

THE ANSO REPORT

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YOU NEED TO KNOW

- Instability persists in the North, South, and East
- Kabul Conference will draw AOG attention
- Further attacks on organizations that support stability operations likely

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COUNTRY SUMMARY

With the Kabul Conference set to occur, NGOs are bracing for a likely attack in the city during the surrounding period, especially when one recognises the duration between grandiose attacks has now shortened (see Kabul).

Despite assertions of success through counterinsurgency (COIN), indications persistently suggest the contrary. Thus, NGOs are continually confronted with further instability.

The North had its fair share of incidents. IED activity in Badakhshan, for instance, is disconcerting, and AOG migration resulted in a brush with NGO staff in Takhar on 6 and 7 July. Also in Baghlan, AOG migration is hampering access. Faryab, additionally, saw the effect of AOG with numerous coordinated attacks on ANP.

Nowhere in the country is instability more evident than Ghazni, where IMF appear to have received the message and increased operations. Regardless of IMF efforts, though, AOG continued a campaign of intimidation through targeted killings and, although to a lesser degree, attacks on schools. Moreover, AOG brought the fight to IMF and ANSF evermore, with increased direct attacks

on instillations and DACs.

Helmand also serves as a constant example of IMF direct attacks on IMF: five in Marja, four in Sangin and Nad Ali, and three in Nahri Sarraj and Lashkar Gah. After review, one sees that direct confrontation has increased in various segments of the Southern and Eastern regions, for example in Nimroz and Paktya. Likewise targeted killings persisted, for example occurring in Logar, Ghazni, Helmand, and Nimroz.

A new and indicative sign of AOG intentions to expand areas of operation was also seen on 14 July when 50-60 AOG members setup a vehicle checkpoint on the Kabul-Jalalabad Road in the early morning, during which they set ablaze two trucks returning from Kabul.

Also a sign of the times, instability is making further waves in Nangarhar, which until recently escaped AOG focus, likely due to economic interests in the area. Furthermore, activity in and around Jalalabad City is especially deserving of attention; for example, an SVBIED targeted IMF in Bihsud on 9 July.

As always noted in ANSO

reporting, changes in the dynamics of armed actors put NGOs at increased risk; for instance, NGOs now face an increased risk of abduction in Baghlan, Faryab, Kunduz, Parwan, etc. Conversely, as noted in the ANSO Quarterly Report, NGO incidents are down in 2010. While media may incorrectly cite 'threats against humanitarian workers' in the press, all evidence indicates that AOG are not. Instead, they are merely adhering to expressed intentions to target people and organisations who are perceived as parties-to-the-conflict, especially development agencies that support 'stability operations'.

In support of this, AOG targeted a for-profit development agency on 2 July in Kunduz City—one that is clearly aligned with IMF and operates in support of COIN doctrine. The complex attack, involving an SVBIED and multiple BBIEDs, drew significant attention. After a lengthy clash, several fatalities resulted, including two of the agency's PSC expatriates, three guards, two ANP, two civilians, and five AOG.

PARWAN

Reported activity in the province was minimal; however, peripheral information suggests that Shinwari District is currently experiencing notable AOG infiltration and sympathy throughout the area, likely furthered by AOG flows from Baghlan in the aftermath of IMF/ANSF operations. Past AOG activity in the district consisted primarily of attacks on ANP checkpoints; opposition was evident also during this period, with an 8 July IED strike that targeted a UN convoy which was es-


KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- AOG activity in Ghorband Valley
- ACG activity in Chaharikar
- Kidnap along the Kabul-Bamyan Road

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	2
This Report Period	0

corted by ANP as it transited through the district, leading to the deaths of two ANP and one UN-contracted staff member. (While not certain, the armed escort likely drew extra attention to the convoy). An IED was also discovered in the same area on the 12th.

Security in the district remains in question because ANSF have yet to confront AOG, and security forces do not maintain a presence—at a minimum—between Chaharikar and Shinwari. While security in the district has deteriorated (from January-June, 9 AOG incidents occurred in 2010, compared to 5 in 2009 and 2 in 2008), the GoA's inability to address AOG pervasiveness has resulted in a 'quick fix' effort: founding pro-government militias. Militias, said to be part of the Afghan Pub-



lic Protection Force (APPF), are currently active in Dara Kafshan, Qulher, Austama, and Sardary Ushter Shah, with all being rumoured to be comprised heavily of AOG. After analysing developments, all information supports the notion that ANSF and the GoA are attempting to establish a tacit agreement with AOG that allows them to exist unchallenged; how long this situation will last, however, is unknown. For NGOs, AOG have voiced that NGOs which enter certain areas with armed escorts, or after alerting the GoA, cannot be assured of their safety. (Regardless, accompaniment by armed escorts often draws the attention of AOG). At first glance this may be disconcerting, contested or controlled areas.

LOGAR


For this period, the conflict was primarily manifest in Barak-e Barak and Pul-e Alam, with the two districts experiencing 13 and 11 incidents, respectively. The majority of activity in Barak-e Barak was AOG-initiated. Of note, AOG shot dead a local shopkeeper during the morning of the 8th, gunning him down from behind as he was opening his store in the Barak-e Barak Bazaar. Although preliminary, it appears that he was targeted because he was suspected of being a GoA informant, marking only the second known AOG targeted killing of a civilian in the

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- IEDs, especially targeting IMF
- Abduction

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	1
This Report Period	0

district for 2010. (The first was a religious personality who was targeted in January. Also of importance, another religious personality was targeted for abduction, although unsuccessfully, in late March). One should note abductions and targeted killings signify that AOG will likely begin taking a more active interest in the area, and that they typically cannot freely operate in the area that the incidents occur. Moreover, they often seek to target legitimate social bodies or actors (mullahs, shuras, etc.) that stand in opposition to AOG activities or values. (These methods are an obvious demonstration of AOG intentions to kill collaborators, an effective intimidation method). IED activ-



ity was also notable, with 7 IED-related incidents occurring in the district during the period.

Turning to Pul-e Alam, it only experienced two IED-related incidents and general AOG attacks. An AOG checkpoint, however, was noted in Babos on the 10th. Lastly, the most notable occurrence in the district was the 11 July demonstration in which locals sought to voice their dissent concerning the deaths of 10-12 Khushi District residents as they were transiting through Paktya. (It remains unclear who was responsible for their deaths).

KAPISA


Reported activity in Kapisa during the period was extremely limited.

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- AOG expansion
- Low intensity factional disputes in Kohistan I & II
- AOG in Alasay, Nijrab, & Tagab

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	1
This Report Period	0

The most notable incident was an AOG ambush that targeted the Nijrab District Chief of Police on 8 July, albeit unsuccessfully. Except for the abovementioned incident, all activity occurred in Tagab and was of little note, consisting of an IMF detention of AOG; a find of some hand grenades; an RCIED that struck civilians in the bazaar; an attack on an ANP



check post; and an ambush on IMF/ANA that also utilised an IED.

DAYKUNDI


Reported information from Daykundi during the period was minimal; one incident highlighting

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Security vacuum
- Ethno-political tensions between Hazara and Pashtuns
- Spoilers-to-peace in Gizab District

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	0
This Report Period	0

issues in the province, though, affected an INGO that adapts a profile and activities which differ from typical NGO activities. On 9 July in Khadir, gunmen working for a notorious warlord stopped the INGO's vehicle and searched it, demanding that the passengers provide something in exchange for passage, resulting in the staff relinquishing a mobile phone. Two incidents occurred in restive



Kajran: one an ANP operation that purportedly unseated an AOG on the 13th, and the other a demonstration that apparently asked for an increased GoA presence in Baghran, Helmand, on the 11th.

