

THE ANSO REPORT

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YOU NEED TO KNOW

- Climbing AOG incident rates will surpass all records
- Slander targets the INGO community
- Further instability evident in Balkh, Badakhshan, and Faryab
- Ghazni, Helmand, and Kandahar racked by fear

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COUNTRY SUMMARY

International media look towards the Peace Jirga in Kabul to discern how the conflict will play out, but current data show that Summer 2010 will be a new record for AOG activity. And although instability brought upon by changes in the security context garners the greatest amount of attention, local press' attempts to defame NGOs and incite the populace against them are clearly worrisome, as well as frustrating. Many NGOs were consequently flabbergasted by GoA reactions to a questionable 'exposé' that asserted NGOs were focused on proselytising, rather than aid and development.

The role that civil unrest plays in the Afghan context was manifest during the period, particularly in Bamyán and Kabul. In Bamyán, residents demonstrated initially due to a perceived lack of development, later turning their sights on their Governor because she allowed their then targets—visiting GoA officials—to circumvent road blocks. In the aftermath, the local political machine rolled into action, seizing the moment in an attempt to unseat the Governor. As of yet, demonstrations persist with the insistence that she must resign. Likewise, a small

number of Kabul University students rallied to voice dissent concerning a mix of perceived offenses, ranging from slanderous accusations levelled against NGOs, to defamation of Islam. Mass rallies by Hazara also sought to affect the political landscape, demanding intervention on continuing Hazara and purported Kuchi clashes.

Possibly a sign of AOG intent to expand influence, Badakhshan saw an odd slew of AOG incidents. Balkh also experienced disconcerting AOG activity, with a late-reported intrusion into an NGO clinic in Chahar Kint and night letters warning girls not to attend an NGO run school in Sholgara. Possibly signifying further changes in the actor map of the province, a night letter warning locals to not support the GoA was released in Balkh District on 23 May.

Instability was again evident in Faryab, with AOG migrations probably effecting change in the context; for example, an NGO encountered a checkpoint and small arms fire in Gurziwan District.

Despite an obviously smaller NGO footprint in

the Southern Region, it still serves as the bellwether concerning the conflict. With this, high rates of AOG-initiated actions and what appears to be shrinking IMF influence is of note. In Helmand, for example, Marja and Nad Ali continue to suffer from insecurity, demonstrated in attack rates, flows of displaced families, and allegations of corruption in ANSF circles.

Rising AOG rates persist also in Ghazni, putting NGOs at risk. An NGO abduction, for instance, was only resolved by the intervention of local elders and the realisation that the NGO was involved in the health field. A campaign of intimidation and abduction, furthermore, has afflicted notorious Andar District, even leading to civil outcries for GoA assistance.

Fear has also paralysed life in Kandahar, with locals now restricting movement. Moreover, IMF are likely confounded by now fervent civilian attempts to avoid contact with security forces. An apparently unforeseen result is now local resistance towards accepting IMF development assistance.

KABUL


Illustrating the everyday risk for all residents of Kabul City, an INGO found itself the target of an apparent criminal break-in on 24 May in District 13, with no losses reported. Apprehension was the gravest element to afflict Kabul during the reporting period, though, with the populace eagerly awaiting the next attention-grabbing attack. Within Kabul City, the usual ailments of demonstrations, criminality, and arrests of suspected AOG were felt. Demonstrations thus occurred in relation to the Hazara and purported Kuchi conflict in Behsud, with Hazara ministers of parlia-

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Complex attacks around high-profile GoA, IMF, & foreign targets
- ACG abductions

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	6
This Report Period	1

ment and others encouraging Hazara solidarity to draw attention to the brewing conflict. Unfortunate for NGOs, sensationalism took the helm in albeit limited public dissent in support of a smear campaign that depicted certain INGOs as proselytising on a local TV programme. In a series of questionable pieces, a reporter sought to incite protest against INGOs and the Ministry of the Economy (MoE), resulting in purported civil discontent that led to two INGOs being suspended pending investigation. (The same reporter conducted a similar campaign circa late 2008). Of note, on 31 May the issue conflated with other concerns of perceived offenses towards Islam and found itself one of the issues cited by Kabul University students in a small-scale demonstration on the campus. In sum, despite a so far



mutated voicing of support for the programme, NGOs should be prepared for a quick turn of events which could set them in the sights of discontent demonstrators.

IED, explosive, and rocket finds during the period demonstrated ANSF attempts to continually hinder AOG efforts, occurring in Qarabagh, Khaki Jabbar, Bagrami, and Kabul City. Likewise, Surobi fulfilled its stereo type of being an amenable host for AOG strikes, with AOG targeting ANSF, logistics convoys, and fuel tankers in the district on 19, 23, 26, 29, and 30 May, as well as 1 June. And as the period wound up, all eyes were turning towards the much touted Peace Jirga that would likely draw AOG activity toward Kabul City.

LOGAR

Logar Province remained very active in terms of security incidents during the report period. AOG attacks were focused on several districts, most notably Puli Alam and Baraki Barak. Rocket attacks occurred in Puli Alam's DAC, as well as against ANA posts in the villages of Qalai Alikhan and Padkhwab Roghani. Also in Puli Alam, a rocket impacted close to a primary school and injured one pupil; however, owing to the inaccurate nature of the rocket used, it has not yet been determined whether the school


KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- AOG rocket attacks
- IED strikes

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	1
This Report Period	0

was the actual target of the attack. Lastly, Puli Alam also witnessed the killing of a civilian by AOG on motorcycles near the village of Dih Now on 23 May. In the restive district of Baraki Barak, AOG initiated attacks on ANP in the area of Tangi Saydan, and on IMF units near the villages of Dadukhel and Sheikhan, with the latter attack involving heavy machine guns as well as SAF. The erection of an illegal checkpoint by AOG resulted in the abduction of an ANP officer in Charkh District on 23 May near the village of Do-baro. The status of this individual remains unknown.

IMF/GOA operations appeared to be limited to search operations,



primarily in the districts of Kharwar, Charkh and Baraki Barak, with two operations in Baraki Barak leading to the detention of a total of at least six AOG and a wide variety of weapons, ammunition and explosives.

The remaining incidents in the province during the report period consisted mainly of numerous IED strikes in the districts of Khushi, Muhammad Agha, and Charkh (with multiple IED incidents) and the discovery and disposal of IEDs by IMF/ANA/ANP units in the areas of Pili Rajan, Shamazar, and Padkhwab of Baraki Barak District.

KAPISA


All reported activity in Kapisa Province occurred in the eastern districts of Alasay, Nijrab and Tagab. In Tagab District, the IMF discovered and defused an IED for the first time in 2010,

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Clashes between AOG & ANSF/IMF in Tagab
- Low intensity factional disputes in Kohistan I & II
- Decentralised AOG activity in Alasay, Nijrab, and Tagab

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	0
This Report Period	0

following a series of IED incidents which resulted in an estimated thirteen IMF injuries since the beginning of the year. Also in Tagab District, AOGs ambushed IMF patrols twice this reporting period, a tactic which AOGs have employed ten-fold this year in Tagab District, relative to the first five months of 2009. AOGs also ambushed a joint IMF/ANA patrol in Alasay District, where close-range attacks on IMF are much less frequent. The increase in close-range and IED attacks on



IMF may be a result of the IMF's increased level of exposure as it has taken on a more population-centric strategy since the latter half of 2009. Also, in Nijrab District, Dawo Area, inter-factional fighting occurred between two AOGs—the first incident of its kind reported in the district.

