

THE ANSO REPORT

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YOU NEED TO KNOW

- AOG momentum increases in light of COIN approaches
- Targeted killings persist country-wide, with increased attention given to those who support expansion of foreign and GoA interests
- Instability expands in North

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COUNTRY SUMMARY

The change of US military leadership to General Petraeus this period brings with it the expectation that he will do a much better job of advocating for an extension of the July 2011 withdrawal deadline than his predecessor. The slow motion progression of the Kandahar operation will assist him in this effort as he will be able to legitimately claim to have not been allowed sufficient time to show results.

The fleeting visit of the UN Security Council resulted in predictable platitudes regarding progress with, at least no public, discussion on the substantive issues of withdrawal, reconciliation or the general failure of the COIN approach.

Also this period, attention was given to the AOG intent and ability to target IMF's "development" line of operation, with some analysts erroneously interpreting this to mean blanket targeting of NGOs. ANSO believes that AOG are perfectly able (and willing) to distinguish between genuinely impartial NGOs and contractors who overtly participate in COIN, for a profit, and will deliberately attack the latter only.

AOG appear to be seizing upon weaknesses in COIN

doctrine and increasing their offensive momentum country-wide. Instability in Nangarhar Province, for example, garnered much attention, especially manifest in its first complex attack of 2010 which targeted Jalalabad Airfield with BBIEDs and a VBIED.

Attempts to demonstrate the expansion of the GoA's writ, as well as district-level access, continue to foster targeted killings. A multitude of perceived collaborators and civil servants were thus targeted during the period. The abduction and beheading of the Saydabad District Administrator is an exemplar of AOG approaches to GoA administration and an indicator of the level of personal security that will be required for such officials in the future. Uruzgan also saw multiple AOG attempts to target GoA leadership through suicide attacks. With this, AOG intentions in Uruzgan should draw caution, suggesting that violence will likely escalate during the withdrawal of Dutch forces. Ghazni saw further deterioration, with rampant attacks occurring on district centres. While instability was pervasive, especially in An-

dar, recent targeting of those involved in the field of education is disconcerting, ranging from forced school closures, to arson of schools, to the execution of staff.

Further changes in the context will amount to declines in security, for example, as seen in the Northern Region. Another reminder of the need for NGOs to abstain from relations with parties-to-the-conflict was thus evident in Balkh when suspected AOG attempted to kidnap an engineer involved with constructing a security checkpoint in Chintal—the engineer was executed when he resisted.

The north saw further AOG expansion and migrations, with new AOGs emerging in previously uncontested areas, even in Samangan. AOG migration also was observed along the Mazar-e Sharif - Kabul Highway.

An especially lethal IED strike also affected the North, killing four IMF soldiers in Faryab. IED activity was also notable in Badakhshan, with some believing that it has recently manifested due to local vested interests in demonstrating instability.


WARDAK

Declines in Wardak made local headlines in the kidnapping and beheading of the Saydabad District Administrator during the period. Last seen during the early evening of 15 June, his decapitated corpse was located in the Shad-Puch area of the district. As continually noted, despite claims to the contrary, security in Wardak has been deteriorating for some time now. For those who do not know, Saydabad District is clearly considered to be the most perilous district within the Central Region, and NGOs are consistently confronted with inordinate risk while even transiting through the area, especially that of abduction. In Saydabad District, specifically, the period of January through May of 2010 has witnessed

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	2
This Report Period	0

nessed a 53% increase in AOG activity when compared to 2009, and a 187% increase when compared to 2008.

NGOs are likely also aware of a recent barrage of press reports concerning one of the GoA's many security test projects, this one being the Wardak-based 'Afghanistan Public Protection Program' (AP3), because its current commander (a contentious personality who had past involvement with various AOGs) has been asserting that the force needs increased funding, restructuring, and better training. Furthermore, the commander has voiced his intent to resign from the post due to these inadequacies, and there exist multiple rifts between the AP3, community, himself, and Wardak-based GoA authorities. While the situation in the province continues to deteriorate regardless of the status of the AP3, NGOs should be mindful of surrounding developments concerning it (e.g., erosion of morale, demobilisation, and collusion with



AOG/ACG) because they will likely lead to further destabilisation.

Many who are interested in the province are now looking for an explanation on the drastic increase in insecurity. Sadly, though, due to the existence of a multitude of incentives for even 'pro-government' forces to see a continuation of the conflict, determining the motive behind increased incidents is quite difficult. Nonetheless, the instability is evident. For example, 19 IED-related incidents occurred during the period in Saydabad, Jalrez, Hisa-e Awali Bihsud, Jaghatu, and Maydan Shahr. AOG also conducted numerous attacks on security forces and logistics convoys in Saydabad, Jalrez, Day Mirdad, and Nirkh. Abductions also occurred: AOG abducted a GoA official in Daymirdad on 25 June, and in a late reported incident AOG abducted an off-duty ANA officer in Saydabad on 15 June. Saydabad experienced another targeted killing, additionally, this time of a civilian contractor supporting IMF on the 16th.

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS


- AOG prevalence in Saydabad
- Abduction
- IEDs and ambushes targeting IMF/ANSF logistics convoys along Highway 1

PARWAN

In relation to NGOs, Parwan experienced little of concern during the period. Incidents demonstrated that AOG are still present in the province and intent upon

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	2
This Report Period	0

hindering IMF logistics operations; for example, AOG targeted an IMF logistics convoy in Chaharikar on the 26th. An ambush of an IMF/ANA convoy occurred in the same district, but on the 28th, although amounting to little except AOG losses. Not to leave out the now notorious district of Shinwari, AOG conducted a limited



assault on an ANP check post in Dahan-e Dara Namak Ab on the 17th.

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- AOG activity in Ghorband Valley
- ACG activity in Chaharikar

KABUL

AOG activity was inconspicuously absent from the province in spite of international media's thirst for news on attacks in the nation's capital. With this, arrests of suspected AOG persisted during the period, which will have a continual impact. Despite the lack of


KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Criminality in the morning
- Attention-grabbing AOG attacks targeting GoA, IMF, IOs, and comingled targets
- Violent demonstrations

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	6
This Report Period	0

AOG activity, the international community witnessed the loss of a UN national staff member's life when an unarmoured UN vehicle was shot at near Masoud Circle. As of yet, there is no clear indication of who or why the vehicle the staff member was seated in was shot at, with the only indication so far being that an IMF member was responsible.

Outside of this incident, Kabul City's residents observed how violence can quickly manifest through the 29 June demonstration in Qalacha that involved circa



300 participants. Demonstrators turned their ire, initially focused on IMF for a raid that occurred on a madrasa in the area and led to the detention of nine people, towards ANP who sought to contain them. In the end, severe damage would be done to ANP vehicles by the demonstrators' stones, and ANP would fire off several warning shots.

LOGAR

When looking at activity in Logar during the period, an intimidating AOG presence was definitely experienced. Minus a few exceptions, AOG did not, however, display the brutality that is evident in other provinces, such as Ghazni. According to ANSO records, only one targeted killing of a civilian occurred—22 July in Pul-e Alam—and likewise only one


KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- IEDs, especially targeting IMF
- Abduction

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	1
This Report Period	0

abduction occurred—on the 17th in Muhammad Agha, AOG abducted three locals, including a presidential bodyguard, from a house. Intimidation was additionally present in the arson of an IMF contractor's truck in Charkh on 26 June. Also of note in Muhammad Agha, though, was an AOG attack that took place on the 16th, targeting a cellular relay station.

