

THE ANSO REPORT

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YOU NEED TO KNOW

- The 26 February attack on guesthouses targeted Indian officials
- AOG participation in negotiations is unlikely in light of several arrests of Quetta Shura members
- IMF encouraging the perception of stability to allow for reduction of forces

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COUNTRY SUMMARY

On 26 February, AOG intentions to target the official Indian presence inside Afghanistan again manifested; this time two guesthouses frequented by Indian security officials in a usually sedate area of Kabul City were decimated by a simple attack that apparently utilised a significant car bomb and armed attackers augmented with suicide vests—a typical AOG tactic. The initial blast caused the collapse of the Nour guesthouse, and remaining AOG took up positions inside the neighbouring Park Residence as they were quickly confronted by ANSF.

While many will find the incident disconcerting, one must glean that AOG are conscious of the ramifications of generally targeting the civilian community. Moreover, the dominant AOG threat to NGOs in Kabul City is merely being in the 'wrong place at the wrong time', namely an event or location where NGO staff are in the presence of parties-to-the-conflict or other high-valued targets, such as foreign dignitaries, local power-players, or IO staff.

The issue of reconciliation talks between GOA and the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan was prominent this pe-

riod, although many analysts believe the recent spate of arrests in Pakistan have effectively removed the most likely interlocutors from the frame. The existence or lack of a process remains the subject of intense speculation with few facts to substantiate any perspective. The only thing ANSO can be certain of is that some form of political settlement is fundamental to resolving the conflict, but that it is unlikely to be achieved with the ongoing presence of international military.

In Marjah, Helmand, IMF/ANSF made a widely anticipated declaration of success as their 15,000 strong multinational force saw off close to 200 AOG fighters. The Information Operation (IO) value in encouraging a perception of stability would seem to have been the primary purpose of this event.

Many see the impending withdrawal of Dutch and German forces as only a preliminary sign of ISAF intentions to depart, and no party has yet voiced a desire to assume the role that the Dutch currently fill. With this, as long as conditions allow for a seeming declara-

tion of IMF success, reluctant ISAF partners will be able to realise their desires to exit.

In the past, one has not necessarily seen an AOG comprehension of this desire to merely achieve the perception of success, so IMF plans to conduct another sweeping operation, this time in Kandahar, may meet more AOG resistance. Regardless, one should expect increased grandiose attacks on IMF, ANSF, and GoA facilities as well as numerous IED emplacements in affected districts and roads exiting Kandahar Airfield.

The usual gamut of NGO incidents occurred during the period, taking place in Kabul, Faryab, Nangarhar, and Kunar provinces. Although ranging in severity, almost all appear to be due to personal or professional grievances, with three threats occurring—SMS night letter, and phone—including one to target an office with a suicide attack. In Kunar, personal grievances led to the death of an NGO staff member's brother, theft of his family's goods, and arson.

KABUL

A series of recent ANSF arrest operations and the retention of a ring of checkpoints around the centre of the city failed to stop a complex attack on 26 February which left an area of Shar-e-Naw looking like a war zone. In a claim of responsibility for the morning’s actions, an AOG spokesman declared that it was an attack on ‘foreigners’; however, it appears that it was more specifically an attack on Indian interests in Kabul. The attack began shortly after 0630 on a Friday, which has been immune from such attacks over the past year, when two AOG targeted the guards at the entrance to the Park Residence using SAF and grenades. The two AOG, believed to be BBIEDs, promptly breached the alleyway leading to the inner courtyard where the entrance to the guesthouse is located. Once inside, one of the larger SVBIEDs to strike Kabul detonated approximately 50 metres outside the Nour Guesthouse, which was leased by the Indian government for visiting delegations and diplomats. The blast literally tore apart the south west corner of Shar-e-Naw Park; decimated the Nour Guesthouse and caused its later collapse; led ANSF to believe that it was an attack on the Safi Landmark Hotel due to the damage; and blew out windows several hundred metres away.

The attack continued in the Park Residence guesthouse for at least two and a half hours, with one BBIED reportedly detonating on the first floor and another being killed by ANSF after a number of foreigners had been killed by SAF, some in their rooms. Two NGO workers escaped the assault, with one receiving superficial wounds


	NGO Incidents
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and managing to find a taxi. A French citizen who was contracted to work on cultural programs in Kabul and working for a NGO in France was killed in the attack.

The attack occurred on both a Friday and a national religious holiday, meaning that there were few people to be expected on the streets. A detonation several hours later on any other day would have resulted in dozens more than the reported 17 fatalities (6 Indian, 1 French, 1 Italian, 3 ANSF and 6 Afghan civilians) and more than 31 injured.

The attack occurred against a backdrop of high profile arrests of senior AOG figures in Pakistan, the killing of Mohammad Haqqani in a drone strike also in Pakistan, a tentative commitment to talks between India and Pakistan, and an almost six week absence of a large scale AOG attack in the capital, where typically there is a regular five week attack cycle. The quantity of the explosive was clearly designed to cause the maximum number of fatalities inside the Nour Guesthouse without requiring a follow up assault. The detonation left a crater approximately 2.5 metres deep and five metres wide. The assault on the Park Residence, despite a perception that a number of Indians were guests, is a concern for the wider international community in Kabul, including NGOs. Once inside, the attackers clearly aimed to locate and kill foreigners irrespective of their nationality.

The latest incident illustrates both AOG capacity and ANSF defensive weaknesses. The Kabul City checkpoints, in place since prior to the election, have once again



proven that they are able to find the occasional unlicensed gun owner and narcotics stash but have been virtually unable to stop the half a dozen high profile attacks over the past six months.

For NGOs, the attack should provoke a re-evaluation of the use of commercial guesthouses, or at least greater scrutiny of the residences, for either visiting or permanent staff when the most recent attack is combined with the October Bakhtar Guesthouse attack. Secondly, the ‘international community’ is clearly a target in the current context and measures should be adopted that reduce an NGO’s risk profile. The risk of collateral exposure remains minimal in a city of 3.5 million; however, measures can be taken which can reduce the risk further, such as the simple avoidance of vulnerable targets, such as GoA buildings, embassies, consulates, and other clear representations of the international community, especially during the morning hours.