WARDAK

In Jaghatu District, the abduction which was initially described in the last report as involving three surveyors for an NSP program was in fact that of an INGO national staff member working on implementing the NSP. The INGO staff in a rented vehicle with its driver was abducted by AOG in Ariab Kahlan Village (50km North of the DAC). During their captivity, the two individuals were questioned regarding their employment and their stated purpose in the district; however, they were not physically assaulted. Ultimately, they were released two days later. Besides the intervention of the local elders, some others elements likely facilitated their

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS


- ACG/AOG abductions
- AOG intimidation
- IEDs and ambushes targeting IMF/ANSF and logistics convoys along Highway One

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	2
This Report Period	0

release. Probably the most important: the organisation is well established in the area and known for its impartiality and high level of acceptance from the local communities.

The overall security situation in Wardak has been shaped on the one hand by a usual scope of security events and on the other hand by often forgotten but still present elements of inter-tribal tensions. In fact, a long term opposition between Hazara and Kuchi manifested itself in the western part of the province, in Day Mirad and Behsud districts in the form of violent clashes that reportedly resulted in at least seven people killed and another five missing. Moreover, the scale of the clashes and the emotive aspect of the conflict affected the situation in Bamyán and Kabul, with a series of demonstrations occurring.

During the present reporting period the province continued to



witness the well-known patterns of security events with AOG initiated ambushes and IED attacks on ANSF/IMF and PSC convoys. There were a total of eight ambushes and IED attacks in usually unstable districts of Saydabad, Nirkh, Maydan Shahr and Jaghatu. However, particularly Maydan Shahr and Jaghatu districts continued to experience numerous stand-off attacks. A total of ten such incidents have been reported over the past two weeks (five in each district). The main AOG targets remain the DACs. However, after the rocket attack targeting the FOB in Jaghatu recorded in the last report, an IMF base located in Maydan Shahr was targeted on 22 May. To counter this surge in stand-off attacks on 24 May, an IMF airstrike targeted a suspected rocket launching site in Jaghatu (Patwok area). The attack was followed by a ground clean-up operation and purportedly resulted in important weapons and ammunitions seizures.

BAMYAN


Bamyan garnered international and country-wide attention during the period due to sustained protests that took place in the provincial capital. On 21-24 and 28 May the capital was seized up by demonstrators who at first sought to express their ire at a perceived lack of development in the province. Feeling slighted by the Pro-

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Civil unrest
- ACG/AOG activity in the Shinkari & Ghandak Valleys
- ACG/AOG inflows from Tala Wa Barfak

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	0
This Report Period	0

vincial Governor due to her apparent aiding of members of parliament in circumventing road blocks that sought to prohibit the members' return to Kabul, however, the demonstrators then turned their focus towards the Governor. With the Governor in their sites, it became apparent that the political establishment sought to seize the moment in forcing the resignation of the Governor. Sustained demonstrations thus took hold in the capital, drawing press coverage and leading to limited displays of low-level violence; for instance, demonstrators forced the closure of the Bamyan Bazaar



for multiple days and threw rocks at the Governor's office on at least one occasion. Political actors in the province held discussions with the Governor later during the unrest; however, they did not relent from their insistence that the Governor must resign. As of yet, the political discord remains, with political power-players in the province asserting that they will not cease opposition until the Governor resigns, although demonstrations have ceased for the time being.

DAYKUNDI


Daykundi Province remained relatively quiet, with a handful of security incidents during this report period. The unrest in Gizab was the focus of an IMF airstrike on 15 May near the village of Dashti Maluk, which targeted several AOG positions and killed at least two AOG, including a commander. The longstanding problem of common banditry in the province was highlighted with the robbery of a government official near Pasiband Village of Khadir District on 18 May.

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- AOG presence
- Banditry
- Instability in Gizab

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	0
This Report Period	0

In Nili District on 20 May, a large demonstration of approximately 1,000 Hazaras marched to protest the current outbreak of violence between Hazaras and Kuchis in the areas of Behsud and Day Mirdad. The demonstration ended peacefully. Although these outbreaks of violence have occurred regularly in the past, there is certainly a sense of heightened anxiety this year amongst Hazaras as the Karzai government speaks more frequently about reaching out to moderate Taliban, who have a legacy of violent oppression towards Hazaras in general (and who have supported the largely Pashtun Kuchis in their past clashes with the Hazara people). It can be expected that



should reconciliation efforts towards the Taliban proceed, Hazara communities throughout the country will become more vocal and confrontational.

Lastly, on 28 May there occurred an armed clash in the Tamazan Valley area of Gizab District between local villagers and AOG who had set up positions in the area. As was mentioned in the most recent bi-weekly report, it does appear that the majority of local tribal sentiment in the district has landed on the side of the government and local communities have actively attempted to expel AOG units from their areas.

BADAKHSHAN

A series of incidents in Baharak District of Badakhshan Province has raised concerns that an increase in AOG activity could affect certain districts in the coming months. On 15 May, night letters were found distributed around several mosques in the District Centre, discouraging the population from supporting or cooperating with GoA, and encouraging attacks on IMF and ANSF. The letters also stated that the people should pray five times a day, that women should wear the hijab, and that Mullahs should not preach "for the government." Several days later, AOGs fired 6 RPGs towards the ANP Headquarters and District Centre from the north of the District Centre. Reportedly, the rockets exploded in the air, causing no casualties or damages. The following week, ANSF laid an ambush for AOGs traveling through Baharak District in Ardar Village near the border


KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Increase in AOG activity
- Backlash against poppy eradication

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	0
This Report Period	0

with Warduj District. The ANSF engaged the AOGs for approximately 30 minutes, killing three and arresting one other. While the origin of the above night letters is unknown, the letters appear to be mass-produced and are reportedly identical to those which have been seen in Kunduz Province in the past. There is an indigenous AOG presence in Baharak, Shohada and Warduj districts, yet these letters and the subsequent increase in activity may signify that exogenous AOGs are trying to increase support for these local groups. The last night letter reported in Baharak District was distributed in August 2009, discouraging locals from participating in the presidential elections. In the weeks and months prior to the parliamentary elections, AOG activity should be expected to increase in districts where AOGs are present, particularly in Kishim and Warduj districts where an increase in AOG presence has been reported but not confirmed.

In the first ever ANSO-recorded IED attack on ANP in Darayim District, an IED detonated against



an ANP Ranger in Alani Village, killing eight ANP and injuring one other. Reportedly, the ANP Ranger was en route to Alani Village to conduct poppy eradication. The ANP had reportedly travelled to the village a few days prior to identify the fields for eradication, and the local population protested. Anti-GoA violence in Badakhshan can be frequently traced back to those who are trying to protect their drug production or smuggling operations. ANP will likely continue to be targeted whenever poppy eradication operations are underway, and this particular incident may indicate an increased IED capability in the area.

In another rare incident, an IMF patrol came under SAF and RPG attack south of Feyzabad City this period in Qara Mughul Area. This is the first ANSO-recorded close-range attack on an IMF patrol in Badakhshan Province since April 2007, when AOGs attacked an IMF convoy a few kilometres south of Qara Mughul in Jawazak Area.

SAMANGAN


Following the arrest of the Samangan Shadow Provincial Governor last reporting period, ANSF succeeded in arresting the Shadow District Governor and Commander in Chief of Roy Du

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Unreported activity

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	0
This Report Period	0

Ab District and seizing a large amount of ammunition. Oddly enough, the district has only reported four security incidents in the past four years, suggesting that either the apprehended AOG leadership was extremely ineffective, or there is some degree of unreported AOG activity in the district.




