

THE ANSO REPORT

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YOU NEED TO KNOW

- Suicide attack targets INGO in Lashkar Gah City that undertakes programming in support of the GoA
- CERP funding and shift in AOG tactics will likely result in increased civilian casualties
- AOG migration exposes more NGOs to danger

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COUNTRY SUMMARY

Rumours continue to circulate about AOG intentions to conduct grand-scale attacks in Kabul City and throughout the country. Still, Kabul only experienced typical criminality and weapons/explosive finds this period.

On 17 March, a compound in Lashkar Gah in which an INGO and for-profit development agencies are co-located in was attacked by BBIEDs. Although the attackers were shot dead before they could detonate their vests, the incident should serve as a reminder that AOG intentions to target any organisation—NGO or not—that assists in efforts to expand the GoA's writ should be taken seriously.

Although involving an NGO, in this case ANSO continues to assess that the threat is not transferable to genuinely impartial NGOs.

AOG doctrine and practice has not been to target such organisations as underlined by the two NGO abductions this period (Wardak & Kunduz) in which the abductees' NGO status was either a positive factor, or an irrelevant one, in their early release and in the AOG approach of an NGO vehicle and staff in Takhar (24 March), in which a friendly warning was given

that the NGO vehicle profile (with radio antenna affixed) may cause it to be erroneously targeted as a GoA/IMF target.

All these events would indicate that AOG perceive some convergence of interest in keeping genuinely impartial NGOs safe and present.

ANSO continues to advise against NGO participation in 'integrated' programming with government or military.

Also this period one has seen an erosion of AOG efforts to avoid civilian casualties or directly target civilians involved in receiving IMF assistance in a public manner; for example, the 31 March IED that resulted in numerous civilian casualties purportedly targeted farmers who were receiving IMF assistance in Lashkar Gah.

With the increase of Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP) funding and deployment of development advisors to new areas, one can foresee increased targeting of civilians involved in such activities, including beneficiaries.

As instability has been highlighted in the Northern Re-

gion—Faryab, Kunduz, Baghlan, Takhar, and Jawzjan—we note power struggles in Nangarhar as illustration of likely tears in the already weak social fabric.

Likewise, Daykundi and Uruzgan deserve serious attention. If US efforts to promulgate the ALDI (local militias) framework and incorporate controversial powerbrokers and their patrons into ANSF under the guise of 'reconciliation' succeed, one can expect deterioration. Early reports indicate a growing ethnic tension in Daykundi, particularly.

High level talks between a major AOG and the Government were confirmed this period with the AOG presenting a 15 point plan based around setting a date for IMF withdrawal and new elections. It is not clear at this point what level of support these talks have within both parties, or what the outcome will be.

Instability will likely rock the south and the north in the coming months due to planned US military deployments—7,000 will be based in the north, alone.

WARDAK


The often contentious province experienced a spate of incidents during the period, including one NGO incident. On 24 March in Saydabad District—a district known for its instability—armed gunmen claiming to be AOG abducted five Afghans, four of which were INGO staff, while the

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Abduction
- AOG targeting of ANSF
- Factional and PSC disputes

	NGO Incidents
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victims were transiting through the area. All of the victims were able to secure their release, purportedly without furnishing a ransom, by the 31st. Additionally, the victims were not targeted because of their association with an NGO, rather because they merely encountered the AOG. Focusing on Saydabad, 14 incidents occurred in the district during the period, ranging from convoy ambushes paired with arson to tar-



geted killings of PSC staff to numerous ambushes of ANP.

Elsewhere in the province, typical AOG modus operandi was used to target IMF and ANSF; for example, an IED struck a vehicle transporting IMF supplies in Nirkh on the 28th, and AOG engaged IMF/ANSF in Chaki Wardak on the 28th and the 20th.

KAPISA

The western districts of Kapisa remain relatively quiet. While there was a rocket impact in the vicinity of a high school in Hisa-i-Awali Kohistan, illustrating only a general concern, there


KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Attacks on police and security forces, especially in Tagab and Nijrab
- Spread of attacks to schools or other non-security-related targets
- Rockets, IEDs, and mines

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	1
This Report Period	0

have not been any recent reports of threats to NGOs. Conversely, although few security incidents were recorded during this period, AOGs and AOGs are active in the province. For instance, on the 24th an IMF base reportedly came under AOG rocket attack in Tagab District, and On 27 March during an IMF cordon search operation eight AOG were killed in Dandawche, also in Tagab District.

In light of the abovementioned incidents, and purported AOG infiltration, activities or travel



through Tagab should be avoided. Mahmud Raqi was also not neglected during the period, with suspected AOG killing a former HIG commander in the district on the 27th. The north-western districts, Koh Band and the Kohistans, have also been quiet, but NGOs are cautioned to maintain a low profile due to the potential for periodic AOG activity.

NOTICE: Your input is invaluable for the production of this report. While we appreciate information on incidents, we also need general information on the security situation and context in your area. So please remember to call or email us regularly.

Contact details of ANSO staff are provided on the last page.

ANSO: “..by NGOs for NGOs..”

