

THE ANSO REPORT

ANSO and our donors accept no liability for the results of any activity conducted or omitted on the basis of this report.
-Not for copy or sale-

Inside this Issue

Central Region	2-5
Northern Region	6-10
Eastern Region	10-12
Southern Region	13-15
Western Region	16-18
ANSO Info Page	19

YOU NEED TO KNOW

- Heavy fighting in Baghlan, Kunduz and Jawzjan
- Return of AOG to Marjah and significant suicide attacks in Kandahar
- IMF withdraw from Korangal Valley, Kunar
- Turkey to open PRT in Gen. Dostum stronghold

ANSO is supported by

EUROPEAN COMMISSION



Humanitarian Aid



Schweizerische Eidgenossenschaft
Confédération suisse
Confederazione Svizzera
Confederaziun svizra

Swiss Agency for Development
and Cooperation SDC



NORWEGIAN MINISTRY
OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

COUNTRY SUMMARY

In BAGHLAN major clashes occurred in Pul-i-Khumri and Baghlan-i-Jadid as ANSF/IMF attempted to reclaim some territory from AOG in those areas to limited success. AOG alignment with the Pashtun side of a land dispute in Hussein Khel area threatens to polarize communities there.

In KUNDUZ heavy clashes occurred in Chahar Dara while AOG focussed their response on Kunduz City with IED and rocket strikes. Local militia forces, in Khanabad, continue to clash with AOG and each other while a case of fratricide killed 6 ANA in Tut Mazar.

Major ANSF operations came to inconclusive end in Qushtepa, JAWZJAN while AOG attempt to consolidate and extend their reach in Jangal, TAKHAR.

In HELMAND AOGs return to Marjah to plant IED and kill/intimidate locals cooperating with IMF while Marjah residents demonstrate against a lack of progress. Eradication efforts contribute to instability in other parts of the province while the arrest of NGO staff in a Lashgar Gah hospital results in a staged demonstration

against NGO presence.

In KANDAHAR the poppy harvest creates a lull in activity. Three BBIEDs target NDS HQ in an unsuccessful attacks while other VBIEDs target the compound of a civilian contractor and an IMF convoy. An IMF Escalation of Force shooting kills four persons on a local bus and escalates tension in the city.

In HERAT and FARAH IEDs result in civilian fatalities while in BADGHIS the ANSF operation in Murghab continues. AOG clash with local militias groups in Jawand, Badghis. In GHOR criminal robbery turn violent and kills one NGO worker.

Multiple AOG arrests keep KABUL City quiet this period while two events cause concern that womens activities may be targeted in PARWAN. AOG cause civilian casualties in KAPISA, including school children, while heavy fighting continues in WARDAK, with IMF airstrikes, and LOGAR with a spate of IED's.

AOG mortar and IED strikes cause civilian fatalities

ties in KUNAR while the IMF withdrawal from Korangal Valley is expected to improve security there.

In NANGAHAR clashes between empowered tribesmen and the ANP continue in Sherzad and Khogani while land disputes result in violence elsewhere.

In NURISTAN road workers are abducted and released by AOG while and ANSF proposal to renter Kamdesh district is anticipated to deteriorate conditions there.

In PAKTYA Mangal and Zardarn tribesmen continue to clash over land disputes.

In LAGHMAN province armed AOG enter an NGO compound, advise the closure of the office and abduct a staff member who remains missing.

On April 15 Sweden & Turkey concluded an agreement for Turkey to establish two new PRT in Sar-i-Pul and Jowzjan in a move that is generally seen as being in support of Mr. Abdul Rashid Dostum.