BALKH

AOGs in Chahar Bolak, Chimtal and Sholgara districts are increasing their activity and may be coordinating their efforts, posing an increased threat to the Mazar-Shibirgan Ring Road, as well as some areas south of Mazar. The increased AOG presence in eastern Sholgara and western Chahar Kint districts has impacted NGO operations, where two late-reported NGO incidents occurred in the second week of May. Late one night last reporting period, over a dozen armed men entered an NGO-run clinic in western Chahar Kint District, demanding to know the whereabouts of the midwife. After being told she was not on duty, the men threatened not to allow her to return and proceeded to steal medical supplies and communications equipment before escaping the area. The following day in Sholgara District, east of the river, night letters were found in and around an NGO-run school, threatening the girls not to attend. Two groups of AOGs are known to operate in the Siyab and Painkan Dara areas, and they may have recently begun cooperating with one another. In addition to the two NGO incidents, AOGs con-

	NGO Incidents
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This Report Period	2

ducted one targeted killing of a local civilian in western Chahar Kint District and attacked a telecommunications tower in Sholgara District with SAF, possibly with the intent to shut down the tower. According to unconfirmed reporting, AOGs in Sholgara may have also begun coordinating their activity with those in Chahar Bolak and Chimtal districts. Lending some credibility to this report, the first AOG attack on a target west of the Sholgara River occurred this period, when an international construction site came under SAF, reportedly fired from the direction of the Alburz Mountains in south-eastern Chimtal.

While AOGs have a large degree of influence in most areas of northern Chimtal and southern Chahar Bolak, the group is apparently expanding its reach across the border into Balkh District. A night letter was distributed in Elman Village of Balkh District on the border with Chahar Bolak District. The letter appealed to the community not to work with IMF or GoA and threatened to kill anyone who is caught spying. The letter also requested that the community pay tithes to the AOGs, and to rely on the AOGs to settle any legal or interpersonal disputes. The letter also forbid the community to travel after 2100 hours. Areas along the Ring Road—from Elman in Balkh to Temurak in Chahar Bolak—have seen a considerable increase in AOG activity in the past month and a half. Several attacks and road blocks have



been reported in the early evening hours along the road, despite the heavy presence of ANP checkpoints. In one such incident at 1630 hours in Gorteppa Area, AOGs fired on a white Surf vehicle belonging to the consultation company contracted to oversee the Uzbek-Hayraton Railroad construction. Some have attributed the ANP's inability to deter these incidents to their immobility—they are either reluctant or not given the authority to leave their posts.

Despite the series of incidents along the road, IMF has also been unable to respond as they are currently in a handover period. While an ANSF-led search operation in Chahar Bolak and Dawlatabad districts has recently yielded a considerable number of weapons, no significant arrests have been made. The curfew imposed by the night letter in Elman indicates that attacks in this area may continue after dark. South of the Ring Road as well, AOGs who previously engaged to a limited degree in targeting ANSF/IMF have begun to direct pressure towards the local population, demanding weapons, taxes, and threatening them against cooperating with the government. While AOGs traditionally increase their activity in the warmer months and especially prior to a national election period, the current spike in activity west of Mazar-e Sharif should not be assumed to be seasonal or coincidental. Rather, in conjunction with trends seen throughout the northern region, AOGs in this area are expanding, becoming increasingly organized and possibly coordinating their efforts with AOGs in neighbouring districts.

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Increased AOG presence in Sholgara District
- Emboldened AOGs in Chahar Bolak and Chimtal
- AOG targeting of IMF supply lines


BAGHLAN

While two ANSF-led operations have recently quieted AOG activity in Baghlan Province, the long-term outcome is far from clear. The operation launched in Dand-e Ghor Area of Pul-e Khumri District on May 13 ended abruptly after four days of heavy fighting when the AOG commander responsible for abducting the five IO staff on 14 April gave himself and his captives up in Joy Naw Area, Ahmed Zai Village. According to one unconfirmed report, the commander had reportedly been severely wounded and was offered medical treatment in exchange for their release. Though the commander in Joy Naw was

	NGO Incidents
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captured, the top AOG commander in the area remains at large, and the AOGs who fled the area may be gradually returning. Reportedly ANSF have maintained very little presence in Dand-e Ghor Area since the conclusion of the fighting, and reported ANP misconduct during the operation may have further disaffected the local population. It is likely that AOGs will return to the area.

Two weeks after the completion of Tawhid II in the north of Baghlani Jadid District ANSF have established three additional combat outposts along the Kunduz River: two east of the river near Pul-e Bashir Khan and Kok Chinar, and one west of the river near Omar Khel Area. Despite the increased presence of ANSF in the area, on 26 May heavy fighting



broke out in Mangalha Area in which one ANA was killed and one other injured. Two children were also injured in the clash by ANSF artillery fire. Two days later, IMF launched an airstrike which killed 13 AOGs including the Baghlan Provincial Shadow Governor. Despite the heavy loss of life, AOGs maintain strong control of some areas in the north of Baghlani Jadid District, as well as some areas in the Shahabudin Triangle in northern Pul-e Khumri District.

Elsewhere in the province, an interpersonal dispute among two ACGs resulted in two days of heavy fighting in Andarab District, Bano Sub-district, Awoda Area. The clashes reportedly included the use of mortar fire and SAF and caused some damage to civilian property.

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS


- Continued instability in post-operational areas
- Local criminal disputes

SAR-E PUL

In the past month, AOGs have carried out two attacks on telecommunications towers and two attacks on ANP checkpoints in the vicinity of Sar-e Pul District, raising the risk of AOG attacks on ANSF targets in the district itself, particularly on the Sar-e Pul - Sayyad and Sar-e Pul - Shibirgan roads. Two telecommunications

	NGO Incidents
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towers have also been attacked in the past three weeks on the roads leading from Sayyad and Darzab districts towards Sar-e Pul City, and AOGs have threatened telecommunications companies to shut down their networks from 1800 to 0500 hrs daily. On 15 May at 1930 hrs, AOGs attacked two telecommunications towers in Sar-e Pul District, Takht Arab Area, with RPGs, injuring one local guard. Previously, on 27 April AOGs threatened to shut down a telecommunications tower in Jurghan Area of Kohistanat District, a key junction connecting



Bilchiragh and Qush Tepa Districts to Sar-e Pul District. AOGs from Sayyad District may be attempting to secure access to the vicinity of Sar-e Pul City, where an ANA forward operating base has recently been established. The AOG campaign against telecommunications companies has been successfully employed in Kunduz Province as a method to prevent ANSF/IMF to detect AOG presence in the area.

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Attacks on telecommunication towers
- Threat of attack on Sar-e Pul-Shibirgan Highway


FARYAB

AOGs continue to consolidate their presence in several districts of Faryab, and an NGO incident in Gurziwan District may point to an increasingly active AOG in the southwest of the province. An NGO vehicle (non-white Surf) en route from Kohistan District to Maymana City was stopped by a large group of armed men (estimated between 30-40) in Kaykak Village of Gurziwan District. The armed men questioned the NGO staff regarding their purpose of travel and specifically inquired whether they worked for the GoA. The NGO vehicle was able to pass through the area but was later shot at with SAF by a second group of armed men. The armed group may have been lying in wait for the Kohistan District Governor and Chief of Police who were reportedly travelling on the same road later that same day. This incident may suggest some degree of coordination among the emerging group of AOGs in Kohistan District and the long-standing AOGs present in Gurziwan. A small group of exogenous AOGs have reportedly infiltrated Kohistan District in the past few months—an astonishing develop-

	NGO Incidents
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ment for a district which is known to have staunchly resisted Taliban influence during the Mujahidin period. Two fatal AOG-ANSF clashes have been reported in Bandar Area of Kohistan District in the past two weeks. While former Jihadi commanders in Bandar and Lawlash areas have traditionally fought among themselves, it has been widely reported that the most recent attacks have been carried out by a newly arrived group trying to leverage anti-government support among the community. The group has recently issued letters to shopkeepers and businessmen to provide zakat. Meanwhile, the newly appointed District Governor of Kohistan is severely under-resourced, with only a handful of ANP at his disposal. Weak governance, inadequate security and a history of inter-communal strife has perhaps made the strategically-located district even more attractive to AOGs seeking to secure a link from Badghis to Faryab and neighbouring Sar-e Pul and Jawzjan.