Separately, an INGO received an SMS warning of a possible internal threat and another INGO worker received a threatening night-letter in Kabul City. Night-letters and other such threats are inherently difficult to trace and assess for credibility. In the vast majority of occasions, the threats are derived from personal disputes that are cloaked in AOG language in an effort to extort money, discredit an employee, or force a resignation. However, whether emanating from AOG or not, night-letters are extremely unsettling for the recipients and should always be treated seriously as the consequences of not doing so could result in possible attacks on staff or a ‘settling of scores’ if the author of the letter is identified.

WARDAK

Wardak is a complex operating environment for NGOs. Freedom of movement throughout the province is largely determined by a person's birthplace or family residence as perceptions of identity and therefore acceptance can be reduced to the village or valley level. Bihsud I & II, as well as Day Mirdad, are the exceptions due to their Hazara populations, rendering them virtually immune from the violence in the east. NGOs remaining in Wardak have established a policy of employing at the district level, which serves to mitigate any local perceptions of outsiders entering into the local communities. In essence, NGOs are mirroring the local communities in which they are working.

The security situation in the provincial capital, Maydan Shahr, has improved from past years; however, the establishment of three bank branches, a new public square, and the PRT built Amir Amza Mosque is not necessarily a determinant of its long term stability. AOG initiated attacks in 2009 decreased by 30% from 2008 despite last year's election. The improved security in the provincial capital is largely a result of the basing of large numbers of domestic and international security forces, rather than a pacification of AOG groups.

The Kabul-Kandahar Highway, which passes through Maydan Shahr, Nirkh, Saydabad and Jaghatu on its way south, is the main cause of instability in the province. At issue is the convergence of interests between IMF, ANSF, AOG, ACG and competing security and logistics companies. IMF and ANSF's main priority is the securitisation of the highway to ensure the free flow of

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freight between provincial capitals and to maintain the illusion that the multi-billion dollar highway project is contributing to the stability of the country rather than leading to a greater level of instability. In Saydabad, where 44% of all AOG initiated incidents took place in 2009, attacks on logistics and security companies feature foremost in incident reports. For the months of November and December 2009 and January of this year alone, there were fifteen 'AOG' attacks against logistics convoys (most often associated with IMF), ten attacks against IMF, and only one single attack against ANSF along the main and district roads in Saydabad. The statistics largely echo a similar pattern for the same period the year before. Similar attacks against logistics convoys in Surobi create the perception of insecurity and drive transport costs and insurance premiums significantly higher.

The attacks on ANP are particularly revealing and they contribute to a greater understanding of the events surrounding the desertion of eight ANP from the Chaki Wardak District on 17 February. During the early evening, eight ANP stationed at the DAC left their posts to join the AOG ranks, possibly following some sort of negotiations with the local AOG commander. The men left with two ANP rangers and an assortment of weapons, including RPGs. GoA control of the DAC was reestablished in the early hours of the morning with the assistance of IMF. Similar to the comparatively few attacks on ANP in Saydabad, the Chaki Wardak desertions should be viewed

through the local context. Attacks against ANP are relatively infrequent compared to other target groups (IMF and logistics convoys) as ANP are often posted to areas where they have traditional family and tribal ties which transcend loyalties to national institutions. Similar to NGO employment practices as a method to mitigate risk, local AOG are unlikely to either abduct NGO workers from their own neighbourhood or attack ANP from their own valley or tribe.

This idea is perhaps best exemplified by the Afghan Public Protection Force (APPF), which is locally referred to as the 'Arbaki' or tribal militia. The force has now provided training to the sixth class of recruits and according to the government is deployed in Chaki Wardak, Jalrez, Maydan Shahr, Nirkh, Saydabad and will possibly involve Jaghatu in the coming weeks, although this is yet to be confirmed. Following initial reports that the program did not represent the ethnic realities on the ground, the latest 'class' of the APPF is now believed to be 62% Pashtun. Retention, as reported by GoA, is believed to be 93%. The APPF is derived from the local communities in which they subsequently police and have the support of the local shuras. The force, with no powers of detention or arrest, performs basic static guard duty and limited patrolling. They are aware of the local power dynamics and are indeed a mirror of the local communities and perhaps most importantly, 'they know the local villagers and valleys.' Numerous local reports credit the APPF with contributing to a greater level of stability in the areas where they operate. Few attacks are recorded against the APPF with the major casualties resulting from IEDs along the main roads, rather than any close range attacks.

For NGOs, the greatest concern in Wardak is abduction by criminal groups either acting alone or with links to AOG factions. Differentiating attacks by AOG and ACG is becoming increasingly difficult as motivations and support structures are evermore intertwined, compounding the criminal threat. NGOs operating in Wardak currently benefit from long established community relations, often a result of decades of implementing programs across the province, thereby reducing their risk profile.

PARWAN

Following the heavy loss of life after a series of avalanches struck the southern Salang area on 8 February, the GoA is in the process of formulating a plan to ensure a coordinated and efficient response to any future incidents of a similar magnitude. Political will and financial constraints will most likely be the largest hurdles, rather than the implementation of any plan. The Salang's strategic importance to Kabul is evidenced in the hundreds, if not thousands, of heavy vehicles that slowly navigate the narrow tunnels, galleries and roads to approximately 3,450 metres. The southern Salang is dominated by a two kilometre stretch of tunnel and a series of galleries that seemingly double as temporary car parks. Traffic blockages are usually the result of car drivers attempting to overtake the long and often colourful line of trucks in the tunnels and galleries, causing a stalemate in the middle

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS


- Low intensity AOG activity in the Ghorband Valley
- ACG activity in Chaharikar
- Winter road closures through the Shibar and Salang passes

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where the oncoming traffic meets the impatient drivers. Strained negotiations are often the only way to unblock the traffic in the absence, in many cases, of a GoA presence. Ideally, a permanent traffic controller at each major gallery, beyond just the main tunnel, would vastly improve the current system of collective negotiations to ensure passage.