DAYKUNDI

Daykundi Province remained calm in most districts, with the exception of Gizab and Kajran, where AOG movements, activities, and attacks have been recorded. On the 29th, ANP located three antipersonnel landmines on the main road of Gizab, and also of note AOG abducted two drivers in a late reported inci-


KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- High AOG infiltration in Kiti, Gizab, and Kajran
- Low security presence throughout the province
- Clashes between AOG and the local population, especially in the south

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	1
This Report Period	0

dent on 12 March while the two were transporting fuel along the bordering district of Kajran. After lengthy mediation by local elders, they were released along with the trucks. And a late reported IED find occurred on the 15th along the main road in Tamazan Valley, Gizab District. It was defused and suspected to have been planted by AOG elements.

Gizab is still said to be controlled by pro-GoA groups with strong support from the local community, but AOGs in Gizab were nonetheless able to gather in Wogeer Village, where the Taliban Shadow District Administrator is



said to be positioned, to defend him against any military operations.

Ongoing military operations in the Southern Region will likely result in further displacement of AOG fighters, driving them into Gizab and Kirjan districts—these migrations will likely go unchecked by ANSF.

In other areas of the province, a land dispute between two families resulted in seven people being injured, and in further illustration of crime that occurs in the province, armed men in Ishtarlay District shot dead a woman in her own home.

LOGAR


IEDs on IMF convoys are becoming a regular occurrence in Puli Alam District. Additionally, bordering with Ahmad Abad, Puli Alam has experienced three significant incidents against IMF for the year to date. The district is host to the road which links the Kabul to Kandahar and the Kabul to

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Abduction
- Spread of attacks to schools or other non-security-related targets
- Attacks on security forces

	NGO Incidents
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Khost highways and is frequently used by IMF convoys. For example, on 24 March, an IED struck an IMF vehicle on a district road, injuring two IMF soldiers; and on 30 March an IED struck an IMF vehicle along the Kabul-Logar Road. Also in illustration of AOG activity in the area, on 19 March AOG apparently distributed night letters warning locals of dire consequences if they did not stop working with IMF/ANSF. Furthermore, on the 28th AOG attempted to abduct a religious teacher in Baraki Barak, which



borders with volatile Wardak Province, but locals thwarted the abduction.

In light of instability in the province, NGOs should note the threat of abduction and the likelihood that AOG conduct surveillance on the main road from Kabul to Gardez for the purpose of attack or abduction. Most of the province is considered to be heavily infiltrated with AOG, and random AOG check points are common, especially in the Puli Alam District.

GRAPHS: Please note, graphs in this report are current as of 24 March 2010.

BAMYAN

Bamyan Province remained calm for the week despite uncertainties and instability in north-eastern areas. With this, the Shikari Valley of Shibar and Kahmard districts is of concern. And because migration of any actor—IMF, ANSF, or AOG—results in instability, unconfirmed reports that AOGs


KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- IEDs and mines
- Armed robbery along roadways

	NGO Incidents
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have increased their presence along the bordering province of Baghlan deserve attention.

Abduction is also a concern that was illustrated on 20 March when unknown armed men, alleged to be AOG or their affiliates, abducted an employee of a clinic in Kahmard District and reportedly took him to Tala Wa Barfak District, Baghlan. Also of note, on the 26th an AOG commander



from Gardan Deh surrendered himself to the GoA.

ANP desire to increase their presence in Kahmard and Shiber districts, and an additional check point was established in Ghandak Village, located in the Shikari Valley, to address criminality and AOG activity.

KUNDUZ

One NGO abduction was reported this period in an area approximately three kilometres southeast of Imam Sahib District Centre. One INGO staff member who had been travelling through the area was reportedly held for over 48 hours and threatened against working with GOA or INGOs. While AOGs maintain a strong presence in several areas in Imam Sahib District, NGO abductions are rare due to the fact that NGOs operating in the area

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS


- NGO abduction in Imam Sahib District
- Armed clashes in Imam Sahib District
- Continued attacks in Chahar Dara District

	NGO Incidents
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maintain a low profile, limit their movement within the district, and have a high degree of community acceptance.

Armed clashes between IMF/ANSF and AOGs continue in Chahar Dara District, primarily in areas where newly formed pro-government militias have recently been deployed. While the district remains an AOG stronghold, IMF/ANSF have focused recently on holding these areas, but with little apparent success. IMF/ANSF may be preparing to launch an offensive operation in the near future, and further IMF/ANSF activity may be expected to increase as a new IMF contingent arrives in the province.

Prolonged clashes between AOGs and pro-government militias were reported in Tashguzar and Qutor-



blogh areas of Imam Sahib District, where pro-government militias had reclaimed territory last reporting period. During a several hour-long firefight, three AOGs were killed and seven AOGs and two pro-government militia members were injured. In Archi District, AOG SAF forced the emergency landing of an IMF contracted helicopter which had been flying low over the area. Two IED-related incidents were reported in Khanabad District, one which detonated prematurely several kilometers north of the district centre, and one which was discovered and defused by ANSF several kilometers south of the district centre. No incidents have been reported in the past two weeks on the main Khanabad-Kunduz Highway.