Besides the abovementioned incidents, the period witnessed conventional assaults on an ANP



check post, an ANA convoy, and an IMF/ANA patrol. An AOG reliance on IEDs was noted during the period, with 11 IED-related incidents being recorded. Of these, only three resulted in successful detonations: one that targeted an IMF vehicle in Charkh, another that struck a culvert in Pul-e Alam, and a third that targeted an ANA vehicle in Baraki Barak.

PANJSHIR

Just as is typical for Panjshir, the

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Politically motivated IEDs

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	0
This Report Period	0

past two reporting periods have not resulted in any notable security developments. Due to a continual desire to hinder derogatory

information concerning any such developments from coming to the fore, ANSO continually faces hurdles in collecting relevant information on the province. Consequently, NGOs are strongly encouraged to contact ANSO's Central Region representatives with any information on changes in the context within the province.

KAPISA


While activity in the province remains below high levels displayed elsewhere, IED activity was nota-

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- AOG expansion
- Low intensity factional disputes in Kohistan I & II
- AOG in Alasay, Nijrab, & Tagab

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	1
This Report Period	0

ble in Nijrab and Tagab during the period. Four IEDs were discovered in the said districts, and one IED targeted a construction company's vehicle in the Zinda area of Nijrab. As usual, Tagab dominated armed activity in the province, with AOG ambushing IMF/ANSF patrols on four occasions.




BALKH

The security situation in Balkh Province remains calm with the exception of a few areas west and south of the provincial capital. An ongoing joint ANSF/IMF operation continues into its third week in Chahar Bolak and Chimalt districts, where forces have reportedly established new checkpoints in certain areas and an observation post near Alizai Village. In a likely demonstration of AOG reaction to the new presence, though, four gunmen on two motorcycles stopped a vehicle belonging to a construction company that has been employed by IMF to assist in constructing the checkpoint in Alizai. The armed

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	5
This Report Period	0

men separated the vehicle's occupants—an engineer, driver, and assistant driver—and attempted to abduct the engineer; the engineer resisted, however, leading the gunmen to shoot him dead. And of little surprise, the abovementioned IMF/ANSF operation has met with limited resistance relative to the known AOG presence in these districts. One patrol was attacked in western Chahar Bolak, and an IED was discovered and defused on the road between Alizai and Arab Mazari villages. Meanwhile, AOG activity has picked up again in Sholgara District, where an ANP officer was killed while en route from the checkpoint at Jar-e Bairam Shah Area. The single checkpoint on the eastern side of the river was established last month in an effort to suppress an emboldening AOG presence in the area which had been long-neglected by ANSF. The daytime assassination of the ANP member clearly indicates



that the single checkpoint is insufficient to counter the growing threat, and continued acts of intimidation should be expected in the area. In addition, in the first incident reported in Kishindeh District since mid-April, a group of 15-20 AOGs entered the compound of an international road construction company in Kishindeh Payan Area, and abducted four workers, including a Pakistani national. This area has seen sporadic AOG activity in the past nine months, including the temporary abduction of an INGO staff member in Jar-e Khushk Area, west of the District Centre. The AOG activity in this area has been rumoured to be linked with local disputes regarding the road construction company; however, given the previous INGO abduction in Jar-e Khushk Area, it cannot be guaranteed that INGOs will not be targeted by this group.

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Joint operation in Chahar Bolak/Chimalt
- AOGs east of Sholgara River
- Abduction in Kishindeh District

GRAPHS:

Please note, graphs in this report are current as of 30 June 2010

KUNDUZ


A series of targeted IMF and joint “kill and capture” operations in Chahar Dara and Kunduz District resulted in a number of AOG fatalities, including two AOG commanders and at least two foreign fighters. The rate of AOG fatalities caused by reported air strikes has significantly increased in the past three months. Since the end of April, at least 44 AOGs and three commanders have been killed by air strikes in Kunduz and Chahar Dara districts. It appears that IMF are conducting a concerted campaign targeting AOG leadership in the long-neglected strongholds of Gorteppa Area of Kunduz District and Nahri Sufi Area of Chahar Dara District.

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- IEDs in Kunduz and Chahar Dara
- Targeted military operations
- Pro-government militias defecting to AOGs

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	2
This Report Period	0

Despite these “successes,” AOGs continue to retaliate against IMF/ANSF advances through IED strikes, reportedly with an increasing level of sophistication. Eleven IED-related incidents were reported so far in June 2010—the highest number of IED-related incidents reported so far in single month. AOGs may tend to rely more heavily on stand-off tactics in the weeks following a targeted strike, as stand-off tactics can be easily employed despite the loss of AOG leadership. IEDs have become increasingly sophisticated in the province as well, challenging traditional detection and defusing methods. An increase in targeted strikes, arrest operations and IED incidents will likely continue into the summer months. Also in Kunduz City, an RCIED detonated in the private clinic of the director of the provincial health department, killing the said target and injuring three bystanders. Local officials assess that AOGs had previously appealed to the health department



to provide services to injured AOGs, and that the attack may have been in response to the department's apparent refusal.

In Aliabad District, an eight hour-long clash between pro-government militia members and AOGs resulted in the deaths of five AOGs, including a foreign fighter, and the injury of 10 others. Five militia members were also killed in the clash, after which it was reported that the surviving militia members threatened to relinquish their support for the government given that ANSF/IMF reinforcements declined to come to their aid. Two independent militias reportedly joined the AOGs in Imam Sahib District this period, where AOGs continue to attack militia positions, on one occasion launching simultaneous attacks in three separate villages. Telecommunication service continues to be inoperable in the evening and early morning hours throughout the province.

SAR-E PUL


In Sar-e Pul, a demonstration in the provincial capital may have been an outward indication of a growing extremist presence in the province. Weeks ago, after initial allegations of INGO proselytizing were leaked in Kabul, residents of Sar-e Pul put together a small demonstration akin to those seen across the north and western regions. After the fervour had dissipated, however, a larger group

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Reports of AOG presence in Kohistanat

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	0
This Report Period	0

(estimated between 7-800) consisting predominantly of religious leaders and madrasa students from throughout the province, rallied together this period to demand a response from the provincial government. Consistent reports of growing AOG presence in Kohistanat District have raised concerns of infiltration from neighbouring districts. Possibly related to the increased AOG presence in Kohistanat, unusual activity was reported in Sangcharak and Sozma Qala districts. Late last reporting period, an



RCIED struck a civilian vehicle in Sozma Qala District on the road to Kata Qala Village, the motive of which could not be determined. In Sangcharak District, the former Chief of Police was killed, possibly due to an interpersonal dispute. And in southwestern Sangcharak, AOGs attacked an ANP patrol, prompting a firefight in which two AOGs were killed, three injured and another arrested.