KABUL

The regular monthly attack cycle in the capital appears to have been disrupted during the last reporting period as a result of numerous arrests of AOG suspects both in the city and the outer lying districts of Kabul Province. For the year-to-date there have been 69 AOG suspects arrested in Kabul City compared to 29 for the same period in 2009. In addition there have been several discoveries of weapons, ammunition, IEDs, suicide vests, explosives and rockets found both during arrest operations as well as in caches, mainly centred around districts 5, 8 and 12 as well as Bagrami, Paghman and Surobi. The entry points to Kabul City, especially from the south and west, are highly vulnerable to hosting AOG logistical cells as evidenced by the number of arrests in those loca-


KEY THREATS

- SVBIED attacks around highprofile GoA, IMF and foreign representation targets
- ACG abductions
- Car accidents

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	5
This Report Period	1

tions. Recent arrest operations will delay rather than eliminate the AOG threat due to the perceived value of striking the capital. A high profile attack in Kabul City is worth several in the provinces due to the domestic and international attention it focuses and the propaganda value derived from highlighting the security deficiencies of the current government and international forces.

The Peace Jirga, expected to convene at the beginning of May, will involve several thousand influential tribal, religious, political and security figures arriving in the capital for several days of negotiations and discussions. Security will be a distinct concern for ANSF with hundreds of ANP, amongst others, being drafted into the capital prior to and during the Jirga. The most obvious manifestation of the ANSF presence will be in the form of an increased number of checkpoints around the city. As the main events will take place around the Loya Jirga Tent in the Kabul Polytechnic, it can be expected that security



around the area will impose significant delays to travel times.

Two incidents in the Taimani Area of PD4, where a large number of NGOs are clustered, served as a reminder that criminality and personal disputes involving the use of violence occur irregularly. On 3 and 4 April, a grenade was thrown against a private residence and an individual was shot walking down street nine. No NGOs were involved in either incident.

Surobi hosted three separate AOG ambushes of ANSF and IMF on 5, 11 and 15 April, injuring one civilian in the area. The attack on IMF was again in the Uzbeen Valley, far from the main road between Jalalabad and Kabul. Attacks on ANSF generally occur on the isolated outposts littered along the main road. The number of AOG initiated attacks have more than doubled year-to-date to thirteen from 2009 levels, however all attacks have targeted petrol tankers, ANSF, GoA or IMF with no civilian passenger vehicles affected.

PANJSHIR

The usually tranquil province of Panjshir was awoken on 7 April following the detonation of an IED after an IMF convoy had passed in Bazararak, the provincial capital. Various rumours have circulated since; however it would be difficult to believe that the incident was AOG related.

KEY THREATS

- Nil

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	0
This Report Period	0

The most likely author of the attack is a local faction attempting to gain leverage from perceptions of instability. Local leaders met following the incident and reaffirmed their support for the PRT. Separately, there have been no further reports of tension following an exchange of SAF between the bodyguards of the former governor and ANP at the end of March. Panjshir remains a safe operating

- NO CHART AVAILABLE-

environment for NGOs with the latest events having no reported effect on operations.

BAMYAN

An attack against an IMF convoy involving RPGs and SAF in Eshpushta Area of Kharmard again illustrated how vulnerable the district is to occasional attacks against the security forces. The attack occurred on 9 April with no

KEY THREATS

- ACG/AOG activity in the Shikari and Ghandak Valleys
- ACG/AOG penetration from Tala Wa Barfak

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	0
This Report Period	0

reported casualties and stands in stark contrast to the rest of the province, where occasional land disputes or petty crime are the main issues. Other reports suggest that AOG are intending to penetrate Kharmard from neighbouring Tala Wa Barfak to possibly abduct individuals in exchange for an AOG commander captured during last summer. Since the intra-AOG clashes in Baghlan a month ago, ANSF have created

extra checkpoints along the border which are likely to remain in place for the near future. AOG attacks remain occasional and generally do not result in civilian casualties.

Virtually all of the isolated NGO bases in the province have been reopened following the winter stoppages and there have been no reports of any security concerns. Bamyan hosts numerous NGOs due to the safe operating environment and local acceptance levels, whose number may increase as Yakawlang becomes more accessible.