North of Kohistan, a significant increase in the number of AOGs in Pashtun Kot District has been reported, where just two months ago the threat was limited to a mobile armed group no more than twenty. In the north of the district, AOGs ambushed a GoA flood assessment delegation visiting Qizil Qala Village, resulting in a brief firefight between the AOGs and the delegation's ANP



escorts. While the expansion of AOGs in southern Faryab is a legitimate concern in many areas, oftentimes fears of AOG infiltration may be exaggerated by commanders or communities seeking increased GoA support and the opportunity to fund their own pro-government militias.

AOGs in Kohistan and Pashtun Kot may be supported by those operating in Almar and Qaysar, where AOGs continue to increase their activity. Heavy fighting was reported in Qaysar District this period, focusing on Shakh Village, where AOGs attacked an ANP checkpoint at night and fired rockets toward the market during the day; and Senchitak Village, where AOGs attacked a checkpoint during the night and an IED detonated against a civilian vehicle in the early morning hours. To the east of the province, clashes continue in eastern Bilchiragh, Qorchi Village, where AOGs are vying for control of the village in the face of local resistance. In Shirin Tagab District, AOGs continue to assert their presence despite the alleged successes of Operation Cheshma-e Naw. AOGs have preached publicly against the government in Gul Qodogh Village, and an RCIED was discovered and defused by ANSF in Astana Baba Village. Finally, in Dawlatabad District, AOGs assassinated a well-known elder who was a former Junbesh and Hezb-e Islami supporter, as well as the leader of the district's pro-government militia. This individual was targeted one month prior in an RCIED attack which killed two bystanders and wounded a dozen others during market day in the central bazaar.

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS


- Possible AOG infiltration in southern districts
- Increase in activity in Qaysar District
- Continued instability in several districts

TAKHAR

Over the past several months, while the region's military assets have been occupied in neighbouring Baghlan and Kunduz, a small insurgency has been brewing north of the Kokcha River in Takhar Province. AOGs have gained control of the physically isolated Jangal Area near the border with Tajikistan, not only guaranteeing them a safe haven, but also lending them control of key terrain in the smuggling route from the border to other areas. Three weeks after the provincial government made a public appeal for military assistance, preparations are finally underway for a long-promised military operation in the northern districts of Darqad, Yangi Qala, Khwaja Bahawuddin and Khwaja Ghar. This period, a reported 100 additional ANP have been deployed to Khwaja Ghar and Khwaja Bahawuddin districts, while ANA/IMF aircraft have conducted reconnaissance in preparation for the operation. In parallel to these measures, a pro-

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	2
This Report Period	0

government militia has been deployed to protect the road from Yangi Qala to Khwaja Bahawuddin and parts of Darqad. Complicating matters further, at least one of the recently recruited pro-government militia leaders has been known to take part in smuggling and anti-governmental activities in the recent past. Meanwhile, AOGs have not shied away from continuing to attack both official and unofficial forces. Two attacks on pro-government militias in Maida Tepa Area of Darqad District left two militia members dead early in the reporting period, while later attacks along the main road between Yangi Qala and Khwaja Bahawuddin resulted in three AOG deaths. Another three AOG were killed this period when the IED they were preparing detonated in Kaltoot Area of Darqad District. Ironically, the incident marked the first confirmed IED in this area of northern Takhar, perhaps indicating a new AOG tactic in the area (though not yet skilfully executed). While police and military remain the sole targets of kinetic activity in the area, AOGs may continue to have a strategic interest in ab-



ducting high-profile civilians, as seen when the staff member of a GoA-run organization was held for two days in Shahri Kohna of Yangi Qala District, and allegedly released through negotiations with local elders. While it remains to be seen whether ANSF/IMF will deliver on its promise of sending troops to the region, once these troops are deployed it will not likely be a quick and easy victory. First, the AOG-controlled Jangal Area can only be reached by boat—a common feature among many AOG strongholds in the northern region—making the area almost impossible to enter and even more difficult to control. Second, given that Takhar is a tertiary IMF priority relative to its “key terrain” neighbours, it is not likely that ANSF/IMF will be able to dedicate the number of troops or resources necessary to maintain security in the area for an extended period of time. Depending on the scale and duration of the proposed operation, in the short term, NGOs may be forced to scale down their activity to avoid risking collateral involvement in AOG-ANSF clashes. In the longer term, NGOs may have to reconcile with a change in local power dynamics in the area.

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS


- AOG presence in northern Takhar
- Possible ANSF operation

JAWZJAN

In a clear sign of persistent AOG presence in the area, an ANSF/IMF convoy came under complex attack in Khaniqa Village of Qush Tepa District early this period, killing one ANP and injuring three others. The convoy was

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	0
This Report Period	0

struck by an IED followed by SAF, after which AOGs withdrew to the west of the district. The accompanying IMF unit called in close air support, but no action was taken by the aircraft. In Aqcha District, an ANP patrol was ambushed in the Shakarqul Mountain area, where AOGs had previously clashed with ANP in March 2010. While the security



situation remains volatile in the southern panhandle of the district, security in the greater Jawzjan Province has been stable for the past two months.

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- AOG presence in Darzab and Qush Tepa

KUNDUZ

Kunduz Province was quieter than usual this period, as military forces refrained from conducting offensive operations, and AOGs are still likely recovering from last period's massive airstrike which reportedly killed several key leaders. In spite of this set back, AOGs continued to attack IMF/ANSF patrols and ANP checkpoints, often resulting in clashes which produced AOG deaths. On at least two occasions, close air support was called in to respond to these attacks, and in one airstrike in Chahar Dara District two AOGs and a child were killed and another two AOGs and two civilians were injured. During the same clash, a mortar round mistakenly struck the northern part of


KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Execution of suspected collaborators
- AOG control of telecommunications
- Daytime attacks on north-south highway

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	2
This Report Period	0

Kunduz City in Zarkharid Area, impacting a local house and injuring three civilians.

AOGs continued to execute suspected IMF/ANSF collaborators this period, with one reported execution in Gorteppa Area of Kunduz District. It was also revealed this period that an MoI guard commissioned to protect an IO compound had been captured by AOGs in Imam Sahib District at the end of April and later died after his release due to abuse during his detention. In a second incident targeting an IO, an IO compound in southern Kunduz City near Sedarak Area also came under RPG and SAF attack by a group of AOGs who had infiltrated from Chahar Dara District. An almost identical attack on the same compound happened in June of last year, and the compound is thought to be targeted because of its vulnerable location. Three attacks occurred on the main road to Tajikistan, and such attacks are expected to continue as IMF increase their reliance on



the “northern supply route” running through Kunduz Province. Two rare daytime direct-fire attacks on the Kunduz - Pul-e Khumri Main Road took place in Aliabad District—one in Jelaw Gir Area, near the border with Baghlan Province, and one in Angor Bagh Area, a few kilometres south of Kunduz City—both targeting IMF or ANSF targets. North of the city as well, an IED detonated against a passing IMF convoy, causing slight damage to a vehicle. No IMF/ANSF casualties were reported this period; however, two pro-government militia members were killed and another four wounded in Tashguzar Area of Imam Sahib District, when AOGs launched mortars toward their checkpoint. The fight for control of eastern Imam Sahib District continues, where an RCIED was discovered and defused by IMF near Joy Begum Area. Telecommunications continue to be inoperable between the hours of 1800 to 0500, daily, as a result of an AOG intimidation campaign now being replicated in Baghlan and Sar-e Pul provinces.