KABUL

Activity in Kabul is relatively se-date in comparison to other provinces. When looking at attack trends, though, one sees that the time between spectacular AOG attacks in Kabul City has actually shrunk despite strong ANSF efforts to pre-empt them, whether


KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Criminality in the morning
- Attention-grabbing AOG attacks targeting GoA, IMF, IOs, and comingled targets

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	6
This Report Period	0

through arrests or weapon and explosive finds: the new average time between such attacks is now 25 days. Recognising that data indicate the likelihood of an attack is high, one should expect a similar styled attack to occur in the days surrounding the Kabul Conference.

The Kabul Conference is drawing attention not for policy reasons—all policy decisions have already been taken—rather for the effect the event will have on the city, with the airport being closed from



2200 hrs on the 19th until 0400 hrs on the 21st, as well as multiple road closures around the Presidential Palace. Besides concerns about the conference, activity in the city consisted only of crime and ANSF efforts to round up AOG suspects and seize material.

WARDAK


47% of the period's incidents occurred in Saydabad, a clear AOG stronghold. Irrespective of Sayda-

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- AOG prevalence in Saydabad
- Abduction
- IEDs and ambushes targeting IMF/ANSF logistics convoys along Highway 1

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	2
This Report Period	0

bad, AOG were once again the dominant actors in the province, and IEDs were of clear concern. (16 IED-related incidents occurred during the period). Over-shadowed by IEDs, but of clear importance, were AOG assaults and ambushes, with 12 occurring against IMF contracted convoys, ANP posts, and ANP, ANA, or



PSC vehicles (4 against the former and 7 against the latter). Two targeted killings also occurred, one in Saydabad on the 13th and one in Chak-e Wardak on the 5th.

BAMYAN


In general, Bamyan remains one of the most secure provinces for NGO operations; however, the effect that banditry has on NGO

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Civil unrest
- ACG/AOG activity in Shinkari & Ghandak Valleys
- ACG/AOG migration from Tala Wa Barfak

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	0
This Report Period	0

movements was evident in a 1 July incident which occurred in Panjab. In the early evening, an INGO vehicle transiting through the Khargul Pass encountered what appeared to be an ANP checkpoint, noting that they were searching a vehicle on the road. When the vehicle approached the apparent ANP, the driver stopped the vehicle and one ANP ordered them to open the window. The driver asked if it was a checkpoint,



and the ANP shouted, opened the door and ordered him to lie down on the ground. The staff member was consequently robbed of money, two satellite phones, and other equipment by the gunmen who were later confirmed not to be ANP.

JAWZJAN


Jawzjan was relatively quiet again during this reporting period, with only three recorded incidents. However, AOGs continued to show their presence in Qush Tepa—as it has been the case already in June—and in Fayzabad District.

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- AOG activity in Qush Tepa
- AOG attacks on communication facilities

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	0
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On 8 July, AOGs attacked an ANSF patrol with SAF and RPGs. The ANSF members responded to the attack, and AOGs withdrew after an hour-long fire fight. This incident again confirms that AOG activity is present in Qush Tepa and an increase of direct attacks can be expected. In Fayzabad District, AOGs fired two RPGs at a telecommunications antenna, on 6 July, and subsequently set the antenna on fire.



The ANP responded, and the perpetrators retreated after a brief fire fight. AOG attacks on communication facilities are a usual tactic by AOGs in areas where they increasingly establish their presence and are quite common in the north and northeast.

KUNDUZ


In Kunduz Province, the hotspots were as usual Chahar Dara, Imam Sahib, Qala-e Zal, Aliabad and Kunduz districts. Nearly 40% of all incidents were direct AOG attacks targeting ANSF, pro-government militias, and IMF, albeit to a lesser extent than during the previous two weeks. This reporting period has seen two massive attacks on ANBP check posts in Imam Sahib and Qala-e Zal as well as a massive attack on a pro-government militia again in Qala-e Zal. In Tuqus Tepa Area of Qala-e Zal, a pro-government militia was forced to abandon a check post on 11 July, and two days later ANBP had to do the same. Furthermore, in Satar Paira Area of Imam Sahib AOGs attacked an ANBP checkpoint on 10 July, killing nine ANBP members and abducting another. In addition, IMF conducted an air strike on 4 July in Isa Khil Village of Chahar Dara. Reportedly, an AOG member was injured and a nearby mosque sustained damage. Again fighting between pro-government militias was reported, this time in Aqtash Area of Kunduz District. Clashes of this kind indicate the difficulty in ensuring that pro-government militias are not additional risks to local secu-

rity and stability, as well they again raise questions on how to actually control these militias.

The province has seen already seven IED related incidents in July, of which four were RCIED strikes, two discoveries in Kunduz and one a premature detonation in Chahar Dara. In Qala-e Zal on 10 July, an RCIED hit the vehicle of the district governor, killing him and his driver and injuring his son in Jinghariq Area. In Kunduz City in PD 4 on the main road to Taluqan an RCIED hit an ANP patrol on 8 July. In addition, on 9 July an RCIED hit vehicles of the Kabul Bank in Qazaq Village of Aliabad District. The fourth RCIED targeted and hit two IMF vehicles in Qrayateem Village of Chahar Dara District. The previous reporting periods have seen a significant increase of IED strikes in Kunduz Province. with 11 strikes in June. With already four strikes in the first half of July, a high level of IED strikes appear to be continuing.

Kunduz City witnessed an SVBIED attack against a for-profit development agency's office/guesthouse on 2 July which lasted for 8 hours, from 0300 until 1100 hrs. An AOG member detonated an SVBIED—a Land Cruiser laden with explosives—outside of the agency's office to initiate a complex attack. Afterwards, guards inside the compound, as well as an ANP patrol which happened to be in the area, engaged 4 AOG as they attempted to enter the compound. After an unknown period of time, the AOG were able to enter the compound. Circa 0700 hrs, IMF

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	2
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responded to provide assistance. In conclusion, casualties include the deaths of five AOG members, two expatriates employed by the for-profit development agency's security firm, three of the agency's guards, two ANP, and two civilians. The sum of wounded includes one of the agency's expatriates, three of its guards, one ANP, and 21 civilians. It is likely that some may see the said incident as confirmation of the recent statement, purportedly released by the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, that they will now begin to target foreigners who support the GoA—meaning those who extend its writ—particularly Indians; however, one should note that that policy has been the de facto and de jur IEA approach for some time. In addition, the for-profit development agency is perceived as strongly linked to US involvement through 'stability' and counterinsurgency operations. Especially in the South of Afghanistan, the increased targeting of US implementing partners has been observed already for quite some time, although this incident is the first case in the Northern Region. For these obvious and pre-existing reasons, ANSO continues to advocate for NGO abstention from involvement with parties to the conflict whenever possible.

Furthermore, on 13 July in Kunduz City an international organization staff member received a call from an unknown person, threatening him not to work with the international community. However, intimidation cases like this are not unusual in Kunduz.

AOGs also have again resumed their nighttime rocket campaign, usually targeting the Airport/PRT area south of Kunduz City. On 4 July, A 107mm rocket was fired from Chahar Dara and impacted in the vicinity of a school.