TAKHAR


As predicted last period, AOGs readily resumed their activities in northern Takhar after a much-publicized yet unfruitful five-day ANSF/IMF “operation” in early June. In addition to resuming attacks on border police and pro-

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Intimidation in northern Takhar
- Clashes with pro-government militias
- AOG presence in Ishkamish

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	2
This Report Period	0

government militias, AOGs have turned towards open intimidation of the population. In Yangi Qala District, openly armed men have been reportedly patrolling Omar Khel Village and areas beyond the District Centre, AOGs have demanded tithes from AOG in Khwaja Ghar District, and in Darqad District two local nationals accused of spying were temporarily abducted and threatened against cooperating with the GoA. It is likely that AOGs will con-



tinue to clash with pro-government militias in areas which both groups have an interest in controlling. Meanwhile, Ishkamish District has remained quiet, despite occasional reports of an increased AOG presence in the border area with Baghlan Province.

JAWZJAN


Longstanding tension erupted in Qush Tepa District this period, where AOGs carried out attacks on an ANSF patrol in Gardan Village and the district administrative centre, both incidents prompting prolonged fire fights

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Growing AOG threat in Darzab and Qush Tepa
- AOG presence in Khwaja Du Koh

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	0
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which resulted in no casualties or damages. AOGs have maintained a low-lying presence in Darzab and Qush Tepa districts since ANSF established a forward operating base north of the Qush Tepa District Centre two months ago. The attacks show that after a long period of respite and preparation, AOGs are now willing and capable to confront ANSF in direct and prolonged engagements. An additional increase in direct attacks should be expected.



Further developments northwest of Jawzjan's southern panhandle have confirmed recent suspicions that AOGs had established themselves in Khwaja Du Koh District in the past two months: an ANP patrol was attacked with SAF and RPGs in the Dasht-e Laylee Area, resulting in no casualties or damages.

SAMANGAN


Samangan Province had little reported activity this period; however, an apparent new AOG manifested in Dara-e Suf Payin, consisting of circa 40 men. The AOG was observed in Sorkha and Zeraki villages on at least the 27th and 28th of June, when the group approached locals and pressed

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- AOG infiltration into Dara-e Suf Payin

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	0
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them not to work for the GoA. Furthermore, it instructed locals to adhere to their prayers and demanded assistance (money, food, etc.). As of yet, the AOG has only been observed during evening hours in the district. Outside of this, unreported infiltration is rumoured to be occurring along the border with Baghlan Province, where there is a continued threat of abduction east of Robatak Area. ANA are said to be estab-



lishing a base in Hazarat-e Sultan District in order to prevent such infiltration; however, the size of the contingent to be based in the area and the expected impact is still unclear.

BAGHLAN


Threats to the main roads through Baghlan persist, as indicated this period in four separate attacks involving direct fire: three which occurred in Bagh-e Shamali and Cheshma Shir areas west of Pul-e Khumri City, and one which occurred in Hussein Khel Area on the road to Kunduz. While IMF continued to target remaining AOG leadership in Baghlani Jadid, AOGs are focusing their activities southwest of Pul-e Khumri City in Dand-e Ghor Area, where they are able to launch attacks on the main road to Mazar-e Sharif, and north of the city in Shahabuddin Area,

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- ➔ Attacks on main roads
- ➔ AOG presence southwest of Pul-e Khumri
- ➔ Continued AOG presence in Baghlani Jadid

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	1
This Report Period	0

where they are able to launch attacks on the road leading to Kunduz. The most significant of these attacks occurred at 0930 hours in Bagh-e Shamal Area, where AOGs attempted to stop a fuel tanker with SAF and RPGs. The ANP responded, temporarily disrupting traffic. This was the third such attack on the main road in this vicinity in two weeks, and the first attack to occur on the road in the mid-morning hours. The other two attacks occurred in the early and mid-evening, one targeting a fuel tanker and the other targeting an IMF convoy. North of the city, in Hussein Khel Area, AOGs launched a complex attack in the early morning against an IMF convoy. One RCIED struck the vehicle, followed by SAF and RPGs, causing no damage or injury. This incident occurred in the same area as a premature IED detonation reported



last period. In a rare attack in the early morning hours, AOGs also indicated their ability to infiltrate the city itself by attacking an ANP headquarters in PD 4 with SAF and RPGs, injuring one ANP. One AOG was also killed in the attack. While AOGs maintain a strong presence in the areas mentioned, officials continue to downplay the possibility of further insecurity spreading into the city itself. Although there were only limited reports of other AOG activity beyond Pul-e Khumri City—Bagh-e Shamali Area on the 30th—AOGs remain present in other areas of the district, south of the city (Doshi, Tala Wa Barfak, Dahan-e Ghor). Additionally, small numbers of AOGs are still believed to be present in Burka, Nahrin, and Khost Wa Firing districts, where sporadic attacks on IMF/ANSF remain probable.

BADAKHSHAN

In a rare attack in Warduj District, an RCIED detonated against an IMF convoy, injuring three soldiers and one translator. The convoy had been transporting foreign government development advisors on an assessment mission in Zibak and Warduj districts. While several NGOs operate relatively freely in the more volatile districts of Badakhshan Province, their security is obviously afforded in part by their disassociation from


KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- ➔ IEDs in Warduj and Kishim

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	0
This Report Period	0

parties to the conflict. This incident raises concerns about the potential for further attacks targeting development projects which are visibly associated with the military.

Elsewhere, in Kishim District, ANP discovered and removed an RCIED from the Kishim-Tagab main road. Likewise, an IED was discovered in Itarchi Village, Argo, on the 30th. At least in the last case, the IED was deemed to be professionally-constructed, leading one to believe that it had likely been 'imported' from Paki-



stan. Moreover, the emplacement was said to be in such a poor manner that it was likely meant to be discovered, possibly to draw further attention towards the province—as seen elsewhere in the country, this attention is often desired by those who benefit monetarily or politically from the protracted nature of the conflict. Regardless, IED incidents are likely to increase as the summer proceeds.

FARYAB

In an area where the majority population is Uzbek and Tajik, the rise in AOG activity in Faryab Province may in fact be emblematic of the influence that AOGs are now trying to bolster within non-Pashtun communities. Many areas of Faryab are physically remote and lack any form of relevant GoA presence, leaving many districts wide open to unreported anti-governmental activity including intimidation, community mobilization and infiltration from neighbouring districts. The province, like many others in the northern region, hosts a plethora of local powerbrokers who are currently being recruited and mobilized by AOGs and integrated into an increasingly sophisticated and widening network. Therefore, the relatively low rate of reported incidents throughout Faryab


KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Road blocks in Dawlatabad District
- AOG activity in Qaysar and Almar
- AOG intimidation in Khwaja Sabz Posh

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	11
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Province may pale in comparison to the actual reach of AOG influence. Symbolic of this growing level of influence, AOGs in recent months have managed to intimidate telecommunications companies to shut down services in the evening and early morning hours in a number of districts. AOGs are currently most on the offensive in Qaysar and Almar districts, where four IED-related incidents were reported: one targeted an IMF patrol, killing four members in an area 9 km north of the Almar Bazaar; a second detonated prematurely in Khwaja Kenti Vilage, killing a local civilian; and two others were discovered and defused by ANP. Yet in other districts where incidents are less frequently reported, the occasional report may reveal a more formidable AOG presence bubbling beneath the surface. For example, this period in Khwaja Sabz Posh District an individual was abducted in relation to a refusal to pay illegal taxes to AOGs, possibly pointing to an increased level of intimidation in this area.