PARWAN

Although ostensibly a safe operating environment for NGOs, Parwan is host to a complex security environment where the delineation between ACG and AOG is all but clear. The province was on the front line during the country's civil war and hosted various factions whose strengths waxed and waned during many years of conflict. Following the fall of the Taliban regime in 2001, numerous commanders of all persuasions returned to the province preserving their networks, which over time became dormant. The fault lines between the different factions were never geographically divided, which has often resulted in personal disputes being settled in the streets of Chaharikar and the valleys of Ghorband. The provincial capital is known for a high


KEY THREATS

- Low intensity AOG activity in the Ghorband Valley
- ACG activity in Chaharikar

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	2
This Report Period	1

level of criminality that is believed to be derived from the different factions competing economically rather than militarily. Criminality appears to be the main motivator behind most incidents in Chaharikar; however tenuous links to AOG may also be a factor. There have only been five publicly reported AOG or ACG incidents in the capital for 2010, which is half that of 2009. During the month of April, three IEDs were planted in Chaharikar, two of which detonated. An IED was discovered by ANP in the vicinity of the women's park in Baghi Zanana Area and subsequently defused on 3 April. Another IED detonated while a shopkeeper was attending to a pile of scrap metal in the Bazaar area on 6 April.

Of direct concern for NGOs was an IED deliberately left outside a private residence which also housed a training room for an NGO during the daytime. The incident occurred during the night of 31 March and resulted in the



deaths of two members of the same family as they exited the compound following seeing a lit fuse. Three people have been arrested in conjunction with the incident. It appears that the incident may be the result of a personal dispute, although the concern is that the NGO was involved in gender issues and such programming in the past has attracted antagonism from the more conservative segments of the Parwan population. The IED found near the women's garden in the same week gave further credence to the theory that the IED may be related to the NGOs activities, however ANSF are insistent the IED was the result of a dispute and that the deaths of the two individuals were accidental.

Separately, two weapons caches and two launch sites with primed rockets were found by ANSF in Jabalsarraj and Bagram and were most likely destined for the IMF airbase itself or convoys leaving the base. A rocket attack was launched on the airbase on 5 April, with no casualties incurred.

KAPISA


The deterioration of the conflict in the east of the province has again had a direct effect on the civilian population. In mid-November, an AOG rocket attack narrowly missed an IMF-convened shura and impacted in the Tagab Bazaar killing twelve and wounding dozens and may have contributed to several hundred families seeking refuge on the outskirts of Kabul City. In the

KEY THREATS

- Secondary exposure to clashes between AOG and ANSF/IMF in Tagab
- Low intensity factional disputes in Kohistan I & II
- Decentralized AOG activity in Alasay, Nijrab and Tagab

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	0
This Report Period	0

last reporting period three separate attacks have resulted in civilian casualties. An AOG ambush of an IMF convoy on 31 March led to a sustained exchange of fire leaving three civilians wounded in Afghanya Area of Nijrab. On 6 April, an AOG rocket attack on an IMF position in Karamkhel Area of Tagab missed its target and struck a school killing five school children and wounding three others. An AOG ambush of IMF on the same day in Lagan Khel Area of Alasay resulted in six civilians wounded. The growth of the conflict in the coming weeks and months will most likely produce a corresponding increase in the number of civilian casualties.



In the West of the province, where most NGO operations are based, there have been few reported incidents year to day. Of possible future, rather than immediate concern is the growing number of students returning from madrassas in Pakistan. The students, seemingly unaligned, have a dim view of 'foreign' organisations, women's right to work and in some cases the legitimacy of the Afghan state. For the moment the returning students do not pose a threat to NGO operations however an increasing level of conservatism may be expected in some segments of the population.

WARDAK

This month, AOG incidents have been increasing in number but consistent in nature with incidents in recent months namely attacks on military/security convoys and attacks on DACs. In the districts of Chaki Wardak, Nirkh, Jaghatu and Saydabad there have been a total of fourteen ambushes or IED attacks in the last two weeks, which included the injuries of four PSC guards on 13 April.


KEY THREATS

- ACG/AOG abductions
- AOG intimidation
- Secondary exposure to IEDs and SAF ambushes targeting IMF/ANSF and logistics convoys along Highway One

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	1
This Report Period	0

ANSF conducted a joint operation against a location/building believed to be used by AOG. During the operation an IMF air strike was called in resulting in the destruction of the building. Where previously AOG attacks have not been marked by a significant ANA/IMF response, the latest reporting period suggests that punitive IMF strikes will rise significantly in the coming months.

