

THE ANSO REPORT

Inside this Issue

<i>Central Region</i>	2-4
<i>Northern Region</i>	5-6
<i>Western Region</i>	7-10
<i>Eastern Region</i>	10-13
<i>Southern Region</i>	13-15
<i>ANSO Info Page</i>	16

YOU NEED TO KNOW

- Targeted killings of GoA collaborators in Kandahar and AOG infiltration around Marjah
- AOG still intent upon striking targets in Kabul City
- IMF seize control of the Gizab District Centre

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COUNTRY SUMMARY

As tension ratchets up in the Southern region, one sees AOG relying upon proven guerrilla tactics, such as targeted killings of Government personnel and assumed collaborators. In Kandahar, AOG targeted over a dozen actors in the provincial capital and its surrounding areas including the Kandahar City Deputy Mayor and intelligence, religious, tribal, and GoA leaders. An additional effort to kill the former Spin Boldak Governor failed.

While AOG intentions to kill those who may stand against them should draw IMF attention, IMF setbacks in Helmand are also driving suggestions that IMF should rethink and postpone the upcoming Kandahar offensive, especially because of what should have been a foreseeable, strong AOG ability to infiltrate and intimidate a population centre in the aftermath of IMF/ANSF operations. A humanitarian fallout in the wake of any future Kandahar operation is a reigning concern for NGOs.

Although AOG have been making local headlines through their efforts to inculcate fear throughout the South and East, Kabul City remains quiet. Security force

operations are likely responsible in part for the absence of any recent grandiose attacks in the city, with further arrests of alleged AOG figures in Kabul City and the surrounding districts, numerous weapons cache discoveries, and a premature VBIED detonation in Deh Sabz demonstrating that Kabul is not off the AOG radar. The Peace Jirga, expected in Kabul in early May, was suspended until at least May 23/27 to accommodate the presidential travel schedule.

Not far from Kabul, IMF and the GoA exploited local developments in Daykundi to seize control of the Gizab District Centre in the aftermath of a clash between AOG and locals that culminated in locals detaining the District Shadow Governor. Just as seen in all cases where IMF/ANSF experience success, they are highly dependent upon local support and initiative to bring about change—how lasting this change may be is questionable, though.

Frequent clashes in Baghlan continue, with numerous AOG assaults taking place

against ANSF in Baghlani Jadid and Pul-e Khumri. IMF and ANSF operations, usually in response to AOG attacks, also occurred in the province with, there again, questionable results.

Kunduz also drew attention this period for reasons other than its typical high AOG activity: multiple reports asserted that girls' schools were targeted with poisonous gas, which required admission of circa 100 girls for medical treatment.

As mentioned previously, civilian casualties resultant from IED blasts are a rising concern. Khost, experiencing 45 IED-related incidents during the period, serves as a suitable example, with one IED causing at least 12 civilian fatalities when it targeted a minibus. NGOs also felt the effects of instability in three provinces—Logar, Herat, and Ghor—during the period. Incidents ranged from temporary detention by locals, to an IMF arrest, to an ACG threat to kidnap NGO workers if prisoners are not released.

KABUL

In the two weeks prior to Mujahideen Day, there were seven further ANSF arrest operations that resulted in the capture of alleged AOG figures in both Kabul City and the surrounding districts. Numerous weapons caches including rockets, mines and RPGs continue to be reported on an increasing frequency, although a certain percentage are most likely remnants of previous conflicts. An indication of AOG intent is evident by two different incidents during the last reporting period. Firstly, a VBIED prematurely


KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- SVBIED attacks around high profile GoA, IMF and foreign representation targets
- ACG abductions
- Car accidents

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	5
This Report Period	0

detonated at a house that a reported AOG cell was using to plan attacks on the capital on 18 April in Deh Sabz. The detonation obviously alerted ANSF, which uncovered the operations of the cell upon investigation. Secondly, an ANSF intelligence-led operation resulted in the arrest of three suspected AOG in PD12 on 22 April; however, it is understood that at least six other individuals linked with a reported plot to attack the capital were not there or escaped, again illustrating AOG intent.

ANSF arrest operations and seizures have most definitely had an effect in disrupting the regular attack cycle in the capital. Despite all of the measures, including an increase in ANSF checkpoints throughout the city, an AOG managed to infiltrate the military



side of the Kabul airport dressed as an ANA recruit on 19 April and detonate a grenade that he had hid on his body. The blast killed one IMF mentor and injured six others. A further report suggested that another ANA was also wounded. Following the incident, three ANA were arrested, including a senior officer.

The first three weeks of May will most likely produce a tense security environment in the capital in the lead up to the Peace Jirga, which will be held at the Kabul Polytechnic in the fourth week of the month. Security will most likely be more pervasive than it was for Mujahideen Day due to the likelihood that several AOG factions may want to distract attention from the event itself and play the 'spoiler'.

WARDAK

Wardak hosted a familiar pattern of security events in the past reporting period. Virtually all reported incidents occur along the main highway between Kabul and Kandahar, with isolated incidents occurring along the district roads in Jalrez, Jaghatu, Charkh and Day Mirdad. Attacks against logistics convoys, which are a mixture of AOG and ACG initiated, are the most common form of attack.


KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- ACG/AOG abductions
- AOG intimidation
- IEDs and SAF ambushes targeting IMF/ANSF and logistics convoys along Highway One

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	1
This Report Period	0

There were five such incidents in the past two weeks, four of which occurred in Saydabad. Typically, the vehicles are burnt, the drivers are either held for ransom or killed in the initial attack, and ANSF who respond to the incident are engaged with SAF, prior to AOG retreating into the surrounding hills.

Also of note in Saydabad was the abduction and release of a provincial director of Women's Affairs from a neighbouring province. The woman was abducted on 17 April and released approximately three days later following the intervention of the local shura. Similar to other parts of the coun-



try, a road construction company in the Abdul Mehduddin Area of Jaghatu was attacked on the 20 and 21 April; the PSC guarding the construction work suffered several casualties.