Perhaps the greatest threats to NGOs in recent weeks have been increasingly reported AOG check-



points in Dawlatabad District along the main highway. On four reported occasions in the past month, AOGs have stopped passenger vehicles along the main highway in the border area with Andkhoy District, searching vehicles for GoA, ANSF or NGO staff. On each occasion, passengers have been made to exit their vehicles and pray alongside AOGs who have preached against the government and foreign interference. Those passengers who have refused to stop have been shot at, and two people have been injured as a result. While ANP checkpoints are located in the immediate vicinity of the incidents, security forces have not immediately intervened on any occasion. In the morning following the incident on 8 June, ANP deployed to neighbouring Pata Baba Vilage and arrested fourteen suspected AOGs; however, the operation was apparently unsuccessful as the threat continues to persist. On no occasion have the AOGs stolen items from passengers. It is possible that the group could be coming up from Shirin Tagab or Khwaja Na Musa, where the presence of IMF/ANSF may have led them to direct their activities northwards.

NOTICE: Your input is invaluable for the production of this report. While we appreciate information on incidents, we also need general information on the security situation and context in your area. So please remember to call or email us regularly.

Contact details of ANSO staff are provided on the last page.

ANSO: “..by NGOs for NGOs..”


GHOR

After a decrease in the overall level of incidents recorded at the beginning of June, Ghor Province experienced once again increasing AOG activity in the second half of the month. During the present reporting cycle, 10 AOG-initiated incidents were reported, including IED/RCIED strikes, an attack on the DAC, a rocket attack, and also intimidations and abductions targeting the local population. As seen in previous reports, AOG activity remains concentrated in Pasaband District; however, during the present cycle AOGs were also active in Du Layna, Charsada, and Chaghcharan districts. In Pasaband, IED deployment continues to involve civilian casualties, with two locals being killed on 22 June when their motorbikes struck an IED in Senay area. Besides Pasaband, due to the use of

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	3
This Report Period	0

IEDs/RCIEDs, the security situation has been deteriorating along the main road in Du Layna District. On 22 June in Turbulaq area, an RCIED detonated as an ANP vehicle was passing by, causing no casualties. Furthermore, there are reports that later the same day security forces located and defused another RCIED in the same area. Of note, this marks the second RCIED attack against security forces in Turbulaq area this year. Prior to these incidents, on 30 May an RCIED detonated in the said area also as an ANP vehicle was passing by. Additionally, on 26 June in Gala Asia area, an AOG member was killed when an IED he was planting detonated prematurely. Usually the use of RCIEDs indicate that AOG are trying to avoid civilian casualties; regardless, as the before mentioned incident indicates, IED deployment should not be ruled out in this area.

A rocket attack was reported on 22 June in Chaghcharan District. AOG launched four rockets (BM1) towards Quttos Village which impacted in an open area. The rockets were reportedly fired from Narkoh, a mountainous area



located approximately 25 km northeast of Chaghcharan City. Two days prior to this attack, a female school in Quttos Village was closed down allegedly due to an AOG threat warning girls not to go to the school. AOG-initiated attacks targeting DACs in Ghor have continued. On 23 June, AOG attacked the Charsada DAC with RPGs and SAF. It is worth noting that the incident marks the first reported AOG attack on the Charsada DAC since 10 April 2010, when an AOG fired three RPG rockets towards the DAC. Although according to ANSO data the attack marks only the second recorded AOG-initiated incident in the said district this year, AOGs are known to be active particularly in the north and east areas of Charsada District. Intimidation targeting the local population continued as well, particularly in Pasaband District, where on 18 June in Eskowcha Village, AOG abducted three relatives of district ANP officials; they were released the following day due to negotiations by tribal elders. Lastly, two days later two CDC members were abducted in Hotkal Village.

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- AOG activity in Pasaband, Taywara and Du Layna
- RCIED/IED deployment (southern areas of Pasaband and Pasaband-Chaghcharan Main road)
- Armed robbery

TRAINING ANNOUNCEMENT:


ANSO will be conducting national staff training in Kabul City during July. Please see the back page for further details

BADGHIS

Badghis had a total of 23 reported incidents, of which 13 were AOG-initiated. When comparing June to May, one sees that AOG-initiated incidents have in actuality dropped from 39 to 25. Taking into account the same period last year, these figures represent an increase of 25%. AOGs have remained active, particularly in Muqur, followed by Murghab, Ghor-mach and Qadis. The majority of incidents consisted of direct attacks targeting ANSF/IMF convoys, with two ambushes of IMF contracted logistics convoys occurring. On 21 June in Muqur, one truck was set ablaze in the attack. The following day, but in Murghab (Mangan Pass area), one of the drivers was reportedly killed in the crossfire.

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	0
This Report Period	0

IED deployment continued to be a concern, though. A total of 9 IEDs were reported across the province, of which 3 detonated (all of them in Muqur, targeting ANSF/IMF convoys). On 15 June in Murghab (Sinyha area) an ANSF/IMF patrol located five IEDs which were placed on the main road. In Qadis District, besides an AOG attack reported on 25 June, ANSF/IMF led another operation in Dara-e Boom area, apparently without any results. Another incident of note occurred in Ab Kamari District on 19 June, where an armed clash occurred between an AOG and members of a local militia reportedly over the collection of taxes. According to some sources, two AOG mem-




bers and one local civilian were killed, whilst five AOG members and one local civilian were wounded. This incident was followed by what seems to be a reprisal attack targeting the neighbouring village where AOG withdrew. This resulted in a significant number of casualties including civilians; however, the exact circumstances of the incident as well as the casualty figures are unknown at this stage because an investigation is ongoing. One should nonetheless recognise that although the situation in the area is reported to be calm, the incident may reignite tribal tensions in the future.

FARAH

Farah witnessed significantly more AOG-initiated incidents than other Western provinces. Compared to May's total of 23 AOG-initiated incidents, it saw an increase, to 41, with 28 occurring during this period. These figures represent an increase in the level of AOG activity by 70% compared to June 2009. As seen in the southern areas of Ghor, this increase can probably be explained by AOGs infiltrating from Helmand as they seek new safe havens. Regarding the current period, more than half the reported incidents took place solely in Bala-Buluk, whereas Pusht Rod, Farah, Gulistan, Bakwa and particularly Khaki Safed experienced the remaining part of AOG activity. After similar incidents in Herat and Ghor, Farah City saw two attacks targeting high ranking GoA officials.

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	1
This Report Period	0

On 22 June, an RCIED detonated, wounding the Head of the Provincial Council and his son. Five days later, an RCIED targeted the Chief of NDS's vehicle, killing one NDS employee and wounding two locals (he was not in the car during the attack). In addition, on 30 June one RCIED was located in Farah City, District 3. Including these, a total of 15 IED/RCIED incidents were reported in Farah during this period, of which 2 devices detonated prematurely while being planted. This surge in IED deployment resulted in a significant number of civilian casualties. In three separate incidents in Bala-Buluk, four civilians were killed and the same number wounded. On 21 June in Khaki Safed, an IED struck a local transport vehicle, killing two locals and wounding four others.



