

THE ANSO REPORT

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YOU NEED TO KNOW

- Results of Peace Jirga support GoA extant plans
- MAY witnessed record AOG activity, topping the previous high of AUGUST 2009 (see pg. 8 for chart)
- IMF and GoA inconsistent in future plans and mainly concerned with the illusion of success

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COUNTRY SUMMARY

The, strategically packed, period opened with the Consultative Peace Jirga in Kabul where invitees convened to approve Government plans for negotiations with the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (IEA/Taliban). The primary outcomes were (i) approval of the extant “*Afghan Peace and Reintegration Plan*”, the initiative unrealistically aimed at encouraging the surrender of mid-level IEA fighters; (ii) the request to transfer combatant detainee responsibility to the Government and establish a review board, moves which are mostly intended to strengthen the Government's hand in negotiating with the IEA; and (iii) agreement to remove IEA figures from the UN 1267 list which freezes financial assets and puts them on a ‘no-fly’ list, a move of little practical benefit as it was easily circumvented and removal does not reduce the chance of national or international criminal prosecution. In summary, the Peace Jirga successfully gave the sheen of popular support to an already extant plan for a ceasefire drafted by a minority of Government insiders. A number of notable Afghan actors, such as Dr. Abdullah and Mr. Dostum, voiced noted, but quiet, opposition to the set-up by their absence. The Jirga outcomes are now ready to be regurgitated at the Kabul Conference, scheduled for July 20th, where donors will applaud and pledge support for their anthem du jour.

That the Peace Jirga gives the Government a green light to become more energetic and overt in its talks with the IEA, and other Armed Opposition groups, led quickly in its aftermath to the resignations of both Amrullah Saleh and Haneef Atmar, respectively the Director of the NDS and Minister of Interior. The latter resignation was apparently anticipated for some time and may only be circumstantially related to the former. De-

spite the official explanation being that they related to the Peace Jirga day attacks (one RPG round impacted within 200 meters of the Jirga Tent meaning it was fired from well inside the first ring of the security cordon provided by NDS) in public comments Mr Saleh noted as his main reason opposition to the Government's intent to reconcile with the IEA and to release detainees, many of whom had been arrested by NDS at significant human and financial cost. Whether the Government deliberately put Mr Saleh in to a position that they knew would result in his resignation remains the subject of much speculation.

The crisis in Government provided an unhelpful backdrop then to the final strategic shift of the period being COMISAF's lengthy suspension of OP HAMKARI, the Kandahar based centre piece of the US military offensive. A realization that the campaign is neither wanted or winnable, reinforced by evidence that the MARJA Operation has failed, is behind the delay as Strategic Communications staff scramble to rebrand the exercise as a ‘governance initiative’ and avoid using the word ‘offensive’ at all.

OP HAMKARI's apparent reversal of the standard COIN mantra, in to “Build, Hold, Clear”, would seem to indicate that ISAF has no intention of addressing underlying power distribution issues in the province and is instead focussed on finessing a plan that works around problems and not against them. Arrogance, egotism and momentum seem to be the only dynamics sustaining the campaign and preventing someone altogether more sensible from cancelling it.

As IMF looked the other way, AOG killed all their Afghan partners in Arghandab District (the Governor and the new local militia forces) and took country wide monthly attack rates to an all time high.

KABUL

Activity in Kabul Province, despite common perception, remains negligible in comparison to other areas of the country. Contrary to pictures of climactic life in the province, data actually show that the province has experienced a decline in activity when compared to 2009. Thus, only 46 AOG-initiated incidents occurred during the period of January-May 2010, compared to 68 in 2009 (46 also occurred in 2008). Likewise, criminality and security force operations are also down from 2009 highs. With this, it is important to note that this is not the case country-wide (the country clearly stands to witness its most danger-


KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Criminality in the morning
- Attention-grabbing AOG attacks targeting GoA, IMF, and comingled targets

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	6
This Report Period	0

ous year yet); rather, it shows that AOG are currently directing resources elsewhere and conducting only the occasional grandiose or limited attack in Kabul City.

In an example of this strategy, pre-staged AOG launched an assault in District 5 when they attempted to break through the security cordon on 2 June and strike the then commencing Peace Jirga. Accounts now differ on the actual events and weapons involved (ANSF had publicly and privately reported the involvement of a BBIED attacker, one who was detained by NDS after being shot in the leg. With this, the change in reporting could be due to an erroneous initial report, or it could be an attempt to obfuscate the truth and avoid further dissent from GoA officials who especially blamed NDS for apparent poor planning). Two AOG, said to be



in burqas, and two in normal dress engaged ANSF. Ultimately, all of the attackers, minus the mentioned suspect BBIED attacker, died in the attack. AOG also ushered in the attack with a rocket strike that apparently sought to target the site of the jirga, and an RPG landed in close proximity to the jirga tent, apparently fired during the above skirmish.

Surobi also did not disappoint during the period, with two attacks occurring: one an inter-AOG clash and the other an AOG assault on an IMF/ANSF foot patrol on 1 June. Arrests and seizures persisted, additionally; for instance, ANSF conducted arrests of suspected AOG on seven different occasions during the period in Kabul City, Dih Sabz, and Chahar Asyab.

KAPISA

On 2 June in Hisa-e Duwumi Kohistan District, ANSF discovered three IEDs that had been emplaced outside the gate of an INGO office. While the exact motive for the incident cannot be gleaned from the event, it is likely that local actors targeted the INGO for its controversial programming, just as has been the case in the past. Additionally,


KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- AOG expansion
- Low intensity factional disputes in Kohistan I & II
- AOG in Alasay, Nijrab, & Tagab

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	2
This Report Period	1

the IEDs were most probably intended to target regional staff who were expected to visit the office, albeit one day prior.

NGOs operating in the province are aware of past acceptance issues, such as religious dissent towards the involvement of women in NGO programmes, but the situation in the province has, and continues, to allow for well-planned and deliberate NGO activities. One should note, however, that incident levels in the province continue to rise, with ANSO recording a 158% increase in AOG activity during the January-May period in comparison to



2009 (an increase of 51% in comparison to 2008). In contravention of usual patterns, the increase in AOG activity has occurred although IMF/ANSF operations have declined, illustrating that AOG are active in the province solely out of their own interest, not in response to an increase in targets. And as is further demonstrated, AOG are especially reliant on IEDs in the province: all but two AOG-related incidents during the June 2010 reporting period were IEDs.

PARWAN


Activity in Parwan is consistent with past levels. Nonetheless, one continues to see instability in Shinwari as a notable concern, with rumours further asserting that AOG are intent upon targeting the District Centre. The 11 June AOG ambush of an ambu-

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- AOG activity in Ghorband Valley
- ACG activity in Chaharikar

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	2
This Report Period	0

lance in Namakab—an area rumoured to be under AOG control—and the kidnapping of three of its passengers (one was killed in the ambush) is an example of the brutality that small numbers of AOG employ in Shinwari. Similarly, four civilians were killed in an AOG ambush of their vehicle in Ghorband a day prior. Other incidents that initially appear to have criminal roots, such as the



discovery of a decapitated head and the targeted killing of a business man who works on Bagram Airbase, should be monitored to discern if AOG intimidation is taking hold in the province under the guise of criminality.

DAYKUNDI


Due to limited reporting and the evident security vacuum that exists in the province, the situation in Daykundi remains convoluted and disconcerting. While IMF and the GoA waffle between reconcil-

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Security vacuum
- Ethno-political tensions between Hazara and Pashtuns
- Spoilers-to-peace in Gizab District

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	0
This Report Period	0

ing and confronting spoilers-to-peace, for example in Gizab District, AOG have set their sights on the southwestern district of Kajran. Thus, AOG conducted consecutive attacks on the 13th and 14th in the vicinity of the Kajran District Centre, orchestrating prolonged gunfights that purportedly resulted in numerous AOG and ANP casualties, as well as the deaths of civilians who also were said to have stood in resistance to



AOG. Outside of Kajran, AOG also appear intent upon igniting conflict in Miramor District, where they recently warned villagers to leave the area. Besides the abovementioned changes in the context, Daykundi continues to be wracked with lawlessness.