BAGHLAN

An ANSF operation was launched this period, targeting AOG strongholds in the west of Baghlani Jadid District. Beginning in Qaysar Khel Area, ANA apparently spread northward and southwards, pushing east along this latitude, with the intent of dividing AOG strongholds west of the main Pul-e Khumri-Kunduz Main Road. These areas, along with several others throughout Baghlani Jadid and Pul-e Khumri districts, had been left under AOG control following last month's battle between AOGs. AOGs have responded with sporadic RPGs and BM-1 rockets on ANA positions, as well as some close-range fighting. No casualties have yet been confirmed. Several days prior to the ongoing offensive,


KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- ANSF/IMF Operation
- ACG/AOG activity in Tala wa Barfak
- IEDs in Doshi

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additional ANSF/IMF troops were deployed to areas east and south of the current offensive, and these troops remain in place. As AOGs are present elsewhere in the province, AOG-initiated attacks may be expected to occur outside the current area of fighting as pressure builds on the northwestern stronghold. Potential flashpoints include areas north of Shahri Kohna in Baghlani Jadid District; Pouzza Ishan, Bibi Aina, Omar Khel, Shahabudin, Dand-e Ghor and Cheshmasir areas of Pul-e Khumri District; and areas of Dahan-e Ghor and Doshi districts. AOGs may also retaliate by striking IMF/ANSF positions or softer targets further east, potentially affecting the Pul-e Khumri-Kunduz or Pul-e Khumri Mazar main roads.

Elsewhere in Baghlan, a private construction convoy (three dark-colored high profile vehicles) was ambushed by a group of approximately 7-8 armed men along the main road in Tala Wa Barfak Dis-



trict. The vehicles sustained slight damage, and one of the drivers was lightly injured. The armed men also stole some items being transported by the convoy. ANP pursued the attackers; however, they managed to flee from the area. It is suspected that the group responsible for the attack are local ACGs who may have support from AOGs. While the attack may have specifically targeted this particular company, other high profile vehicles on this road may be at risk for criminally-motivated roadside attacks. A similar incident was reported on 30 October 2009, when armed men attacked a private truck transporting commercial goods in Shahidi Area, south of the district centre. Also, one command-wire IED was discovered and defused by ANSF in Doshi District, near the main intersection leading toward Tala Wa Barfak District. The intended target of the device is unknown; however, some AOGs are known to be present in the surrounding areas.

BADAKHSHAN

Badakhshan Province saw a slight increase in AOG-related activity over the past two weeks. Two IED incidents were reported: one RCIED which detonated against a passing ANP convoy in Sabzi Bahar Area of Argo District on the main road leading to Feyzabad City, and one which was discov-


KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Attacks on Feyzabad-Kishim Main Road

	NGO Incidents
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ered and safely removed from the proximity of the Feyzabad District Chief of Police's private residence.

The first attack against the Altin Jalaw ANP checkpoint in Argo District was also reported. In the early hours of the morning, the checkpoint came under SAF and RPG attack, slightly injuring two ANP. Privately owned construction equipment was also found damaged nearby. Also, in Tishkan




District, unknown individuals attacked an ANP police station with RPGs. These incidents were likely perpetrated by a broad network of AOGs/ACGs who work in coordination with one another throughout the central districts of the province.

BALKH

Three AOG-related incidents were reported in Kishindeh District in the past two weeks, following a five-month lull in AOG activity since the 5 November 2009 attack on the Kishindeh District Chief of Police in Kishindeh District Centre (Aqupruk). Over the past two weeks, an elusive group of six to ten armed men were engaged by ANP on two occasions in Kishindeh Bala Area. Also, in Jar-e Khushk Area, two armed men attacked an ANP ve-

	NGO Incidents
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hicle. It is not known, but highly suspected, that the group seen in the prior two incidents was responsible for the third. ANP have conducted sporadic search operations to find these individuals, but have so far been unsuccessful. The group behind the most recent attacks is suspected to be led by the same AOG responsible for the November 2009 attack on the DCOP and other AOG-led incidents around that time. Jar-e Khushk Area was the site of an NGO abduction that occurred on 29 October 2009 and the sighting of an AOG checkpoint reported shortly thereafter. Also in Novem-



ber 2009, night letters were discovered in Kishindeh Bala Area, warning the community against working with GOA and foreign organizations. Given the distance between these two locations, it still has not been confirmed that the same group is responsible for both incidents; however, the simultaneous re-emergence of incidents reported in these two areas suggests that the threats originate from a single source.

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS


- Armed group in Kishindeh District

SAR-E PUL

ANA forces launched an operation in Sayyad District as well as Qush Tepa and Darzab districts of Jawzjan Province and Bilchiragh District of Faryab Province. The operation is intent on targeting AOGs in Almalik Village in Sayyad District, as well as related AOGs in the abovementioned areas. Within the past month, the targeted AOG has expanded ac-

	NGO Incidents
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tivity in Sayyad District in areas beyond its traditional stronghold in Almalik Village. The AOGs targeted in the operation have been engaged by various ANSF/IMF operations over the past several years; however, the group has been able to maintain control of these areas due to a lack of sustainable ANSF/IMF presence. As in Jawzjan, the ongoing operation is reportedly intent on "clearing" the area and constructing an ANA outpost which will guarantee a longer-term presence of ANSF.



NGOs who enter the area immediately following the operation may put themselves at risk of being associated with ANSF/IMF objectives in the area. This perception of association may jeopardize the physical security of NGO staff, as well as the long-term sustainability of NGO operations in the area.