LAGHMAN


After a calmer period at the beginning of May, Laghman Province saw again increasing AOG activity in late May. During the present reporting cycle, eight AOG initiated incidents were recorded, including four direct attacks, three

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- AOG attacks, especially against IMF/ANSF targets
- Increasing AOG activity, particularly in Qarghayi

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	1
This Report Period	0

IDF assaults and one IED related incident. The main focus of AOG attacks continued to be IMF/ANSF targets. AOG targeted an IMF/ANA base with three mortars in Dashti Zan Talaq Area (Kabul-Jalalabad Highway) and directly attacked three ANP CPs with heavy weapons and small arms fire. On 26 May, an IED hit an IMF vehicle patrol on the primary road to the IMF base in Al-ishing District (Gulwata Area).




Apart from that, AOG attacked the DAC in Alingar District with two mortars on 26 May. As in late April, Qarghayi District remains the hotspot for AOG activities and has seen 50% of all AOG initiated incidents in the province. However, the effects on the Jalalabad-Kabul Highway security still remain limited.

NURISTAN

After a significant period without relevant reports from Nuristan, late May saw a relative spike in incidents recorded across the province. As it has been widely publicised, AOG conducted coordinated operations in Nuristan's Bargi Matal during this period, and took control over most parts of the district. In a coordinated offensive on 29 May, several hundred AOG from Pakistan attacked multiple ANBP CPs in eastern Bargi Matal, and overran these positions. Facing this unexpected AOG advance, ANSF decided to withdraw from the area. Since then, Bargi Matal appears to be

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	0
This Report Period	0

under full control of AOG. Although most reports from the district are currently hard to verify, information indicates that several hundred civilians have been displaced due to the heavy fighting in recent days. It is understood, however, that ANSF increased its presence significantly southwest of Bargi Matal, and that IMF air assets supported several ANSF operations in that area. This, in turn, makes further deterioration in the area more likely. Besides several security incidents surrounding AOG's Bargi Matal offensive, Nuristan saw three



AOG-attributed incidents in Kamdesh and Nurgaram, including one IED strike, one direct attack, and one IDF assault. All of them targeted ANSF. Criminal activity, including a heightened risk of abductions, remains of concern in Nuristan. For instance, on 23 May in Waygal District, armed men abducted a local doctor who is running a private clinic in Kandagal Area.


NANGARHAR

With around 87 recorded security incidents, the overall level of reported incidents remains high throughout Nangarhar. As identified previously, the huge bulk of them are related to significant levels of criminality across the province as well as security force operations. Still, around 36% of all security incidents were attributed to AOG in late May, which displays a significant increase compared to previous ratios and a doubling of AOG incidents since early May. During this reporting cycle, Nangarhar saw a resurgence of incidents related to explosive devices.

The overall amount of recorded IED detonations tripled from 6 to

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	3
This Report Period	0

19 in comparison to the previous period. Outside of usual areas of IED deployment, such as Khogyani or Bati Kot, particularly the urban area in and around Jalalabad City saw a spike of emplaced explosive devices in late May. For example, on 20 May in Jalalabad an IED detonated near the AWCC office in Zone 1, wounding two civilians. In another incident on 27 May, ANP discovered a suspected VBIED parked along the Torkham Road which was control detonated on the spot. Magnetic IEDs—until this year's Spring, rarely used in Nangarhar—accounted for a significant portion of IED attacks and targeted mostly fuel tankers. For instance, on 28 May along the Ring Road south of Jalalabad City, two magnetic IEDs detonated against fuel tankers on different parts of the road, completely damaging both vehicles. All in all, at least seven incidents involving magnetic IEDs were reported



from Bihsud, Surkh Rod, and Bati Kot districts in late May.

AOG remain very active in Nangarhar's southern and south-eastern districts, apparently enjoying a significant freedom of movement and operation. Hisarak, for example, saw at least three direct attacks against the District Administration Centre. In Sherzad on 29 May, a group of AOG attended the Friday prayer in a local Masjid, agitating against GoA and threatening locals not to shave their beards anymore. Subsequently, the AOGs assaulted and temporarily abducted two off-duty ANA from the Masjid. Districts like Hisarak, Sherzad, Chaparhar, Khogyani, and Pachir Wa Agam are seeing increased volatility due to AOG activity, and even rather calm areas, such as Muhmand Dara, saw AOG incidents in late May.

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- AOG assaults in southern and eastern Nangarhar
- IEDs, particularly in Bati Kot and along the Ring Road

KHOST

The security situation in Khost Province continued to be difficult with a similar level of security incidents as during the previous reporting period and a slight increase in AOG initiated incidents. IED incidents remained high as usual and were at a similar level as direct and indirect attacks. This further underlines the trend of a diversification of AOG offensive


KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- IEDs throughout the province
- Direct and indirect attacks against security forces
- IDF targeting DACs, particularly in Musa Khel and again in Sabari

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	2
This Report Period	0

tactics from IED-related attacks as already noted in the beginning of May. A hotspot for direct and indirect attacks was not only again Sabari District, but also Bak, and especially Musa Khel. However, IED incidents might increase since nearly the same number of IEDs was discovered and safely defused as those that detonated.

The last three days have seen two significant AOG incidents in Khost City. On 29 May, AOG detonated explosive devices and destroyed a new high school building. Furthermore, on 30 May an SVBIED attack targeted an ANP static position, destroying several buildings in the immediate vicinity. At least



15 people, including 9 ANP and six civilians, were injured, and only the attacker was killed.

In addition, intimidation tactics, such as killings and abductions, continued. On 21 May, AOG killed a Mullah during prayer in Tere Zayi District. Two days later in Shamal District, AOG invited tribal elders for a religious meeting, opening fire on the local elders, killing five and abducting several others. On 25 May, the corpse of one of the abducted elders was found.

KUNAR

On 20 May in Marawara District, AOG abducted three INGO national staff members as well as twelve day labourers from an INGO project site. They were taken by armed men to an unknown location, and eleven of the day labourers were released later during the day. The remaining abductees were released on 28 May, and information suggests that the payment of a ransom was necessary to secure their release. As outlined in previous periods, Kunar Province, and its mountainous border districts such as Marawara in particular, remains a


KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- AOG – IMF/ANSF clashes, particularly in Manogai and Bar Kunar
- IEDs
- Abductions in Marawara

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	5
This Report Period	1

dangerous environment for NGO operations. The notorious instability across the province, marked by multiple local and external AOGs as well as the highest rate of AOG-initiated security incidents throughout the ER, inheres significant risks for NGOs, and abductions have become quite frequent. In late May, at least six abductions were recorded throughout Kunar.