Assassinations and abductions targeting locals continued. For instance, in Khaki Safed two civilians were executed in two separate incidents. On 22 June in the said district, AOG abducted one civilian. Earlier, on 15 June, in Gulistan AOG stopped a local transport vehicle and abducted three passengers. Furthermore, stand-off attacks continued in Farah, with this time five attacks occurring, concentrated in Bala-Buluk District. In one of these attacks, AOG fired two rockets towards an ANP CP on 21 June in Kanesh. One rocket impacted in a residential area, killing two civilians. Lastly, a BBIED attack was reported in Bakwa on 30 June, targeting an ANP convoy which resulted in two civilians wounded.

HERAT

Herat remains relatively active, with a total of 25 recorded incidents, of which 15 were AOG-initiated during the period. Whereas the number of incidents has decreased from 68 in June 2009 to 41 during June 2010, AOG-initiated incidents have increased slightly, from 18 to 22.


During the present period, Kushki Kunha, Kushk, Adraskan, Gulran and Farsi witnessed AOG activity. Regarding the latter district, on 23 June in Kotal-e Nakhod an ANSF patrol escorting an IO contracted convoy came under attack. This incident marks the third AOG attack on IO contracted convoys which were escorted by ANSF in Herat this year. Despite the fact that the last recorded incident in Farsi occurred in November 2009,

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- IED/RCIED
- AOG presence in Kushki Kunha, Kushk, Shindand, Karukh, Obe and Gulran
- Criminal activity

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	3
This Report Period	0

the district, which is a remote area with limited presence of the GoA, has recently witnessed an increased AOG presence, making road travel extremely hazardous. Worth noting, there have been five AOG direct attacks, including the above mentioned incident, in the past two weeks. Besides one AOG attack targeting an ANSF/IMF convoy on 29 June in Kushk, the remaining four incidents targeted ANP/ANBP CPs in Gulran, Kushki Kunha and Adraskan. The rate of IED incidents in Herat still remains significant with seven explosive devices which detonated across the province, of which three resulted in civilian casualties. On 21 June in Kushki Kunha (Darzak area), a roadside IED hit a local transport vehicle, killing five civilians and wounding another three. On 27 June in Shindand, two persons were wounded as their car hit an IED on the main road leading to the DAC. Finally, the same day, once again in Darzak area, an IED detonated, killing one local. It is



likely that due to the significant rate of IED-related civilian casualties that have been reported over the past few months (particularly in Kushki Kunha and some areas of Kushk), AOGs have been losing local support and acceptance. This notion is bolstered by the 24 June circulation of letters in Kushk (the DAC area) that sought to inform locals of IED locations and advised them to avoid the affected areas. Moreover, if the AOGs' efforts to limit civilian casualties are translated into practice, one can expect an increase in RCIED deployment as seen during the present cycle in Ganj area (Herat-Turghundi Road) or in Shindand (near the airport), where two motorcycle mounted RCIEDs detonated against ANSF/IMF vehicles. Also of note, ANP seized explosives that were hidden in a rickshaw (a three wheel vehicle) on 20 June in Gulran. The same day in Herat City (Darwaz-e Iraq area), security forces discovered an RCIED that was likewise placed inside a rickshaw.

LAGHMAN


With 11 AOG-initiated incidents recorded, late June saw a significant increase in AOG activity across Laghman when compared to the previous period. Still, in a regional perspective, the security

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- AOG attacks against security forces, particularly in Qarghayi and Alishing
- Hit-and-run assaults along the Jalalabad-Kabul Highway
- Significant AOG presence in northern Laghman

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	1
This Report Period	0

environment in the province is rather moderate. Around four incidents were recorded in Qarghayi along the Jalalabad-Kabul Highway, with three of them being direct attacks against security forces in Sangi Kalima, and one being an assault against a fuel convoy in Tangi. As usual, these assaults followed the already identified hit-and-run tactic targeting security forces and supply convoys, not necessarily endangering NGO road travel. Apart from that, Laghman saw two incidents



related to explosive devices in Alishing, four direct attacks in Alishing, Dawlat Shah, and Mihtarlam, and one IDF assault in Qarghayi. Additionally, on 20 June in Alishing, around 35 AOG established a mobile CP and searched vehicles for civilians working GoA, security forces, and NGOs. This marks the first reported AOG CP in Laghman in 2010, and it displays a rather rare occurrence.

NANGARHAR

Around 85 security incidents were recorded in late June across Nangarhar, with 28% of them initiated by AOG. Although the overall level of reported incidents remains relatively constant compared to previous periods, the ratio of incidents accounted to AOG fell sharply in comparison to early June (ratio in early June: 50 % of all incidents accounted to AOG). Still, the province saw its first complex attack in 2010 during this period. Namely, on 30 June in Bihsud district, around five attackers launched a complex attack against the southern gate of the Jalalabad Airfield (JAF), including BBIEDs as well as a VBIED. Although the attackers did not manage to break through


KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- IEDs throughout most parts of the province
- IDF and complex assaults against JAF
- AOG attacks in southern Nangarhar, particularly Sherzad

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	3
This Report Period	0

the airfield's perimeter, the subsequent firefight between AOG and IMF/ANSF took several hours, spilling over to neighbouring villages.

IED-related incidents remain of concern throughout the whole province. In late June, around 23 such incidents were reported from Achin, Bati Kot, Bihsud, Chaparhar, Jalalabad City, Kot, Khogyani, Muhmand Dara, Rodat, Shinwar, and Surkh Rod districts. The number of effective detonations increased from 10 to 14 in comparison to the previous reporting cycle. Since their first appearance in Nangarhar in late 2009, magnetic IEDs have become an established tactic across the province. This period saw five detonations of such devices, with four targeting fuel trucks and one an ANP vehicle. Displaying a rare occurrence, Jalalabad City saw at least three IED detonations targeting shops at Chawk-e Talashi. Although the exact motivation behind these strikes remains un-



clear, the nature of business of these shops—mainly music CDs and DVDs—may suggest that AOG targeted them.


Nangarhar saw a comparatively high amount of other AOG activities. Three AOG direct attacks were reported from Sherzad, Bati Kot, and Dur Baba; and at least three IDF strikes were recorded in Bihsud, Rodat, and Sherzad. In one incident, on 28 June in Sherzad District, AOG fired 13 mortars towards the DAC which underlines again a working supply chain. Particularly Nangarhar's southern and south-eastern districts are affected by a de-facto security vacuum, allowing AOG to increase their operational capability and freedom of movement in these areas. For example, on 29 June in Sherzad, AOG stopped two trucks of an implementing partner of an IO, abducting the truck drivers and their assistants. All abductees were released after one day in captivity through the mediation of local community members.

NURISTAN

In late June, the security environment in Nuristan was again violent, marked by increased levels of confrontation between AOG and security forces, particularly in Bargi Matal and Nurgaram. Although ANSF regained control over Bargi Matal's DAC after the coordinated AOG offensive in late May, the situation across the district remains tense. During this cycle, around five AOG-initiated incidents were reported from Bargi Matal, with four being coordinated direct attacks against multiple ANP/ANBP CPs, and one

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	0
This Report Period	0

being an IDF assault against the DAC. AOG, particularly those from Pakistan, remain highly present throughout the district and are apparently regrouping. Besides the tense situation in Bargi Matal, Nuristan saw four additional AOG incidents in this period. All of them occurred in Nurgaram District, including two direct attacks and two IDF assaults. As a reaction to the significant increase of AOG activity, IMF conducted several operations across Bargi Matal and Nurgaram, and dis-



patched additional air assets. In combination with the increasing influx of foreign AOG into Nuristan, and a traditionally strong presence of local AOG across the province, it is understood that the likelihood of further violence will probably increase.