Presently the Ministry of Public Utilities is responsible for the security and safety of the Salang, using elements from the ANSF and the National Department of Disaster Management. It appears, after discussions with local GoA figures, that future contingency planning could include the establishment of six refuges along the length of the pass which would provide shelter and possibly other rudimentary services to any trapped motorists. A permanent ANSF or emergency team presence is also being contemplated as helicopter flight times for emergency rescue teams take approximately 25 minutes from the closest base in Bagram.

The threat to the Pass from AOG attack remains minimal despite its strategic importance to both IMF and the GoA. A sentiment, how-



ever, which is increasingly being heard across the central region, particularly in non-Pashtun areas, is the absence of a 'peace dividend.' It is becoming increasingly apparent that those communities which laid down their weapons in expectation of some form of future benefit have become increasingly disillusioned as vast amounts of money and attention have been diverted to the south and east of the country. As the government has been unable to provide often basic services to these communities and economic activity is virtually absent, the 'peace dividend' is being reappraised. Although not a risk which should be perceived as widespread, there is certainly an undercurrent of, firstly, ambivalence to GoA authority and, secondly, residual frustration which could manifest itself in the form of isolated security incidents with an overtly criminal disposition. The longer the conflict is prolonged and the tangible benefits of peace remain absent, then the greater the risk of instability. The early stages of this phenomenon are currently being witnessed along the Ghorband Valley. For the second half of February there have been no reported AOG or ACG incidents of note and NGOs have not expressed any security concerns in regards to their operations.

PANJSHIR

Panjshir provides a safe operating environment for NGOs. There were no reported AOG incidents in 2009 and crime is of little con-

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Winter road closures

	NGO Incidents
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cern. The ethnic homogeneity and the mountain ranges serve to isolate the province from the instability throughout the rest of the country. During the last reporting period, there were no reported security incidents.

KAPISA

The security situation in some parts of the Kapisa has deteriorated over the past two weeks. AOG and IMF clashes in the east of the province are occurring at an increasing rate, with the risk of collateral exposure growing for civilians. On 22 February, an IMF convoy was ambushed by AOG in the early morning. The resulting exchange


KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Secondary exposure to clashes between AOG and ANSF/IMF in Tagab
- Low intensity factional disputes in Kohistan I & II
- Decentralized AOG activity in Alasay, Nijrab and Tagab

	NGO Incidents
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of fire left one civilian dead and five wounded. Following the attack, four rockets impacted near an IMF base, causing no casualties. A further escalation of force shooting in Tagab on 20 February illustrates the potential risk for civilians travelling around the arterial roads.

The areas of concern in this province are Alasay, Nijrab and Tagab districts, where IMF operations and AOG ambushes are becoming increasingly regular, especially for so early in the year. Few NGOs operate in the east of the province; however, there is a light presence, and NGOs should limit any contact with IMF for fear of association in the eyes of the local populace.



The capital is relatively quiet in comparison, despite the location of two rockets which were set to be fired on the provincial centre on 20 February. The potential for political instability in Mahmudi Raqi does exist following the arrest of a senior ANSF figure on allegations of links to AOG factions, especially if further arrests of ANSF or GoA figures take place. The north-western districts (Koh Band and the Kohistans) have also been quiet, but NGOs are cautioned to maintain a low profile due to the potential for periodic AOG activity.

DAYKUNDI

An IMF airstrike in neighbouring Char Chino District, Uruzgan, led to the deaths of 33 civilians, all of whom were from Daykundi. While it is not clear how the three minivans were mistaken for AOG, any sentiment supporting IMF activities in Nili may be a further victim of the airstrike. There were no reported demonstrations either in Nili or Kijran following the funerals. If the PRT base in Nili is suspected of any coordinating role for IMF operations in the south of the province,


KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- ACG/AOG abduction threat in Gizab
- Winter road travel
- Occasional banditry on roads leaving from Nili

	NGO Incidents
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then there is a high likelihood that it could invite demonstrations in case of further civilian casualties or AOG attention in the form of retaliatory attacks.

Again the Tamazan Valley was the focus of security incidents in Daykundi. The Tamazan Bazaar area is the limit of GoA authority in Gizab and the beginning of AOG control. The Bazaar is situated approximately 30 kilometres south of the capital and is often the flashpoint for attacks occurring approximately twice a month. On 24 February, it is believed that a dispute over the ownership or relocation of some trucks which were stolen from a subcontractor several weeks ago led to an exchange of fire between villagers and AOG. One AOG was reportedly injured in the clash which



lasted for over three hours. The ANSF, considering the area's location on the border of AOG controlled Gizab, were at first reluctant to intervene and then reportedly assisted in the evacuation of some local villagers without playing a significant part in the confrontation. ANSF are unlikely to change the security dynamic of Gizab on their own due to their hesitancy to move into their district as well as their limited capacity. Two other incidents were also recorded in Tamazan Bazaar on the 24th. Rifles and ammunition were seized from one house and 56 kilograms of poppy, as well as one kilogram of heroin, was seized from another house by ANP. Three suspects were arrested in all.

LOGAR

Baraki Barak, Muhammad Agha, and Charkh represent the largest share of security incidents in Logar, with IED attacks and ambushes, mainly directed at IMF and ANSF, being the most frequently used tactics.


The main risk to NGO operations remains collateral exposure to IMF/ANSF and AOG engagements as well as from IEDs planted by AOG along district roads. For this reporting period, there were two discoveries of

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- ACG/AOG abductions
- IMF operations
- AOG intimidation

	NGO Incidents
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IEDs along district roads in the province, with an additional detonation on 20 February in Baraki Barak injuring a road worker. On the same day in Puli Alam, an IMF logistics truck was burned in Qallai Juma Area with no reported casualties. On the road linking the Kabul-Gardez Road to the Kabul-Ghazni Highway, an AOG attack using heavy weapons on an ANSF checkpoint on 16 February in Shaykhkhel Area also left no reported casualties. Baraki Barak remains a difficult operating environment for NGOs due to competing AOG factions—one that is willing to accept development programs and another that maintains foreign links and is virulently



opposed to any form of assistance to local communities. The district also hosts the link road between two major highways, making it vulnerable to IED emplacements targeting IMF and, to a lesser degree, ANSF.