LOGAR


2010 incident levels for AOG activity from January through May in Logar are in line with 2009, with only a negligible increase occurring. Interestingly, though, this observation is made in light of another: IMF/ANSF activity

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- IEDs, especially targeting IMF
- Abduction

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	1
This Report Period	0

has increased by 23% (not discounting for anti-crime activity). Although incident levels have remained generally stagnant and AOG commonly employ IEDs (10 during the reporting period in Barak-e Barak, Pul-e Alam, Charkh, and Khushi), they have not shied away from conventional strikes; for example, 7 instances of AOG activity occurred during the



period, ranging from checkpoints, to ambushes, to targeted killings. (In comparison, AOG only conducted two indirect fire attacks).

WARDAK

Recent press reports have portrayed Wardak as a complex province that is grappling with AOG activity, questionable alliances and activities by AOG, and inadequate security forces. And just as these reports allude, discerning between the actual allegiances of those behind instability in the province is quite formidable. Putting this to the side, after one examines data on the activities of parties-to-the-conflict it is clear that further deterioration is likely in the prov-


KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- AOG prevalence in Saydabad
- Abduction
- IEDs and ambushes targeting IMF/ANSF logistics convoys along Highway 1

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	2
This Report Period	0

ince. When looking specifically at the first five months of 2010, the data demonstrate a 22% increase in AOG activity in comparison to the same 2009 period (a 141% increase in comparison to 2008). Additionally, the five months saw a 65% increase in IMF/ANSF activity (not discounting for anti-crime activities).

Although data need to be viewed in context, all NGOs that operate or transit through the province will attest to the ever-increasing AOG threat, especially that of abduction. Besides abduction, the first two weeks of June were afflicted with IEDs: 10 IED-related incidents occurred in Saydabad, Nirkh, Maydan Shahr, Day Mirdad, and Jalrez. In one example, though, ethno-political discord



between Hazara-and Kuchis in the province was a possible motive for an IED that killed a Hazara ANP officer and three other ANP. (If ethnic tensions do not subside—which is the likely case—there may be further clashes). Conversely, one cannot discount the possibility that AOG are seeking to enflame tensions between the two ethnic groups under the guise of communal discord, thereby hiding an AOG hand in targeting, similar to previous suspicions that AOG were involved in the purported Kuchi-Hazara clashes that led to vast regional confrontations. AOG also conducted conventional assaults and ambushes against ANSF, IMF, and GoA targets in Saydabad, Jaghatu, and Day Mirdad.

SAR-E PUL


As was predicted last period, AOGs attempted two stand-off attacks in Sar-e Pul City, as well as a successful ambush of an ANSF convoy near the border between Sayyad and Sar-e Pul districts. These incidents signify a continued AOG presence within Sayyad District, as well as a continued intent to carry out attacks within the provincial capital. One rocket was launched from a village in the west of Sar-e Pul District towards the city centre, landing one kilometer east of the provincial govern-

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Indirect attacks in Sar-e Pul City
- Threat of abduction
- Continued AOG presence in Sayyad

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	0
This Report Period	0

nor's office. In addition, one anti-vehicle mine was discovered and defused 1-2 kilometres west of the city on the road to Sayyad District. Such incidents are intended to intimidate the population against supporting GoA and ANSF; however, given that there is a lack of support for AOGs among residents in Sar-e Pul, it is not likely that AOGs will attempt to engage ANSF directly within the city itself. Rather, the greater threat outside of Sayyad District is the continuation of IEDs and indirect fire attacks, as well as the possibility of high-profile abductions. Direct engagements with ANSF are more likely to occur, however, in Sayyad District itself, where late this reporting period an ANA convoy was ambushed on



the district border with Sar-e Pul while en route to southern Sayyad District. In the first show of force from AOGs since the most recent ANSF-led operation concluded on 1 April, one ANA soldier was killed and another two were injured in the attack. Further south in the province, Kohistan District has also reported rumours of an increase in the number of openly armed men, predominantly in the southeastern villages of the district. This area borders Bamyan and Ghor provinces and, if confirmed to be true, could indicate AOG migration from the central and western regions to the north, as was reported in neighbouring Kohistan District of Faryab Province last period.

BADAKHSHAN


Badakhshan returned to its normal state of quiet this period, with little significant activity to report. In Darayim District, ANP discovered and defused an IED near Alani Village, where last month an IED detonated against an ANP Ranger, killing eight ANP and injuring one other. ANP will likely continue to be targeted wherever ANSF attempt to inhibit drug production or smuggling. Districts such as Kishim, Warduj and Ba-

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- IEDs in Darayim

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	0
This Report Period	0

harak, which are known to host politically and ideologically motivated AOGs, have remained quiet for the past two weeks; however, an increase in activity may be expected as the country prepares for the upcoming parliamentary elections. An increase in AOG presence has also apparently manifested in Shahri Buzorg District, as a small number of AOGs from neighboring Yangi Qala and Chah Ab Districts in Takhar Province have moved to the area after last week's short-term operation in northern Takhar concluded to



virtually no effect. While Shahri Buzorg has reported AOG activity in the past, most incidents have been connected to criminally-motivated attacks intent on securing smuggling routes and drug production operations. It is possible that a spill over from northern Takhar may result in an increase in ideological AOG activity in the long-term; however, the threat of such activity appears to be minimal at present.

KUNDUZ


Attacks against pro-government militias markedly increased this period in Kunduz Province, where three commanders and eight other members were killed: three in an RCIED strike in Khanabad District, two who were abducted and subsequently hanged in Aliabad District, and the rest of whom were killed in targeted ambushes throughout the province. IMF and AOGs appear to be abstaining from major operations, reportedly at the request of local elders who are harvesting their crops. Despite the downturn in direct-fire engagements, AOGs continue to employ stand-off tactics against IMF targets. Two RCIEDs detonated this period against IMF vehicles – one in

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- AOGs targeting pro-government militias
- IMF troop increase
- IEDs on main roads

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	2
This Report Period	0

Chahar Dara, injuring two IMF soldiers, and one in the north-western part of Kunduz City, killing one and injuring three others. As the newly arrived IMF police mentors begin to deploy out to the districts, the province is sure to see a rise in the number of incidents involving IMF and their ANP counterparts. The thousand-troop unit which began deploying to the province in March is part of a regional effort designed to increase ANP competence and efficiency in strategically important areas. The units will partner at the district-level with local ANP and provide a semi-permanent IMF troop presence in every district but Qala-e Zal and Archi. This will likely translate into a surge in joint ANSF/IMF operations and patrols, correlated with an increase in the use of close air support. The new deployment will likely have a significant impact on the security dynamics in the prov-



ince, where previously IMF have maintained a primarily defensive position.

Attacks in Aliabad District continued this period, lending evidence to suspicions that AOGs from Baghlan have redirected their attention northwards in light of the increased ANSF presence in Baghlani Jadid. IEDs continue to pose a threat on the province's main highways, where three IEDs were discovered this period, one on the main road through Khanabad District, one to the south of the city en route to Aliabad District, and a third north of the city en route to Imam Sahib District. AOGs also have resumed their night-time rocket campaign on the Airport/PRT area south of Kunduz City. Long-range attacks continue in Archi District as well, where AOGs fired two grenades toward the district centre in Archi during the day, after which ANP responded with mortar fire, killing one civilian.

FARYAB


Qaysar District, which has been teetering on the edge of instability for the past several months, has seen a sharp increase in AOG-initiated incidents in the past two weeks, particularly around the border area with Gormach District. In the single NGO-related incident in the Northern Region this period, AOGs set fire to an INGO project site in the midst of heavy fighting with ANSF/IMF. Over the last year, AOGs who have pushed into this area from Gormach District by cultivating local ties and employing predominantly hit-and-run tactics seem to be emboldened by the relative success of their campaign in Gormach District. At least two separate groups of AOGs are reported to be present in Qaysar, those who are local to the area and those who have arrived from further south. The presence of newly deployed IMF units dedicated to advising ANP in Gormach, Qaysar and Almar are expected to increase the level of activity in these areas. The units have also come equipped with air assets, and the districts may see an increase in helicopters used in IMF/ANSF operations and clashes in the near future. In the long-term, however, even the additional force of an estimated 5-700 may not be enough to maintain control of both AOG-affected districts in the south of the province as well as those areas now seeing an increase of activity in the north.