The overwhelming number of incidents in Wardak comprise IEDs, ambushes and armed attacks, against district centres and IMF /ANSF checkpoints. Wardak remains a challenging security environment for NGO op-



erations. The districts of Saydabad, Nirkh, Jaghatu and Chark represent the highest threat to NGO operations due to the risk of collateral exposure to attacks on ANSF/IMF.

The frequency of AOG and ANA/IMF engagements in Wardak significantly raises the risk of travelling the already dangerous route to Ghazni. NGO are strongly advised to avoid travel along the highway route and indeed those districts in the southeast of the province.

DAYKUNDI

Daykundi experienced a quiet reporting period with only one realized security incident. It appears that a 'gunfight' between two individuals in Khadir district on 3 April led to two other individuals attempting to intervene, both of whom were subsequently shot and wounded. The cause of the dispute is not known nor what happened to the two 'gunfighters'.


KEY THREATS

- ACG/AOG abduction threat in Gizab
- Winter road travel
- Occasional banditry on roads leaving from Nili

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	0
This Report Period	0

Similar to most districts in Daykundi, Khadir remains lightly policed with the majority of security incidents in the centre and north of the province derived either from isolated acts of banditry or land disputes between families or communities.

Gizab and Kijran remain a concern with some reports suggesting that a significant number of AOG fighters have arrived in Gizab after seeking shelter from ANSF/IMF operations in Helmand and Uruzgan. If confirmed, then the Tamazan Valley, south of Nili, and viewed as the border between AOG and GoA control, could



witness further attacks in the coming weeks. For the rest of the province, NGOs express no particular security concerns beyond the rather important issue of whether a former commander, responsible in the past for an NGO abduction, will assume the post of district police chief in Gizab. If the post is accepted, then ethnic relations could deteriorate south of Nili and short term instability may result.

LOGAR

The volume of AOG incidents this year is markedly higher than last year. There was no slowdown in March and incidents have continued to climb in April. Baraki Barak, Muhammad Agha, Charkh hosts the majority of AOG initiated incidents in Logar with IED attacks and ambushes, mainly directed at IMF and ANSF, being the most frequently used tactics.


The main risk to NGO operations remains collateral exposure to IMF/ANSF and AOG engagements as well as from IEDs

KEY THREATS

- ACG/AOG abductions
- IMF operations
- AOG intimidation

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	0
This Report Period	0

planted by AOG along district roads. For the month of April alone, there were eleven discoveries of IEDs/anti tank mines along district roads in the province, with an additional AOG IED cell being intercepted on 2 April that allowed ANP to seize one complex IED that the AOG were preparing to lay. The AOG managed to escape. And on 3 April an IED struck an IMF vehicle on a district road, leaving two IMF wounded. Furthermore on 5 April, three rockets impacted near an ANP check point. ANP located/ searched the firing point and arrested three suspected AOG with one AK-47 rifle and a pistol. This assessment is reinforced by the



growing number of small arms, rocket, and RPG attacks on security forces/ police in Logar this year. Most incident areas are in the high traffic areas of Muhammad Agha and Puli Alam, but the southern districts of Kwawar, Charkh, and Baraki Barak (which combined have borders with Paktya, Ghazni, and Wardak) are likely the most heavily AOG infiltrated and dangerous areas for NGO.

BAGHLAN


The security situation in Baghlan Province has rapidly deteriorated in the past month and a half. AOG strongholds lie heavily to the west of the Pul-e Khumri-Kunduz Main road, and encircle the Pul-e Khumri-Mazar main road to the north and south, a few kilometres west of Pul-e Khumri City. While IMF/ANSF have focused their attention on AOG strongholds north of the Pul-e Khumri-Mazar Road, AOGs have consolidated control of Dand-e Ghor Area, south of the main road. Early in the reporting period ANSF suffered an embarrassing loss when AOGs ambushed a convoy of nine ANP rangers en route to Dahan-e Ghor District. After several hours of sporadic SAF exchange, AOGs managed to abscond with seven of the nine rangers, two of which may have been destroyed and five of which are confirmed to be at large. Furthermore, in a much feared and anticipated offensive attack on the Pul-e Khumri-Mazar Main road, AOGs struck an ANA convoy in the early evening, prompting a several-hour long fire fight which closed the main road for several hours. There have been several unconfirmed reports of AOG checkpoints along the Mazar-Pul-e Khumri main road, and evidence suggests that high profile NGO and IO vehicles are vulnerable to

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	1
This Report Period	0

attacks and possible abductions along this road in the early evening hours.