The capital, Maydan Shahr, has remained incident free for the past reporting period, with the vast security presence, both international and domestic, affording a reprieve from the instability further south. NGOs continue to operate throughout the province, although only with a long experience of community acceptance and transparency.

KAPISA


AOG reportedly have substantial freedom of movement during the night in Tagab and Nijrab, and both have the highest incident frequency. However, Alasay is also reported to be unstable, with the lack of incidents reflective of a limited security presence.

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Clashes between AOG and ANSF/IMF in Tagab
- Low intensity factional disputes in Kohistan I & II
- Decentralized AOG activity in Alasay, Nijrab and Tagab

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	0
This Report Period	0

On 22 April, an IED struck an IMF vehicle on a district road. Five IMF soldiers sustained injuries, and on 28 April an ANP officer was shot and killed by AOG. And on 24 April, AOG reportedly attacked a road construction site in the area; the AOG later escaped after ANP reinforcements arrived. Furthermore, on 17 April AOG ambushed an IMF patrol. A brief firefight ensued before the AOG withdrew from the area, killing one local male and wounding two women. Last year, AOG incidents in Kapisa dropped drastically in April; this year, however, they remained high throughout April, declining only late in the



month. While declines may occur, Kapisa should still be considered an AOG shelter which serves a risky environment for NGOs. The predominate number of incidents in Kapisa have been attacks on security forces (especially ANSF convoys). Looking towards attack trends on IMF, most occurred in Tagab and Nijrab districts. The IED threat was also present during the period, with ANP discovering two IEDs.

DAYKUNDI


Gizab again dominated security reporting from Daykundi following a dispute between local villages and senior district level AOG leadership, possibly over taxation or a decision to move the DAC, according to one other report. The dispute, on 21 April, evolved into a SAF exchange and led to the detention of seven AOGs by the local inhabitants. Gizab has long remained under the control of AOG, with GoA influence only stretching as far south as the Tamazan Valley from Nili.

A joint ANSF/IMF and militia force was dispatched from Uruzgan within several hours,

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	0
This Report Period	0

suggesting that the initial dispute may have been provoked by either ANSF or the militia. The pro-government forces were quick to seize control of the DAC, located close to the Uruzgan border, and took custody of the detained AOG. In the following days after the reversion of control of the DAC to the GoA, there were reports of ten to twelve AOG killed after isolated skirmishes were understood to have taken place in the general vicinity of the DAC.

The situation remains tense as the government maintains control of the road to the DAC from Uruzgan and the northern Tamazan Valley Area. The road from the DAC north to Nili could be said to remain under AOG control through their ability to deny freedom of movement by the use of IEDs and ambushes. Controlling the DAC does not obviously mean controlling the district and



further skirmishes should be expected in the following weeks following the government's foothold in the district capital. Numerous reports also suggest that there may be enough local support to select a district governor favoured by the militia, ANSF, and provincial authorities in Nili.

Recent activity in Gizab also provokes the question of what will happen with the post of Gizab District ANP Chief, which has recently been offered to a local commander/warlord previously responsible for abducting NGO staff in 2008. If the post is not accepted, then being outside the system may contribute to a degree of tension between ANSF and the commander's militia, traditionally based in the district of Khadir. The rest of Daykundi remains quiet, with NGOs reporting no particular security concerns.

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- ACG/AOG abduction threat in Gizab
- Occasional banditry on roads leaving from Nili

LOGAR


Large scale demonstrations, following the initial arrival of the new IMF in January 2009 have been virtually unheard of; however, two IMF arrest operations in Muhammad Agha in the very early morning of 23 April, and a further late on 24 April, provoked large demonstrations on the outskirts of Puli Alam.

The IMF raid on 23 April resulted in the deaths of five persons, alleged by IMF to be AOG, and the arrest of two others in Doghabad Village. Early the next morning several hundred people were mobilized in the Kolangar Area, not too distant from a school and chanted anti-IMF slogans. At least one IMF fuel tanker was burnt in the vicinity. A further report suggested that an ANSF vehicle was also attacked during the demon-

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	1
This Report Period	1

stration. On the night of 24 April, a further IMF raid resulted in the deaths of two persons, again alleged by IMF to be AOG, and the arrest of three other people, one of whom is an NGO worker. Again, and to the surprise of nobody, a further demonstration occurred the following morning which attracted a reported 500 people. RPGs and Ak-47s were evident in the crowd and a further ill timed IMF fuel convoy was attacked which led to at least three vehicles being burnt in the restive Kalangor Area. The arrested NGO worker was released without charge after two days in the custody of the IMF raising serious doubts as to the validity of the claim of any AOG presence.

The second demonstration held the very distinct possibility that it could have been a lot more violent considering the prevalence of weapons in the crowd and the burning of a number of vehicles.



The mood was only changed once a delegation of elders met with the governor to demand the release of those detained. Similar such flare ups following IMF operations which resulted in the deaths of locals cannot be ruled out.

Separately, the arrival of anti-tank mines, evidenced by a number of discoveries and seizures in Baraki Barak and Puli Alam, are most likely an attempt to defeat the armour plating of the new generation of IMF vehicles. At present it appears that most IEDs or mines placed along the district roads are remote detonated, rather than 'victim initiated'. The pressure plate, or 'victim initiated', are the main cause of civilian IED casualties as they are indiscriminate in nature. Several isolated ambushes and IEDs were also reported against IMF and ANSF in Charkh and Baraki Barak. There have been no reported civilian casualties from IEDs reported so far this year.

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- ACG/AOG abductions
- IMF operations
- AOG intimidation


PARWAN

Parwan experienced periodic AOG incidents throughout the province; thus, it likely hosted an increased AOG presence during the period. Activity is typically manifest through rocket attacks targeting ANP and DACs; for example, Shinwary and Ghorband experienced either rocket or RPG attacks or ambushes during this

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	2
This Report Period	0

period. Consequently, the Parwan to Bamyan Road through Ghorband Valley in Shinwari District should be considered a potential risk area for rocket attacks. And of note, in recent months Parwan has been the preferred route to Bamyan, which could make it an attractive target for AOG seeking to further control routes in and out of Parwan.