IEDs were discovered in both Gurziwan and Bilchiragh on the roads leading toward the district centres. The IED in Gurziwan, which was made of five mortar rounds, was seemingly planted in mid-day and discovered shortly thereafter. The area around the

	NGO Incidents
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mentioned incident is host to a local former commander who has recently appealed for GoA support in the area, and it is suspected that the IED may not have been AOG-initiated. In Bilchiragh, however, the two IEDs discovered in Qorchi Village are more indicative of a significant AOG presence east of the District Centre. AOGs are dominant in Qorchi and Kowlan and are pushing for control of the villages to the west, which are currently under control of local militias. The resultant violence in the area over the past few months has caused several NGOs to halt their travel to those villages.

Further north in Dawlatabad District, a formidable AOG presence has been reported in the evening, possibly disrupting traffic on the Ring Road in Jungle Area near Pata Baba Village. A large number of AOGs stopped vehicles on the Ring Road in Dawlatabad District in the early evening hours and searched the passengers for ANSF or NGO employees, according to a single source. The AOGs then made the passengers pray with them and preached against international organizations. The following morning after the reported checkpoint, ANSF launched a search in the neighbouring Pata Baba Village to arrest those believed to be supporting or taking part in these incidents. Fourteen local residents were arrested; however, it is not clear whether they were actually involved in the incident. Illegal checkpoints and armed attacks have been known to occur in this area in the evening hours, as seen most recently on 5 June at 2100 hours when unknown armed men attacked a private taxi in this area, injuring one



occupant. If this incident occurred as described, it would be the first recorded illegal checkpoint reported in this area in which AOGs have specifically sought out NGO staff.

In the first joint ANSF/IMF excursion in Myandara Valley since 18 April, up to nine AOGs were killed by an IMF airstrike. Reportedly, two civilians were also killed (this has not yet been confirmed). The AOGs in Myandara, who are a mix of locals and outsiders believed to be from Almar District, have rapidly grown in strength over the past three months. The group originated as a mobile, predominately criminal unit of fewer than 20 in number with a few local roots; it has since grown to a substantial element with exogenous ties, able to invoke some degree of local support. Until recently, ANSF were either unwilling or unable to enter the area. While IMF in Faryab Province have been focusing their attention on the Jalayir Valley for the past three months, districts south of Maymana City have been largely neglected. The new IMF unit officially dedicated to training and mentoring ANP has recently become operational in Gormach, Qaysar, Almar and Pashtun Kot, and will likely increase the number of joint ANSF/IMF operations seen in these areas. Joint ANSF/IMF operations with access to air support will likely increase throughout the north, where this new unit is deployed.

Finally, in Maymana City, two demonstrations took place against the purported accusations of INGO proselytizing, widely publicized by a media expose released earlier this month. The demonstrations both occurred peacefully; however, the demonstrators also raised allegations against foreign government and international military interference, and they burnt pictures of foreign leaders and foreign government flags.


TAKHAR

A demonstration in Taloqan City revealed the potential for future civil unrest this period, when a group of extremist mullahs rallied up to one thousand madrassa students and local citizens to protest against the government and foreign interference. The protest took place one day after several hundred university students led a peaceful demonstration demanding government action against INGOs accused of proselytizing. While the student-led demonstration ended peacefully and without event, the following day a group of mullahs (reportedly some of whom came from Kunduz) took up a broader anti-foreigner and anti-government campaign which led to violent confrontation with authorities. After rallying in the city centre, the group marched toward the IMF base in Taloqan, evoking an armed response from the base's guards who allegedly fired into the air to disperse the crowd. The group also threw rocks at the gate of an INGO whose office was en route to the PRT, as well as a GoA office building in the city centre. While the day's events concluded by

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	2
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lunchtime, the arrest of seven demonstrators and the injury of four others reportedly elicited threats of further action from the group's organizers. A third demonstration occurred in Rustaq District, the only district in the country to take up the issue outside of a provincial capital. The violent nature of the Taloqan demonstration can be attributed to the presence of extremist religious elements in and around the provincial capital. While the situation has returned to normal, the potential for further anti-international and anti-governmental violence cannot be discounted.

In northern Takhar, the security situation remains much the same, despite the deployment and subsequent redeployment of up to a thousand international and Afghan forces over a five day period. From 5 to 10 June, approximately 400 IMF and 400 ANSF deployed to engage AOGs in Khwaja Bahawuddin, Darqad and Yangi Qala districts. While troops used helicopters to cross over into the remote Jangal Area of Darqad, AOGs hid their weapons to evade capture or fled to neighboring districts. A limited number of arrests were made, yet reportedly many of those detained have since been released due to a lack of evidence against them. According to ANSF, a small



number of weapons were also confiscated, yet the number of confiscated material falls markedly below the estimated number of weapons and ammunition believed to be in AOG possession. While some AOGs reportedly fled to Archi and Imam Sahib districts of Kunduz Province, to the west, and to the mountainous areas of Chah Ab and Rustaq districts in Takhar, no more than three days later locals reported their return. IMF and ANSF have reportedly agreed to maintain an increased ANSF presence in Khwaja Bahawuddin and on the road between Darqad and Khwaja Bahawuddin districts. It is far from clear what the next few weeks and months will hold in this area; however, it can be anticipated that AOGs and possibly certain GoA elements will resume their fight for control of the highly valuable smuggling route along the Tajikistan border.

Meanwhile, in the south of the province rumours of a renewed AOG presence may have come to fruition in Ishkamish District, where a group of twenty armed men reportedly preached in mosques and collected tithes in villages near the border with Baghlan Province. Since the conclusion of Operation Tawhid II in Baghlan Province, an estimated fifty to a hundred AOGs have reportedly established themselves on the border between Burka District (Baghlan) and southern Ishkamish.

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Violent demonstration in Taloqan
- Ineffective military operation in the north

ANSO SERVICES

Amongst many ANSO services, NGOs can reevaluate their programming and posture in a given district by requesting a district analysis from the respective ANSO Region. Please contact the regional RSA and allow two-weeks lead time for any requests.

BAGHLAN


In an uncharacteristically strategic move, IMF managed to arrest the newly appointed Baghlan Shadow Governor just three days after his successor was killed in an air strike on 26 May. The day-long arrest operation, which reportedly resulted in the deaths of five AOGs and the arrest of 15 others, seems to have stifled AOG plans to renew activity in Baghlani Jadid District, at least for the time being. While armed men remain in the district, the majority of active fighters have shifted their attention southwards to Shahabudin and Dand-e Ghorri areas in Pul-e Khumri District, and even further towards Dahan-e Ghorri, Doshi and Tala Wa Barfak districts. In

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- AOG focus south of Baghlani Jadid


	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	1
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Dahan-e Ghorri District, a six hour-long fire fight erupted along the border with Doshi District when AOGs ambushed an ANP convoy, killing one ANP and injuring another. The AOGs in Dahan-e Ghorri District have reportedly stepped up their intimidation campaign in this district, threatening to carry out further attacks on villages east of the district centre. Emphasizing this point, AOGs in Dand-e Ghorri Area of Pul-e Khumri District executed an ANA soldier who had returned home and publicly hanged his body. No activity has been reported in Tala Wa Barfak District since the commander responsible for attacking the District Centre two months ago reportedly reached an agreement with ANSF. However, the situation is tense as AOGs have recently put pressure



on this individual to resume his activity. A contingent of fighters has also been reported in northern Burka District on the border with southern Takhar Province, where AOGs attacked an ANSF patrol with RPGs and SAF. Despite the downturn in direct-fire engagements in the province, AOGs are continuing to plant IEDs along the road leading toward Kunduz, where two IEDs were reported this period, one RCIED which detonated along the road near Baghlan New City, and a second device which partially detonated along the road near Hussein Khel Village of Pul-e Khumri City. The device was made up of three IEDs linked to one remote control device, reportedly made of homemade materials similar to those found in Kunduz Province.