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- ANA operation in Sayyad

TAKHAR

AOGs continued their expansion of activity in Darqad and Yangi Qala districts this period. The recent increase in AOG activity may signify a shift in power among AOG leadership, as a newly established leader is attempting to assert control. In demonstration of AOG expansion, a brief encounter in Yangi Qala area occurred when AOG members advised an INGO against driving white unmarked Land Cruisers with HF antennas, stating that GoA, ANSF and IMF use such vehicles. The AOG gave a specific example in which an unmarked white Land Cruiser with an HF antenna was seen immediately prior to an IMF airstrike in a neighbouring province. The AOG advised the INGO to either mark their vehicles with a flag, remove the secu-


	NGO Incidents
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rity antennas, or drive alternative vehicles such as jeeps or Corollas. The AOG's behaviour toward the INGO indicates a desire to maintain local acceptance while trying to exert control. Furthermore, the AOG's concern for the safety of the INGO staff suggests that exogenous AOG elements (not local to Yangi Qala) may be operating in the area, beyond the local leadership's control.

Also, in Rustaq District, AOGs attacked the residence of the acting District Chief of Police. The acting DCoP managed to escape to the District Centre, and the AOGs withdrew from the area after two hours. This is the first AOG-initiated incident in Rustaq District since one AOG was killed and nine others were arrested in an ANP search operation in mid-January of this year. The responsible group is local to the area and is not necessarily connected to AOGs in the more northern districts.

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- AOG presence in northern Takhar
- Attacks on ANP in Bangi District




Elsewhere in Takhar, AOGs attacked a checkpoint in Bangi Bridge Area with SAF and RPGs. The area, which had been subject to similar attacks in the spring and summer of 2009, fell quiet for a two month period after an ANP search operation in November 2010 arrested three suspects who were suspected of connections with the attacks. In January 2010, AOGs attacked the checkpoint once again, but ANSF responded, killing one AOG and injuring another. AOG-ANSF confrontation in the area may be expected to continue. Finally, in Taloqan City, four AOGs attempted to abduct an NDS member while he was on the way from his residence to his office. The NDS member managed to escape from the area unharmed. There is a known AOG presence in and around Taloqan City; however, AOGs do not typically carry out activity within the city itself. Targeted abductions of this kind are also often motivated by interpersonal disputes.

JAWZJAN

ANA forces launched an operation in Qush Tepa and Darzab districts as well as the surrounding areas of eastern Bilchiragh District in Faryab Province and Sayyad District in Sari Pul Province. During this operation, AOGs attempted to obstruct ANA access to Darzab and Qush Tepa Districts by planting IEDs on the

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main Shibirgan-Darzab road; however, they were discovered and defused by ANSF. The ongoing operation is reportedly intent on "clearing" the area and constructing an ANA outpost, which will allow ANSF to maintain a sustainable presence where they had previously been unable to do so. Given the degree of control which AOGs have maintained in this area, it is highly unlikely that this operation will remove AOG presence indefinitely. AOGs may



in fact disperse or hide for a period of time until they have gathered strength or until ANSF weakens its presence. NGOs who enter the area immediately following the operation may put themselves at risk of being targeted by AOGs, as they may be perceived as being a part of the military's strategy.

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- ANA operation in Darzab and Qush Tepa

FARYAB


Two IMF/ANSF operations were launched this period in Faryab Province. In Jalayir Valley (western Shirin Tagab and Khwaja Na Musa Subdistrict of Pashtun Kot), an ANA-led operation has attempted to “clear” the area of AOGs and establish an ANA outpost, similar to the ongoing offensive in Dasht-e Layli Area (eastern Faryab, southern Jawzjan, and western Sari Pul). The operation was announced last reporting period when IMF dropped leaflets in the area, warning civilians to avoid movement during the ongoing offensive. Also, as described in the sections on Jawzjan and Sari Pul, ANA has deployed to eastern

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Bilchiragh District, in coordination with the ongoing operations in Sayyad District of Sari Pul Province and Qush Tapa and Darzab districts in Jawzjan Province. NGOs who enter these area immediately following the operation may put themselves at risk of being associated with the operation, jeopardizing the physical security of the NGO staff, as well as the long-term sustainability of NGO operations in the area. Prior to the deployment of ANA in Bilchiragh District, AOGs in Kowlian, Archatu, Qorchi and Tash Qala villages attacked pro-government militia and ANP positions, seizing temporary control of all but Qorchi Village, where pro-government militias were able to resist the attacks. ANP rein-

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- ANSF/IMF operations



forcements deployed to these areas the following day, and secured the area within 24 hours. Two AOGs and one ANP were injured in the operation. Elsewhere in Faryab Province, AOGs abducted a school teacher in Dawlatabad District and released him after questioning him for two hours. AOG attacks on ANP positions were reported in Shekh Ha Village of Dawlatabad District, and Mirshadi Village of Almar District. Also, in Pashtun Kot District, Myandara Valley, unknown armed men shot and killed a shepherd and injured another, subsequently stealing their livestock. This incident may be connected to the same group seen last reporting period in Myandara Valley.