On 22 April in Ghorband Valley, Sayagerd District, the DAC came under AOG rocket attack; and also in the valley, but on the 26th,



AOG ambushed an ANP convoy on a district road. Also in the province, IMF discovered 19 mortars during a cordon and search operation in Bagram District, and increasing AOG activity—particularly rocket strikes—in the north-east districts of Shinwary and Shaikh Ali are of concern.

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Low intensity AOG activity in the Ghorband Valley
- ACG activity in Chaharikar

BALKH


On 26 April in Chahar Bolak, a large AOG element (estimates ranging from 12 to 30) established a temporary vehicle checkpoint in the abovementioned area. Of note, one report indicates that the AOG employed two members that were dressed as ANP to man the checkpoint while the remainder of the element waited in cover. While the checkpoint was

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Armed groups in Kishindeh and Chahar Bolak

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	0
This Report Period	0

in place, the AOG were in search of GoA and ANSF employees, advocated that bystanders join the opposition, and asked bystanders to support AOGs. As usual, to ascertain bystanders' statuses, they questioned them and reviewed their mobile phonebooks. The checkpoint ceased, however, after Afghan Highway Police confronted the AOG, and the police purportedly detained 3 suspects in relation to the incident. Also in the district on the 26th, AOG



attacked an ANP checkpoint in Timurak Village for circa one hour.

Other incidents of note include an AOG attack on an ANP checkpoint that injured one ANP in Pashma Qala, Chimtal, and a protest in Mazar-e Sharif that resulted from the defacing of an Uzbek poet's statue on the 25th.

FARYAB

AOG activity occurred throughout the province during the period, affecting the districts of Qaysar, Dawlatabad, Pashtun Kot, Qurghan, Gurziwan, and Bilchiragh, and as noted in ANSO's recent quarterly report, IEDs continue to impact the civilian populace. In one example of the latter, an IED that apparently sought to target a pro-government militia


KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- ANSF/IMF operations
- Changes in the context

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	8
This Report Period	0

leader injured thirteen civilians and killed two on 18 April in the Dawlatabad District Centre. Minus this incident, all reported AOG activity was typical ambushes of ANSF or IMF patrols, with the only exception being an attack on an ANP checkpoint in the Jungle area of Qurghan District, also on the 18th.

Inroads to peace are still fleeting in the province, with various stakeholders vying for control, and support for all sides will continually be in flux. Thus, as is wit-



nessed in most other regions, Faryab experienced at least one defection to local AOG from armed parties: five armed guards who worked for an international road company abandoned their posts in Doabi, Qaysar District, and purportedly set off to join with AOG in contentious Ghormach District.

TAKHAR


Reported activity in the province was minimal during the period, with AOG activity taking place in Darqad and Khwaja Ghar. In the

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- AOG presence in northern Takhar
- Attacks on ANP in Bangi

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	1
This Report Period	0

case of the first district, AOG attacked an ANBP checkpoint with SAF and RPGs on the 22nd. The clash reportedly lasted for three hours and resulted in solely AOG casualties, including the death of one AOG commander. In Khwaja Ghar, also on the 22nd, AOG attacked an ANBP vehicle in a minor clash that



somehow persisted for several hours but ended in no casualties.

BAGHLAN

No surprise to anyone, Baghlani Jadid and Puli Khumri were the focus of attention during the reporting period, with the latter district experiencing the greatest amount of activity. Six AOG-initiated incidents occurred in Baghlani Jadid and two in Puli Khumri. Of these, results appear to be negligible, as seen in most AOG small arms operations. Nonetheless, AOG did orchestrate at least one sustained attack—a three hour SAF and RPG attack on an ANP post in Baghlan Old City (this was likely due to


KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- ANSF/IMF Operations
- ACG/AOG activity in Tala wa Barfak
- IEDs in Doshi

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	1
This Report Period	0

harassment fire that hindered ANP from mounting a counterattack)—and did injure six ANA in an ambush of an ANA convoy on 17 April in Pul-e Kokchinar, Baghlan New City. Additionally, in a late reported 14 April attack, AOG apparently killed four IMF and injured another three in an RPG attack on an armoured vehicle in Baghlani Jadid. In demonstration of the inability of IMF/ANSF to strategically target AOG through ground operations in Baghlani Jadid, IMF conducted an airstrike that killed an AOG commander and six of his followers in Baghlan New City on 17 April. IMF/ANSF also conducted operations in the district on 15 and 23 April.

Turning towards Puli Khumri, on 15 April an attack on an ANA



convoy on the Mazar-e Sharif – Puli Khumri Main Road led to a large-scale IMF/ANSF operation. As the events surrounding the operation concluded, it became apparent that two IO vehicles, containing five IO national staff members, had gone missing in a suspected case of AOG abduction which still remains unclear. And on 16 April in Puli Khumri, AOG again attacked an ANP checkpoint on the main road. The attack led to the deployment of 100 ANP who were later joined by ANA and IMF; AOG casualties from the operation are unknown, but two ANA and one IMF were purportedly wounded during the extensive three hour clash that ensued.

KUNDUZ

AOG-initiated incidents occurred in Imam Sahib, Archi, Chahar Dara, Aliabad, and Kunduz districts during the period. AOG modus operandi spanned the gamut, including small arms clashes with ANSF; a mortar strike on the Chahar Dara District Centre; an RCIED strike in Kunduz City and another that killed a


KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- NGO abduction in Imam Sahib
- Armed clashes in Imam Sahib
- Continued attacks in Chahar Dara

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	1
This Report Period	0

civilian on 18 April in Archi; and RPG strikes on communications towers in Dashti Archi, Sofi Zaman, and Shaikhabad. Also reflecting the threat of IEDs, ANSF recovered, through various methods, IEDs in Musazai, Khanabad District, and on the main road between Khakani and Chahar Dara in Kunduz District.