AOG INITIATED ATTACKS (2006-2010)



BALKH


Early in the reporting period, the first IED near the Mazar-Shibirgan Highway since January was discovered, suggesting a reintroduction of IED capabilities in the area, and a renewed threat of IEDs on the main road. In light of the continued threats posed by AOGs in this area, IMF/ANSF launched an operation in Chahar Bolak and Chimtal districts this period, south of the river, in an attempt to create a permanent IMF/ANSF presence in the area. Troops are currently establishing an outpost on Russian Hill, north-east of Ali Zai Village, and will continue to conduct search operations in key villages throughout Chahar Bolak and Chimtal districts. Thus far, the operation has

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- ANSF/IMF joint operation
- IED on Mazar-Shibirgan Road
- AOGs east of Sholgara River

	NGO Incidents
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resulted in the discovery of one IED north of Ali Zai Village, and in western Chahar Bolak an ANSF/IMF joint patrol came under SAF and RPG fire. During the latter incident, an IMF vehicle was abandoned after AOGs set it on fire, and the AOGs dispersed when IMF called in close air support. Though the air support was only used in order to display a show of force, the incident is significant as the use of even non-kinetic air support is rare in Balkh Province. The use of aircraft will likely increase in the coming months as additional helicopters and UAVs have recently become available in conjunction with the newly deployed IMF police mentoring unit, many of whom are deployed within Balkh. In Nahri Shahi district, two incidents occurred which may or may not be AOG-initiated. The head of a district-level GoA department was



abducted along the road to Sharakh Afghaniya Village. However, the fact that his two GoA colleagues were immediately released may indicate that the abduction was somehow related to an interpersonal dispute. In addition, a possible IED was discovered along the road to Gandak Village near Marmal District. As there is no known AOG presence in or around Gandak, the discovery of the IED may have been intended as a political manoeuvre to call attention to the area. Meanwhile, in Sholgara District AOG activity continues on the eastern side of the river, where an ANP patrol came under SAF early in the morning. AOGs have until now limited their activity in Sholgara since an ANP checkpoint was established a month and a half ago on the east side of the river.

JAWZJAN


Jawzjan Province remained calm this period, while reports indicate an increase in AOG strength and intent to attack ANSF/IMF in Darzab and Qush Tepa districts, where one joint convoy struck an IED last reporting period, killing one ANP and injuring three others. As was the case in Balkh, Sare Pul, Baghlan, Faryab and Takhar provinces, a demonstration was

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Growing AOG threat in Darzab and Qush Tepa

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	0
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held in Shibirgan City to protest the rumoured involvement of INGOs in proselytizing. According to unconfirmed reports, the organizers of the demonstration were rumoured to be associated with a certain political party that is the minority in Jawzjan Province, and the demonstration may have been a manoeuvre to rally support for that particular party. The security dynamics in Jawzjan are likely to shift in the next six months, as new IMF actors are arriving in the



province. The newly deployed IMF police mentoring unit is gradually establishing a joint base with the present IMF provincial office in Shibirgan City, complete with air assets, and a full-size PRT under a new IMF command is expected to be introduced to the province by summer or fall of this year.

SAMANGAN


In Samangan Province, a single incident of arson was reported in Hazarat-e Sultan District, where a school was set on fire, causing damage to a tent and some other material. The exact motive of the perpetrators is still unknown; however, it may have been linked to a local dispute. Official sources report the incident as AOG-

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- AOG infiltration from Baghlan

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	0
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initiated; however, no evidence has been seen to this effect. While the district is known to harbour some AOG elements from neighbouring Baghlan Province, no AOG-initiated activity has been seen in this province to date. If confirmed to be connected with recent AOG migration, it should be noted that significant or sustained AOG activity in the province is not likely to occur in the short-term, as AOGs in the area



are currently focused on the more strategically valuable and penetrable districts of southern and central Baghlan Province.

HERAT

Herat Province was quite active in the past two weeks, yet the number of AOG initiated incidents across the province remains in line with the trend that was observed during the same period in 2009. Nonetheless, the security situation in the province has been marked by an increase of incidents in areas usually considered free of AOG presence or activity. On 14 June in Ghoryan DAC area a motorcycle-mounted RCIED struck an official's vehicle. This represented the first ever ANSO recorded RCIED/IED detonation in the area. Earlier on 31 May in Obe District (Chesmah-i-Obe area), AOG attacked an ANP CP with SAF which marked the first attack since February 2009 in the said district. Of note another at-


KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- AOG presence in Kushki Kunha, Kushk, Shindand, Karukh, Pashtun Zarghun and Obe
- IED/RCIED
- Criminal activity

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	3
This Report Period	0

tack, targeting this time an ANP convoy carrying several ANP officials, occurred on 8 June in the vicinity of the DAC. Obe District has, so far, been affected by criminal activity and very rarely IED/RCIED deployment. Furthermore, changes in AOG tactics have been observed in other areas with, as expected, an increase in IED/RCIED deployment. For instance, in Pashtun Zarghun after a roadside IED discovery in the DAC area (reported in previous cycle) an RCIED detonated on 6 June in Zaman Abat area as an ANP vehicle was passing by.

During the present cycle AOG activity continued as well in Karukh District. On 5 June AOG attacked, with SAF and RPGs, an ANP CP in Armalik area. Subsequently, the attackers opened fire on an international road company worksite located near the ANP CP, killing one worker and injuring the other two. Also in Karukh on 2 June, the main Herat-Qala-i-Naw road experienced another AOG attack targeting an ANSF patrol escorting an IO contracted



convoy in Ab Khoban area. Along this road, besides armed attacks, the possible IED deployment represents a significant threat, particularly around Sabzak Pass. Therefore, as mentioned in previous reports, NGO movements through this area should be avoided. Additionally, two IED related incidents were reported in Shindand District in Chah Gurgin and Zir Koh areas.

In Herat City, the situation was marked by two separate demonstrations. On 5 June, in District 9 area, IMF led a search operation. As a result, one person was killed and another nine were arrested. Subsequently, locals staged a demonstration to voice their discontent towards this operation targeting, according to them, local civilians and not persons having links to AOGs. The demonstrators threw stones at ANP vehicles, but the protest finished with no further damages. Finally, earlier the same day, mostly students staged a peaceful demonstration in response to the recent allegations of INGOs proselytizing.

FARAH

The overall level of AOG activity in Farah province has dropped compared to the last reporting period, with a total of 16 incidents of which 11 were attributed to AOGs. It is worthy to note, that besides AOG initiated incidents that have been reported during the present cycle in Bala-Buluk, Bakwa and Gulistan districts (areas which traditionally host the bulk of activities), Pusht Rod District has remained active. Regarding the province as a whole, another pattern that has not changed during the present cycle is, on the one hand still a low rate of armed clashes, with only two reported incidents that occurred in Bala-

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- IEDs/RCIEDs
- Abduction
- AOG ambushes/Armed clashes

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	1
This Report Period	0

Buluk (both targeting ANP check posts), and on the other hand the continuity of AOG initiated stand-off attacks. On 4 June, one rocket was fired towards the Pusht Rod DAC, which has become AOGs' target of choice. Later, on 12 June, another rocket attack targeted an ANSF base in Bala-Buluk (Shiwan area). As seen in previous periods, road construction companies frequently remain targets throughout the province. For instance, on 11 June in Pusht Rod (Nale Dashi Village), AOG set ablaze two trucks of a private construction company and abducted their drivers. The threat of abduction for political or criminal reasons is still an important concern across the province. On 6 June, there were reports that in two separate incidents a total of four national engineers, working

for a for-profit organization, were abducted in Pusht Rod and Bakwa districts. Whereas in Bakwa the victims were subsequently released due to negotiation efforts of local elders, on 8 June the corpse of one of the abducted people in Pusht Rod was located in Farah. Additionally, one local civilian was abducted on 11 June, in Farah District and another three persons were abducted in Gulistan four days later. The AOG campaign against telecommunication companies manifested itself on June 13, in Pusht Rod (Arbary Village) where AOG set ablaze a private telecommunication tower and looted some equipment. Such incidents are quite frequent in the South and intended to prevent ANSF/IMF to locate AOG presence in the area. However, regarding Farah Province, the most recent similar incident occurred in November 2009, also in Pusht Rod. Finally, on 10 June in Farah City, a private vehicle refused to stop at an ANP check post, resulting in the death of the driver. The reason behind the incident was apparently the Farah authorities' decision to set up check points in order to seize unregistered vehicles. Following this incident, the locals staged a demonstration throwing stones at the Governor's Office, wounding one ANP.