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- IEDs in Kunduz, Chahar Dara, Qala-e Zal and Aliabad
- AOG attacks against US implementing partners
- Direct attacks targeting especially against ANSF but also pro-government militias and IMF

BALKH


A direct NGO incident was recorded in Chahar Bolak, Kalili Village. On 10 July at 0800 hrs, two unknown armed men riding on a motorcycle stopped an INGO employee who was en route to visit program recipients. The armed men beat the staff member and he attempted to escape; subsequently, the perpetrators shot and injured him. The perpetrators stole the employee's motorcycle and escaped from the scene. The attackers are believed to be ACGs, encouraging NGO staff members not to carry valuable items or large sums of cash. The general security situation in Balkh Province remains calm with the exception of Charhar Bolak, Chintal—despite the ANSF/IMF operation—and Sholgara districts where AOGs remain visibly active.

In Chintal, AOGs attacked an ANP gas pipeline checkpoint on 6 July in Imam Sahim Village. The ANP responded to the attack and the fire fight lasted for an hour. Of note, in Charhar Bolak and Sholgara illegal checkpoints have

	NGO Incidents
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been reported. On 13 July in El-man Village, Charhar Bolak, AOGs closed the road around 2200 hrs and searched vehicles for GoA and ANSF employees on the road between Mazar-e Sharif and Shibirghan. On 9 July in Sholgara, a large number of AOGs stopped private transport vehicles on the road leading to Dalan Village of Sholgara and searched the passengers for ANSF employees. AOGs released the vehicles after beating some of the passengers and stealing mobile phones and cash. Also in Sholgara, on 13 July an AOG member attempted to assassinate a former local Jihadi commander in his residence. A follower of the commander detained the perpetrator.

In Mazar-e Sharif City on 7 July, IMF conducted a helicopter raid in Kart-e Zerahat Area near the teacher training centre. Two local security guards who had been appointed by locals due to past robberies were shot and killed. Additionally, it appears that IMF searched at least one house and detained three individuals. Of note, this marks the first IMF action in Mazar-e Sharif since March 2009, and the first IMF detention of suspects since August 2006. In reaction to the incident, a peaceful demonstration occurred in front



of the UNAMA office in Mazar-e Sharif City. Demonstrators transited from Masjed-e Hazrat Ali to submit a petition to the UNAMA office that voices dissent towards the recent IMF raid that resulted in the death of two local security guards and the detention of three Afghans in Kart-e Zerahat area of District 2. With the increased presence of special operations forces and general IMF in the Northern Region and Mazar-e Sharif, it is likely that similar actions will become quite more common.

Mazar-e Sharif City saw two more notable incidents during the last two weeks which, however, seem to be crime related. On 4 July, three gunmen attempted to abduct the nephew of an influential businessman in Kefayat Hotel Area. The incident was likely due to financial or social rivalries. With this, though, the incident marks only the second abduction to be recorded in the city for 2010. In addition, on 6 July gunmen opened fire on a vehicle with workers on their way to a construction site for a new university in Bez-e Sokhata Area. ANP engaged the attackers, killing three attackers and arresting two. The exact motive remains unclear; however, there are indications that the incident is crime related since at least one of the gunmen was identified as a known criminal.

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- AOG activity in Chahar Bolak/Chintal
- AOGs east of Sholgara River

GRAPHS:

Graphs in this report are current as of 7 July 2010.


FARYAB

AOG presence and activity were again quite visible, especially in Qaysar District of Faryab Province, but also in Dawlatabad, Bilchiragh, Pashtun Kot and Shirin Tagab districts. The most significant AOG attack, especially in regard to AOG's coordination capabilities, was an attack on multiple ANP checkpoints in Dawlatabad, Jungle Area, on 6 July. ANP responded to the attack and the fire fight lasted for almost an hour, killing an ANP member and injuring a female civilian. In addition, armed attacks against ANP patrols took place in Shirin Tagab, Kohri Sayad Village, and Bilchiragh, Archatu Village. In Qaysar District, AOG attacked an ANP patrol in Zohoria Village and an IMF patrol in Khaja Gawhar Village. Individual ANP officers were targeted in Maymana City,

	NGO Incidents
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Qaysar abd Pashtun Kot. On 4 July, AOG opened fire on a motorcycle opened fire at an ANP guard and escaped from the scene. Three days later, AOGs abducted an ANP officer on his way to work in Naghara Khana Village, Qaysar. Another ANP officer was abducted on his way home on 11 July in Rahee Village, Pashtun Kot. Again in Qaysar District, Doabi Area, AOGs stopped a truck of an international road construction company, set the truck on fire and abducted the driver on 11 July.

The presence of illegal checkpoints decreased during this reporting cycle. The only recorded incident of this kind in the first half of July was on 2 July when AOGs established a road block in the Jungle area on the ring road




during the early evening. The ANP quick reaction force responded, and AOGs retreated from the area. One ANP member was injured during the fire fight. However, given the overall AOG presence and activity, another increase of road blocks and illegal checkpoints should be expected in the mentioned area. The abovementioned attack on multiple ANP checkpoints in the same area suggests that the current capacity of the security forces to intervene on any occasion is limited. ANSF/IMF joint operations to reduce AOG influence took place in Bilchiragh District on 9 July in Tash Qala Village Area and on 10 July in Qorchi Village Area.

TAKHAR

Yangi Qala District—especially Omar Khel Area—has become increasingly precarious with the current expansion of AOG influence in northern Takhar. On 6 and 7 July, INGO staff were directly affected when travelling through Omar Khel. On 6 July, six AOG members stopped the INGO's vehicle and questioned the staff, to include which organisation they worked for and the duration of time they had been working in the area. After providing answers, the staff were allowed to proceed. The following day, AOG again stopped the INGO staff and searched its car, afterwards allowing the staff to again proceed. During the return trip through the area, though, the INGO again was stopped by the

	NGO Incidents
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AOG—there were different members present. After conducting a search, the staff members were instructed not to carry digital cameras, GPSs, or mobile phones. In addition, on 12 July another illegal CP was established by AOG in Omar Khel on the main road between Yangi Qala and Khujabahuddin. An increase of further illegal checkpoints can be expected in the mentioned area during the upcoming weeks. Again in Omar Khel Area, on 6 and 7 July, two ANSF staff were abducted, in both cases while using public transport. The increase of illegal checkpoints as well as the abductions of ANSF staff further indicate a focus on intimidat-



tion tactics in the area as was mentioned in the previous report.

Nearly half of all recorded incidents were AOG attacks targeting ANP/ANBP or pro-government militias, or armed clashes particularly in Yangi Qala, Darqad, and Kwaha Ghar. Especially in Darqad and Yangi Qala, further armed clashes and AOG attacks targeting ANSF/IMF are to be expected because of the redeployment of IMF and ANSF in the beginning of June in Khwaja Bahawuddin, Darqad and Yangi Qala districts.


BADAKHSHAN

In Badakhshan Province, nearly all AOG related incidents were taking place in Kishim District, which is linked to the AOG presence in the area already mentioned in previous reports. Although AOGs are remaining relatively quiet, an increase in activity should be expected. On 10 July, an IED detonated against a passing ANP vehicle in Chilgazi Village, Kishim District, killing four ANP members, including the District Deputy Chief of Police, and injuring three other ANP members. A day later, ANP arrested three suspected ANP members who were accused of being involved in an RCIED attack targeting the ANP vehicle the day before. In addition, ANSF arrested AOG members, including two

	NGO Incidents
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AOG commanders, on 4 and 5 July in Kishim District.