Out of the norm, though, reports circulated of various girls' schools near the Kunduz District Centre and in Now Abad being targeted with poisonous gas. While questionable in the degree of gravity



and credibility, nonetheless, circa one-hundred girls were admitted to local hospitals for treatment in relation to the suspected poisonings. And on 20 April in Aliabad, AOG abducted two international engineers, possibly accompanied by seven to eight national staff members, who were working for a private road construction company as they were travelling through the area.


HERAT

There were two direct NGO incidents in Herat Province during this reporting period. On 19 April, four armed men stopped a private vehicle of an NGO staff member in Guzara District (Malan Area, on the road to Pusht Koh). The gunmen demanded to be taken to a place a few kilometres away, where another vehicle was already waiting for them. The motivation seems to have been getting transport to a nearby location, since the armed men had just one motorbike for four persons. There are no indications that the armed men knew they had stopped an NGO staff member, but the incident emphasises again the importance of planning and monitoring road missions according to circumstances and travelling in a low profile if needed. In addition, this incident also needs to be viewed in connection to AOG movements in and through Guzara District. The district had been quite calm during the first few months of 2010, with only two incidents in the vicinity of Herat airport in January and February; however, a slight increase in AOG related incidents has been noticed during this reporting period. In addition to the NGO incident, ANP conducted a search operation on 24 April, seizing an assortment of weapons and munitions, which seems to fit with current reports of AOG regrouping. Allegedly, supporters of the killed AOG commander Gulam Yahya are

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	3
This Report Period	2

present in the mountainous area of Guzara (Haftarband area), moving also to and from Pashtun Zargun and Injil districts.

The second direct NGO incident took place on 26 April in Badamtu Village, Karukh District. AOG entered an NGO sub-office and set fire to stored food and office equipment. After the attack on the NGO sub-office, the AOG also damaged the primary school of the village. Allegedly, there had been no threats or warnings before. It remains to be seen if AOGs in this area are specifically targeting NGOs. It seems more likely that the NGO sub-office was more a target of opportunity since the AOG also attacked the primary school. Nevertheless, the incident indicates that AOGs are not only present in the area but also try to increase their influence by intimidating local communities. Karukh District had seen very few incidents before 2009, according to ANSO data; however, AOG presence and activity has been visibly increasing since then, especially in the eastern part of the district. The increasing AOG presence in Karukh District is connected to AOG movements to and from neighbouring Kushki Kuhna District, Herat Province, and Qala-i-Naw District, Badghis Province. Particularly, the road from Herat to Qala-i-Naw and the Sabzak Pass are getting more and more difficult due to AOG presence. At present, AOGs are expanding their area of influence from Badghis especially to Kushki Kuhna, but allegedly also to Obe District. Therefore, similar incidents which might involve GoA, NGO, or community related targets cannot be excluded during the next months due to the in-



creasing AOG presence. NGOs are advised to avoid the road between Herat and Qala-i-Naw. IED related incidents remain relatively high in Herat Province. As mentioned in the last bi-weekly, there had been altogether only seven IED related incidents this year before April. April has seen the same number of incidents now, including 3 IED related incidents during the current reporting period. Unlike the previous reporting period, there had been none in Kushki Kuhna. The current incidents took place in Shindand (suburb area), Gulran (Yakka Pa Area) and Kuskh (Baghchaha Area). On 17 April, ANBP discovered a roadside IED in Gulran District, and in Shindand District a roadside IED detonated in front of a fuel convoy on the same day. On 29 April, an IED killed three AOGs, including a commander, when it prematurely exploded while being emplaced.

Weapons seizures continued in Shindand and Guzara districts during the present reporting cycle. Of note, an assortment of weapons and munitions were also seized by ANP in Ghoryan (Gaudar Area) on 19 April. Usually, AOG activity in Ghoryan remains low. In 2009, there had only been five AOG related incidents recorded by ANSO, most of them attacks on ANP; however, on 17 March an RCIED had hit an ANBP vehicle.

With two incidents during the current reporting period, Herat City itself remained again relatively calm. There had been four recorded incidents, two more than during the previous reporting cycle. However, three of them had been crime related. The third incident took place on 22 April 2010, when local elders of Shindand District voluntarily handed over an assortment of weapons and munitions, including 66 AK-47s and 6 PK machineguns.

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- AOG presence in Kushki Kuhna, Kuskh, Shindand and Karukh
- IED/RCIED
- Criminal activity

GHOR


On 17 April, villagers stopped an INGO car in Tangiazan Village, Shahrak District. They expressed general concerns in regard to a personal dispute involving the brother of an INGO staff member. The villagers held the INGO staff for about an hour and returned the INGO vehicle the next day; however, it can be excluded that the incident will affect other NGOs, since the incident was primarily linked to a personal dispute. And on 18 April, a local group threatened to abduct GoA or NGO staff in Chaghcharan and Dawlat Yar Districts if ACG members are not released from prison. Some of the arrested ACG members were allegedly involved in the 10 April armed roadside robbery in Dawlat Yar District that killed four civilians, including one INGO staff member, and wounded three persons, including the second INGO staff member; however, a second local group asked the authorities not to release the arrested ACG but instead insisted on a quick trial. Abduction is usually not very frequent in Ghor. During the last 28

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	3
This Report Period	2

months, there had been eight abductions by ACG in the province, according to ANSO data. None of them had taken place in Dawlat Yar District, and only one in Chaghcharan District. The last abduction in combination with an armed roadside robbery took place on 11 April in Du Layna District; however, three of the eight abductions which involved NGO staff directly (Saghar, Tulak and Taywara districts) had been in August, September, and October of 2009, and there have been no further indications that the threat is still valid. Therefore, it remains unclear how serious the above-mentioned threat is and which local group(s) are backing it.