BADGHIS


The affirmation that in Badghis AOG activity steadily continues to increase and that the province remains the most volatile area in the Western Region was once again backed by statistics. The rate of AOG initiated incidents recorded during May has increased by 30% compared to the same period in 2009. Events in Badghis in the present reporting period, besides numerous AOG attacks on ANSF/IMF in Muqur, Murghab and Ghormach, have been shaped by an IMF operation launched on 6 June, in Qadis Dis-

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- AOG-ANSF/IMF clashes
- IEDs in Murghab, Muqur, Ghormach and Qadis

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	0
This Report Period	0

trict (Dara-e-Boom area) resulting in numerous AOG casualties. As past practise indicates, following an important military operation involving AOG casualties, the risk of retaliation should not be ruled out. Particularly, an increase in IED deployment, a tactic which avoids further AOG casualties, may affect neighbouring areas. The local population, as seen in previous reports, remains frequently the victim of the conflict. In the present cycle, on 13 June in Muqur (Miranzaiha area), an anti-personnel mine detonated, wounding a child. Regarding the threat from IEDs in Murghab, on 3 June an IED detonated prematurely in what seemed to be an IED factory, killing six AOG



members, including a prominent AOG commander. Another four AOG members were wounded. Interesting to note that after a temporary lull, AOG activity has resumed in Ghormach. On 13 June in Qala-i-Wali area, AOG attacked an ANP check post, overrunning it. The group abducted five ANP members along with different weapons and a Ranger vehicle. The previous day two rockets were launched towards an ANSF/IMF base located close to the Ghormach DAC. Finally, a local civilian was abducted on 3 June, in Muqur in Qolghan area.

GHOR

Compared to the unusually active previous reporting period the overall level of reported incidents in Ghor has dropped significantly during the present cycle. A total of 13 incidents were reported in the past two weeks, 5 of them were AOG initiated. AOG activity was mainly concentrated in Pasaband which still remains the area of concern. It is worthy to underline that a highly unusual incident occurred in Dawlat Yar, on 13 June, when AOG fired a rocket towards the DAC. According to ANSO data, the most recent stand-off attack in Dawlat Yar District occurred on 2 August 2009, when an RPG was fired towards the DAC; however, the area never experienced a long-range rocket attack. There have

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- AOG presence in Pasaband and Taywara, AOG infiltration in Du Layna
- Criminal activity
- Armed robberies along districts roads


	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	3
This Report Period	0

already been a total of four AOG attacks on DACs (including this incident) throughout the province since the beginning of the year.

In Pasaband, attacks continued against security forces operating in the area. On 2 June, AOG attacked with SAF an ANP patrol in Khamin Village. Moreover, the AOG campaign to target high ranking police officers manifested itself in the same district. On 10 June, in Eskochak area, an IED struck an ANP vehicle, killing two ANP members, including the District Chief of the Criminal Department, and injuring another two.

Besides the risk of being collaterally targeted as a result of attacks targeting security forces, intimidation represents another threat in the area for the population, as well as NGOs. For instance, on 5 June in Bazaar-e Nawrak area, AOG stopped two local civilians riding on a motorbike, and assaulted them physically.

The current situation in Pasaband is in keeping with the status quo, probably only temporary. Despite



the military operation launched in May, security forces are controlling the DAC area, whereas AOGs preserved their freedom of movement and a significant presence in the southern areas. As the situation seems to be similar in Taywara, in both districts, the security environment can evolve rapidly, affecting neighbouring areas, especially Du Layna District.

Nonetheless, it should not be forgotten that criminal activity, particularly armed robberies, remains the concern in the province. On 13 June, in Lal Wa Sarjangal (Kotal-i-Garmab area) a group of armed men stopped several commercial trucks en route to Chaghcharan City and robbed the passengers of their cash and valuables. Of note, a similar incident had already occurred in April in the Naw Abad area. Additionally, localised disputes can also affect the security as seen on 3 June in Du Layna (Gala Aseya area), where an armed clash occurred between two local commanders over a tribal dispute.

NURISTAN


After the Bargi Matal DAC was regained by ANSF allegedly in the night from 31 May to 1 June, Nuristan Province again remained quiet as it has been in the beginning of May. There had been no relevant reports until 10 June which saw AOG attacks in Nurgaram and Nuristan. In Kala Gosh Area of Nurgaram District,

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- AOG attacks
- IMF/ANSF operations

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	0
This Report Period	0

AOG attacked the IMF base with rockets. However, the rockets impacted in an open area in the vicinity of the base. In addition, in Barfkhoch Area of Nuristan District AOG attacked an ANP CP in the evening with heavy weapons and small arms fire. ANP were forced to withdraw after 20 minutes and the position was not regained before approximately 1100 hrs the next morning. Even though Nuristan seems to be quiet, the AOG presence remains



high and more fighting in GoA-controlled areas and districts can be expected, especially in the run-up to the elections. This is at present particularly the case in Bargi Martal, where there is no clear picture which areas are controlled by AOG and which are by ANSF.

NANGARHAR

The overall number of security incidents in Nangarhar Province decreased during the current reporting period. However, AOG initiated incidents increased and accounted for around 50% of all incidents, which is 14% more than during the previous period. The trend of a significant increase in AOG activity seems to continue. (Previous ratios were already doubling since early May).


The use of explosive devices in Nangarhar Province remained high as usual. However, the number of detonations decreased to 10 after there was a significant increase during the last reporting cycle. This period also recorded two SVBIED related incidents in and around Jalalabad City. On 6 June, an SVBIED hit an IMF convoy on Bihsud Bridge, destroying one IMF vehicle. Reportedly, thirteen civilians were injured, including three children, and the suicide attacker was killed. The number of IMF casualties was allegedly five. In addition, on 3 June a mo-

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	3
This Report Period	0

torcycle SVBIED hit an ANA vehicle and failed to detonate. Furthermore, a roadside IED was discovered near the old Chaparhar Bus Station in Jalalabad City. Further roads affected by IED related incidents during the last two weeks were secondary roads to the respective DACs in Khogyani and Nazyan; a secondary road to Pachahano Village in Pachir Wa Agam; the Jalalabad-Torkham Road in Barikaw and Haji Khel, Bati Kot; as well as secondary roads in Safder Area of Kama and Khusgumbad Area of Bihsud.

Magnetic IEDs again accounted for a significant portion of IED attacks, targeting fuel tankers on the Ring Road and Jalalabad-Torkham Road. However, the background of the sudden increase of magnetic IEDs in Nangarhar Province during the last couple of weeks remained unclear, and according to several reports, a criminal background cannot be excluded.

As indicated in previous reports, AOGs remain especially active in Nangarhar's southern and south-eastern districts. Hisarak again is an example for this trend. On 14 June, AOG set three vehicles of a private road construction company on fire. Approximately 30 minutes later, they also attacked a vehicle of a for-profit develop-



ment agency with two RPGs, but missed their target. Private road construction companies are common targets, but the arriving vehicle of the for-profit development agency might have been just an additional target of opportunity. Nevertheless, this incident underlines the trend of increasing AOG activity in the district.

In addition, AOG intimidation tactics remained a concern. On 3 June in Merkehel Area of Khogyani a driver of a private construction company was abducted together with his assistant, but they were released unharmed one day later. Also of note, five days later a local Mullah was shot and killed in Sholana Village of Chaparhar District.

Lastly, a land dispute in Rodat District increased tension in the area, as a clash between locals of Rodat and Bihsud districts on 11 June indicates. The clash allegedly killed four local males and wounded another 22, as well as five ANP. At present, the locals from Rodat and Bihsud District withdrew from the abovementioned area. Negotiations are ongoing, but the arrest of approximately 59 locals by ANP seems to have caused serious tensions in Rodat District, which may lead to further protests. Therefore, it cannot be excluded that similar gatherings or demonstrations erupt, nor that they may turn violent.