With 73 reported AOG incidents, late May saw again a significant increase in AOG operations across Kunar. Although this increase exemplifies already identified seasonal trends, the overall amount of AOG incidents recorded in May 2010 is higher than in every other year before. Direct attacks remain by far the preferred AOG tactic in Kunar, accounting for around 55% of all AOG incidents. The usage of explosive de-



vices remained unusually high during this reporting period, with eight IED detonations reported from Chawkay, Sirkanay, Bar Kunar, Wata Pur, and Manogai districts. Additionally, due to apparent availability of projectiles, IDF assaults increased by over 50% compared to the last reporting cycle. In late May, around 18 of such strikes were recorded across the province.

AOG CPs remain frequent throughout Kunar, particularly in highly contested areas, such as the Pech Valley and bordering districts to Pakistan. During this period, at least two AOG CPs were reported in Manogai, with one incident involving AOGs dressed in ANSF uniforms.


PAKTYA

The level of recorded security incidents in Paktya rose from 22 incidents in the last reporting period to 39 during the present one. In addition, 75% more incidents were attributed to AOG. Particular active areas were Gardez District, with 16 security incidents, as well as Waza Zadran and Zurmat. This further deterioration of the security situation confirms a trend already identified during the previous reporting cycles.

On 18 May, a BBIED detonated himself while trying to enter the Jaji DAC. Additionally, ten days later a complex attack against an

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	1
This Report Period	0

IMF/ANP convoy was recorded in Dand Wa Patan near the Pakistani border. Most of the AOG assaults were direct and indirect attacks, targeting IMF/ANSF. However, there had been also three attacks on DACs, one in Jani Khel and two in Sayid Karam. In addition, PSCs remain frequent targets. During the reporting cycle there have been five such incidents recorded – four in Gardez District. Furthermore, IEDs continued to be a relevant AOG tactic as well. There were 14 IED related incidents recorded



during the last two weeks, of which six were safely defused and two detonated prematurely. Of note, AOG efforts to intimidate the local population were evident on 27 May in Sayid Karam, when an IED detonated in front of a civilian's residence whose owner was suspected of co-operating with the GoA, and on 24 May in Wuzza Zadran when AOG abducted civilians perceived as IMF/ANSF spies.

GHOR


The security situation in Ghor Province has significantly deteriorated over the past two weeks, particularly in its southern districts of Taywara and Pasaband. In the latter district, following an ANSF operation launched on 21 May, several AOG/ANSF clashes have been reported south of the DAC (between Sangand and Kakory). Along with armed clashes, the risk of collateral exposure for civilians is growing with the surge in IED deployment in affected areas. In three separate incidents (one of them occurred in the suburb of the Pasaband DAC, on 29 May), four civilians were killed and another one was wounded as a result of IEDs. It is worth noting that

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	3
This Report Period	0

according to ANSO data, the last incident related to IED deployment in Pasaband occurred on 17 April 2009.

AOG activity manifested itself also in the neighbouring district of Taywara. During the night of 30 May, AOGs launched simultaneous attacks with RPGs and SAF on ANP check posts located in the area of the DAC, causing no casualties. Additionally, another AOG attack on the District Centre occurred earlier, on 21 May in Du Layna, highlighting the risk that the deterioration in the security situation in the south of the province may affect other areas. Furthermore, on 30 May, an RCIED detonated in the said district as an ANP vehicle was passing on the main road in Turbulagh Area.

This increase in the activity in the abovementioned areas is likely to be a result of different factors: an inadequate ANSF presence, the



province's proximity to the AOG 'safe havens' in Helmand and probably to an AOG desire to widen the theatre of operations towards the western region, which will require further ANSF and IMF resources. At the time of writing this report, it seems that both sides are re-organizing themselves and the situation is still tense, particularly in Pasaband District.

Further AOG initiated incidents took place on 17 May in Chaghcharan District with an AOG attack using SAF targeting a primary school in Ghalmin area (several bullets impacted the perimeter wall of an NGO supported clinic). Also on 17 May, night letters were distributed in the said area, threatening community members against cooperating with the GOA and going to school. Finally, in Shahrak District on 23 May, security forces discovered two RCIEDs which were made of two mortar bombs and an unknown quantity of munitions.

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Heightened tension in Pasaband and Taywara
- AOG infiltration in Du Layna
- Armed robberies along districts roads

BADGHIS


The overall rate in security incidents in Badghis remains consistent with the previous reporting period. The cycle of AOG ambushes on the one hand, and IMF operations on the other hand, has continued in the area, unabated. Murghab District, after a temporary decrease in the rate of incidents that has been reported dur-

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- AOG-ANSF/IMF clashes
- IEDs in Murghab, Muqur, Ghormach and Qadis
- Abduction

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	0
This Report Period	0

ing the past cycle, has witnessed the major part of activity in Badghis Province with 11 recorded incidents, followed by Muqur. Worth noting, that the number of AOG initiated direct attacks on ANSF/IMF convoys and facilities has decreased during the present cycle, with only three reported incidents. Nonetheless, IED deployment remains significant with 8 devices that detonated throughout the province. As seen in other Western provinces, the local population is frequently the victim of the ongoing conflict. Regarding Badghis, three private trucks were targeted in separate



incidents in Muqur District. During one of the incidents that occurred on 17 May, on the main road in Jelawgirak area, two civilians were wounded. Additionally, in Ghormach AOG members attempted to abduct an ANP official on his way to the DAC. Finally, on 28 May in Qadis District, a judiciary official en route to Jawand District was abducted then purportedly executed by an AOG.

FARAH

AOGs activity in Farah Province has continued to affect Pusht Rod, Khaki Safed, Bala-Buluk, Bakwa and Gulistan districts. Particularly the latter district has experienced several unusual incidents during the present reporting cycle. Besides three reported IED attacks on IMF convoys, which are relatively commonplace in the area, on 16 May an AOG stopped and set ablaze a local transport vehicle travelling on the main road in Tali Kamand Area. Further intimidation of locals has continued in the area with an incident that occurred on 27 May in Gorzanak area. AOG abducted 12 members of the local Shura, accusing them of cooperation with the GoA and ANSF. Two of them were killed and the remain-


KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- IEDs/RCIEDs
- AOG ambushes/Armed clashes
- Criminal activity

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	1
This Report Period	0

ing ten were taken to an unknown location. Some unconfirmed reports indicate that they were executed as well. It is likely that, as seen in the south of Ghor, the security situation in Gulistan has been affected by AOG elements moving from neighbouring Helmand. Such actions are usually to intimidate the local population and to assert AOG presence in the area.

IED deployment still remains a concern throughout the province, with a total of eight IEDs being placed, of which seven resulted in detonations. Besides Gulistan, IED related incidents have been reported during the present cycle in Pusht Rod, Bakwa, Bala-Buluk and, of note, Khaki Safed. In the said district, on 24 May, in Sorkhedewal Area, a roadside IED struck a private transport vehicle whilst travelling from Pusht Rod to Khaki Safed District, killing five civilians and wounding an-



other eight. According to ANSO data, this marks the first IED incident involving civilian casualties in the latter district since April 2009.

It is interesting to note that besides IEDs, Pusht Rod District has experienced two rocket attacks during this reporting period. The first incident occurred on 18 May in Massaw area with two rockets that impacted near an ANP CP. Then, on 29 May, another rocket, probably fired towards the DAC, detonated close to an ANP CP in Chine Afghani Area. On 18 May in Bala-Buluk, AOG attacked a road construction company worksite, purportedly killing three national workers, wounding two and abducting another two. As a response, ANSF/IMF launched an operation against the AOG which were involved in this attack. As a result, six AOG were killed and another three were arrested.