FARAH

During present cycle Farah has witnessed the first NGO-direct incident this year. On 27 March, in Pusht Rod District (Massaw area) a local transport vehicle whilst travelling on the road leading to the District Centre was targeted by a roadside IED. The explosion killed one civilian and injured another ten, including an NGO national staff member. According to ANSO data this incident marks already the fourth IED related attack (with two incidents in Bakwa and another one

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in Bala-Buluk) involving civilian casualties since the beginning of the year. Following this incident, in the same area, an ANSF patrol clashed with an AOG, killing two AOG members and wounding another two. Additionally, regarding the road security, security forces seized numerous explosive devices throughout the province. For instance, two IEDs were located on 21 March, in Bala-Buluk, on the main road, planted under a bridge. Another two IEDs were found in Pusht Rod on 28 in Dorahy area. Finally, two RCIEDs were located on Herat-Kandahar Highway in Bakwa District, on 29 March.

Several criminal related incidents were also reported during present



reporting period with an abduction of two local civilians that occurred on 24 March, in Khaki Safed District.

It is worth noting, that a great deal of security incidents recorded during the present cycle was again related to military/police operations (literally seven). Besides seizures of weapons and munitions in Bala-Buluk, Pur Chaman, Bakwa and Khaki Safed, security forces led several operations seizing a large quantity of drugs particularly in Bakwa District (suburb area).

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- IEDs/RCIEDs
- AOG ambushes/Armed clashes
- Criminal activity

BADGHIS

Although, the overall level of security incidents in the province (compared to the last reporting cycle) has decreased, Badghis continued to register a bulk of AOG activity in the Western Region. During present cycle among nine reported incidents, seven were


KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- AOG-ANSF/IMF clashes
- AOG presence around Qala-I-Naw city and in Qadis
- Abduction

	NGO Incidents
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AOG-initiated. The usual pattern of AOG close range attacks on ANSF/IMF convoys or check posts was this time almost solely concentrated in Murghab District with five incidents and in Muqur with only one incident. Of note, in the said district, on 18 March, ANSF/IMF conducted an operation supported by an airstrike, wounding one AOG member and killing two local civilians.

As seen in the last report, Qadis remains an area of concern due to AOG activities. After abduction



of the three employees of the Education Department, reported during the last reporting period on 29 March, district witnessed abduction of two GoA employees' relatives. On a positive note, though, five AOG members surrendered to authorities along with several light weapons in Qala-i-Naw on 20 March.

HERAT

As seen in Farah, the risk of collateral damage represents an important concern for the local population as well as for NGOs in Herat Province, due to the use of IED/RCIED. On 30 March, in Adraskan District, a private transport vehicle hit a roadside IED on a secondary road. Five civilians were killed and another three were injured in the incident. This incident marks the first IED detonation this year in the said district. However, the area witnessed last year numerous, mainly RCIED-initiated attacks, targeting security forces along Herat-Kandahar Main Road.

Kushki-Kuhna and, particularly during this reporting cycle, Kushk remains the source of instability


KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- IED/RCIEDs
- AOG presence in Kushki Kuhna and Kushk
- Criminal activity

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	1
This Report Period	0

with continuing AOG activity. On 21 March, the latter district (Gala Chah area) experienced an AOG attack on an ANBP check post that resulted in killing of two ANBP. Two days later, in the same area, AOG ambushed an ANBP patrol. This time, the ANBP returned fire killing two AOG members and wounding another one. On the same day, but in Jahar Sukhr area, AOG attacked an ANP patrol with RPGs and SAF. Finally, the Gardana area in Kushki-Kuhna District witnessed another armed clash on 30 March. Moreover, on 17 March, AOG activities manifested itself in Ghoryan District with an RCIED that targeted an ANBP vehicle.

On 27 March, in Injil District, an UXO detonated, wounding eight civilians including five children. This incident underlines often forgotten but still prevalent presence of UXO in Herat Province (particularly in Injil and Guzara districts). An 'escalation of force'



incident involving civilian casualty occurred on 18 March, in the said district. IMF opened fire on a motorcyclist approaching too close to an IMF convoy, wounding him. The victim has succumbed later to his injuries.

The security situation in Herat city during this reporting period was characterised by an increase in criminal activity with two incidents of note, related probably to inter-personal grievances. On 17 March, in District 9, unknown perpetrators hurled two hand grenades into a private residence, wounding one person. Then, on 28 March in District 5, during late morning hours, two armed men riding on a motorcycle opened fire on a private car, killing the driver and wounding another motorcyclist who was driving on this street at the moment of the attack. Additionally, regarding the threat of abduction a local businessman was abducted in Herat city, District 4, on 29 March.

GHOR


In the past two weeks, in Ghor, the numbers of incidents has continued to increase. However, the overall activity still continues at a level below that registered during the same period last year. This time, a total of six incidents have been registered in four districts: Shahrak, Chaghcharan, Pasaband and Du Layna. In the latter district, on 25 March in Seyachub area, an armed clash erupted between two groups and resulting in two being killed and three wounded. The exact reason be-

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Criminal activity
- Armed robberies
- AOG presence in Pasaband and Taywara

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	0
This Report Period	0

hind this clash is still unclear, but the incident is probably related to a long term grievance between two local commanders. As seen in the last reporting period in Shahrak, criminal activity targeting private vehicles on districts roads continued with another armed robbery. On 25 March, in Ghuk Pass area, unknown armed men stopped a public transport vehicle and robbed passengers of their cash and valuables. An incidental explosion occurred the same day in Chaghcharan District, inside an ANP Check Post, reportedly killing one ANP official. Also in Chaghcharan, in the city area on 18 March, a prison demonstration turned violent as several prisoners attempted to escape using light



weapons. There was a clash with ANP and three prisoners were reportedly injured. Additionally, on 30 March, in Pasaband, a local civilian was killed by unknown individuals.