Hence, Logar Province has a strategically important location in the central region. AOGs are using some of its districts for their logistic flows to neighbouring provinces. Unless an NGO has specific guarantees of support and evidence of acceptance, all of Logar should currently be considered high risk for NGO operations.

KUNDUZ

A large group of armed men from Chahar Dara District reportedly surrendered to the government after a Kunduz GOA official threatened AOGs in a press conference held a few days prior. These armed men appear to have been regrouped to form pro-government militias in Chahar Dara District, a previously impenetrable AOG stronghold. A seven hour-long armed clash that killed three pro-government militia members was reported two days after the said pro-government militia had been


KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Pro-government militias in Chahar Dara
- IEDs in Western Imam Sahib
- Prolonged armed clashes

	NGO Incidents
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formed. IMF/ANSF are reportedly maintaining a presence in the areas of Chahar Dara in which the pro-government militias were formed. Extended clashes were witnessed in the north of the district, where an IMF/ANSF operation was retaliated against by AOGs, resulting in nine AOG and three ANA deaths and several injuries. AOGs appear intent on maintaining control of Chahar Dara District, as it was reported that six mortar rounds were launched against the ANP headquarters in the district. The mortars impacted in the vicinity of the headquarters, though, causing no damage.

In Imam Sahib District, an IMF airstrike mistakenly hit an ANP vehicle while responding to an



AOG attack on an ANSF/IMF convoy. Seven ANP members were killed, including two officers. This incident highlights the dangers inherent in aerial targeting—an IMF asset frequently employed in Kunduz and Baghlan provinces. Further evidence that AOGs are planting IEDs on the road from Archi District to Imam Sahib District was found when an IED prematurely detonated in Tash Guzar Area of Imam Sahib, killing five AOG members, including an AOG commander from Archi District. AOG attacks against ANSF have picked up again in Archi District after a three-week lull, as AOGs attacked ANSF positions in the district centre and in Qarlogh Area.

BAGHLAN

AOGs in Baghlani Jadid District have reportedly planted multiple IEDs along the side roads between Baghlan Old City and Baghlan New City. These devices, which were planted during the day, have remained in place due to an apparent reluctance among ANSF to enter the AOG-controlled area. Confrontation between AOGs and ANSF continues to be reported in the district, including a daytime clash which took place in Jangal Bagh Area, when ANP confronted AOGs who had reportedly estab-


KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- IEDs
- Local political tension

	NGO Incidents
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lished an illegal checkpoint along the main road. Additionally, a member of ANA was reportedly abducted from the District Centre, and AOGs also targeted a private telecommunications tower in Tarakhil Area of the district.

Following rumors of a potential change in the provincial government in Baghlan, at least two small demonstrations were seen in Pul-e Khumri and Baghlani Jadid, in support of the status quo. Also in Pul-e Khumri District, the first reported IED of the year detonated near the Baghlan Education Center and Women's Affairs Department. The device was small and caused no damages. This was the first AOG stand-off attack on



a GOA facility in Pul-e Khumri City since August 2009, when an IED attached to a bicycle detonated near the ANP headquarters. Also in the north of the district, near the border with Baghlani Jadid, a BBIED that was being prepared in an AOG residence prematurely detonated, killing 5 AOGs and wounding 4 others who escaped from the area. AOG activity in Pul-e Khumri District has remained low in the past six months relative to the same period in previous years. AOG attacks on GOA, IMF and ANSF may be expected to increase in the Spring.

BALKH

In the first suspected AOG incident reported in Hayraton Area in Kaldar District, a projectile launched at night from the west of the town caused minor damage to a parked truck. The resultant damage indicated that the device was likely an RPG, whereas the distance from the suspected launch site suggests a range more similar to a small rocket or mortar. This area of Kaldar District is not known to host any AOG or ACG presence, and the attack may have been directed toward IMF assets, as the border crossing


KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Incidents in northern Balkh
- Demonstrations

	NGO Incidents
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is known to transport IMF supplies. In the first incident reported from Khulm District since September 2009, in Sayyad Area, the ANP arrested six locals who were in illegal possession of fire arms and body armour. The arrested individuals claimed to work for a private security company. Also in Engi Arek Area of the district, ANP rescued a taxi driver who had been abducted in the area and arrested five individuals in connection with the incident. It is possible that the sudden activity seen in Khulm District could be due to an increase in ANP reporting.

Also in the north of Balkh Province, residents of Shortepa Dis-



trict held a large demonstration to pressure GOA officials to reinforce the banks of the Amu Darya River, along which their villages had suffered from flooding in previous years. The demonstration, which gathered approximately 2500 people from the surrounding districts, blocked the road from Hayraton to Mazar-e Sharif. The demonstrators stated that larger demonstrations would be held if the government did not promise to take action in one week's time.

FARYAB


In the second NGO-related incident reported this year in Faryab Province, an NGO-run clinic in a rural area of Pashtun Kot District was robbed at night by two armed men who stole one television. Continuing the trend of AOG abductions elsewhere in the province, two villagers who had been abducted last reporting period from Bilchiragh District were released following negotiations with the district elders. The abductees

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Abductions
- IEDs

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were reportedly released on the conditions that the community would relinquish support for the government and provide the AOGs with a large cache of firearms. South of Bilchiragh in Gurziwan District, a suspected weapons dealer opened fire on ANP, killing one ANP and injuring the DCoP. In Qurghan Sub-district of Khani Chahar Bagh, AOGs broke into a girls' school, destroyed windows and computers, and placed an IED that had to be destroyed by an IMF EOD team. This kind of incident is highly unusual for the area,



which does not have a known AOG presence. In addition, an IED was discovered and removed from a culvert in Khwaja Na Musa Subdistrict. IED discoveries and removals are typical in areas of Faryab where AOGs are known to lack support from the local population. IED-related incidents in Faryab have been low in the past three months, relative to previous reporting periods, but may be expected to increase in the coming months.