HERAT


On 31 May in Injil District, an RCIED detonated while the Provincial Chief of Police convoy was passing on the Herat Airport Road. The official escaped the attack unscathed; however, two ANA and two civilians were wounded in the incident. This marks the first use of IEDs/RCIEDs in the said area since 1 November 2009, when a motorcycle-mounted IED hit a passing IMF convoy, wounding two persons. Regarding the province as a whole, the use of IEDs/RCIEDs continues to be a concern, with a reported 7 devices being placed (including the before mentioned incident), of which 5 resulted in detonations. Worth noting, besides ANSF/IMF convoys, AOGs seem to target especially high ranking police officers and GoA related officials. This trend has particularly been visible during the

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- AOG presence in Kushki Kunha, Kushk, Shindand, Karukh and Obe
- IED/RCIED
- Criminal activity

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	3
This Report Period	0

present cycle, likely related to the recent AOG announcement of the Al-Faath Spring offensive. In addition to the last attack in Injil District, on 16 May in Gulran (Sargardan area) an RCIED detonated whilst a Member of Parliament's convoy was passing by. Three days later, in Adraskan, a roadside IED targeted an ANP patrol, wounding the District Chief of Police. Subsequently, the official died of his injuries. Of note, as mentioned in the previous report, he was already the target of an IED attack that occurred on 6 May. Reporting continues about AOG movements in the neighbouring district of Karukh, especially around the Sabzak Pass. The AOG presence in this area manifested itself on 16 May when ANP escorting an IO contracted convoy came under attack in Ab Khoban. Another example of an increase in AOG activity in Karukh District occurred on 17 May, in Masjed Chubi area (both locations are only a few kilometres from Sabzak Pass). An AOG established a temporary check point, searching the vehicles and asking for GoA employees and NGO



staff. As it was mentioned in previous reports, it appears that AOG are expanding their presence from Badghis not only towards Kushki Kunha, but also towards some areas in Karukh and Obe districts. This expansion may involve further incidents and intimidations against the local population as well as NGOs in the near future.

Regarding Herat city and surrounding areas, it is worthy to note, there was an attempted abduction in District 10 and two further abductions in District 8 and in Guzara (Cheshmae Rig area). Regarding this last incident, peripheral reporting indicates that the son of the killed key AOG commander in the area may have been involved. Finally, the demonstrations that occurred in Herat on 14 May, initially planned to voice discontent about the recent death sentences against Afghan nationals in Iran, was likely motivated by a local Friday sermon involving a call for a protest against perceived offenses towards Islam. The incident underlines once again that demonstrations or civil disturbances are unpredictable and may occur with little or no warnings.

NOTICE: Your input is invaluable for the production of this report. While we appreciate information on incidents, we also need general information on the security situation and context in your area. So please remember to call or email us regularly.

Contact details of ANSO staff are provided on the last page.

ANSO: “..by NGOs for NGOs..”

HELMAND


Although the media has focused primarily on developments in Kandahar, one must realize that the precursor to these operations, Operation Moshtarak in Helmand, can be said to have ground to a bloody halt, if not a reversal of earlier progress. Indeed, AOG have clearly taken the initiative in the province during the report period, launching over 40 separate attacks on IMF, ANA, ANP and PSC targets, primarily in the districts of Nad Ali, Marja, and Sangin. In one of the more audacious attacks, AOG brought down an IMF helicopter with ground fire and in the process wounded four IMF and one Afghan interpreter. AOG have also continued their successful campaign of intimidation against the local population, with several warnings delivered to communities in the Marja

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- AOG attacks
- IMF raids

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	3
This Report Period	0

and Nad Ali Districts. These messages warning locals not to collaborate with IMF and GOA were reinforced with the beheading of a local IMF interpreter as well as several murders of local civilians in Lashkar Gah which have been attributed to AOG. As a measure of the success of these efforts, reports indicated that as many as 300 families (1200 – 1500 persons) have fled the Marja area, citing a failure of security force efforts to provide security following Operation Moshtarak, launched over three months ago. The inadequacies of the ANP were demonstrated by two incidents this report period. In Nahri Sarraj District, eight ANP officers were arrested for extorting bribes from the local community, and in the Babaji Area of Lashkar Gah District an IMF raid on an ANP post resulted in seven ANP officers arrested along with substantial amounts of money and opium seized.



IMF operations during the report period appeared to be limited to search and seizure of drugs and bomb-making materials, with raids taking place in several districts, including Naw Zad, Nad Ali, Musa Qala, and Sangin. These raids primarily resulted in the seizure of raw opium, or partially processed opium, most likely destined for transport and further processing in Iran and/or Pakistan.

The loss of momentum from IMF to AOG in Helmand Province, and in particularly the areas around Marja (previously and prematurely declared as 'liberated' by IMF commanders after the first few weeks of Operation Moshtarak), will most likely continue as the focus of IMF efforts shift fully to Kandahar and its surrounding districts, a prospect which has increased unease amongst local leaders in Helmand, which in turn hinders cooperation between IMF/GOA and local communities.

ZABUL


Overall, the number of incidents in Zabul Province remained slightly lower relative to last month; however, there were more direct AOG attacks during this report period, with the majority comprised of attacks on IMF logistical convoys. Direct attacks by AOG against convoys and their PSC guards occurred in Tarnal Wa Jaldak, Mizan, Shahjoy and Qalat districts. The incident in

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- IED strikes
- Direct AOG attacks against convoys

	NGO Incidents
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Qalat District, in the Pash Kanda area, was particularly violent, with six PSC and five AOG killed, and over 12 others wounded. As has been mentioned in previous reports, the increase in attacks can be partially attributed to the increase in convoy traffic on the Ring Road, presenting more targets of opportunity to AOG. IEDs also figured significantly in the incident count, with eight separate strikes being recorded against IMF patrols and convoys, mostly along the main route leading to and from Qalat City. IMF also appeared to be more active



during this report period, as two separate operations in Tarnal Wa Jaldak District (one in the area of Chakar Khel village, the other near Shokhak village) resulted in a total of 25 AOG killed, and over 15 wounded. ANP were similarly active, conducting raids in Qalat and Shahjoy districts which were successful in seizing various weaponry and IED-making materials.

GHAZNI


In an NGO-related incident, two local NGO employees were abducted by AOG earlier in the month in the village of Rashana in Gelan District. They were released unharmed, along with their driver, after assurances were given by local village elders that they were not GOA employees (they had in their possession a digital camera with pictures of education settings and were therefore initially assumed to be school teachers) and that their NGO was conducting itself properly in the area. This incident holds several important lessons for NGOs operating in these types of environments, including the importance of minimizing materials and documents which can identify staff, and enlisting local leaders as allies and supporters of one's projects.

Violence levels in Ghazni Province remained extremely high, and it retains the dubious distinction of being arguably the most dan-

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	1
This Report Period	1

gerous province in the country. During the report period all types of incidents were recorded, including direct AOG attacks, indirect AOG attacks, IED strikes, IMF airstrikes, abduction of village elders and provincial officials, beheading of civilian collaborators, and an influx of foreign (Pakistani) fighters.

What distinguishes AOG activity from the rest of the country is the sheer aggressiveness, frequency and, in most cases, sophistication shown in their attacks. As has been highlighted in past reports, AOG in Ghazni clearly have access to, and a propensity for, using rockets in attacks and during this report period combined rocket and small arms attacks took place against virtually every DAC in the province: Ab Band, Gelan (two attacks), Andar (three attacks), Rashidan, Khogyani, Ghanzi (two attacks), Din Yak, and Waghaz (four attacks). These attacks themselves represent a remarkable work rate for a two week period; however, during this same period AOG managed to



launch another 43 direct attacks, primarily targeting IMF bases, IMF logistical convoys, and ANP patrols and posts. These occurred primarily in the districts of Muqur, Gelan, Andar, Ghazni and Qarabagh, with one particularly sophisticated attack on an IMF armoured patrol in which two RCIEDs were detonated simultaneously, resulting in 11 IMF wounded and two IMF armoured vehicles destroyed.