According to different reporting, it appears that AOG present in the southern Ghor, particularly in Pasaband, are in the process of reorganizing themselves for the upcoming operations in the spring. Although, for the time being, it has not yet been translated into practice, NGOs operating in the area should closely monitor the possible development of the situation in the province.

KUNAR

During this reporting cycle, Kunar Province had again a violent period, marked by a slight increase in reported security incidents. With 48 AOG-initiated incidents recorded, Kunar continues to witness the highest level of AOG activity in the Eastern Region. As seen in previous periods, direct attacks against ANSF/IMF and supply convoys remained AOG's tac-


KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- IDF in Sirkanay
- AOG – ANSF/IMF clashes
- AOG abductions in Wata Pur and Shegal

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	4
This Report Period	0

of choice, accounting for more than 80% of all recorded incidents.

Besides the high level of direct attacks against security forces, late March saw an increase in sporadic IDF assaults, particularly in bordering areas to Pakistan such as Sirkanay. Due to the relative inaccuracy of these assaults, IDF attacks in Kunar often inhere the risk of civilians being targeted collaterally. For instance, on 22 March in Sirkanay District AOG fired two mortars towards an IMF base in the area. The mortars missed the target and impacted in a residential area, injuring one person.



In at least two cases—namely in Wata Pur and Shegal—AOG attempted to abduct local civilians for various reasons. For example, in Wata Pur on 19 March, AOG attempted to abduct a local civilian who was alleged to be spying for the Government or IMF. Locals from the village rendered assistance and an exchange of fire occurred. Prior to fleeing the scene, AOG killed the civilian.

GRAPHS: Please note, graphs in this report are current as of 24 March 2010.

NANGARHAR

In late March, Nangarhar saw a significant increase in AOG activity, particularly in its southern districts. In comparison to the last reporting cycle, the overall amount of ANSO-recorded AOG incidents throughout the province increased by more than 150% to 19. Relatively calm areas such as Hisarak and Kot witnessed several AOG assaults, and improving weather conditions in southern areas bordering Pakistan enabled AOG to increase their operations significantly. Due to the rather limited presence of GoA in several remote areas, the AOG capability to conduct operations has apparently improved. For instance, on 28 March in Khogyani's Hashimkhel Area, around 25 AOG established a temporary, checkpoint for more than one hour. The armed men searched several vehicles, checked ID-cards, and asked the occupants if they had connections with GoA or foreign organisations. Remote areas such as Hisarak District, which were without major incidents during the winter months, saw a resurgence of AOG activity. For example, on 28 March in Hisarak, AOG fired 10 rockets towards the District Administration Centre.


KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- IEDs
- AOG activity, particularly in southern districts
- Local disputes in Achin, Kuz Kunar and Goshta

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	3
This Report Period	0

Due to the mentioned improvement in weather conditions, several AOGs operating in Nangarhar's mountainous border areas with Pakistan were able to increase their level of direct attacks against security forces. After a relatively low level of such assaults in recent winter months, this period saw at least four direct attacks. Namely, in a well-coordinated attack on 16 March in Nazyan District, AOG attacked a number of ANBP CPs for about two hours. It is understood, however, that the recent increase in volatility in Nangarhar's southern districts of Sherzad, Khogyani, and Pachir Wa Agam can be partly attributed to the assassination of a local powerbroker in late February which created a security vacuum in parts of these areas.

Nangarhar Province witnessed again resurgence as well as sophistication of IED deployment. In this reporting period, 19 devices were detonated or located throughout the province, which displays the highest amount of recorded IEDs within one reporting cycle for 2010 in Nangarhar. Some of these devices underlined clearly a well-coordinated AOG supply chain and technical sophistication. For example, on 20 March on the Khogyani-Sherzad Road, a 150-pound IED detonated against an IMF convoy, causing significant damage. Next to the usual areas of emplaced explosive devices in southern Nangarhar, a significant number of IEDs was deployed in rather unusual areas such as Jalalabad



City, Kot, and Bati Kot. In particular, with five reported IED-incidents, Kot District saw a significant deterioration in its security environment.

Next to the high level of criminality, the security environment in Jalalabad City was marked by a significant increase in emplaced explosive devices as well as by two IDF attacks. The huge bulk of IED incidents as well as one rocket strike occurred during Nawroz weekend. Namely, in the late evening hours on 20 March, four IEDs detonated inside the city and a fifth one was discovered by ANP. Although this is an unusually high amount of significant incidents in Jalalabad City, this does not necessarily display a challenge for NGOs operating inside the city. All of these explosive devices were carefully planted at places where they could only do minimal harm or damage, and all of them lacked usual ingredients such as shrapnel-material or nails. It appears that these incidents were rather isolated occurrences, intending to disturb and intimidate the official Nawroz celebrations organized by GoA authorities in the city.