An INGO food convoy luckily avoided incident on 19 April in Khyran Area, Shahrak District, when an armed clash erupted between AOGs and ANP, wounding two ANP—the INGO food convoy passed the area unharmed during the clash. Armed clashes in Ghor are not frequent but also not unusual. The majority of clashes are linked to ACGs and local disputes. On the same day, there had also been an armed clash between ACG in Tulak, for example.

Overall, there had been 32 armed clashes in Ghor Province in 2009 and 2010; AOG were involved in 13 of them. The majority of armed clashes with AOG involve-



ment took place particularly in Saghar District, but also in Sharak, Pasaband and Du Layna. During this reporting period, also two prominent AOG incidents occurred. On 24 April, Barakhol Area, four unknown armed men shot and killed an AOG commander (allegedly the shadow governor of Ghor Province). However, it remains to be seen if the assassination will have further implications. In addition, on 17 April 2010, an IED was found under the main bridge, connecting Chaghcharan City Centre with the airport and the PRT. In 2010, there had been only one IED discovery in Ghor Province before, which had been in Du Layna District; however, last year there had been 16 IED related incidents in the province, of which 13 had been discoveries. Most of the IED incidents had been in Shahrak, where 2 of 6 also detonated. However, there had been also several in Chaghcharan, Saghar and Du Layna. In Chaghcharan City, there had been an IED discovery in the Bazaar Area on 22 April. Even the use of IEDs is not very common in Ghor; this, however, shows that the IED incident in Chaghcharan City is neither extraordinary, nor a direct indicator of an increased AOG presence.

Nevertheless, it remains important for NGOs to plan road missions in Ghor carefully, know the areas beforehand, and exercise caution while travelling.

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Armed robberies long districts roads
- AOG presence not only in Pasaband and Taywara
- Abduction

ANSO SERVICES TIP: If your NGO is contemplating adjusting programmes in a certain district because of changes in the conflict, did you know that ANSO can provide district-level analyses? Please contact your respective RSA and allow circa two weeks time for completion.

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BADGHIS

Badghis Province has seen significantly more incidents than the other provinces in the Western Region and continues to be the most unstable one. Compared to March 2010 with 26 incidents, the province has witnessed a significant increase to 46 incidents, with 21 occurring during the recent reporting period. This increase is linked to ANSF/IMF operations during April. One Major ANSF/IMF operation in Murghab and Muqrur Districts ended on 22 April, and the second half of this reporting cycle has seen 50% less incidents than the first.

Half of incidents in Badghis Province took place in Murghab District. However, the other half was concentrated in Muqrur, Ghormach, and Qadis districts. This fur-

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS


- AOG-ANSF/IMF clashes
- IEDs in Murghab, Muqrur, Ghormach and Qadis
- Abduction

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	0
This Report Period	0

confirms the trend that Ghormach (Tale Kushk, Qala-i-Wali and especially Doabi Areas) and especially Qadis are seeing more AOG presence.


The vast majority of incidents remained to be armed clashes and IED related incidents. AOG attacks have been focused on ANSF/IMF in Murghab. Of note, on 21 April near the Murghab DAC, AOG fired two rockets (107mm) towards the ANSF/IMF base. (The rockets landed in an open area nearby). In addition, AOG attacks on ANP in Ghormach continued. ANSF/IMF search operations took place as usual in Murghab, but also in Qadis. Furthermore, most IED related incidents were recorded in Murghab and Ghormach, targeting ANSF/IMF, but there also was one in Qadis District.

Of note, AOGs are clearly extending their presence to Qadis District as the incidents during this reporting period show again. In Qadis District, there have been two search operations, with one



occurring in Ghal Zardak Area. The latest, on 29 April, started in Qale Dascht Area, expanding to Khakedarwish and allegedly Karizmir-hazar Area. In addition, on the 24th, an ANP patrol located a roadside IED (composed of 18 kg of explosives) on the main road in Qarchaghi Area and defused it safely. The use of IEDs in Qadis is new. According to ANSO data, there had been only three IED related incidents since 2008, including the one on the 29th. (All three took place in 2010). On 2 March, an IED hit an ANP vehicle in Buzby Area. On 24 April, an ANP patrol located a roadside IED on the main road in Qarchaghi Area and defused it safely. So far, IED related incidents were concentrated in Murghab, Muqrur, and also Ghormach districts of Badghis Province, where the AOG presence is high. However, further IED incidents in Qadis are to be expected, encouraging further caution while travelling through the area.

WEST 2010 AOG LEVELS



FARAH

There have been less incidents—only 8—during the current reporting period in Farah Province; the previous reporting period had seen 14. However, compared to April 2009, the number of incidents remains quite similar. In 2009, there were altogether 25 incidents in April according to ANSO data, whereas in 2010 there were 22.


Armed clashes decreased visibly during the current reporting cycle. Of note, on 16 April, ANSF/IMF conducted an operation in Dokan Area, Pusht Rod District, killing ten AOG members including a prominent AOG commander. However, IED related incidents remain prominent and were concentrated in Pusht Rod, Gulistan and Bakwa districts, as well as

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- IEDs/RCIEDs
- AOG ambushes/Armed clashes
- Criminal activity

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	1
This Report Period	0

Farah City airfield. On 23rd April, an IED hit the vehicle of a local elder in Dilaram Area, Bakwa District, serving as a reminder of the risk to civilians. (Dilaram is also a border area to Nimroz and Helmand). On 22 April, an IMF patrol found an IED and defused it safely in the airfield area of Farah District. A few days later, on the 26th, a roadside IED hit an IMF vehicle patrol, damaging a vehicle slightly. Of note, the only other incident for Farah airfield recorded in 2009 and 2010 was on 25th October 2009, when AOG fired three rockets, impacting in an open area near the airport. Therefore, the latest two incidents might indicate a stronger focus of AOGs on the Farah Airfield Area. With IED incidents still high, the risk of being collaterally targeted remains. However, this reporting period has not seen any attacks on logistic convoys.