In addition to these attacks, AOG also continued a campaign of intimidation and assassination that focused on Andar District, beheading four civilians accused of working/spying for the GOA in Muquri Village, assassinating the CoP of Andar District, and killing two civilians for 'collaboration' with GOA in Pul-e-Mullah village. This wave of killings in the district prompted a large demonstration in the Andar DAC, which was addressed by the Deputy Governor. Although assurances were given that security would improve, it is almost certain that further targeting of Andar District by AOG will lead to additional unrest.

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- IEDs
- AOG attacks

ANNOUNCEMENT:

In the coming months, ANSO will be helping develop an incident mapping service to aid NGO management and security procedures. Registrants will receive further information as it becomes available.


KANDAHAR

The dire situation in Kandahar is as much about the increasing fear and tension amongst local citizens as it is about actual security incidents. Skillful intimidation efforts by AOG, including the continuing use of targeted killings and the increasing use of night letters and other warnings, have resulted in the increased resentment of the presence of IMF and ANA units in Kandahar City. Many residents now restrict their daily movements severely, moving out of their houses only when required and increasingly refusing to report to work, especially in provincial government departments. In the surrounding districts there are increasing reports of local communities, previously enthusiastic partners with IMF units in development projects, now refusing to allow such projects to continue for fear of AOG retaliation. Specific incidents during the report period included a warning to local employees of an IO to stop working or face severe consequences, threats against a butcher who supplies meat to IMF, and orders to several Kandahar City mullahs to tell congregations to remain home

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	3
This Report Period	0

on 18 May 2010. In addition, there were four separate discoveries of a total of six bodies throughout the city during the report period which, although they may be related to criminal activity, is being attributed by locals to AOG killings of ‘collaborators’.

Intimidation efforts aside, AOG were also extremely active in initiating attacks against a variety of targets. In this regard, Zhari District, one of the target districts for upcoming IMF operations, witnessed over 18 separate attacks over the last two weeks, primarily against IMF patrols and static ANP posts. Similarly, Arghandab District hosted eight attacks on ANP posts and two against IMF patrols. Lastly, there were 16 AOG direct attacks in Kandahar City during the report period, including a complex attack involving a suicide bomber plus several gunmen against the HQ of the ANBP, two attacks against NDS personnel, and numerous attacks on ANP posts and patrols. The two highest profile attacks, however, involved an SVBIED attack



on the parking lot of the PRT, and a rocket and ground assault on the north side of KAF. The intent of both of these attacks (in addition to a similar assault on Bagram Airfield in Central Region) were clearly to signal AOG resolve to carry on their campaign against IMF and GOA forces, to display their ability to plan and execute operations at will, and to boost morale by striking at such potent symbols of the ‘foreign occupation’.


The next report period will most likely see an increase of incidents in Kandahar City itself, simply as a result of greater IMF activity and presence, in addition to the continued influx of AOG from other southern provinces as well as Pakistan. In addition, one can expect a steady increase in clashes in Zhari, Arghandab and Panjwayi districts as IMF/ANA/ANP begin establishing checkpoints and forward observation posts in advance of more concentrated operations, a pattern which we observed in the weeks prior to the launch of Operation Mosh-tarak in Helmand Province earlier in the year.

NIMROZ

Following the dramatic multiple BBIED attack in Zaranj City in early May, Nimroz has remained somewhat restive, with another attack by AOG on the DAC of Khash Rod during the current report period. The other major incidents came as ANP conducted a series of raids in Zaranj District, most likely as a result of the large attack earlier in the month. These raids netted a number of small arms, ammunition, unprocessed

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	0
This Report Period	0

opium and processed heroin, and some chemicals and drug equipment. It is also significant to note that border tensions remain a concern as in mid-May an Afghan farmer was shot by Iranian border guards. Several days later two Iranian military personnel were arrested inside Afghan territory (Zaranj District) and their weapons confiscated. These incidents follow from recent mass demon-



strations protesting the execution of Afghans by Iranian authorities last month and may be part of growing friction between the two countries.

PAKTIKA

Paktika remained violent during this report period, with AOG continuing an aggressive series of attacks. Attacks occurred in the DACs of Yahya Khel, Sharan, Urgun (two attacks), Omna, and Mata Khan. The most complex attacks were conducted against ANBP forces. In Waza Khwa District, an ANBP logistical convoy was attacked with a combination of IEDs, RPGs and SAF, resulting in several casualties. In


KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- IEDs
- AOG attacks on DACs

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	0
This Report Period	0

Urgun District, an ANBP compound was initially attacked by an SVBIED to gain access to the facility, after which three BBIED attackers entered the compound and commenced a firefight. Surprisingly, the casualties were relatively low, with five killed (including the suicide bombers) and only four others wounded.

IED strikes in the districts of Waza Khwa, Khushamand, Khair Kot and Yahya Khel accounted for the majority of the remaining incidents and for a total of four



IMF and six ANP wounded and two civilians killed during the report period.

Lastly, IMF operations appeared to be limited but effective in targeting AOG, with an air-strike in Inzarkai, Barmal District, resulting in an estimated 20 AOG killed and an unknown number of wounded, and a joint IMF/ANA operation in Urgun District (Chana Khwa Village) resulting in an estimated 15 AOG killed.

URUZGAN


Incident levels in Uruzgan Province were relatively low during the report period. IMF operations in Tirin Kot and Chora districts resulted in seizures of various small arms and IED-making materials; however, there were no significant clashes associated with these operations. There were AOG initiated attacks on several ANP posts in the same districts, with three ANP officers killed in the attack

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- IMF/ANA operations

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	0
This Report Period	0

in Tirin Kot. A rare ambush took place in the Aranya area of Dihrawud District, wherein an IMF EOD team was struck by an RCIED, at which point AOG riflemen attacked the group. Two IMF soldiers, along with their local interpreter, were killed and four others wounded in this serious incident. Lastly, of note is the killing of a civilian in the Gul Khar area of Tirin Kot District, accused by AOG of working for IMF/GOA. This killing of an



accused 'collaborator', while not a new tactic in the south, has been relatively rare in Uruzgan Province and may be part of an increasing trend designed to unsettle local communities in advance of the Dutch pull-out beginning in August.



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ANSO ACRONYMS

ACG-Armed Criminal Group /
AEF-Afghan Eradication Forces
/ **ANA**-Afghan National Army /
ANBP-Afghan National Border
Police / **ANP**-Afghan National
Police / **AOG**-Armed Opposition
Group / **APPF**-Afghan Public
Protection Forces (local depu-
tised militias) / **DC**-District
Centre / **GOA**-Government of
Afghanistan / **IDF**-Indirect Fire
(ex: mortars) / **IED**-Improvised
Explosive Device / **IMF**-
International Military Forces /
NDS-National Directorate of
Security (Intelligence) / **PRP**-
Previous Reporting Period /
PSC-Private Security Company
/ **RPG**-Rocket Propelled Gre-
nade / **SAF**-Small Arms Fire /
VBIED-Vehicle Borne Impro-
vised Explosive Device

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MISSING

This report ANSO
could not provide
analysis for the prov-
inces of:

Panjshir
Parwan

This is because we
do not know enough
about the area to
comment on the sig-
nificance of the inci-
dents occurring
there.

If you can help us
understand the prov-
ince better, please
contact us.

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