On 14 April, ANSF/IMF forces launched a second major operation in western Baghlani Jadid District. Thus far, three IMF soldiers and an unknown number of ANSF have been killed in action, with several others wounded. In addition to engaging IMF/ANSF forces, AOGs have retaliated by striking targets further east and south, such as the ANP headquarters in Baghlan Old City, and the abovementioned strike on the ANA convoy. Prior to the ongoing operation, ANSF/IMF performed search operations in Pouza Ishan and Shahabudin Areas of Pul-e Khumri District. The operations met with little reported resistance until 11 April, when AOGs managed to attack and disable an IMF truck being transported on the main road leading north, near Hussein Khel Area. At around the same time, AOGs attacked a separate IMF/ANSF patrol in the adjacent area of Dand-e Shahabudin, critically wounding one IMF soldier.

The AOG attacks on 11 April occurred immediately after a civil unrest erupted in Hussein Khel Area. The clash was in relation to a land dispute between the primarily Pashtun residents of Hussein Khel and government-supported settlers, primarily from Andarab District. The residents of Hussein Khel (who reportedly received AOG support) took up arms against the ANP who had been deployed from throughout the province to assist the Andarabi people in securing the land which had been guaranteed to



them by the previous Provincial Governor. The clash ended when provincial government leaders met with elders from Hussein Khel, guaranteeing that the settlers from Andarab would temporarily cease construction until an official decision is made regarding the ownership of the land. The land redistribution process has evidently worked to alienate the population of Hussein Khel, and the evident ethnic dimension of the dispute may further polarize ethnic groups in the area along political lines, driving Pashtuns to solidify their support for AOGs, while driving others to solidify their support for GOA.

Pul-e Khumri City remains vulnerable to IED attacks, as two have been discovered and defused by ANP in the past three weeks – one in front of girl's high school, and one in front of private residence near the main road north of Dand-e Ghor Area. Also in Pul-e Khumri City, an attempted assassination attempt on a member of the provincial council left the GOA official severely wounded. It is not clear whether the attack was perpetrated by AOGs or ACGs in relation to an ongoing inter-familial dispute.

KEY THREATS

- Attacks on main roads launched from AOG-controlled areas
- Threat of IEDs in Pul-e Khumri City
- Missing ANP Rangers
- IMF/ANSF Operation

TAKHAR


NGOs operating in northern Takhar are faced with a rapidly changing security dynamic in Darqad, Yangi Qala and Khwaja Bawahudin districts. The area's dominant AOG is consolidating control over Jangal Area, and expanding its presence southward towards Khwaja Bawahudin District. The group appears to be contesting ANP's control of the

KEY THREATS

- Illegal checkpoints and AOG-ANSF clashes in northern Takhar
- Competing AOG and ACG factions in northern Takhar
- Armed clashes in Bangi Bridge Area

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	1
This Report Period	1

river crossing to Tajikistan, and has clashed with ANP in Khwaja Bawahudin District twice this reporting period. ANP are currently too under-resourced to secure the area, and portions of the road between Jangal Area and Al Qonaq Area of Khwaja Bawahudin are assessed to be under AOG control. Illegal checkpoints have been reported on this road, and have been confirmed in Al Qonaq Area of Khwaja Bawahudin and Jangal Area of Darqad District. While the dominant AOG has not been hostile thus far towards NGOs, the situation is highly unpredictable. Multiple AOGs and ACGs appear to be vying for influence in the area, and NGOs are at risk of being



targeted for political capital by the opposing groups. An abduction and subsequent release of two engineers in Yangi Qala District was believed to have been carried out by a smaller, more criminally-oriented faction, perhaps in order to undermine the authority of the dominant Jangal-based group. The engineers were accompanied by armed guards, which may have been a factor in their being targeted. The same two groups clashed last reporting period in Darqad District. Elsewhere in the province, night time AOG-ANSF clashes have resurged in Bangi District for the second consecutive reporting period.