SAR-E PUL


A known AOG in Sayyad District is continuing to attempt to consolidate power in the area. The AOG commander entered a mosque in Pasta Mazar Village with a group of armed men, and preached to the community to stop cooperating with the government. The AOG leader appealed

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- CDC abduction
- Destruction of roads

	NGO Incidents
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to prayer-goers to destroy government and foreign-run clinics, as well as the roads leading to Almalik Village. Some community members confronted the AOGs, and a brief exchange of SAF ensued. The AOGs then abducted the community's CDC treasurer and reportedly demanded ransom in exchange for his release. The CDC member remains in AOG custody. AOGs attempting to destroy the road to Sayyad Dis-



trict from the direction of Qush Tepa and Darzab districts in Jawzjan has been reported in the past, suggesting that AOGs in the strongholds of Qush Tepa and Darzab may be working in coordination with those in Sayyad.

SAMANGAN


In the first incident in over two months reported from Samangan Province, an anti-tank mine was discovered planted upside-down beneath an unpaved road leading

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Anti-tank mines

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	0
This Report Period	0

to the ANP headquarters in Aybak District. The device was discovered, removed and promptly reported by ANP. The area does not have a known AOG presence, and the incident does not appear to represent a sustained threat in the area.



TAKHAR

AOG intimidation and illegal tax-collection in northern Takhar continued this period, as a large amount of money was reportedly collected by AOGs from local civilians to fund their activities in Yangi Qala District. The AOGs in Darqad District have become increasingly bold, as they attacked the ANP headquarters in Darqad District Centre with SAF and ambushed an ANP convoy, slightly injuring two ANP. Prior to this


KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- AOG presence in northern Takhar
- Roadside robbery

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	0
This Report Period	0

attack, which reportedly caused minimal damage, AOG attacks on ANSF in northern Takhar had been limited to SAF and RPG attacks on checkpoints and ANSF facilities. AOG attacks on ANSF may continue in these districts, particularly if ANSF increase their presence in these areas.

Elsewhere in the province, armed roadside robbery remains a threat. Robberies were reported on the Taloqan-Kunduz Road, Aqmasjid Area, and on the Ishkamish-Khanabad Road, Jadi Khaki Area. In both incidents, the ACGs managed to rob multiple vehicles in



succession. The former incident occurred in the evening, while the latter occurred in the early morning hours.

In a rare weapons find by ANP in Kalafgan District, eight BM-1 rockets were discovered as they were prepared to be shot toward the District Centre. The discovery may be evidence that AOGs continue to be active in the district.

JAWZJAN

AOGs continue to be active in Qush Tepa and Darzab districts. No clashes were seen this period; however, a group of twenty armed men were seen patrolling the main road north of the Qush Tepa District Centre. AOGs continue to


KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- AOGs in southern panhandle
- Targeted attacks in Feyzabad District
- Attacks against CDC members

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	0
This Report Period	0

target local leadership in Feyzabad District, as it was reported that unknown armed men attacked the residence of a former local jihadi commander with SAF and grenades in Gorjak Village.

In the first ANSO-recorded incident in Khanaqa District since July 2009, the head of the local CDC was shot dead by two unknown armed men while leaving a mosque in Shah Mirza Village. The CDC member reportedly received a threat against his life a



few days prior to the shooting. The area is not known to host AOG or ACG activity, and the incident may have been criminally motivated or related to an interpersonal dispute. NSP is not currently being implemented in Khanaqa District, and the incident may not be related to the victim's CDC position.

NOTICE: Your input is invaluable for the production of this report. While we appreciate information on incidents, we also need general information on the security situation and context in your area. So, please remember to call or email us regularly.

Contact details of ANSO staff are provided on the last page.

ANSO: “..by NGOs, for NGOs..”

GHOR

Difficult weather conditions persist in Ghor. After snowfalls, recent heavy rains have limited mobility in the area. The overall level of security incidents remains low in the province, with two registered incidents in the present cycle. Compared to the same period last year, it represents a drop of 66% in the number of security


KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Criminal activity
- Armed robberies

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	0
This Report Period	0

incidents. Regarding the rate of AOG-initiated incidents over the past two months, this decrease is even more significant and represents a drop of 81% compared to the same period last year (with only two ANSO-registered incidents since the beginning of this year).

Similar to the previous reporting period, the majority of incidents are criminal related and consist of a family dispute and a police operation. Regarding the first, on 19 February in Taywara, a family dis-



pute degenerated into violence, causing the death of a local female.

The following day, but in Chaghcharan, ANP arrested one suspect who had allegedly been involved in the murder of a local female that occurred in the area.

HERAT


A motorcycle-mounted RCIED targeted an elder's car on 26 February, in Turghundi area. In the explosion, four people were wounded, including the elder. The blast also damaged a fuel tanker which fortunately was empty, preventing further casualties. It is still unclear who was the intended target, as uncorroborated reports indicate that a prominent official was supposed to travel through this area. And even though it is difficult also to say who was behind this incident, the pattern of the attack was typical for the Western Region, mixing AOG methods with probable political or business rivalries.

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- IED/RCIED
- AOG presence in Kushki Kunha
- Criminal activity

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	1
This Report Period	0

A significant surge in IED deployment has been observed during this reporting period in the neighbouring district of Kushki Kunha (which still is an area of important AOG activity). On 27 February, security forces recovered and defused twelve different IEDs planted on the main road leading from Kushki Kunha DAC to Kushk District. Of note, another AOG ambush on an ANP convoy occurred in the said district on 22 February. In the fire fight, one ANP and six AOG members were killed and another four AOG members were wounded. Taking into account that the district is a continuing source of instability with an important level of AOG activity, the possibility of a police or military operation in this area should not be ruled out. Additionally, in Shin-



dand District on 20 February two AOG members were killed when an RCIED they were planting detonated prematurely.

Search operations persisted throughout the province during this reporting cycle. In Guzara (Sheyawshan area), security forces seized an assortment of weapons including several 82mm rockets. In another operation in Shindand District, reportedly around 1 ton of explosives was seized along with weapons and munitions. Also of note, in another development that may improve security—at least temporary, particularly around Herat City—a notorious AOG commander influential in Guzara District was arrested in Kandahar Province on 19 February.