In Fayzabad New City, Hesa-e Awal Area (PD 5), a roadside IED was discovered, within 100-200 m of an INGO facility. The device was constructed of a pressure cooker and 1.5 kg of TNT (it appears that it was also rigged with a timer); however, according to ANP the device was not constructed to properly detonate. If the ANP are correct that the device would not have detonated, it is likely that the IED was only meant to intimidate a local or serve as a sign of instability in the area, both common occurrences in the province and the Northern Region. As of yet, there is no indication that the IED was meant to



target the INGO in the area. It was some distance from the facility, and other notable targets exist in the area as well.

Five demonstrations in relation to the elimination of candidates from the upcoming parliamentary elections took place in the second week of the current reporting period. In Fayzabad and especially Argo, demonstrations occurred against the elimination of Abdul Jabar Musadeq, and in Tishkan against the elimination of Sayed Khairuddin. Further gatherings and demonstrations in regard to the upcoming parliamentary elections and respective candidates are to be expected.


BAGHLAN

Threats to the main roads through Baghlan still persist as has been stressed during previous reports. The majority of incidents in Baghlan are armed attacks mainly in Pul-e Khumri but also in Baghlan-e Jadid and Dushi targeting ANSF, IMF, fuel tankers and supply convoys. Of note, this reporting period has also seen two AOG attacks on civilian vehicles. On 11 July, AOGs opened fire on a private vehicle, injuring two passengers at in Qala-e Naw Area, Pul-e Khumri. In addition, on 4 July at 2200 hrs AOGs targeted a passing private truck. As a result, the driver was injured and his assistant was killed on the road between Pul-e Khumri and Mazar-e Sharif in Dand-e Ghorri Area, Pul-e Khumri. Further incidents demonstrating the risk for civilian travel in the area were an illegal

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	1
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checkpoint on 12 July where AOGs robbed passengers of their cash and valuables on the road between Pul-e Khumri and Mazar-e Sharif in Bagh-e Shamal Area, Pul-e Khumri, as well as an abduction of three staff members of a private commercial company on their way from Badakhshan to Kabul on 4 July at 1600 hrs in Jangl-e Bagh Area, Baghlan-e Jadid. NGOs should note the risk of continual AOG clashes as well as abduction in the mentioned areas and plan travel accordingly. All NGOs are encouraged not to conduct any travel through Pul-e Khumri district and to avoid any travel on the Pul-e Khumri – Kunduz Road.

AOG presence was again visible in Burka District, where AOGs distributed night letters threaten-



ing religious elders to avoid participating in the forthcoming election, to refuse funeral prayers for ANSF members who were killed during clashes with AOGs, and warned female teachers to quit their jobs.

During the first two weeks of July, there was only one IED related incident recorded which took place in Tala Wa Barfak District, where AOGs had been quieter as the commander in charge allegedly had reached an agreement with ANSF: an RCIED hit an international business' vehicle on 5 July in Anar Dara Area. One international and one national staff member of the company were injured.

BADGHIS


The northeast districts of Badghis have, as usual, accounted for the most security incidents reported during the present cycle. Nonetheless, compared to the last reporting period, the rate of AOG incidents, following the usual pattern of attacks on security forces convoys and check posts, has dropped in the past two weeks. Ghormach District continued to be active with three AOG attacks on ANP CPs in Qala-i-Wali (1) and Tali Khoskh (2). In addition, on 10 July in the same district (Petaw area) ANSF/IMF conducted a joint operation and

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- AOG-ANSF/IMF clashes
- IEDs in Murghab, Muqur, Ghormach and Qadis
- Abduction

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	0
This Report Period	0

seized a vehicle reportedly prepared to be used as a VBIED. ANSF/IMF continue to concentrate their operations in Murghab in order to dislodge AOGs from their historic bases in the area. On 3 July, in Shinyan area (where five IEDs were discovered as mentioned in the last report), ANSF/IMF conducted a follow-up operation, wounding one AOG member. Furthermore, reports indicate that two separate operations were conducted in Quir Rikha area. In one of them on 7 July, six AOG members were killed and another eleven were wounded. Also of note, an AOG attack was reported in Qadis District (Kabul Cha area) on 8 July. In Ab Kamari District, tensions continue surrounding pistachio plantations. An ANP official was



killed on 11 July in Mubarak area by unknown individuals as he was en route to a pistachio plantation. Two days later, a group of armed men opened fire on local civilians collecting pistachios in Kargas Ghal area, wounding five persons. Another incident worth noting occurred on 5 July in Qala-i-Naw District on the main road in Kotal-e Katageran area, when armed men opened fire on a private vehicle en route from Qadis District to Qala-i-Naw City, wounding also five people. Lastly, during this time in Qal-i-Naw City, an IO national staff member received a threatening phone call from a suspected AOG member accusing him of cooperating with ANSF/IMF.

FARAH

The overall level of AOG activity in Farah has decreased compared to the last reporting period, but IEDs/RCIEDs continue to be the preferred method of attack in the province. During the present cycle, a total of 11 devices were reported across the province, of which 8 detonated. Besides the familiar pattern of IED related incidents in Bala-Buluk and Gulistan targeting ANSF/IMF convoys, one IED detonated in Pusht Rod (Chin area) against an ANA


KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- IED/RCIED
- AOG ambushes/Armed clashes
- Abduction

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	1
This Report Period	0

convoy and in two separate incidents four RCIEDs were located in the said district, respectively in Massaw and Nawbahar areas. It is worth noting that AOG activity in Pusht Rod has been steadily increasing since the second half of March. Furthermore, according to ANSO data, the rate of AOG initiated incidents recorded in the said district during the second quarter of this year has increased by 35% compared to the same period in 2009.

AOG attempts to interrupt IMF logistical convoys on the strategically important Herat-Kandahar Highway manifested themselves during the present cycle in Bakwa with an IED located on this road



on 9 July. Of note, later on this road in Dilaram area, ANP seized 50 AK-47s and a significant quantity of explosives hidden in three vehicles en route to Herat Province.

AOGs in the province continue to target those they suspect of cooperating with security forces or supporting the GoA, with two incidents recorded in Bakwa District: on 8 July, in Shagai area, AOG killed two locals, and four days later another two civilians were abducted in the Bakwa suburb area.

HERAT

On 7 July in Shindand District, four NGO staff members transiting through Kham-e Mozaffar area were forcibly stopped, then abducted along with their car by six armed men. The gunmen, who introduced themselves as AOG members, questioned all abductees about who they were and for whom they worked. It seemed that the perpetrators knew that their victims were employees of an NGO. However, according to their statement, their intended targets were “engineers coming from Herat.” As the NGO staff insisted that they were only social workers, they finally were released late that night in the Dasht-e Tak area of Adraskan District. However, their car and personal belongings were stolen. The motive for this particular abduction appears to be financial, as the perpetrators were searching for ‘valuable targets.’ It is likely that the early release of the NGO staff was ensured because the NGO has an established presence in the area and because its members were from there. It should be

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS


- IED/RCIED
- AOG attacks on ANSF/IMF/logistical convoys

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	5
This Report Period	2

noted that AOG activity remains high in the district, and during the present reporting cycle another two incidents of note occurred in the DAC area. On 5 July, a suspected BBIED detonated prematurely, wounding three civilians. Later, on 13 July, an explosion occurred in the vicinity of the District Governor’s office, this time causing no casualties.