As usual, AOGs were quite active. Six of seven incidents were initiated by AOGs. Of note, five of them involved the use of IEDs while armed clashes were fewer during the reporting period, as mentioned before. Yet, it is too early to tell if this is related to a shift in AOG tactics and recent ANSF/IMF operations in Farah Province. It had been pointed out in previous reports that significant military/police operations were occurring in Farah Province, especially in Bakwa and Pusht Rod. Throughout April, one key area of AOG activity remaining was Pusht Rod District, which had seen a significant increase of incidents already in the second half of March. Bakwa District as well saw an increase in April, but it remained relatively calm with only one incident during the current reporting cycle. Of note, Bala Baluk District has seen significantly less incidents during April.

PAKTYA


Paktya Province remains volatile, with a comparatively moderate amount of security incidents recorded. Still, the steady increase of AOG activity reported in early April continued during this re-

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- AOG direct attacks, particularly in Jaji and Zurmat
- IMF/ANSF operations in Zurmat
- IEDs on the main Gardez-Khost Road

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	1
This Report Period	0

porting cycle, with a particular increase in direct assaults. Seven AOG-initiated incidents were reported from Paktya, with six of them being direct attacks against security forces in Jaji, Zurmat, Gardez, and Lija Ahmad Khel as well as one IED-related incident in Shwak. The latter incident occurred on the main Gardez-Khost road on 25 April, when an IED detonated while an ANA EOD team was attempting to defuse it.



The level of IMF/ANSF operations remains high across Paktya, with six such operations recorded in late April. The emphasis of security force activity still concentrates on Gardez and Zurmat, with a significant IMF operation reported from Zurmat.

NANGARHAR


On 22 April in Chaparhar District, an unidentified number of AOG established a temporary checkpoint and searched passing vehicles for around one hour. For unknown reasons, the armed men fired on the vehicle of a national staff member of a for-profit development agency, killing at least two national staff members as well as one civilian. Subsequently, AOG also assaulted and killed two off-duty ANSF. Although it is believed that the for-profit development agency staff members were not assaulted because of their professional affiliation, this incident exemplifies the increased risk posed by AOG activity in southern Nangarhar Province.

AOG CPs became frequent occurrences in several southern districts in recent weeks. Just one day after the incident in Chaparhar,

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	3
This Report Period	0

AOG established multiple checkpoints in Sherzad District for several hours, explicitly looking for individuals associated with GoA or IMF/ANSF. Therefore, as a precautionary measure, NGOs travelling in these areas are strongly advised to ensure that they are sanitised of any information identifying them as NGO staff.

The overall security environment in Nangarhar continues to deteriorate. With 19 ANSO-recorded AOG incidents, the level of AOG activity continues to increase steadily across the province. It appears that AOG are attempting to exploit local enmities caused by official poppy eradication efforts. Late April saw several AOG attacks against ANSF/IMF counter narcotic teams, assumingly with the intention to gain local sympathy. For instance, on 25 April in a bordering area between Sherzad and Khogyani, AOG reinforced an assault of locals against a poppy eradication team. The subsequent clash continued for more than eight hours, spilling-over to several surrounding areas in Sherzad and Khogyani and causing numerous casualties. A similar



attack, although less significant, was recorded in Lal Pur District.

Incidents related to explosive devices remain significant across Nangarhar. In this reporting period, around 15 IEDs were detonated or located in the province. Until now, the efficiency of these devices is rather limited, with a pre-detonation discovery rate of over 40%. Many of them are used for intimidation purposes, or for limiting ANSF movement in poppy cultivation areas, and do not necessarily affect NGO operations throughout Nangarhar. Still, late April saw several attempts of tactical improvement of AOG IED attacks targeting ANSF. On 17 April in Jalalabad City, a RCIED struck the vehicle of a high-ranking NDS official, wounding several people. Albeit this incident appears to be isolated, such high-level assassination attempts are rather unusual in Jalalabad. In another incident, on 24 April in Shinwar District, AOG used the tactic of secondary detonations for causing maximum damage amongst ANSF: a few minutes after an initial IED struck an ANBP vehicle, a second IED detonated in the same area, targeting responding ANSF.

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- AOG assaults, particularly in Sherzad, Khogyani and Pachir Wa Agam
- IEDs
- AOG CPs in Chaparhar and Sherzad

NOTICE: Your input is invaluable for the production of this report. While we appreciate information on incidents, we also need general information on the security situation and context in your area. So please remember to call or email us regularly.

Contact details of ANSO staff are provided on the last page.

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KHOST

With 37 ANSO-recorded AOG incidents, the security environment in Khost remains violent and dangerous. Explosive devices remain the major concern across the province, posing significant challenges to road travel in all districts and movement inside Khost City. In late April, around 45 IEDs were detonated or located throughout Khost. As seen in previous cycles, civilians remain prone to be harmed collaterally or even sometimes intentionally by these assaults. For instance, on 28 April in Tani District, a roadside

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS


- IEDs throughout the Province
- AOG assaults in Tani
- IDF in Bak, Sabari and Tani

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	2
This Report Period	0

IED struck a local minibus, killing at least twelve civilians.

Most assaults are concentrated along the main Khost-Gardez Road as well as in Khost City, with IEDs used for intimidation, against security forces, and for high-level assassinations. Late April saw several incidents of RCIED attacks against high-level GoA and ANSF officials. For example, in Khost City on 20 April, an RCIED detonated against an NDS convoy, killing a high-ranking NDS official.

Next to the constant threat posed by IEDs throughout the Province, AOG increasingly use additional tactics in several areas. The level of IDF assaults has increased significantly in recent weeks, with particular concentration of such



attacks in Bak, Sabari, and Tani. The amount of projectiles fired suggests an improved supply chain, particularly in Sabari, where around 18 rockets and mortars were fired during this period. Additionally, a significant number of direct attacks against IMF/ANSF were reported, mainly from Tani District.