BADGHIS

AOG activity in Badghis has dropped by 30% compared to the last reporting period (i.e., seven AOG initiated incidents). One of the reasons behind this decrease is probably the significant number of casualties that AOGs have suffered over the past few weeks, as well as due to difficult weather conditions which limited mobility.

A pattern of AOG-initiated attacks on ANSF/IMF convoys


KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- AOG-ANSF/IMF clashes
- AOG presence around Qala-i Naw City
- Abduction

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	0
This Report Period	0

continued in Muqur (with three incidents registered) and in Ghormach (with two incidents). On 27 February in Muqur, AOG ambushed an ANSF/IMF patrol. As a result of the attack, one IMF soldier was killed and one ANP wounded.

Another trend—AOG rocket attacks—was apparent in the previous reporting period and continued into the present cycle. However, the intended target this time was not the ANSF/IMF base located in the area of the Murghab DAC (the favorite AOG target over the past weeks), but the Ghormach DAC. On 21 February, AOG fired six BM-1 rockets



toward this target that landed in an open area. Worthy to note, two days later, but in Murghab, AOG attacked an IMF aircraft with an anti-aircraft gun, causing no damage.

Despite this decrease in incidents, especially AOG-initiated ones, the situation in the province remains volatile. The renewal of incidents that has been observed over the past few days indicates that the initial lull was probably only temporary.

FARAH

Sporadic AOG attacks on ANSF/IMF convoys continued in Farah during this reporting period.

AOG activity in Farah manifested itself particularly in Pusht Rod, Bakwa, and Bala-Buluk districts and, compared to the previous reporting period, the number of AOG initiated incidents has increased slightly.

The AOG target remains mainly ANSF/IMF as seen, for instance, in Bala-Buluk on 22 February, where AOG attacked an IMF


KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- IEDs/RCIEDs
- AOG ambushes/Armed clashes
- Criminal activity

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	0
This Report Period	0

convoy with SAF and RPGs. However, road security in the province remains an important concern due to the use of IEDs/RCIEDs targeting civilians (besides security forces).

Regarding this issue, it is worth noting that during this reporting cycle Farah province has witnessed five incidents related to the use of IEDs/RCIEDs. On 17 February, in Pusht Rod, an IMF convoy was targeted by an IED. Another explosive device, this time an RCIED planted on the main road, was discovered by security forces three days later in the same district. The second RCIED was recovered on 22 February in a



suburb area on the road leading to Farah city. Three days later, an IED hit a private truck contracted by a road construction company in Bakwa, reportedly killing the driver and a local civilian. In addition, in Gulistan, an IED struck an IMF convoy, slightly damaging an IMF vehicle.

On another note, on 25 February a prominent AOG commander operating in Bala-Buluk and Bakwa was arrested in Pusht Rod District.

GRAPHS: Please note that graphs in this report are current as of 24 February 2010.

NANGARHAR

On 11 February, an NGO staff member received a probing phone call that instructed the staff member to close the NGO or face the possibility of a suicide attack. Prior to this, on 5 and 10 February, the NGO was approached by different men in vehicles on three separate occasions. In the first incident to occur on 5 February, men approached the NGO and asked the NGO where its guest-house was located, and in the second occurrence on the same day men approached the NGO in a different vehicle, asking the NGO if it had any Pakistani staff. While not as alerting, on 10 February a car entered the NGO's street, which is not frequented, and stopped prior to reaching the NGO's office. When NGO staff approached the vehicle to note the license plate, the vehicle departed the area.

When looking at the entire range of incidents, contrasted with the apparent lack of other NGOs in Jalalabad City receiving similar threats, the perpetrators are likely

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	3
This Report Period	1

people who have a personal or professional grievance with the NGO, with the latter motive being more likely. (One cannot say for certain that the 5 and 10 February incidents were related to the suicide threat). In addition, when AOG typically wish to have threats taken seriously by NGOs they almost always furnish them in writing—through night letters—to provide an element of legitimacy that provides a form of a 'calling card', such as an organisational name, allowing the NGO to initiate negotiations on access or other matters, usually out of the desire to establish the NGO's identity (country of headquarters, mission, religious orientation, etc.) directly or to seek monetary benefit. Moreover, according to ANSO institutional knowledge, AOG have never provided a warning of a suicide attack to the intended target. Ultimately, the threat is likely not AOG-initiated and was provided to intimidate the said NGO.

Nangarhar Province experienced 63 incidents, 16 of which were AOG-initiated. The overall level of IED-related incidents remains high in the province (also 16 this period), of which 7 materialised. Only three direct attacks were reported in Lal Pur, Khogyani, and Bati Kot districts targeting ANSF and IMF supply trucks.

After a series of BBIED/VBIED threats circulated, Nangarhar recorded the first suicide attack since the beginning of 2010. On February 22 in restive Khogyani District, a BBIED targeted two prominent figures, killing a local power player who was rumoured to have been selected by IMF for a pivotal role in the province—Haji Zaman—and severely injuring a prominent GoA figure—the Director of Returnees—at a local gathering of elders. The blast resulted in 15 fatalities and 20 injuries, after a man in his mid-twenties approached Haji Zaman, feigning a desire to pay respect to him. Upon hugging Haji Zaman, the BBIED attacker purportedly detonated his vest.

And the following day, the GoA appointed delegation sent to investigate the abovementioned BBIED was targeted at the Surkh Junction outside of Jalalabad City when a rickshaw loaded with mortar and RPG rounds was apparently remote detonated. Due to a late detonation, the delegation escaped unscathed, with only civilians incurring casualties: two fatalities and five injuries.


PAKTYA

During this reporting cycle, Paktya Province experienced 11 incidents, of which four were AOG initiated. The overall level of IED related incidents, including two detonations and two discoveries, slightly increased and took place in Zurmat, Wuza Zadran, Chamkanay and Gardez City. AOG

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	1
This Report Period	0

conducted only one direct attack in the province, namely in Shwak District against an IMF logistics convoy.