The second incident directly affecting NGO’s took place on 12 July in Chisht-e Sharif (Shir Khaj area). A local AOG stopped an INGO contracted convoy carrying food supplies from Herat to Ghor and stole four trucks. The group released the drivers and vehicles after they unloaded the goods. The incident marks the first armed robbery targeting a food convoy in Chisht-e Sharif since 24 October 2009. Nevertheless, due to the sustained AOG and ACG presence, the stretch of road between Obe and Shahrak continues to pose significant challenges to NGO operations.

Along with the two AOG attacks targeting PSCs escorting IMF logistical convoys on the Herat-Turghundi Road (on 6 July) and the Herat-Qala-i-Naw Road (on 11 July), a significant amount of activity has been recorded during



the present cycle in Herat City and its southern suburbs. As seen last year, the Herat-Airport Road has become the favoured target of IED/RCIED attacks. During the present cycle, an RCIED was located on this road on 4 July and another device (a motorcycle-mounted RCIED) detonated four days later in the vicinity of the Pashtun Bridge, targeting an ANP passing convoy. It is important to note that the same area had already experienced an RCIED attack on 31 May.

Herat City once again witnessed a typical combination of AOG methods mixed with probable political or personal rivalries. On 1 July, an explosive device placed under a bridge detonated in Park-e Walayat area (District 6), and the following day, a bicycle-mounted RCIED targeted a parliamentary candidate’s compound located in District 4. Lastly, an IED was located in District 8 (Gazergah-e-Sharif area) on 8 July. These incidents, taken together with explosive and munition discoveries in Herat City and in Injil District, indicate that the frequency of such attacks, whether AOG or ACG initiated, will likely increase in the months preceding the parliamentary elections.

NOTICE: Your input is invaluable for the production of this report. While we appreciate information on incidents, we also need general information on the security situation and context in your area. So please remember to call or email us regularly.

Contact details of ANSO staff are provided on the last page.

ANSO: “..by NGOs for NGOs..”

GHOR

On 3 July in Taywara District, an INGO national staff member en route from his home to the office was killed as his motorcycle hit a roadside IED in Chardar area. Although AOGs are known to be active in the southern areas of Taywara District, this is the first IED related incident in the said district since August 2009, when an IED struck a commercial truck in Dahan-e Sarsabad area. It should be noted that, whereas last year in Ghor there had been three IED related incidents which resulted in detonation (two in Shah-rak and one in Taywara), there have already been seven explosive devices (including this incident) which detonated across the province since the beginning of the

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS


- RCIED/IED deployment (Pasaband, Taywara and the main road to Chaghcharan City)
- Localised disputes
- Armed robbery

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	4
This Report Period	1

year (four IEDs in Pasaband and two RCIEDs in Du Layna).

In Charsada District on 7 July, AOG abducted two GoA officials as they were travelling from Charsada District to Chaghcharan City in order to exchange them for prisoners. Reports indicate that this incident was related to an armed clash that occurred three days earlier in the vicinity of the DAC: on 4 July, AOG members attempted to enter the Charsada DAC and were confronted by ANP, resulting in eight AOG members arrested. Recent information indicates that AOGs have threatened to continue abductions in the area in order to obtain the release of their members, and this threat may target NGO staff as well. Furthermore, the limited GoA presence and the great number of AOG threats taken together suggest that the situation will remain volatile for some time in the district.

Another AOG initiated incident worth mentioning took place on 12 July in Dawlat Yar, where an



RPG was fired towards the DAC. The projectile landed in an open area, and therefore was neither accurate nor effective. The last AOG attack against the Dawlat Yar DAC recorded by ANSO occurred almost exactly one month ago, on 11 June, and was also a case of indirect fire. In addition, on 7 July, AOG distributed night letters encouraging local civilians to engage in jihad (holy war) against the GoA and the international community. It is interesting to note that this incident indicates in some way a particularity of Ghor Province, in which AOGs are trying to gain local support through dialogue instead of force. Separately, significant floods have affected Chaghcharan District (south-east of Chaghcharan City). Reports indicate that around 20 houses have been completely destroyed and more than a hundred damaged, but the number of casualties is still unclear. NGOs operating in the area are heavily involved in the emergency response.

NURISTAN


The overall amount of recorded security incidents in Nuristan decreased in early July, with only four AOG incidents reported. All of them were direct attacks against ANSF, with three reported from troubled Barg-e Matal and one from Mandol. Still, it is understood that the province's envi-

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Armed clashes in Bargi Matal
- AOG presence throughout all districts

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	0
This Report Period	0

ronment remains very violent, with AOG exercising control over significant parts. The potential of further confrontation, particularly in Barg-e Matal, remains high, with several hundred foreign AOG still present in the mountainous region bordering Pakistan. Although not fully confirmed by the time this report was written, reporting indicates that several hundred AOG again attacked Barg-e Matal's DAC in the early morning hours of 15 July. Further



details remain unclear, but it appears that this attack followed the strategy used by AOG during the assault in late May, when several hundred Pakistani AOG conducted a concentrated attack against ANSF positions in eastern Barg-e Matal and overran the DAC.

NANGARHAR

On 7 July in Bihsud, AOG fired at least five mortars towards the Jalalabad Airfield (JAF) east of Jalalabad City. Two projectiles impacted in a residential area west of the airfield, killing one INGO national staff member in his residence and injuring two civilians. In another incident, in Chaparhar district on 2 July, AOG attacked the DAC with heavy weapons and SAF, and the fire fight lasted for about two hours. During the clash, several grenades impacted, apparently by accident, inside the compound of an INGO clinic which is located in the immediate vicinity of the DAC.


These incidents exemplified again the deteriorating security environment in Nangarhar Province, manifested by steadily increasing AOG activity and presence, and significantly rising amounts of security incidents in the urban Jalalabad area. IDF as well as IED-related assaults in and around the city remained high during this

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	3
This Report Period	0

reporting period, with four IDF assaults and at least three IED detonations recorded across the urban area. With high amounts and increased intensity of AOG attacks, as seen in the latest incidents involving NGOs, there is a heightened risk of being targeted collaterally, in particular in areas surrounding IMF/ANSF facilities.

Although the quantity of AOG-initiated incidents remained rather stagnant in early July, the quality of several assaults suggests an improved coordination. For instance, on 9 July on the Bihsud Bridge north of Jalalabad, an SVBIED detonated against an IMF convoy, causing several casualties and significant damage. One should note that the geographical allocation of AOG incidents across Nangarhar has shifted significantly in recent months, from remote southern areas towards central parts of the province. Particularly Jalalabad City, hitherto rather untouched by AOG, has seen a spike in AOG activity recently, including emplaced explosive devices, IDF assaults, and even complex attacks.

All in all, around 25 AOG incidents were reported in early July, displaying a similar amount recorded in comparison to the last period. IEDs remain the biggest



concern throughout the province, with 14 detonations reported from Jalalabad, Goshta, Muhmand Dara, Chaparhar, Hisarak, Bati Kot, Kama, Bihsud, Shinwar, and Surkh Rod districts. AOG direct attacks remained constant, with three such incidents recorded in Chaparhar, Hisarak, and Bati Kot. Additionally, seven IDF assaults were reported from Bihsud, Jalalabad, Pachir Wa Agam, and Khogyani. It has to be underlined that all IDF strikes in Bihsud occurred actually in the urban outskirts of Jalalabad City.