The general environment in Khost remains tense and dangerous, and frequent IMF/ANSF operations also inhere the risk of collateral damage for civilians. For instance, on 19 April in Gurbuz District, IMF soldiers fired on an approaching vehicle for coming too close, killing several unarmed civilians.

LAGHMAN

In late April, AOGs stepped their activity significantly up throughout Laghman, ranging from hit-and-run style direct attacks to BBIED assaults. Around nine AOG-initiated incidents were reported, including six direct attacks, one IDF assault, and two incidents related to IEDs. Additionally, three IEDs were discovered across the province.

On 29 April in Alishing District, a BBIED struck a joint IMF/ANSF patrol on the main road, causing several casualties amongst ANSF.


KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Assaults along Jalalabad-Kabul Highway
- AOG activity, particularly in Alishing

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	1
This Report Period	0

This marks the first BBIED attack ever recorded in Alishing, and displays a very rare occurrence in Laghman. However, AOG showed additional activity in Alishing in late April. Two direct attacks were recorded, with one targeting a local IMF base and the other one ambushing an IMF patrol. This spike in assaults might relate to recent IMF operations in the neighbouring Uzbeen Valley, probably forcing local AOG to migrate to Alishing.

The security environment along the Jalalabad-Kabul Highway in Qarghayi District saw some deterioration during this reporting period. Three direct attacks against supply convoys and an ANA patrol, one IDF assault



against an ANSF CP, and one IED detonation were recorded along the road. Although this amount of incidents on the highway is much higher than usual, its effect on the road's security is rather limited. The direct attacks were small scale hit-and-run assaults targeting isolated vehicles clearly associated with either IMF/ANSF or GoA. The attacks were marked by limited manpower and impact, and the highway was not blocked at all. The background behind the IED incident targeting a fuel tanker remains unclear, and initial information suggests that the truck's driver could be involved.

KUNAR

The overall activity of AOG throughout Kunar Province has again increased. Next to the usual amount of direct attacks against security forces, late April saw significant numbers of intimidations, targeting of AOG CPs, and abductions across the Province.

Compared to previous cycles, AOG's capability to operate has improved, and particularly the number of abductions attributed to AOG has increased. For instance, on 17 April in Marawara District, AOG abducted four national staff members of a demining agency from their work-site. All of them were released unharmed after one day in captivity


KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- AOG abductions
- Frequent AOG – IMF/ANSF clashes
- AOG CPs in Wata Pur and Marawara

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	4
This Report Period	0

ity through the mediation of local elders. In another incident in Marawara, on 24 April AOG abducted a local male and later assassinated him for being an IMF/ANSF spy. All in all, late April witnessed seven incidents related to kidnapping/abduction in Sirkanay, Marawara, Ghaziabad, Chapa Dara, and Manogai districts.

AOGs' attempts to intimidate persons or entities associated with the GoA or security forces as well as the local population remain high. For example, on 25 April in Bar Kunar, AOG set fire to three locally contracted trucks carrying IMF supplies to an IMF Base in Nari District. Subsequently, AOG assaulted the drivers and warned them to stop carrying supplies for IMF or GoA. As seen in previous periods, road construction companies remain frequent targets, and during this cycle a for-profit development agency also came un-



der attack when AOG targeted its project site in Sirkanay on 21 April.

AOGs' increased operational capability was also manifested through several illegal CPs in Wata Pur and Marawara districts. Interestingly, in a report describing several AOG CPs in Wata Pur on 20 April, AOG reportedly wore ANSF uniforms.

Due to increased AOG activity, the level of IMF/ANSF-AOG confrontation as well as the amount of security force operations remains very high throughout the province. Besides the usual areas of confrontation, such as Manogai or Bar Kunar, this period saw significant clashes in areas bordering Pakistan. Due to significant influx of Pakistani AOG from Bajaur/Pakistan into Marawara, the confrontations there also intensified in recent weeks.

GHAZNI

Ghazni Province continues to be extremely insecure, as the most recent report period included a huge number of incidents. AOG activity remains aggressive, with a large number of direct attacks on IMF, ANA, and ANP targets in the districts of Gelan, Qarabagh and Ghazni. In addition there were SAF attacks on the DACs of


KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- IEDs
- AOG attacks

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	0
This Report Period	0

Nawa and Andar. As has been apparent in the past, AOG use stand-off weapons (rockets, mortars) more frequently than in other provinces, and in this report period this rate has even increased. Rocket attacks against mainly IMF bases were launched in the districts of Ghazni, Muqur, Waghaz, and Gelan, all witnessing multiple attacks over the past weeks.

IMF operations took place primarily in troubled Gelan District



and Qarabagh District. Gelan operations were substantial, and resulted in an estimated 15 AOG killed and a large number of motorcycles (over 20) seized. In the village of Jamrad in Qarabagh District at least 12 AOG were killed and several vehicles destroyed in another IMF large operation.


HELMAND

The three expatriate staff from the INGO operating in Lashkar Gah City who were arrested on suspicion of plotting to assist AOG in attacks were released by Afghan authorities, along with five out of the six local staff members arrested. There has been no reaction from the local community to this development, and comment from the Governor's office has been muted, following very public accusations and denunciations at the time of the original arrest.

Turning to the general security environment, Helmand remained extremely insecure during the report period, as IMF concede that AOG are infiltrating areas taken during the initial stages of Operation Moshtarak in increasing num-

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	3
This Report Period	0

bers, seriously threatening their efforts to hold key terrain in Marjah and the surrounding area. IMF sources have spoken for the first time of delaying operations in Kandahar until more progress can be shown in Helmand; however, it remains to be seen if that caveat will be applied. AOG kept up the pace of attacks throughout the rest of the province as well, initiating attacks on IMF and ANP posts in Marjah, Sangin, and Nahri Sarraj districts, in addition to two attempted BBIED attacks, one on a body building competition in Lashkar Gah City which was stopped by NDS, and another near the DAC in Sangin which resulted in one killed and two others wounded. Assassination of



local leaders continued, as a tribal elder from the Grishk area of Nahri Sarraj was gunned down at the beginning of the report period.