KUNAR

With at least 57 AOG-initiated incidents in late June, AOG activity across Kunar remains the highest throughout the Eastern Region. Although the overall amount of recorded incidents decreased slightly when compared with previous periods, the frequency and intensity of these assaults remain higher than in any other province in the Eastern Region. Additional to the usual high amount of AOG at-


KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- IMF/ANSF operations in Marawara and Sirkanay
- IEDs in areas surrounding the Jalalabad-Asadabad Road
- AOG attacks against security forces throughout the whole province

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	5
This Report Period	0

tacks against security forces throughout the province, IMF/ANSF stepped up their operations in several districts, which contributed significantly to Kunar's deteriorating security environment. For instance, around 27 June, IMF/ANSF started a comprehensive operation in Marawara District, including ground forces and air assets. Since then, the operation has been ongoing, with IMF/ANSF expanding their operational focus into neighbouring districts, such as Sirkanay.

Although the use of explosive devices is a rather rare AOG tactic throughout Kunar, detonating devices accounted for more than 12% of all incidents in late June. At least three IED-incidents occurred in the vicinity to the main



Jalalabad-Asadabad Road in Chawkay, Khas Kunar, and Nurgal, showing possible intention to disrupt or disturb traffic on Kunar's "lifeline". Additionally, Kunar saw its first suicide attack in 2010 during this reporting period. Namely, on 21 June in Shegal district, a BBIED targeted an IMF/ANSF checkpoint, causing multiple civilian casualties. AOG abductions, intimidation attempts, as well as illegal CPs continued in this period, underlining AOG's freedom to operate. For instance, on 28 June in Manogai District, AOG established a mobile CP and searched vehicles for persons affiliated with GoA or security forces; one ANP officer and one local were abducted.

KHOST

The security environment in Khost remains violent and challenging, and the province saw another increase in AOG activity during this reporting period. With around 50 AOG incidents recorded in late May, Khost is again the second most violent province across the Eastern Region. Emplacement of explosive devices


KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Emplaced explosive devices throughout the whole province
- IDF strikes, particularly in Sabari
- AOG attacks in southern and eastern Khost

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	2
This Report Period	0

remains of critical concern across Khost, displaying significant challenges to road travel throughout the province. Still, with 14 IED detonations reported, the overall ratio of AOG tactics in Khost continues to diversify.

While hitherto, for example during the winter months, IED-related incidents accounted for more than half of all AOG incidents, this ratio has essentially changed in recent months. Direct attacks against security forces in bordering areas to Pakistan such as Tere Zayi and Tani, and especially IDF strikes targeting DACs across the province have ex-



sively increased recently. Both tactics nearly doubled in comparison to the last reporting period. Now, the majority of incidents in Khost are not related to IEDs anymore. In late June, around 19 IDF assaults were recorded in Bak, Musa Khel, Sabari, Tani, and Tere Zayi districts. Additionally, 15 direct attacks against security forces and GoA facilities were reported from Bak, Tere Zayi, Sabari, Spera, Nardir Shah Kot, and Mando Zayi.

PAKTYA


On 26 June in Gardez district, two demining members were abducted by AOG whilst travelling on the main Khost-Paktya Road. Although GoA authorities organized multiple search efforts, both persons remain in captivity.

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- AOG direct attacks, particularly in Jaji, Jani Khel, and Zurmat
- IEDs on secondary roads, especially in Gardez and Zurmat

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	1
This Report Period	0

With 50 recorded security incidents, the security situation in Paktya deteriorated even further during this reporting period. Since April, the incident levels across the province have more than quadrupled. Around 52% of late June's incidents were attributed to AOG, displaying the highest amount of recorded AOG incidents in Paktya in 2010. Direct attacks against security forces and PSCs were by far the preferred tactic of AOG in this period, with 17 such assaults recorded in Jaji,



Wuza Zadran, Zurmat, Jani Khel, Lija Ahmad Khel, Gardez, and Shwak districts. Additionally, at least 16 IEDs were detonated or located across the province. As seen in previous periods, the efficiency of these devices remained rather limited, with a pre-detonation discovery rate of over 50%.

NIMROZ


Nimroz has once again been host to an increased level of insecurity, strong indications that the increases in incidents witnessed over the past month are not temporary, rather mark a more permanent environment of heightened violence. As a result, this report period was the most violent for Nimroz yet.

Direct AOG attacks, a rarity in the past, occurred a total of nine times. ANP posts were attacked in Khash Rod District a total of five times, and the DAC of Khash

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	0
This Report Period	0

Rod was the target of rocket attacks twice. In addition, the village of Shishawa in Khash Rod was attacked by rockets, but to little effect. Two off duty ANP officers were shot and killed in the Rakin area of Khash Rod and another ANP officer was kidnapped two days later in the same area. Lastly, in Chakhansur District, AOG attacked an ANP post near Gawani Village, resulting in a prolonged fire-fight with ANP.

Illegal checkpoints, which have been a regular feature in Nimroz in the past, figured prominently during the report period, with four such operations carried out by AOG. Three were dealt with in



fairly short order by ANP units, but a fourth setup in Khash Rod District on the main road resulted in three off-duty ANP being seized and killed by AOG.

Lastly, AOG kidnapped four national staff members of a USAID implementing organization near the village of Kada in Chakhansur District; however, all were released unharmed after some mediation by local tribal elders, underscoring the importance of securing community support for development projects.

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- AOG illegal checkpoints
- AOG attacks on ANP

ANNOUNCEMENT:

In the coming months, ANSO will be helping develop an incident mapping service to aid NGO management and security procedures. Registrants will receive further information as it becomes available.

URUZGAN


Uruzgan is slowly changing for the worse, with more direct attacks by AOG, and more attacks in Tirin Kot, than have been the case. It is still unclear whether these changes are related to the upcoming handover of responsibilities between Dutch and US forces and, therefore, somewhat temporary, or whether these changes herald a new sustained level of violence. In addition, AOG units in the province have been instructed to exert substantial efforts towards assassination and intimidation of local communities, once again to maximize the psychological effects of the Dutch pull-out.

Accordingly, there were at least six incidents of attempted assassinations and targeted killings during the report period. A suicide bomber detonated his vested beside the Provincial Governor's vehicle as it was passing through

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	0
This Report Period	0

the main bazaar area of Tirin Kot, killing four civilians and wounding several others. The Provincial Governor escaped unharmed, but three of those killed were children. The District Governor of Dihrawud was also the target of a BBIED, an attempt which failed when the attacker was shot before detonating his device. In a horrific attack that took place in Khas Uruzgan District, AOG detained and killed eleven Hazara men, beheading five of them, claiming that they were 'spies' for the GoA. Lastly, there were three incidents of 'unknown armed men' shooting civilians in Chora, Dihrawud and Khas Uruzgan districts, all incidents believed to be related to AOG intimidation efforts. In the last incident, the bodies of four civilians were found with extensive shotgun wounds.