AOG intimidation attempts in Nangarhar, particularly against civilians associated with GoA, continued during this reporting cycle. This became again apparent in a 1 July assassination attempt in Goshta District, when an RCIED detonated against the vehicle of an influential tribal elder who is a current MP as well as a candidate for the upcoming elections. In another incident, in Bati Kot on 3 July AOG distributed night letters, demanding from everyone in the local community to stop potential work affiliations with IMF, ANSF, or GoA. The letters contained an AOG ultimatum, giving them seven days to stop such affiliations or face strong consequences.

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- IDF and IEDs in and around Jalalabad City
- Emplaced explosive devices in central and eastern Nangarhar
- AOG at large in southern districts

ANNOUNCEMENT:

In the coming months, ANSO will be helping develop an incident mapping service to aid NGO management and security procedures. Registrants will receive further information as it becomes available.


KUNAR

Kunar Province continues to inhale a very violent and dangerous environment, with 65 AOG-initiated incidents recorded in early July. The frequency of attacks against security forces, particularly across the Pech Valley area, remains very high, with a daily average of 3 to 4 such attacks occurring. The comprehensive IMF/ANSF operation in Kunar's eastern border region with Pakistan, accounting for sig-

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	5
This Report Period	0

nificant amounts of activity in late June, has ceased, with significantly less incidents recorded from there.

Compared to previous periods, a slight shift in the geographical concentration of AOG activity has become apparent recently. In early July, more than 26% of all AOG-initiated incidents were recorded in Kunar's northern districts of Bar Kunar and Nari, statistically accounting for more incidents than the Pech Valley. Although both districts have been highly contested before, inhering significant AOG presence and activity, the northern part has not been the hotspot of kinetic activity in recent months. It is understood that this geographical shift, at least partially, is a result of recent IMF/ANSF operations in



central and eastern Kunar, forcing local AOG to migrate to northern parts of the province. The use of explosive devices fell sharply compared to the previous period, with only three IED detonations recorded in Ghaziabad, Nari, and Wata Pur districts. Still, IDF assaults against security forces and/or DACs, particularly in and around Asadabad, remain high across Kunar, and around 13 indirect fire attacks were reported from Asadabad, Bar Kunar, Manogai, Nari, Sirkanay, and Wata Pur. One should note that more than 40% of these IDF assaults occurred in and around Asadabad, displaying a significant deterioration of the city's security environment.

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS


- AOG attacks against security forces, particularly in Pech Valley and northern districts
- IDF assaults, especially in and around Asadabad
- AOG presence along the Jalalabad-Asadabad Road

LAGHMAN

In early July, the overall level of AOG activity remained relatively constant across Laghman when compared to the previous reporting cycle, and 12 AOG-initiated incidents were recorded. This period, incidents were recorded in all five districts of the province. Alishing District accounted for five AOG assaults, with all being direct attacks against IMF/ANSF. The second place went to Qarghayi, where three AOG incidents occurred along the Jalalabad-Kabul Road. Two were direct at-

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	1
This Report Period	0

tacks, with one targeting a fuel convoy on 1 July and the other one assaulting an ANP CP on 9 July. In the third incident, occurring in the night of 14 July in Tangay Area, between 50-60 AOG established a mobile checkpoint on the Jalalabad-Kabul Highway for around two hours; they stopped and searched vehicles, looking for civilians associated with GoA/ANSF/IMF. Additionally, AOG set fire to two trucks returning from Kabul. It is understood that this incident displays a very unusual occurrence on the highway. Due to the significant presence of security forces along the highway, AOGs have not been able to manifest their capability by establishing vehicle



checkpoints on this 'lifeline' in recent months. Although the reported number of involved AOG in this incident appears to be quite significant, the likeliness of such CPs during daytime is not necessarily increased, due to the high amount of ANSF positioned along the road during the day. In line with seasonal trends, this incident just exemplifies the increased influx of AOG into Qarghayi District. The remaining four incidents in Laghman this period were one IDF assault against an ANP CP in Mihtarlam, one IED detonation as well as one direct attack targeting IMF in Alingar, and one rocket strike in Dawlat Shah.

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Attacks against IMF in Alingar and Alishing
- Significant AOG activity along the Jalalabad-Kabul Highway


KHOST

Khost continues to be the second most violent province in the Eastern Region just behind Kunar, and early July saw at least 58 AOG-initiated incidents across the province. As outlined in previous periods, the identified trend towards more diversified AOG operational tactics has become an established pattern, with 24 IDF assaults, 19 IED detonations, and 14 direct attacks recorded throughout Khost. Particularly the amount of IDF strikes has increased significantly in recent months, accounting now for the majority (>40%) of AOG inci-

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	2
This Report Period	0

dents. Hitherto, indirect fire attacks were a rather occasional AOG tactic, geographically concentrated on Bak and Sabari districts. Now, such assaults occur across the whole province, targeting security forces as well as GoA facilities. The frequency of these attacks poses a constant risk of collateral damage across Khost, especially in the vicinity of DACs, IMF/ANSF facilities, and convoys.

Still, explosive devices remain of critical concern throughout the province, due to the fact that



many devices detonate prematurely or in residential areas. Additionally, Khost continues to witness occasional high profile attacks against security forces. For instance, on 10 July in Mando Zayi on the main Khost-Gardez Road, an SVBIED detonated close to an IMF convoy, causing significant damages.


PAKTYA

With 48 reported AOG incidents, the security environment throughout Paktya continuous to deteriorate rapidly. Compared to late June, AOG-initiated incidents nearly doubled during this cycle, making the province one of the most violent in the ER. Violence appears to have escalated in all parts of Paktya, with significant concentration of kinetic activity in Zurmat and Gardez districts, accounting for more than 50% of all recorded AOG incidents. The currently preferred AOG tactic appears to be direct attacks against a variety of targets, including IMF, ANSF, PSCs, and road construction companies, with 22 of such direct assaults recorded. Still, AOG operational tactics re-

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	1
This Report Period	0

main comparatively diversified, with 13 IDF assaults and 11 IED strikes reported. Of note, with regards to the latter, it appears that AOG prefer to attack IMF via indirect means, avoiding the direct confrontation. While most direct attacks targeted ANSF – and to a lesser extent PSCs and road construction companies – IMF were mainly attacked indirectly, particularly by IEDs. Namely, six IEDs (or more than 50% of all detonated explosive devices) struck IMF vehicles in Gardez, Wuza Zadran, and Zurmat districts.

All in all, the security situation in Paktya is very violent and dynamic, with rapid changes in tactics and geographical allocation identifiable. As a reaction to the dynamic increase of AOG operations across the province, security forces increased their comprehensive counter-operations again. In at least one case, this resulted in civilian casualties, fostering public



discontent with current COIN approaches implemented in the province. Namely, on 8 July in Jani Khel, IMF artillery rounds were accidentally fired into a residential area near the DAC, killing at least five civilians. In another incident, in Ahmadabad on 10 July IMF conducted a search operation, killing one suspected AOG and arresting eleven. This, in turn, led to significant public discontent throughout Paktya, with several hundred locals demonstrating in Gardez and Ahmadabad against the alleged detention of civilians during the operation. As a protest against several controversial incidents involving IMF, including the Ahmadabad operation, the Jani Khel incident, and alleged body searches of local females by IMF in Dand Wa Patan, the Provincial Council of Paktya decided on 12 July to suspend its work indefinitely, and closed its office in Gardez.