JAWZJAN


ANSF/IMF forces officially ended the ANA-led operation in Qush Tepa and Darzab districts as well as the surrounding areas of eastern Bilchiragh District in Faryab Province and Sayyad District in Sari Pul Province. Immediately following the official conclusion of the operation on 1 April, AOGs attacked an ANP checkpoint in Targhaly Afghaniya Vil-

KEY THREATS

- Continued AOG presence in Darzab and Qush Tepa
- Increase in ANSF presence

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	0
This Report Period	0

lage, along the road north of Qush Tepa District Centre. Throughout the operation AOGs maintained a low profile; however, no significant arrests or AOG movements were reported, indicating that AOGs remain in the area. Approximately 100 ANSF remain in the area, and are currently constructing an ANA forward operating base north of Darzab District Centre. In addition to the continued threat of AOG attacks on ANSF forces, there is a continued threat of IEDs along the main road, as



ANA discovered and removed an anti-tank mine along the road near Chaqmachochur Village.

KUNDUZ

Kunduz saw an increase in incidents throughout the province, including the provincial capital. As isolated IMF operations continue to target AOG leadership throughout Kunduz Province, AOGs may focus retaliatory attacks on Kunduz City. Two successive IEDs detonated in Sedarak Area in the west of the city, the first targeting an IMF convoy, and the second detonating against an ANA vehicle which had been deployed to block the road. Rockets were launched during the day from Chahar Dara District toward the airport and adjacent ANP Training Centers three days in a row, reminding NGOs that the area is vulnerable to such attacks during the day.

Heavy armed clashes were reported between IMF/ANSF and AOGs in Chahar Dara District,


KEY THREATS

- Threat of abduction in Imam Sahib District
- Competing pro-government militias in Khanabad District
- IED and rocket attacks in Kunduz City

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	1
This Report Period	0

resulting in a number of IMF, ANSF and civilian casualties. In Tut Mazar area, a joint IMF/ANSF mine-clearing operation was ambushed by a large group of AOGs. Three IMF soldiers were killed when their vehicles attempted to retreat and struck an IED. Shortly thereafter, IMF mistakenly opened fire on an ANA vehicle driving towards the scene, killing six ANA officers. The incident underscores the precarious relationship between IMF and GOA in Kunduz Province, as it is the second case of ANSF deaths due to IMF "friendly fire" reported this year. High-ranking GOA and IMF officials convened a public meeting in Kunduz City to reinforce good relations and publically display a unity of effort.

There is reportedly an increased threat of NGO abduction in Imam Sahib District, where two NGO staff members had been abducted last reporting period. In Archi District, a four-hour long fire fight in Archi District Centre resulted in three civilian casualties. In Khanabad District, renewed AOG activity and tensions be-



tween several pro-government militias threaten to destabilize the area north of the district centre. In the first AOG close-range attack on pro-government militias in Khanabad since September, AOGs infiltrated and attacked militias in three separate villages in Aqtash Area. The following day, the vehicle of the District Chief of Police was struck with an RCIED in Qabuli Qeshlaq Area within Aqtash. Shortly thereafter, an armed clash between two pro-government militias erupted in which one militia commander was killed and nine of his men disarmed by the opposing militia. The series of events suggests that one of the militias had been accused of or involved in assisting AOG infiltration of the area. These incidents have all occurred several kilometers north of the main Kunduz-Taloqan road; however, AOG infiltration and inter-militia rivalry could destabilize the security of the main road in the future.

BADAKSHAN


While occasional incidents in Badakhshan reveal the presence of AOG-ACG networks and local political tensions, the province remains a respite compared to other areas in the northern region. Local tensions erupted in Warduj District, where armed men at-

KEY THREATS

- Attack on Warduj DCOP

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	0
This Report Period	0

tacked the District Chief of Police and an accompanying GOA convoy. The chief of police, who has been notoriously proactive in arresting high-value AOGs throughout the province, escaped with injury; however, a district-level GOA member and ANP were killed in the attack.