Direct AOG attacks occurred in Tirin Kot, Kas Uruzgan and Di-



hrawud districts, as AOG targeted IMF/ANA mounted patrols. In Dihrawud, air assets were used to repel AOG, with three of them killed and two more wounded.

IEDs strikes, once the mainstay of incidents in the province, occurred against IMF/ANA patrols in Dihrawud and Tirin Kot districts, resulting in a total of three ANA killed and four others wounded. The only other notable IED incident took place in Chora District, wherein seven local construction workers were killed as their vehicle hit a roadside IED.

IMF/ANA activity during the report period appeared to be limited to several search operations in Khas Uruzgan, Chora and Tirin Kot districts, uncovering a quantity of explosives and small arms in each location.

ZABUL


Zabul remained somewhat insecure, although the number of incidents has decreased from the previous period, mainly to due a decrease in IMF/ANA operations.

There were 13 direct AOG attacks, primarily on IMF convoys on the ring road transiting the province en route to Kandahar and Helmand. In total, these attacks resulted in 16 PSC members killed and over 24 wounded. ANP patrols were also a common target, with attacks taking place in Qalat and Tarnak Wa Jaldak districts. AOG also used indirect means to attack targets, employing mortars against the DACs of both

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	1
This Report Period	0

Shahjoy and Qalat, and firing rockets at various targets in Mizan and Atghar districts, without significant effect.

Due to the importance of the ring road, there have always been a high number of roadside IED incidents, and this report period was no exception. There were in total 16 IED strikes, with the majority of these involving ANA/ANP patrolling vehicles. Accordingly, 15 of these strikes occurred on the main highway, in the districts of Qalat, Shahjoy and Tarnak Wa Jaldak.



IMF/ANA operations were rare during the report period, with only three recorded. In Shahjoy, two operations were conducted by IMF/ANA units, resulting in the arrest of six AOG in total and the seizure of a number of small arms. In Tarnak Wa Jaldak, however, a major operation in the area of Ghashai Village resulted in over 15 AOG killed and several heavy machineguns and RPGs seized.

HELMAND

Incident levels in Helmand show that AOG have not only held their momentum established over the past few months, they have increased their activity levels. This implies an effort which is increasing in both capability and morale, most likely assisted by the fact that their efforts (and successes) in Helmand have effectively forced IMF planners to radically re-think the proposed operations in Kandahar, and forced UK forces to re-double their efforts in Sangin and surrounding areas.

Needless to say, the increased aggressiveness of AOG operating in Helmand have contributed to the grim statistic widely heralded in the national and international media – that the past month has been the bloodiest for coalition forces since the initial invasion in 2001.

AOG attacks are not only becoming more numerous, they are beginning to exhibit a greater level of sophistication. In Nahri Sarraj, AOG initiated coordinated, simultaneous attacks on four IMF facilities in the north of the district, and then effectively disengaged.


KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- AOG attacks
- IEDs

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	3
This Report Period	0

Elsewhere in the province, AOG attacks are being conducted in a hit-and-run fashion, harassing IMF posts and bases with SAF and the occasional RPG round, and then moving on before an effective response can be coordinated. These types of attacks on IMF facilities occurred in the districts of Marja, Nad Ali, Nahri Sarraj, and Sangin a total of 13 times during the report period. AOG also launched direct attacks against IMF/ANA patrols on a total of 22 occasions throughout the province, but most notably in Marja (eight times) and Nad Ali (six times).

Emboldened by their rare success last month of downing a IMF helicopter using SAF, AOG attempted this feat several more times during this report period, shooting at IMF helicopters in Nad Ali, Sangin, Lashkar Gah, and twice in Marja. One of the attempts in Marja was against an aircraft containing the visiting US Ambassador and the Provincial Governor, hitting the escorting helicopter as it was landing. The increase in AOG surface-to-air fire (SAFIRE) also scored a moral victory when the visiting UK PM David Cameron aborted a visit to the province due to this new emerging threat.



IEDs remained a significant portion of the reported incidents during the last two weeks and accounted for the majority of IMF deaths. A total of 17 IED strikes were recorded against IMF patrols and vehicles throughout the province, with a further 11 strikes taking place against ANA/ANP units. Unfortunately, the number of civilians affected by IEDs is also rising—during the report period, a total of 18 IED strikes against civilians were recorded, resulting in a total of 14 civilians being killed and 23 others wounded, a marked increase from previous weeks. Most notable of these were two IEDs which detonated within an hour of each other in Lashkar Gah City, the first being placed in front of Kabul Bank and the second in front of the Neswan Boys and Girls School near the main bazaar area.

In contrast to this pace of AOG activity, IMF/ANA operations were few in number during the report period. Search operations resulted in clashes with AOG in the districts of Sangin, Nad Ali, Marja, and Nahri Sarraj, resulting in a total of six AOG killed and 13 arrested. Other operations in Sangin and Dishu districts resulted in a seizure of a total of 30 AP mines, over 500 kgs of explosive materials, and two bags of ammonium nitrate.

NOTICE: Your input is invaluable for the production of this report. While we appreciate information on incidents, we also need general information on the security situation and context in your area. So please remember to call or email us regularly.

Contact details of ANSO staff are provided on the last page.

ANSO: “..by NGOs for NGOs..”

KANDAHAR

Incident levels in Kandahar Province were slightly lower during the report period, and a brief glance at the incidents show that AOG have, for the most part, avoided direct attacks on IMF/ANA, preferring to concentrate on attacking ANP personnel in Kandahar City and logistical convoys in the surrounding districts. Also accounting for the lower levels of incidents was the relative inactivity of IMF/ANA, especially in terms of search operations. What was noticeable was the increased amount of men and materiel being moved into Kandahar City and the surrounding districts, to be used to fortify existing and new ANP posts, as well as to provide added protection for government offices and other facilities. This coincides with the beginning stages of the 'security ring' to be created around the city, cited as stage one of the (hastily redesigned) Operation Hamkari.

AOG attacks targeted IMF supply convoys in Maiwand, Panjwayi


KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- AOG direct attacks on ANP
- AOG assassinations

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	3
This Report Period	0

and Zhari districts, with the troubled Howz-e-Madad area of Zhari being host to four separate attacks over the past two weeks. As mentioned above, ANP bore the brunt of AOG activity, with RCIEDs hitting passing ANP vehicles on six occasions, including four in Kandahar City. Drive-by killings of off-duty ANP occurred another four times in the city, primarily in District 9, a large residential district which is home to many ANP. Roadside IEDs also killed a total of five ANP in Maiwand and Zhari districts. Lastly AOG launched direct attacks on ANP patrols on two occasions in Arghandab District, which has seen a large influx of ANP units as part of the upcoming Operation Hamkari.

Targeted killings continued, mostly in Kandahar City, as AOG attacked the residence of a former Jihadi commander who currently supports the GoA, and a tribal elder residing in District 7 was killed by gunmen for his support of IMF/ANSF efforts. In addition, civilians were killed by AOG in the districts of Arghandab and Zhari and in Kandahar City, all



believed to be related to their supposed 'collaboration' with GoA.

