Previous Reporting Period / **ANBP**-Afghan National Border Police / **SAF**-Small Arms Fire / **NDS**-National Directorate of Security (intelligence) / **PSC**-Private Security Company / **DC**-District Centre

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MISSING

This report ANSO could not provide analysis for the provinces of:

Panjshir
Badakhshan
Samangan
Jawzjan
Sar-e Pul

This is because we do not know enough about the area to comment on the significance of the incidents occurring there.

If you can help us understand the province better, please contact us.

ANSO TRAINING

To help ensure that ANSO's new communications training package meets NGO expectations and needs, ANSO will be running a pilot session in mid to late October. ANSO-registered NGO communications personnel are encouraged to attend and provide feedback. Please contact operations2@afgnso.org to express interest.