ANSF conducted search operations throughout the province; for example, during this reporting period two searches were conducted in Gardez and Chamkanay districts, resulting in the arrest of a local AOG commander and two other AOG members currently under ANSF/IMF investigation and detention.



On February 24th in Chamkanay District, ANP arrested a local AOG commander who is currently in IMF custody. Also on February 24th, but in Gardez, ANP arrested two suspected AOGs.

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- AOG activity in Gardez City
- IEDs in Zurmat District

NURISTAN

On 20 February in Mera Spera, Nurgaram District, unknown gunmen abducted five national staff members working for a for-profit development agency while they were travelling through the area in a rented vehicle. Shortly thereafter, the armed group interrogated and beat the five members. In the evening, though, three of the victims were released. (The two who remained in custody purportedly had organisational ID cards asso-

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS


- AOG at large
- Winter road closures in Waygal and Kamdesh

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	0
This Report Period	0

ciating them with the for-profit on their persons). The armed captors did convey a desire for a ransom for the remaining two, but the specific amount is unknown. Local security forces were informed of the abduction, and the community established a committee to search for the remaining two abductees.

And on 21 February in Waygal District, IMF conducted an air operation targeting suspected AOG locations; three AOG were purportedly killed as a result.

Information suggests that AOG operating in Kamdesh District



migrated to Chapa Dara District of Kunar for two possible reasons: one, weather conditions in Kamdesh have limited AOG activity and, two, the operatives sought to reinforce AOG in Chapa Dara.

As underlined in previous reports, ANSO would greatly appreciate any information, however trivial, regarding any known incidents, threats, or possible developments from this province.

KUNAR

On February 19 during late evening hours in Shalay Walay, Khas Kunar District, an armed group approached the residence of an INGO staff member and knocked on the gate. A brother of the staff member responded, and the armed group shot him dead. Afterwards, the staff member and the armed group engaged in a fire fight for approximately 25 minutes, resulting also in the death of one of the armed group's members.

The armed group again approached the staff member's residence, this time in the evening of


KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- AOG abductions
- Attacks along the Jalalabad-Asadabad Highway

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	3
This Report Period	2

the 21st. The group surrounded the residence, but the staff member and his family escaped. Ultimately, the group pillaged the residence and set it ablaze. (All indications are that the clash is due to a personal dispute).

When looking at incidences of violence, Kunar maintains its position as the most volatile province within the Easter Region. During this reporting cycle, a total of 62 incidents were recorded, of which 44 were AOG-initiated. Keeping with typical modus operandi, AOGs targeted ANSF/IMF convoys, CPs and facilities. Two abductions were reported within the province, and this is a persistent concern that arises from both ACG and AOG activity; for example, on 16 February in



Marawara District AOG abducted two male polio vaccinators who were reportedly released following intervention by tribal elders. (AOG destroyed three vaccine carriers and stole two). Of note, numerous indirect and direct attacks were carried out against Chapa Dara District, which is likely indicator of a new AOG contingent in the area attempting to establish the initiative within their area of operation. With this, various parties to the conflict believe that AOG are intent upon ceasing the advantage in the district, possibly even the entire province, to wrest it from GoA and IMF control.

KHOST

Instability is the apparent form of stability in Khost Province, with a dramatic increase in AOG activity manifesting, particularly through 26 IED-related incidents that occurred; 13 IED-related incidents occurred in Khost city itself.

AOGs continue to emplace IEDs along major and sub-roadways in the province. During only this reporting period, ANSO recorded 24 IEDs: six detonations and eighteen discoveries. Evidently,

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS


- IEDs/RCIEDs, particularly in Khost City
- AOG dominance

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	2
This Report Period	0

IEDs remain a significant contributor to the overall number of reported incidents in the province.

During this reporting period, the Sabari District Centre experienced five AOG-initiated attacks.. Additionally, on the 17th AOG attacked the Spera District Centre with heavy weapons and SAF for about 20 minutes.

ANSF/IMF continue to conduct search operations throughout the province: three operations were conducted, purportedly resulting in 5 AOG being arrested and the seizure of a significant amount of explosive materials. In one exam-



ple on the 16th near the Nadir Shah Kot District Centre, a joint ANA/IMF search operation led to the arrest of two AOG and the seizure of about 750 kgs of explosive materials and three rifles. And in an example of counter-IED efforts, on February 26th in Sabari District, Kholbisat area, an IMF/ANSF operation targeted AOG members who were in the process of planting an IED on the road, killing two and arresting another two.

LAGHMAN


In comparison to other provinces, Laghman only experienced a meagre eight incidents. Out of the eight, four AOG armed assaults, one IED detonation, and one IED discovery in Alishing occurred. During this reporting cycle, the majority of all AOG-initiated attacks took place in Qarghayi District, with Alishing coming in second.

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- IEDs in Alishing and Alingar Valleys
- SAF ambushes targeting ANSF/IMF as well as supply convoys along Highway 1

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	0
This Report Period	0

On 20 February in Qarghayi District on the Tangy Kabul-Jalalabad Road, AOG attacked an ANP CP with heavy weapons and small arms fire. (The fire fight lasted about 45 minutes, but it led to no casualties). NGOs witnessed further deterioration along Highway 1 in the morning of February 28th, again in Qarghayi District, when six to eight AOG members, armed with AK-47s, RPGs, and PKMs, targeted an IMF/ANA convoy in the abovementioned area; however, the attack, upon its initiation, was repelled by IMF, causing the AOG to retreat. On the same day in Qarghayi, this time in the late afternoon, AOG



attacked an ANA pickup truck in Mashala Kamar. The ANA responded, leaving two ANA wounded before reinforcements arrived in the area. After the arrival of reinforcements, ANSF launched a search that was aided by IMF helicopters, culminating in a sporadic fire fight between AOG and ANSF that continued for at least an hour and a half

Road security in Laghman Province is of concern, especially along Highway, and IED activity is persistently a major contributor to incidents.

GRAPHS: Please note that graphs in this report are current as of 24 February 2010.