Land disputes throughout Nangarhar remain of concern. The ceasefire between the two Shinwari clans struggling in Achin District in early March has been extended, but conflicts in other districts appear to be brewing. On 16 March in Kuz Kunar District, a demonstration of locals over a land issue ended in a clash between protestors and illegal occupants of disputed land, wounding at least three people. In at least two other districts, namely southern Goshta and western Lal Pur, unresolved land issues inhere the potential of armed violence.

KHOST

On 26 March in Khost City, armed men attacked a project site of an international organisation with small arms fire. Two gunmen pulled up in a car and opened fire on a group of IO staff members inspecting a project site in Matun's City Centre, killing one national staff member and injuring at least one international as well as three national staff members. Subsequently, the attackers fled to a nearby house and engaged arriving ANP forces in a fire fight for several hours. No AOG took responsibility for the assault, and uncorroborated information suggests a personal dispute is behind the attack. Still, this incident underlines again the vio-


KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- IEDs throughout the whole province
- AOG assaults in Tere Zayi
- IDF in Bak District

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	2
This Report Period	0

lent and dangerous environment in Khost Province.

AOG activity throughout the whole province remains very high, with particular concentration of activity in Khost City, Tere Zayi, Bak, Gurbuz, and Mando Zayi. In late March, 33 AOG incidents were recorded. As seen previously, explosive devices remain the preferred AOG tactic in Khost, with 35 emplaced devices reported. Although most IED attacks in Khost target security forces, GoA, and road construction companies, civilian casualties remain frequent. For instance, on 20 March in Mando Zayi District, an IED detonated in the immediate vicinity of a children's park, killing one child and wounding another. In another incident, in Khost City on 21 March, an IED explosion next to a Nawroz celebration at a local shrine killed at least three civilians.



Next to the high level of emplaced IEDs in the province and occasional IDF attacks in Bak District, AOG direct attacks have increased in recent weeks, particularly in bordering areas to Pakistan such as Tere Zayi. In this reporting period, 11 AOG direct attacks were reported with 5 of them occurring in Tere Zayi District. Besides AOG activity, at least two brewing land disputes tend to affect Khost's security environment, with one in Gurbuz and the other one in Mando Zayi. On 18 March in Gurbuz District, a land dispute between Shamal and Gurbuz tribes erupted into an armed clash. In Mando Zayi on 31 March, Haider Khel tribesmen staged a peaceful demonstration accusing the Provincial Council Members of being partial while solving a land dispute between Haider Khel and Warzi tribes. Both land disputes remain unresolved, inhering further potential of armed violence.

LAGHMAN


As seen in early March, AOG activity continues along the Kabul-Jalalabad Highway in Qarghayi District. In this period, one AOG-initiated attack occurred on the road, targeting a supply convoy. Additionally, on 20 March AOG

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- AOG activity along the Jalalabad-Kabul Highway
- IEDs in Alingar

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	0
This Report Period	0

attacked Qarghayi's District Administration Centre without causing damage. With 6 ANSO-recorded security incidents, four of them attributed to AOG, Laghman's overall security environment remains constant and rather moderate. Mihtarlam saw an inefficient IDF attack targeting the ANP HQ on 19 March, and Alingar witnessed an IED detonation close to an IMF convoy on 17



March. All these incidents occurred within the first five days of this reporting cycle. Since 20 March, no security-related incident was reported from Laghman Province.

GRAPHS: Please note, graphs in this report are current as of 24 March 2010.

PAKTYA


The security environment in Paktya remains comparatively calm. In late March, 9 security incidents

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Local disputes in Gardez, Zurmat and Sayid Karam
- IEDs in Zurmat and Wuza Zadran

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	1
This Report Period	0

were reported from the province, with only one of them related to AOG. The latter occurred on 23 March in Wuza Zadran, when an IED struck a road construction company vehicle. Around 33% of all incidents were related to local disputes in Gardez, Zurmat, and Sayid Karam. The remaining incidents were one IED discovery in



Zurmat, two security force operations in Gardez, and criminality.

HELMAND

Two separate incidents involving an INGO operating out of Lashkar Gah occurred during the period. In Lashkar Gah City, on 17 March, two AOG with BBIEDs entered the compound of an INGO by scaling the wall with a ladder. A fire-fight took place, and reports indicate that both attackers were killed before the devices could be detonated. This attack on an INGO can be viewed as part of an overall increase in direct AOG attacks in both Helmand and Kandahar provinces and is considered a response to ongoing IMF/ANA operations in Marjeh and planned operations in Kandahar. It is important to stress that there is no evidence


KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Ongoing military operations
- IEDs
- Refugees

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	2
This Report Period	2

that this particular organization was targeted due to its status as an INGO, and it is also important to note that the heavily fortified compound is known informally by locals as the 'USAID compound' due to its appearance and association with USAID projects. In the second incident on 27 March, a roadside IED struck a PSC vehicle that was escorting the same INGO en route between Marja and Lashkar Gah, killing three PSC guards and wounding another. Once again, it is important to note there is no indication that the attack targeted the said INGO because of its status and the attack occurred on a route which has become extremely insecure as a result of Operation Moshtarak.