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- AOG direct attacks, particularly in Jaji, Jani Khel, and Zurmat
- IEDs on secondary roads, especially in Gardez and Zurmat

PAKTIKA

Paktika continued to host extremely high numbers of AOG activity, in the form of direct attacks, indirect attacks and IED strikes. IMF/ANSF units, however, were not as active as in previous report periods and as a result the total number of incidents is slightly down.

As has been mentioned in the past, due to its long, uncontrolled border with neighbouring Pakistan, AOG in Paktika clearly have significant supplies of rockets, mortars and other heavy weapons.

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS


- IEDs
- AOG attacks on DACs
- IMF airstrikes

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	0
This Report Period	0

As a result, in this report period AOG employed mortars and rockets on 34 occasions, surpassing previous levels of indirect fire usage.

As usual, IMF bases and DACs were the most common targets for indirect fire, with such attacks occurring in the districts of Gayan, Yahya Khel, Barmal, Urgun, Ziruk, each receiving multiple attacks over the last two weeks, with IMF bases in Barmal hit eight times, surpassing last's month's record of six attacks during a single two-week period.

IMF convoys were once again the target of more conventional ambushes, and AOG attacked con-



voys on five occasions, in the districts of Gomal, Yahya Khel, and Khushamand. The level of IED strikes remained high, with twenty incidents during the report period throughout the province.

IMF/ANSF activity was limited to approximately 11 ANP search and seizure operations, netting a variety of small arms and ammunition; however, in the one notable IMF operation air assets were used to kill an estimated 16 AOG in the area of Godal, in Yahya Khel District.

GHAZNI

Ghazni province continues to host the most security incidents in the country, and as with previous report periods, the majority of these are direct and indirect AOG attacks on DACs and IMF facilities. While IMF/ANSF operations were still relatively limited, especially compared to the tremendous work-rate of AOG, IMF activity has increased and a significant proportion of these operations involved air strikes.


The pattern of AOG attacks continued from previous report periods, with district administration centres (DACs) being the favoured targets. DACs and/or IMF bases were attacked a total of

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	1
This Report Period	0

26 times, with the majority receiving multiple attacks, including Rashidan (three attacks), Gelan (three), Qarabagh (three), and Andar (five attacks). Attacks on ANP posts continued unabated, most particularly in the districts of Andar, Qarabagh, Muqur, Ghazni, Rashidan and Dih Yak.

Intimidation and targeted killings appear to be on the rise, as civilians were killed by AOG in Andar, Ghazni, and Muqur districts, for unknown reasons, although 'collaboration with GoA' is suspected in all three cases. In Kwaja Umari District, a local district prosecutor was killed by AOG, and then a few days later during his funeral AOG also attempted to attack some of the mourners.

In a continuation of the recent attacks on schools, AOG in Ajristan District burnt a primary school near Sayed Khel Village,



and looted another near the Ajristan DAC a few days later.

Contrary to the most recent report periods, IMF/ANSF have increased their pace of activity, and operations took place in the districts of Andar, Gelan, Qarabagh, Ab Band, Ghazni and Waghaz. Air strikes were employed in six occasions, resulting in significant AOG casualties, including 13 AOG killed in Gelan, and 11 AOG killed in Ab Band. This increase in the use of air assets may signal a change in the relative 'restraint' which was the hallmark of recently-departed US General McChrystal, and a return to a more aggressive stance towards the use of air power under US General Petraeus; however, this pattern remains to be established through further data.

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- IEDs
- AOG direct and indirect attacks
- AOG attacks on schools

HELMAND

Incident levels in Helmand remained high during the report period, with AOG maintaining an elevated rate of direct attacks on both IMF and ANSF targets. IEDs continued to plague most areas, with an increasing number of civilians both wounded and killed. Unlike the periods immediately preceding the current one, however, it appears that IMF/ANSF have stepped up the pace of their operations. Lastly, in a case which has been highly publicized, a 'rogue' ANA soldier killed at least three UK soldiers and injured over six in a surprise attack, provoking a considerable amount of comment in the press relating to the 'trustworthiness' of the ANSF as allies in the fight against AOG.

AOG direct attacks occurred against IMF bases and personnel in the areas of Marja (five times), Sangin (four), Nad Ali (four), Nahri Sarraj (three) and Lashkar


KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- AOG attacks
- IEDs

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	3
This Report Period	0

Gah (three), in addition to attempting to down IMF helicopters four times, in Sangin, Nad Ali and Nahri Sarraj (twice). A total of at least three IMF soldiers were killed in those incidents, with the number of wounded difficult to estimate as IMF have been traditionally reluctant to release those figures. ANP were the targets of over 14 separate attacks throughout the province, and a total of 9 officers were killed and over 24 wounded as a result.

Out of the 21 IED incidents, 12 were directed at IMF/ANSF patrols, primarily in the areas of Marja, Nahri Sarraj, Sangin and Nad Ali. Although most of these IED strikes were 'stand-alone', that is, not accompanied by subsequent SAF or RPG fire, in one incident in Nad Ali, the medevac helicopters also came under attack when they arrived to extract the wounded and killed. In total, these IED incidents accounted for at least six IMF soldiers killed, which, along with the casualties of the direct attacks, made this report period one of the deadliest



for IMF soldiers, within an already record high period of IMF deaths over the past six weeks. In response to this elevated level of AOG activity, IMF/ANSF operations have been expanded. During the report period operations occurred in the areas of Musa Qala, Sangin, Nahri Sarraj, Naw Zad, Nad Ali, Marja, Lashkar Gah, and Baghran (essentially throughout the entire province), resulting in significant AOG deaths and detentions, as well as seizures of substantial amounts of explosives, drugs, small arms and ammunition. Whether these operations will serve to reduce the pace of AOG activity in the upcoming weeks remains to be seen.

Lastly, in Lashkar Gah District five sub-contractors for a USAID implementing partner were abducted while travelling between Marja and Lashkar Gah City. Reports indicate that a ransom demand has been received for the return of the individuals.

NOTICE: Your input is invaluable for the production of this report. While we appreciate information on incidents, we also need general information on the security situation and context in your area. So please remember to call or email us regularly.

Contact details of ANSO staff are provided on the last page.

ANSO: “..by NGOs for NGOs..”

KANDAHAR

Four local staff members of an NGO were abducted on 15 July near the village of Loy Karez on the main Kandahar – Herat Highway. No news has been received concerning their condition or whether ransom demands have been made.

Incident levels in Kandahar Province have increased throughout the province and contrary to the previous month AOG are now resuming their campaign of direct attacks on IMF/ANSF targets as well as expanding the ongoing campaign of assassination and intimidation. This is most likely a reflection of the desire to test the newly completed check-posts erected as part of Op Hamkari.


To this end, a complex attack was launched 13 July in which a VBIED and three BBIEDs were used to attack a joint IMF/

	NGO Incidents
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ANCOP base in District 7, with a number of other assailants providing fire support with SAF and RPGs. As a result of this significant attack, 14 persons were killed and another 18 wounded. It can be anticipated that attacks against the newly erected security points surrounding the city will be increased as AOG test the will and capabilities of the recently arrived ANCOP units.

Other direct attacks during the report period included those targeting IMF supply convoys in Zhari, Shah Wali Kot, Maiwand, Panjwayi and Dand districts. The ongoing targeted killings of ANP personnel continued unabated, with seven more 'drive-by' killings of ANP by AOG on motorcycles, primarily in Kandahar City.