As with most of the Southern Region, it appeared that IMF/ANA operations were limited. In Shah Wali Kot District, IMF engaged with AOG; however, one IMF soldier was killed and the majority of AOG escaped unharmed. In Zhari, a larger operation resulted in the detention of at least 15 AOG and the seizure of a number of small arms. A rare airstrike ordered on the western outskirts of Kandahar City resulted in the death of two AOG, and in a development which will undoubtedly create more unrest amongst local communities, IMF killed at least eight civilians, including four children, during a raid on a group of residences in District 7 of the city. Surprisingly, no demonstrations were reported as a result of this failed operation.

In summary, this lull in security incidents is thought by all observers to be momentary, with AOG conserving their men and materiel for future operations against IMF units as they begin to increase their presence in the city and surrounding districts.

GHAZNI

Ghazni province continues to be extremely insecure, and the record levels of incidents seen in previous periods were maintained throughout this report period. While IMF/ANSF operations were limited, AOG attacks made up the vast majority of security incidents.

The pattern of AOG attacks was similar to those of the last two report periods, with the District Administration Centres (DACs) being the favoured targets. Of particular note was an SVBIED attack on the DAC of Andar in which an ANP Ranger vehicle which had been previously reported stolen was rigged with explosives, with the driver attempting to ram the gates of the compound before detonating the charges. Three ANP and five civilians were wounded, and the attacker was killed.


In all, DACs within the province were attacked a total of 16 times, and some were targeted multiple times, including Rashidan (twice), Gelan (four times), Qarabagh

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	1
This Report Period	0

(four times), and Andar (a remarkable six times). Indeed, Andar District appeared the most violent in the province (and most likely the country), as in addition to the six attacks on the DAC, it also hosted another 14 AOG attacks. These included several attacks on ANP posts in the extremely troubled Saini area, near the village of Mullah Noh Baba, and in the region of Khani Qala. As well, IMF logistical convoys were ambushed in Andar District four times during the report period, and IMF bases were rocketed three times, in the area of Chardewal and near the Andar DAC.

Elsewhere in the province, rocket attacks continued to be a preferred method of attack, and rockets were fired at the city centre of Ghazni City on three occasions, hitting the Governor’s compound, the NDS HQ, and several other government buildings.

In a new and troubling development, AOG in Ajristan District ordered schools to be closed, and as a result eight separate facilities closed. In Qarabagh District, two schools were burned down by AOG, although no casualties were incurred. Lastly, also in Qarabagh District, the principal of a local high school was abducted and killed while travelling to his house.



While these incidents are only a small part of the wider insecurity which besets the province, it will be important to note whether this becomes a larger trend in the region. In light of the aggressiveness of AOG operations, especially against ‘hard targets’, such as ANP and IMF, it is difficult to see how schools and teachers can be effectively protected should AOG decide to begin a concerted effort to shut down the province’s education facilities.

The fighting attitude of the AOG in Ghazni can also be seen in their use of IEDs. In most other areas of the south, IEDs are planted in large numbers as an end in themselves – i.e., detonation of the IED is the primary means of attack. In Ghazni, however, relatively few IEDs are planted, but those that are planted and detonated are used to initiate a larger ambush, usually involving SAF and RPGs. IEDs were used in combination with a direct SAF attack on eight occasions during the report period, including four times in the Saini area of Andar District and several times in both Qarabagh and Ghazni districts. Stand-alone IED strikes remain rare in the province; however, in one incident in—once again—the area of Saini, in Andar District, an IED struck a TownAce van and killed its eight civilian occupants.

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- IEDs
- AOG direct and indirect attacks
- AOG attacks on schools

PAKTIKA

Paktika Province remained an extremely dangerous place, with AOG maintaining their previous levels of heightened activity, in the form of direct attacks, indirect attacks and IED strikes. IMF/ANSF units, unlike those in the rest of the Southern Region, responded with a fairly rigorous series of operations.

Benefiting from excellent supply routes with neighbouring Pakistan, AOG in Paktika clearly have access to rockets, mortars and other heavy weapons unavailable to those AOG operating away from the border areas. As a result, in this report period Paktika has been host to more indirect fire attacks than any other province in the country, with AOG employing mortars and rockets no less than 25 times in the last two weeks. Accordingly, this means that static, high value targets, such as IMF bases and DACs, are attacked more frequently than in other provinces.

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS


- IEDs
- AOG attacks on DACs
- IMF airstrikes

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	0
This Report Period	0

IMF bases were attacked by rockets and/or mortars in the districts of Gayan, Yahya Khel, Barmal, Urgun, Ziruk, each receiving multiple attacks over the last two weeks, with IMF bases in Barmal rocketed a remarkable six times. The DACs of Waza Khwa, Ziruk, Urgun, Yahya Khel, Gayan, and Omna were attacked by indirect and direct attacks during the report period, with Ziruk and Gayan receiving special attention as they were targeted by AOG four times each.

IMF convoys were also the target of more conventional ambushes, and AOG initiated operations against convoys on six occasions, primarily in the districts of Yahya Khel, Gayan and Khushamand. It is important to note that these ambushes did not involve simply IED strikes (what is known as 'stand-off' attacks), but rather AOGs deliberately planned direct ambushes using pre-positioned heavy weapons and SAF, implying a high level of confidence, planning and logistics amongst the fighting units in the area.

This is not to say that IEDs are not a factor in Paktika Province;



even without major roads running through the area, IED strikes occurred at least an astounding 24 times, with IMF vehicles on the receiving end of 20 of those attacks.

IMF/ANSF units were fairly active during the report period, initiating at least 16 attacks against AOG units, and using air support to great effect in 11 of those operations, killing an estimated total of over 45 AOG. The use of airstrikes is the highest in the Southern Region, notable for the fact that the recently departed US General McChrystal had as one of his signature policies the limitation of such strikes to minimize the potential for civilian casualties. As Paktika is one of the more sparsely populated areas of the country, it can be assumed that such high use of airstrikes will continue for the immediate future. What remains to be seen is if there will be a change in this policy theatre-wide, as many mid-level US commanders, since the departure of McChrystal, have expressed frustration at these limitations and incoming General Petraeus is known to have somewhat more liberal views regarding the use of air power.



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ANSO ACRONYMS

ACG-Armed Criminal Group /
AEF-Afghan Eradication Forces
/ **ANA**-Afghan National Army /
ANBP-Afghan National Border
Police / **ANP**-Afghan National
Police / **AOG**-Armed Opposition
Group / **APPF**-Afghan Public
Protection Forces (local deputised
militias) / **DC**-District
Centre / **GOA**-Government of
Afghanistan / **IDF**-Indirect Fire
(ex: mortars) / **IED**-Improvised
Explosive Device / **IMF**-
International Military Forces /
NDS-National Directorate of
Security (Intelligence) / **PRP**-
Previous Reporting Period /
PSC-Private Security Company
/ **RPG**-Rocket Propelled Gre-
nade / **SAF**-Small Arms Fire /
VBIED-Vehicle Borne Impro-
vised Explosive Device

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MISSING

This report ANSO
could not provide
analysis for the prov-
inces of:

Daykundi
Bamyan

This is because we
do not know enough
about the area to
comment on the sig-
nificance of the inci-
dents occurring
there.

If you can help us
understand the prov-
ince better, please
contact us.

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