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- IEDs
- Heightened tensions in Rodat District due to a land dispute
- AOG assaults in southern and eastern Nangarhar

GRAPHS

Please note, graphs in this report are current as of 9 June 2010.

KUNAR

Kunar province remained unstable with the highest rate of AOG activity in the Eastern Region. The overall rate of AOG initiated incidents slightly decreased from 73 during the previous reporting period to 68 during the current one. Additionally, AOG intimidation tactics, like abductions and assassinations, were less frequent but still concerning. A hotspot again was Marawara, where on 14 June in Dardam area a local male was shot and killed by AOG, being perceived to be an IMF spy. In addition, on 2 June AOG ab-


KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- AOG vs. IMF/ANSF clashes, particularly in Manogai
- IEDs
- Intimidation tactics such as abductions and illegal AOG CPs

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	5
This Report Period	0

ducted a local male for the same reason but released him one day later due to the mediation of tribal elders. In Wata Pur a local teacher was abducted and killed on 1 June, and in Shegal a local truck driver of IMF supplies and his assistant were abducted seven days later. Of note, on 3 June in Mach Mana Area of Nari District AOG detonated and destroyed buildings at a newly constructed electricity dam funded by the PRT. These incidents show again that AOGs are intent upon targeting people and projects they perceive as linked to GoA or IMF, encouraging NGOs to maintain a low but clear profile, ensuring they are not perceived as linked with either.

Direct attacks continue to be the main AOG tactic, accounting for more than half of all AOG initiated incidents. With this, IDF



assaults significantly decreased from 18 to four recorded assaults. IED detonations remained as high as before and targeted IMF/ANSF. Of note, Jalala Area in Ghaziabad District saw nearly one third of all IED detonations. Despite this, roadside IEDs were also recorded in Bar Kunar, Shegal, Chapa Dara and Manogai districts, as well as in Chawkay District where an IED detonated in a culvert on the Jalalabad -Asadabad Road.

AOG checkpoints continued to be a concern and were focused on Sanji, Gosalak and Akundzadagan areas in Chapa Dara District during the current reporting period. An additional AOG checkpoint was reported in the Malikana area of Wata Pur.

LAGHMAN


The incident level in Laghman Province remained the same as in late May. Again, eight AOG initiated incidents were recorded, including four direct attacks targeting ANSF, a fuel tanker and the Qarghayi DAC, as well as two IDF assaults targeting ANP CPs. In addition, IEDs were discovered and defused in Qarghayi

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- AOG attacks, especially ANSF targets
- Increasing AOG activity, particularly in Qarghayi
- Intimidation measures in Dawlat Shah and Alishing

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	1
This Report Period	0

(Surkhakan Area) on the road to Mihtarlam, as well as on secondary roads in Mihtarlam (Shamatai Area) and Alingar (Nuralam Area); however, this reporting period saw also two significant intimidation cases on 8 June. In Dawlat Shah, AOG entered the main bazaar of a village in Mora Area and searched vehicles and allegedly houses for GoA or IMF employees. In addition, AOG established a mobile CP in Alishing (Andar Area), stopping and searching vehicles for civilians working for the GoA or IMF. Allegedly, taxi drivers were also warned not to take GoA, ANSF or NGO employees in their vehicles. At present there are no indi-



cations that AOGs at illegal checkpoints are specifically looking for NGO employees; however, the possibility that this target profile might change or that an NGO may be mistakenly perceived as implementing partners of GoA or IMF cannot be excluded.

Again AOG activity continues to focus on Qarghayi District, where all four direct attacks and one discovered IED were recorded during the current reporting cycle. With this, the effects on the Jalalabad-Kabul Highway security remain limited, as was the case during the last reporting period.

KHOST

The security situation in Khost Province remained constantly challenging with a similar high level of security incidents as during the previous reporting period. Again IEDs were the main AOG tactic; however, nearly 50% of the IED related incidents were again discoveries as it has been the case during the previous two weeks already. Nevertheless, a significant number of civilians were affected by IEDs in Khost City. On 2 June, an IED which was emplaced in garbage detonated in Beland


KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- IEDs throughout the province
- Attacks against security forces
- AOGs targeting DACs

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	2
This Report Period	0

Manzel Area, wounding four civilians. On 7 June, an IED detonated inside a drug store in the Pharmacy Market Area, wounding two civilians. In addition, three days later an IED detonated in a shop in the Hamam Market, damaging the shop.

On 15 June an SVBIED was allegedly identified by ANP in Karwan Sarai Area of Khost City. After ANP fired warning shots, the driver as well as a man on a motorbike, allegedly guiding the SVBIED, stopped and escaped on foot. Since the beginning of 2010, ANSO recorded already four suicide attacks in the vicinity of Khost City which is just as many as were recorded for the whole year of 2009. Therefore, today's



attempt indicates that further and maybe increasing SVBIED attacks cannot be excluded. The previously noted trend of a diversification of AOG offensive tactics from IED-related attacks continued with nine direct attacks especially in Bak, Tere Zayi and Tani districts, as well as six IDF assaults throughout the province. Of note, AOG efforts to intimidate the local population were seen in Khost City on 12 June, when AOG tossed a hand grenade into a local singer's house, as well as on the same day in Tere Zayi when AOG abducted an ANP officer while he was on annual leave.

PAKTYA

The overall number of recorded security incidents in Paktya Province remained similar to the previous reporting period and was therefore quite higher than in the beginning of May. This suggests that the deteriorated security situation in the province might be lasting. Gardez District continued to be a hotspot of AOG activities with around 30% of all AOG initiated incidents in the province. In addition, the number of incidents in Gardez in mid-June was nearly as high as those recorded for the whole month in 2009. On 8 June, a field team of an INGO that


KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- AOG direct attacks, particularly in Gardez District
- IMF/ANSF operations in Zurmat

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	1
This Report Period	0

conducts high-risk programming that differs from typical NGO activities came under small arms fire attack while visiting a project site in Gardez District. Allegedly, not more than two armed men opened fire for a short period of time from a distant location, wounding one INGO staff member. For emphasis, the abovementioned INGO conducts programming that differs from typical NGO activities, and it therefore faces different and higher risks than other NGOs.

Zurmat and Jani Khel also saw significant numbers of security incidents during the present reporting cycle. Of note, all five security incidents in Jani Khel were AOG attacks against the DAC. Further attacks against DACs took place in Dand Wa



Patan, Chamkanay and Wuza Zadrán. The majority of AOG assaults were direct and indirect attacks, targeting IMF/ANSF as well as to a lesser extent road construction companies and PSCs. IED related incidents decreased to nearly 50% during the current reporting period; however, they continued to be a relevant risk. Furthermore, an abduction, which seems to have again the intention to intimidate the local population, was recorded on 2 June. In the centre of Jaji District, AOG abducted an unknown number of tribal elders from the area. In addition, one day later AOG abducted two staff members of a demining agency from their project site and released them again a few hours later.

GHAZNI

During this report period, Ghazni Province has the extremely dubious distinction of having the most security incidents, of any province. The majority of these are AOG attacks on DACs, IMF facilities and ANP posts. As has been noted in previous reports, the AOG units operating in Ghazni have excellent logistical links with Pakistan which enable them to employ large numbers of rockets in their operations, along with the personnel required to handle these specialized weapons.

Excluding IED strikes, there were 44 direct and rocket attacks conducted by AOG over the last two weeks. The districts of Ghazni and Andar suffered an unprecedented number of attacks, while the districts of Gelan, Zana Khan, Rashidan, Dih Yak and Muqur also had elevated levels of incidents.


In Ghazni District, IMF facilities were attacked by rockets on at least six occasions, with ANP posts in the district attacked four times, the DAC three times and

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	1
This Report Period	0

the Governor's residence twice. In Andar District the situation was even more dire, with IMF facilities being rocketed on eight occasions. ANP posts were attacked five times, and the DAC on one occasion. IMF/ANA patrols and convoys were attacked, mostly with SAF, on seven occasions in the districts of Dih Yak, Andar, Ghazni, Giro, Ab Band, and Zana Khan. Lastly, the DACs of Dih Yak, Zana Khan, Muqur, Ghazni, and Rashidan were attacked by AOG during the report period, mostly with SAF but on several occasions with mortars and/or rockets.