Helmand has remained extremely insecure as AOG successfully demonstrate the tenuous grip IMF/ANA forces have on the



Marjeh region and the rest of the province. As IMF attempt to impose their approach of 'Shape – Clear – Hold – Build' on to the area, AOG are actively contesting the 'Hold' phase by re-inserting fighters into the town of Marjeh and are challenging the 'Build' through intimidation of civilians, community leaders and groups that appear to be ready to participate in the US-led reconstruction efforts. Elsewhere in the province, AOG attacked an ANP post in Musa Qala and beheaded five ANP officers in a strong show of force. There was a series of IED strikes in a variety of areas in the province which resulted in a total of over 30 civilian deaths, raising the fear amongst the local population that the previous AOG strategy of avoiding civilian casualties is at an end.

ANSO SOUTH: Please note, ANSO is expanding its reach in the Southern Region. If you know of NGOs operating in the region which are not registered with ANSO, please encourage them to register. The new South RSA, Peter Dimitroff, is holding security roundtables to facilitate information exchange when in Kabul City.

URUZGAN


The majority of incidents during this reporting period involved IED discovery and disposal operations by ANP and IMF units, with a total of 12 IEDs rendered safe in Tirin Kot District. AOG

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- IED/BBIED attacks
- AOG attacks

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	0
This Report Period	0

attacks occurred in the Kaftar Khana area of Tirin Kot and the Qala Qala area of Chora District against ANP and IMF units, respectively. The majority of AOG casualties occurred, however, in Dihrawud and Char Chino districts, as premature detonations of IEDs killed four AOG at each location.



PAKTIKA


AOG attacks resumed after a three week lull, as the DAC in Yahya Khel District was targeted with heavy weapons and SAF and an IMF convoy was ambushed in the same District a few hours

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- IMF operations and airstrikes
- AOG presence

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	0
This Report Period	0

later. In the latter incident, IMF airstrikes killed six AOG but also killed two PSC members escorting the convoy. In addition, AOG attacked a private construction company working in the central district of Omna; however, they were driven off without serious casualties.



KANDAHAR


Compared to recent reporting periods, Kandahar Province has been relatively quiet, with the exception of Zhari District, which witnessed numerous serious incidents, including five separate AOG attacks on both IMF and ANP targets. In Pashmul Village, five IMF were killed after AOG

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- IEDs
- AOG Attacks

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	3
This Report Period	0

attacked a patrol, and in Hawz-e Madad Village 10 AOG were killed after launching an attack on an ANP post. In Kandahar City, the lull in AOG activity permitted IMF/ANA units to conduct search operations in several areas of the city, arresting a number of AOG with IED materials and weapons. In addition, a total of nine IEDs were located and disposed of within the city. This activity corresponds with reports



received that, in anticipation of upcoming IMF operations, a significant number of IED-making 'experts' have moved into Kandahar City, along with explosives and other necessary components.

ZABUL


The majority of security incidents in the province took place in Qalat District, primarily in Qalat City and the village of Nawrak, as IMF, ANA and ANP initiated a

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- IMF/ANA/ANP operations
- IED strikes

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	1
This Report Period	0

series of operations aimed at both AOG and drug smuggling operations. Naw Bahar District was particularly dangerous during the reporting period, with two separate IED strikes and two premature IED detonations, killing a total of four AOG in the area of Faizabad.



GHAZNI


IMF/ANA remain on the offensive in Ghazni Province, continuing raids on AOG which have, during the most recent reporting period, resulted in a total of 18 AOG captured and eight killed.

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS


- IEDs
- IMF/ANA operations

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	0
This Report Period	0

The majority of these operations took place in the volatile Qarabagh District. Similarly, ANP units discovered and defused a total of eight IEDs in the districts of Andar and Jaghatu over the last two weeks. AOG initiated attacks took place on two occasions, in Rashidan District, which both targeted the DAC.



COMBINED (ACG/AOG) 2010 DIRECT NGO INCIDENTS



■ Armed Attacks ■ Abduction ■ Threats ■ Beatings ■ IED/Explosives ■ Armed Robbery ■ Arson ■ Missile/Mortar ■ Searches



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ANSO ACRONYMS

ACG-Armed Criminal Group /
AEF-Afghan Eradication Forces
/ **ANA**-Afghan National Army /
ANBP-Afghan National Border
Police / **ANP**-Afghan National
Police / **AOG**-Armed Opposition
Group / **APPF**-Afghan Public
Protection Forces (local depu-
tised militias) / **DC**-District
Centre / **GOA**-Government of
Afghanistan / **IDF**-Indirect Fire
(ex: mortars) / **IED**-Improvised
Explosive Device / **IMF**-
International Military Forces /
NDS-National Directorate of
Security (Intelligence) / **PRP**-
Previous Reporting Period /
PSC-Private Security Company
/ **RPG**-Rocket Propelled Gre-
nade / **SAF**-Small Arms Fire /
VBIED-Vehicle Borne Impro-
vised Explosive Device

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MISSING

This report ANSO
could not provide
analysis for the prov-
inces of:

Kabul

Parwan

Panjshir

Samangan

Nuristan

Nimroz

This is because we
do not know enough
about the area to
comment on the sig-
nificance of the inci-
dents occurring
there.

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understand the prov-
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