It appeared that the pace of eradication activities has slowed somewhat, with an estimated total of only 850 jeribs being destroyed. However, search operations over the past two weeks have resulted in significant seizures of both raw opium and processed heroin, most likely from stockpiles from past harvests which were being prepared to be moved to distribution centres.


KANDAHAR

Tensions are mounting in Kandahar Province, as AOG have maintained their program of high profile assassinations, both attempted and successful, of local officials and leaders.

Public resentment over the increased level of incidents will most likely remain high as IMF/ANA and ANP units increase their presence and activity in Kandahar City, as it is increasingly felt that IMF and GOA plans for operations are in direct opposition to the stated desires of the community to refrain from such activities. Over a dozen prominent individuals from Kandahar City and its surrounding districts were targeted during the report period,

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	3
This Report Period	0

including unsuccessful attempts on the lives of a previous Governor of Spin Boldak—closely allied to President Karzai, a municipal official from Arghandab District, and two ANP commanders operating in Kandahar City. Successful assassinations were carried out against the popular Deputy Mayor of Kandahar City, the Administrator of the Provincial Agriculture Department, a civilian running in the upcoming Parliamentary elections, an NDS commander, the imam of Deh Sabz village in Arghandab District, and a tribal elder who was also a member of the local shura of Mirakhoran Village, also in Arghandab District. In an effort to stem the flow of materials and logistics supplies moving into the area to support increased IMF operations, AOG launched attacks against supply convoys and bases, including at-



tacks on convoys in Arghandab and Zhari Districts and a complex attack involving BBIEDs and SAF against a large fuel base immediately outside of KAF which took three lives and destroyed at least eight fuel tankers.

IMF / ANA have increased search operations in response to reports that IED materials and expertise are moving into the area in large numbers. Accordingly, search operations were conducted in Daman, Zhari, and Spin Boldak, with large numbers of explosives, weapons and drugs being confiscated. In addition, throughout the province over 29 separate IEDs were discovered and disposed of, including a fuel tanker truck rigged as a VBIED, discovered in the Wesh area of Spin Boldak.

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- IMF operations
- AOG Assassinations

URUZGAN


Once again, incident levels in Uruzgan remained relatively low during the report period, as IMF/ANA and ANP units conducted several successful search and seizure operations which netted a wide variety of weapons and

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- IMF/ANA operations

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	0
This Report Period	0

ammunition in Tirin Kot, Chora, Char Chino, and Khas Uruzgan districts. There were several AOG attacks on IMF units, including an RCIED which killed two IMF soldiers and wounded another in Tirin Kot District, as well as a large AOG ambush in the Garmaw area of Char Chino District, resulting in several ANA and ANP wounded.



ZABUL


As usual, Zabul Province recorded high numbers of IED incidents during this report period; however, AOG activity showed a distinct rise in direct attacks as well, resulting in one of the most violent periods the province has seen for many months. Convoys and their PSC escorts were tar-

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- IED strikes
- Direct AOG attacks

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	1
This Report Period	0

geted the most, as direct attacks by AOG occurred in Mizan, Qalat, Daychopan and Shahjoy Districts, with Shahjoy witnessing a BBIED attack in the main bazaar area against a PSC convoy, resulting in three civilians killed and over eight wounded. The increase in attacks can be partially attributed to the increase in convoy traffic on the Ring Road, presenting more targets of opportunity to AOG, as well as what is



being described as a relatively small opium harvest in the neighboring provinces, which most likely has subsequently drawn less manpower from local AOG cadres.

PAKTIKA

Paktika Province was host to a relatively large number of incidents, with the majority representing an apparent increase in IMF/ANA operations. IMF-initiated operations took place in Urgan, Barmal and Wor Damay districts, resulting in a total of 12 AOG


KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- IEDs
- AOG attacks on construction operations

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	0
This Report Period	0

killed and large amounts of small arms and ammunition seized. ANP appeared to be more active during this report period, as IED discovery and disposal operations accounted for 11 separate incidents, primarily in Sharan, Baki Khel and Yosuf Khel districts.

AOG direct attacks comprised of several operations against construction company vehicles and workers, with two incidents in Sharan and Mata Khan districts



resulting in several PSC members killed and several abducted. In addition, AOG attacked several ANBP posts throughout the province and an IMF patrol in the Margha area of Barmal District.



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ANSO ACRONYMS

ACG-Armed Criminal Group /
AEF-Afghan Eradication Forces
/ **ANA**-Afghan National Army /
ANBP-Afghan National Border
Police / **ANP**-Afghan National
Police / **AOG**-Armed Opposition
Group / **APPF**-Afghan Public
Protection Forces (local deputised
militias) / **DC**-District
Centre / **GOA**-Government of
Afghanistan / **IDF**-Indirect Fire
(ex: mortars) / **IED**-Improvised
Explosive Device / **IMF**-
International Military Forces /
NDS-National Directorate of
Security (Intelligence) / **PRP**-
Previous Reporting Period /
PSC-Private Security Company
/ **RPG**-Rocket Propelled Grenade /
SAF-Small Arms Fire /
VBIED-Vehicle Borne Improvised
Explosive Device

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MISSING

This report ANSO
could not provide
analysis for the prov-
inces of:

Bamyan
Panjshir
Badakhshan
Jawzjan
Sar-e Pul
Samangan
Nuristan
Nimroz

This is because we
do not know enough
about the area to
comment on the sig-
nificance of the inci-
dents occurring
there.

If you can help us
understand the prov-
ince better, please
contact us.

VACANCY

ANSO is in search of a few good NGO workers. If you have NGO experience, an analytical background, and the desire to be challenged, all while being part of a close-knit team, pass your CV, cover letter, and two English writing samples to operations@afgnso.org.

FEEDBACK ON ANSO SERVICES

ANSO welcomes your feedback. To provide confidential feedback, please email the ANSO Advisory Board at ansoab@yahoo.com.