Killings of civilians also increased during the report period, with a total of 6 civilians shot by AOG on motorcycles, in districts 4, 6, and 9 of Kandahar City. Of note in this regard is the assassination



of a mid-level official from the provincial census department, with a subsequent claim by AOG that he was killed due to his work with the GoA.

In addition to constructing and strengthening the various checkpoints which constitute the security perimeter, IMF/ANSF were markedly more active in operations in the districts outside of Kandahar City, with several airstrikes in Panjwayi District resulting in a total of seven AOG deaths, as well as two operations in Zhari District, near the village of Berana.

Shopkeepers in District 4 of Kandahar City staged a demonstration against the forcible removal of their market area, illegally erected on government-owned land, which involved the construction of barricades that closed several roads in the area. This will undoubtedly remain a source of potential future violence as the municipality has vowed to reclaim the land.

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- AOG direct attacks on ANP
- AOG assassinations

NIMROZ


Incident levels were slightly lower in Nimroz Province than in the previous month, but the number of direct AOG attacks has increased. In addition, attacks aimed at intimidating local officials and killing 'collaborators' has now begun in the province, which is a relatively new development.

AOG attacked ANP posts in Khash Rod on four separate occasions, in the areas of Ghor Ghor,

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	0
This Report Period	0

Rakin, Minar and Dehmazang villages, resulting in a total of six ANP wounded but no fatalities. Also, in Naalan Village a local shopkeeper was killed who AOG accused of collaborating with GoA officials. Lastly, an illegal checkpoint was set up near Dehmazang village as AOG searched vehicle for GoA employees, although there were no reports of injury or death as a result of this effort.

The only roadside IED incident also occurred in Khash Rod Dis-



trict, near Ghor Ghor village, as an ANP convoy containing the district's CoP was struck, killing one of his escorts and wounding two others.

There were no reports of IMF/ANSF operations during the report period.

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- AOG illegal checkpoints
- AOG attacks on ANP

URUZGAN

The number of security incidents in Uruzgan decreased dramatically from previous levels, to a mere handful during the report period. Not only does it appear that AOG suspended virtually all activity over the past two weeks, in terms of both direct and indirect attacks, data indicates that IMF/ANSF have also instituted a temporary pause in substantial operations. There were several IED strikes, however, at a much lower level than in the past several months.

In the one incident involving a direct fire-fight, AOG clashed with local Kuchi tribesmen near

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS


- IED strikes

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	0
This Report Period	0

the village of Chenarak in Tirin Kot District, in what appeared to be a personal dispute, and one AOG was killed. In Charchino District, a joint IMF/ANSF search operation yielded several small arms.

The six IED incidents occurred primarily in Chora District, as IMF/ANSF patrols and convoys were hit, with a total of three IMF/ANSF soldiers killed and a number wounded.

Lastly, civilians were killed in two separate incidents where an IED was placed in a school under construction, killing two workers, and also a civilian vehicle was struck by a roadside IED in Tirin Kot District, killing its two occupants.



To be frank, it is difficult to make any definitive statements about the reasons behind the precipitous drop in AOG activity during the report period, although it may be attributed to a problem of re-supply, as the previous two months have seen a significant increase in direct and indirect attacks. Incident data for the next month will reveal whether this lull will become the norm, or whether incident levels will rebound to the levels witnessed over the past two months.

ZABUL

Incident levels dropped significantly in Zabul Province over the past two weeks. IMF/ANSF activity, which had been relatively low in the past month, picked up dramatically. Roadside IEDs have remained a constant source of risk for travel in the province. Direct AOG attacks, however, dropped to levels not seen for several months.

The only notable direct attack occurred in the main bazaar area of Shah Joy City, when two AOG members, one rigged as a suicide bomber, attempted to enter an ANA post. The suicide bomber was shot before being able to detonate his device and the other was arrested. In another incident


KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- IED strikes
- IMF operations

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	1
This Report Period	0

which may be related to a larger family/tribal dispute, a wedding van was attacked in the Maghlezo area of Qalat District. Two female civilians were wounded and the four males travelling with them were abducted. No ransom demands or other communication has been received relating to this incident.

There were a total of 15 IED incidents, slightly down from previous periods, with the majority of them injuring or killing civilians. In the districts of Nawbahar, Qalat, Shinkay and Shamulzayi a total of 22 civilians were killed in seven separate incidents. On eight other occasions, ANSF vehicles were struck by roadside IEDs, resulting in only one death, that of an ANP officer in Tarnak wa Jaldak District.



The most striking feature of the report period, however, was the marked increase in IMF/ANSF operations. These occurred in primarily the districts of Tarnak Wa Jaldak, Daychopan, Shahjoy, Nawbahar, Qalat, and resulted in a total of 33 AOG killed, 15 others arrested and substantial numbers of weapons, ammunition and explosives seized. It will be important to see if this pressure can be maintained over the coming weeks, and whether this will have an effect on both AOG activity in the province as well as hampering the ability to use the province as a supply route for men and materiel flowing from Pakistan into Kandahar and Ghazni, where violence levels are substantially higher.



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ANSO ACRONYMS

ACG-Armed Criminal Group /
AEF-Afghan Eradication Forces
/ **ANA**-Afghan National Army /
ANBP-Afghan National Border
Police / **ANP**-Afghan National
Police / **AOG**-Armed Opposition
Group / **APPF**-Afghan Public
Protection Forces (local depu-
tised militias) / **DC**-District
Centre / **GOA**-Government of
Afghanistan / **IDF**-Indirect Fire
(ex: mortars) / **IED**-Improvised
Explosive Device / **IMF**-
International Military Forces /
NDS-National Directorate of
Security (Intelligence) / **PRP**-
Previous Reporting Period /
PSC-Private Security Company
/ **RPG**-Rocket Propelled Gre-
nade / **SAF**-Small Arms Fire /
VBIED-Vehicle Borne Impro-
vised Explosive Device

CONTACT ANSO

CENTRAL REGION OFFICE (KABUL)

Vacant - central@afgnso.org - 0799 323 792
Mukhtar - central2@afgnso.org - 0799 322 116

NORTH REGION OFFICE (MAZAR)

Elizabeth Detwiler - north@afgnso.org - 0799 404 617
Firoz - north2@afgnso.org - 0799 408 252

EAST REGION OFFICE (JALALABAD)

Philipp Schweers - east@afgnso.org - 0799 248 362
Shohar - east2@afgnso.org - 0798 778 014

SOUTH REGION OFFICE (KANDAHAR)

Peter Dimitroff - south@afgnso.org - 0796 688 416
Noori - south2@afgnso.org - 0700 492 550

WEST REGION OFFICE (HERAT)

Rachel Adam - west@afgnso.org - 0799 322 192
Sayed Karim - west2@afgnso.org - 0707 474 135

COUNTRY MANAGEMENT (KABUL)

Nic Lee - director@afgnso.org - 0799 325 349
Ali Riazi - operations@afgnso.org - 0797 165 017
Patrick Malach - rsamobile@afgnso.org - 0793 230 118

MISSING

This report ANSO
could not provide
analysis for the prov-
inces of:

Panjshir
Sar-e Pul
Samangan

This is because we
do not know enough
about the area to
comment on the sig-
nificance of the inci-
dents occurring
there.

If you can help us
understand the prov-
ince better, please
contact us.

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