IED incidents accounted for another 29 entries during this report period, affecting IMF convoys, ANP patrols, private construction activity and civilian movement. Not surprisingly, those districts located astride the ring road – Qarabagh, Ghazni, Andar, Muqur, Ab Band – endured the most incidents, with IED strikes occurring in Qarabagh District seven times, Andar District six times, Ghazni District three times, and Muqur and Ab Band each hosting two incidents. IED strikes also occurred on smaller routes in Giro, Waghaz, and Dih Yak districts.

Other significant AOG activities



included the killing of a Hazara elder in Nawur District, and the kidnapping of two employees of a USAID implementing partner in Waghaz District. The latter incident occurred as a team was returning back to their office in Ghazni City after distributing payrolls to a field office. This incident, as well as the escalating levels of violence throughout the province, has led to reports of several similar organizations considering suspension of their operations in Ghazni Province for the near- and mid-term.

IMF/ANA and ANP operations were much less numerous than those of the AOG. ANP arrested several AOG in the Qala-i-Jangi area of Ghazni District, seizing several ANP uniforms and a set of body armour, and in the village of Senai in Andar District, ANP killed two AOG during a search operation. IMF operations took place in the districts of Qarabagh, Waghaz, Andar and Dih Yak. In both Qarabagh and Dih Yak, a total of six AOG were arrested and weapons were seized, mostly small arms. In the village of Laghar, Qarabagh District and in the area of Chardiwal, Andar District, IMF units called in airstrikes during operations which resulted in a total of seven AOG killed.

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- IEDs
- AOG direct and indirect attacks
- AOG assassinations

TRAINING ANNOUNCEMENT

ANSO will be restarting its training programme for NGO national staff. Look for instruction to restart in Kabul City circa mid-July for guard and radio communications training. Registered NGOs will receive an advert and instructions soon.

ZABUL

Zabul Province, with a few notable exceptions, remained at a low level with respect to incidents during the report period, with the majority of incidents occurring in the districts of Shah Joy and Qalat. AOG initiated only a few attacks; however, one of these was a BBIED attack on a IMF unit which was distributing food and other goods to civilians at the main bazaar of Shah Joy on 11 June, with two civilians killed and


KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- IED Strikes

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	1
This Report Period	0

14 others wounded. This attack—as well as the horrific attack on a wedding party in Kandahar—has led some to believe that the ‘relative’ restraint AOG have shown towards causing mass civilian casualties may be coming to an end, although this conclusion will require considerable more data than is presently at hand.

IMF and ANP operations accounted for the majority of the remaining incidents, with several effective operations in Qalat District. In Sarkhogan Village on 2 June, nine AOG were arrested



and a variety of small arms were seized during a joint IMF/ANP operation. In the area of Dor Manda village, five AOG were killed during an IMF operation, and in Zanzeer Village five Pakistani nationals were arrested along with an amount of pro-Taliban propaganda materials, mostly CDs and cassettes.

PAKTIKA

Paktika Province remained very violent during the report period, with both AOG and IMF/ANSF maintaining a high tempo of aggressive operations, resulting in increased casualties amongst both fighting units and civilians.

As with the most recent report period, AOG concentrated their efforts on the District Administration Centres (DACs) of the province, initiating attacks on the DACs of Yahya Khel, Omna, Yosuf Khel, Barmal, Sharan, Gayan, Ziruk, Gomal, Khair Kot and Mata Khan (in other words, almost every DAC in the province) with some of these locations receiving more than one attack. The use of rockets and heavy weapons in many of these attacks (Yosuf Khel, Barmal, Sharan, Gayan, and Ziruk) are most likely resourced

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS


- IEDs
- AOG attacks on DACs
- IMF Airstrikes

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	0
This Report Period	0

from Pakistan, as the province shares a long border with that country. Reinforcing this idea is the presence of a significant number of foreign fighters encountered during IMF/ANSF operations in Sarobi and Omna Districts, who typically receive training and other preparation from bases inside Pakistan before heading off to assist in operations in Afghanistan.

AOG activities during this period also included targeted killings of civilians, with so-called ‘collaborators and spies’ being murdered in Urgan, Khair Kot and Sharan districts. In addition, in Mata Khan District, on two separate occasions a total of nine employees of private construction companies were killed during attacks on their field operations.

Owing to the rural nature of the province and the lack of major roadways, IEDs have been historically rare in Paktika and over the past two weeks there were



only three recorded IED incidents, two in Yosuf Khel District where a total of four private construction company employees were killed and another nine wounded, and one in Urgan District’s Shatori region where three civilians were killed when their truck hit a pressure-plate initiated IED.

IMF/ANSF operations were numerous during the report period. In Khush Amand District two separate operations resulted in nine AOG killed with air support being used during one of those clashes. Air strikes were also called in during operations in Sarobi and Sharan Districts, resulting in a total of 31 AOG killed, including four identified as foreign fighters (nationality not specified). Lastly, IMF operations in Mata Khan, Urgan and Omna districts also resulted in numerous AOG casualties (an estimated 11 killed) which included five foreign fighters, identified as Pakistani nationals.

KANDAHAR


As mentioned in the previous report, the nature of the security incidents in Kandahar, including increasing assassinations and threats, has led to a great deal of tension among civilians in Kandahar City and throughout the province. Compounding this problem is the series of confusing and contradictory signals from both senior GoA and ISAF officials relating to upcoming operations. In the space of two weeks, senior military officials have stated that the offensive will be significantly delayed, due to the setbacks encountered in Helmand and opposition from community elders in Kandahar City. The timing has been given as either August, October, or 'before the end of the year', by a variety of individuals. Contradictorily, other statements have described the urgent need to be vigorous in creating security in the city, implying that an increased presence of IMF units will occur in the next weeks. Lastly, President Karzai, totally reversing his earlier statement that no operations will be undertaken without the approval of the community, stated during a jirga held in Kandahar on 13 June that, "the cleaning-up operation will start first in Kandahar City...we need your cooperation with this operation...I don't accept any excuse for not cooperating". Needless to say, the assembled elders left the jirga voicing their confusion and anxiety over the future operations. Adding to this tension was an almost record-high level of incidents in Kandahar City and throughout the province, including the single-deadliest suicide attack in the country since September 2009. On 9 June, a SVBIED detonated at a wedding party in Arghandab District, kill-

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	3
This Report Period	0

ing over 40 attendees and wounding over 80. The groom was reportedly an ANP officer and in attendance were several other ANP officers as well as members of the district Local Defence Initiative (LDI) militia. AOG later claimed responsibility for the attack, after some denials and attempts to blame the incident on an IMF airstrike. The next day, an IED struck a group of mourners who were burying some of the victims in a cemetery in District 8 of Kandahar City.

AOG conducted another suicide attack during the report period, striking the regional training centre for ANP located near KAF. The attack lasted for several hours as an SVBIED blew a hole in the security fence and was followed by two BBIED-equipped attackers who engaged in a prolonged firefight with ANP and IMF units. An ANP trainer, a PSC guard and the three attackers were killed in the incident.

Aside from those two high-profile attacks, AOG demonstrated that they can operate in any part of the province, launching an astonishing number of direct attacks – 25 – on a variety of targets in most of the districts in the province. These included direct attacks on IMF patrols and convoys in Zhari (three times), Maiwand (twice), Dand, Panjwayi, and Khakrez Districts. In addition, ANP posts were attacked a total of 13 times over the last two weeks, including those in Zhari (four times), Arghandab (twice), Shah Wali Kot (twice) and in Kandahar City (four times). For good measure, AOG also continued their tradition of occasionally launching rockets



against the Kandahar Airfield itself, sending three into the base on 3 June.