HELMAND


The fighting initiated in the previous reporting period (Operation Mushtarak) has dragged on throughout the current reporting period, with IMF/ANA house-clearing efforts in Marjeh itself moving forward, albeit at a slower pace than most expected. This has enabled AOG to attack patrols and checkpoints in the areas to the north and east of the town, in Nahri Sarraj, Nad Ali and Lashkar Gah districts. IMF/ANA casual-

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Ongoing military operations
- IEDs

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	0
This Report Period	0

ties rose as IED strikes both in and around Marjeh hit mounted and foot patrols. Civilian casualties continued in Marjeh at a slower pace than during the first week of the offensive, with an estimated 10-12 civilians killed in various incidents during the continued assault. Civilians were also the victims of an RCIED set off in the center of Lashkar Gah City, as at least 7 people were killed and 16 others were wounded. The actual target of the attack is still unclear; however, it appears AOG are willing to temporarily abandon the 'hearts and minds' battle in



Helmand to prove they can fight in Marjeh and easily strike in Lashkar Gah at the same time. The idea of expelling AOG in Marjeh and destroying them in large numbers appears not to have materialized. Lastly, 11 civilians were killed and over 22 wounded when a bus was struck by an IED in Naw Zad District in the north of the province.

ZABUL


The escalation in AOG attacks in Zabul continued from the previous reporting period, with two serious attacks on ANP in Shahjoi District having occurred two days apart, involving heavy weapons and rockets as well as SAF. In addition, IMF convoys were the

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- AOG attacks against ANP
- IED attacks against IMF

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	1
This Report Period	0

targets of two separate IED attacks in the province, both resulting in the deaths of two IMF soldiers and a significant number of wounded. The other incident of note during this reporting period was the apprehension of 14 ANP who had deserted their posts and joined AOG in the neighboring province of Wardak. Although the true reasons for their actions have not yet been discerned, one can



assume that AOG are waging, and in some cases winning, the 'hearts and minds' battle often cited as a major objective of IMF/ANA.

GHAZNI


The number of IMF-led raids on AOG witnessed in the last report period—resulting in several arrests of mid-level commanders—appears to have triggered a rash of AOG attacks in response. In six

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- AOG attacks on ANA, IMF, and PSCs

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	0
This Report Period	0

separate incidents, AOG attacked ANA, IMF, and PSC targets with rockets, mortars, and SAF. In addition, the District Administration Centers (DACs) of Andar and Rashidan were hit by rocket and mortar fire in an apparent show of strength by AOG during the report period, most likely to signal that the setbacks experi-



enced in the last report period were not significant or lasting.

KANDAHAR


Kandahar experienced a slight decrease in violence during the reporting period, although the level was still high relative to other areas in the country. There were several AOG attacks on ANP, with one targeting a mid-

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- IEDs
- AOG attacks

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	2
This Report Period	0

level commander at his residence. In addition, AOG assassinated two individuals: the first, a local tribal leader in Dand District and the second, the provincial Director of Information and Culture based in Kandahar City. The majority of the incidents reported involved the discovery and subsequent disposal of IEDs through the province by ANA/IMF; how-



ever, there were still a total of 13 IED strikes that managed to cause three fatalities and numerous wounded amongst ANP/ANA/IMF.

PAKTIKA


As in the last report period, Paktika Province remained quiet, with ANP patrols locating several

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- IEDs
- AOG presence

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	0
This Report Period	0

IEDs, which were safely disposed of by ANA/IMF. A bridge in Sharan District was damaged when an IED was detonated as ANP were crossing; however, there were no significant casualties.



URUZGAN


AOG continued to appear to be avoiding serious conflict with ANA/IMF during the report period, although there were a few IEDs attacks on ANP which resulted in several wounded. The most significant incident, how-

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- IEDs
- Suicide attacks on DACs
- Sensitivity to external actors

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	0
This Report Period	0

ever, was the IMF airstrike on a convoy of civilian vehicles which resulted in the death of at least 27 civilians, including women and children. The airstrike was in apparent violation of the oft-cited IMF policy of having positive identification before initiating an airstrike and prompted an investigation and apology from IMF commanders in the country. President Karzai angrily condemned the incident, and several reports



speculated that the furor was used as cover to enact unilateral changes to the election law, enabling the President to assume control over the Electoral Complaints Commission.

ANNOUNCEMENT:

In the coming months, ANSO will be helping develop an incident mapping service to aid NGO management and security procedures. Registrants will receive further information as it becomes available.



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ansoab@yahoo.com

ANSO ACRONYMS

ACG-Armed Criminal Group /
AEF-Afghan Eradication Forces
/ **ANA**-Afghan National Army /
ANBP-Afghan National Border
Police / **ANP**-Afghan National
Police / **AOG**-Armed Opposition
Group / **APPF**-Afghan Public
Protection Forces (local depu-
tised militias) / **DC**-District
Centre / **GOA**-Government of
Afghanistan / **IDF**-Indirect Fire
(ex: mortars) / **IED**-Improvised
Explosive Device / **IMF**-
International Military Forces /
NDS-National Directorate of
Security (Intelligence) / **PRP**-
Previous Reporting Period /
PSC-Private Security Company
/ **RPG**-Rocket Propelled Gre-
nade / **SAF**-Small Arms Fire /
VBIED-Vehicle Borne Impro-
vised Explosive Device

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WEST REGION OFFICE (HERAT)

Patrick Malach - west@afgnso.org - 0799 322 192

Sayed Karim- west2@afgnso.org - 0707 474 135

COUNTRY MANAGEMENT (KABUL)

Nic Lee - director@afgnso.org - 0799 325 349

Ali Riazi - operations@afgnso.org - 0797 165 017

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MISSING

This report ANSO
could not provide
analysis for the prov-
inces of:

Badakhshan

Bamyan

Nimroz

This is because we
do not know enough
about the area to
comment on the sig-
nificance of the inci-
dents occurring
there.

If you can help us
understand the prov-
ince better, please
contact us.

ANSO March Training

The ANSO trainer will be visiting Herat City in early March to provide Basic Guard and Radio Communications training to NGO national staff. For further information, contact operations2@afgnso.org.