IEDs continued to plague the province, with 18 strikes recorded in the report period, primarily in Kandahar City (eight incidents) but also in the districts of Arghandab (five), Khakrez (three), and Panjwayi (two). In total, four ANP, 11 civilians, and two IMF soldiers were killed by these incidents, and a total of 35 persons wounded.

The AOG campaign of assassination and intimidation continued at a rapid pace, with the majority of incidents occurring in Kandahar City. Off-duty ANP officials were killed in District 7 (two killings) and District 9 of Kandahar City while a mid-level official of the education department was gunned down in District 10. Two other bodies of middle aged males were discovered in District 7 in two separate incidents. A village elder in Spin Boldak was killed for his efforts in collaborating with GoA officials. Lastly, one of the most high-profile assassinations in recent months occurred 15 June when the District Governor of Arghandab, a key district in the upcoming IMF operation, was killed along with his son and bodyguard by an RCIED in District One of Kandahar City.

In stark contrast to the high tempo of AOG activity, IMF operations during the report period were low-key. Search operations in District 4 of Kandahar City yielded one suspected AOG with several thousand dollars cash on his person, and other operations in Arghandab and Daman enabled IMF units to seize a sizable amount of explosives, ammonium nitrate, AP mines and small arms. Also in Arghandab District, in Almata village, a mid-level AOG commander was killed during an IMF raid on his house and two others were detained. Lastly, during a botched IMF airstrike, civilians were wounded in Sangisar village of Zhari District.

URUZGAN

IED incidents as usual made up the majority of incidents in Uruzgan during the report period. Tirin Kot District witnessed over 10 IED incidents, primarily in the areas of Sorgh Lez, Khush Mandi, Nachin and several in the town of Tirin Kot itself, where two separate RCIED attacks in the main bazaar area resulted in a total of three civilians killed and another five seriously wounded. It has not


KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- IED strikes

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	0
This Report Period	0

been determined whether the targets for those two attacks were ANP, IMF or more troubling, an attempt by AOG to create a large number of civilian casualties by locating the devices in the perpetually-crowded bazaar area.

Direct AOG attacks are rare in Uruzgan Province; however, a bold attack on the DAC of Char Chino District took place 2 June, with attackers virtually surrounding the area and using RPGs and small arms to attempt to infiltrate the compound and facilities. After



a two hour firefight with responding IMF and ANP units, the majority of the attackers withdrew, leaving two dead and several wounded. Two days later, in an operation launched in response, IMF killed 14 and wounded numerous AOG.

NIMROZ

Nimroz has remained relatively volatile, with several serious incidents during the report period, including the killing of several off-duty ANA officers.

In Khash Rod District several rockets were fired at an ANP checkpoint, with no serious casualties, and in the same district an illegal checkpoint was set-up by AOG for the duration of the day on 5 June, during which several civilian vehicles were shot at when they refused to stop, once again with no serious casualties. However another illegal checkpoint was erected in Khash Rod District on 13 June and during the day a


KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- AOG illegal checkpoints
- Drug trafficking

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	0
This Report Period	0

civilian minibus was stopped and searched. Three passengers who were identified as ANA officers were promptly shot and killed by AOG for working for the GoA. Also on the same day, AOG ambushed an ANP mounted patrol in the Rakan area of Khash Rod, killing one ANP officer. Lastly, in Zaranj, a substantial quantity (125 kgs) of heroin was seized and two individuals arrested.

There had been much speculation as to the reasons behind the recent burst of AOG activity and it is still to be determined whether this current increase in violence is not an anomaly, and part of a future trend. Possible reasons for increasing insecurity have been given as follows: the greater presence of AOG as they are being pushed out of Helmand Province;



the greater activity of IMF/ANSF which has increased the friction points between them and AOG in the area; and the increased flow of raw and processed opium and heroin through transit points on the Iranian border with Nimroz. Of these, the first is not probable, since AOG are clearly not being pushed out of Helmand, but rather the opposite – AOG have increased their presence and activity in the province and most notably in the Marja and Nad Ali areas. It is believed that IMF/ANSF future plans do include a greater presence in the border areas with Iran and so it will be important to see if this results in greater levels of violence in the future.

ANNOUNCEMENT:

In the coming months, ANSO will be helping develop an incident mapping service to aid NGO management and security procedures. Registrants will receive further information as it becomes available.

HELMAND

Helmand continues to be extremely violent, with AOG expanding their efforts in the province both in quantity of attacks and in the brazenness of their actions. As with the previous period, all types of AOG initiated operations were present during the current report period: direct and indirect attacks on IMF/ANSF units, expansion of the number of IEDs in key areas, and intimidation of local communities, including assassinations and threats.

Identified in previous ANSO reports, the numerous setbacks experienced by IMF/ANSF in their efforts to regain the momentum in Helmand has now been cited by senior ISAF commanders as a reason for significant delays in the operations planned for Kandahar. Moreover, the fact that now Kandahar efforts will first focus on development, and then shift to military operations, is a complete repudiation of the “Shape/Clear/ Hold/Build” approach touted by US planners as the solution to the

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS


- AOG Attacks
- IMF Airstrikes

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	3
This Report Period	0

growing tide of AOG dominance in the south, and a clear acknowledgement of the failure of Operation Moshtarak.

Direct AOG attacks occurred throughout the province, with AOG launching actions against IMF patrols multiple times each in Nahri Sarraj, Marja and Sangin Districts. In Marja during an AOG attack on 2 June, four civilians were killed in the crossfire between AOG and IMF units, undoubtedly increasing the resentment of the local community towards the deteriorating security situation in the area. In Sangin, in a particularly audacious attack on 9 June, AOG managed to down an IMF helicopter attempting to support IMF ground units, killing four IMF soldiers and wounding a number of others.

The number of IED strikes remained high during the report period, with over 15 recorded, primarily in the districts of Sangin, Marja, Nahri Sarraj, and Now Zad. In Now Zad District alone, a total of 11 civilians were killed and over 18 wounded in three separate incidents, in the areas of Salam Bazaar and Denah.



Intimidation efforts by AOG continued in Garmser District near the village of Bertaqa as AOG, in two separate incidents, killed a village elder in his home, and set fire to GoA-donated farm equipment, warning locals to stop cooperating with GoA or IMF in the future. In addition, during the report period there were several discoveries of bodies in Lashkar Gah, and in Naraw-i-Barak Zayi District which has been attributed to AOG execution of ‘collaborators’.

IMF and ANP operations accounted for only a few of the recorded incidents during this report period. ANP raids in Musa Qala, Nad Ali, and Marja Districts yielded a total of 57 kgs of opium. IMF raids in Reg and Musa Qala resulted in the arrests of two mid-level AOG and the seizure of several rockets, respectively. IMF also conducted two separate airstrikes that were reported over the past two weeks, both targeting AOG who were in the process of planting IEDs and which resulted in a total of five AOG killed.

NOTICE: Your input is invaluable for the production of this report. While we appreciate information on incidents, we also need general information on the security situation and context in your area. So please remember to call or email us regularly.

Contact details of ANSO staff are provided on the last page.

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ANSO ACRONYMS

ACG-Armed Criminal Group /
AEF-Afghan Eradication Forces
/ **ANA**-Afghan National Army /
ANBP-Afghan National Border
Police / **ANP**-Afghan National
Police / **AOG**-Armed Opposition
Group / **APPF**-Afghan Public
Protection Forces (local deputised
militias) / **DC**-District
Centre / **GOA**-Government of
Afghanistan / **IDF**-Indirect Fire
(ex: mortars) / **IED**-Improvised
Explosive Device / **IMF**-
International Military Forces /
NDS-National Directorate of
Security (Intelligence) / **PRP**-
Previous Reporting Period /
PSC-Private Security Company
/ **RPG**-Rocket Propelled Gre-
nade / **SAF**-Small Arms Fire /
VBIED-Vehicle Borne Impro-
vised Explosive Device

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MISSING

This report ANSO
could not provide
analysis for the prov-
inces of:

Bamyan

Panjshir

This is because we
do not know enough
about the area to
comment on the sig-
nificance of the inci-
dents occurring
there.

If you can help us
understand the prov-
ince better, please
contact us.

TRAINING ANNOUNCEMENT

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FEEDBACK ON ANSO SERVICES

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