BALKH


No significant changes in the security dynamics were reported in Balkh District; however, a highly unusual RPG attack was reported in Kaldar District, where two RPGs were launched toward the District Police Station during the night. Kaldar District does not have a known AOG presence, and no suspects have been arrested in

KEY THREATS

- RPG strikes in Kaldar and Kishindeh districts
- IEDs in Sholgara
- Expansion of IMF base in Dehdadi District

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	1
This Report Period	0

connection with the incident. AOGs continue to operate in Kishindeh District, where after a week of respite from AOG-initiated incidents, AOGs launched two RPGs towards an ANP checkpoint in Kishindeh Bala during the night, and escaped after a brief fire fight. In Sholgara District, IEDs constructed from mortar rounds were discovered emplaced along the road in Qizil Kent Village. This is the first outward sign of AOG presence reported in Sholgara District since November 2009. Also, the significant expansion of an IMF base in



Dehdadi District, and the resultant increase in IMF road movements through and around Mazar-e Sharif City may draw an increase in AOG activity in the area.

FARYAB

Faryab Province saw an increase in AOG activity outside of the typical areas under AOG control. In northern Faryab, AOGs attacked an ANSF/IMF patrol in Khoshak Village, Qaramqol District. Close-range attacks on ANSF in the area are very rare, and the attack may have been in retaliation for an AOG arrest made a few days prior to the attack. AOG presence in northern Faryab appears to be limited to a number of local religious extremists; however, continued AOG activity may indicate that local elements are expanding their breadth, potentially with the support of outside groups.


KEY THREATS

- AOG activity in Northern Faryab
- ANSF/IMF Operation in Jilayir Valley
- AOG-ANSF clashes in Almar and Qaysar

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	8
This Report Period	0

A campaign of AOG intimidation seems to be brewing in a village south of Dawlatabad District Center, where a large number of AOGs have been reported preaching against the presence of foreign troops and cooperation with GOA. These incidents deviate from typical AOG activity in Dawlatabad, which has previously consisted mainly of armed attacks. AOGs may be attempting to consolidate presence in this area, as the ongoing IMF/ANSF operation ongoing in Jelayir Valley has encroached upon their traditional area of control. In response to this growing threat, ANSF arrested three AOGs in Dawlatabad, one of whom is reportedly a mid-level leader in Faryab Province.

The operation in Jelayir Valley is ongoing, with the objective of moving ANBP into a consolidated position in Khwaja Na Musa Subdistrict. AOG-ANSF/



IMF clashes in this area have been sporadic throughout the operation. AOGs have decreased their profile in these areas over the past two weeks; however, it is evident that they remain present in the area. AOGs continue to exert de facto control in Qaysar and Almar Districts outside of the district centres. AOGs ambushed ANSF patrols in both districts this reporting period.

In the first IED detonation reported in Maymana City since October 2009, an unknown type of IED attached to a bicycle detonated near the police station in District #1, causing no damage or casualties. South of Pashtun Kot, AOGs reportedly maintain a presence in the southern part of Myandara Valley, although no activity has been reported in the valley this period.

SAMANGAN

Samangan Province has not reported any activity for the past month; however, AOGs are

KEY THREATS

- ➔ AOG migration from Baghlan

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	0
This Report Period	0

known to migrate in small numbers from Baghlan Province to Hazarat-e Sultan District for safe haven and rest. The presence of small numbers of migrating AOGs without significant local

support does not pose an evident threat to NGO activities. Rather, AOGs will likely refrain from outward activity in this area, because it is not strategically important and only advantageous as a safe haven.

SAR-E-PUL

ANSF/IMF officially ended the ANA-led operation in Sayyad District, as well as Qush Tepa and Darzab districts of Jawzjan Prov-

KEY THREATS

- ➔ AOG presence in Sayyad District

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	0
This Report Period	0

ince and Bilchiragh District of Faryab Province. No significant arrests, armed clashes, or AOG movements were reported during or after the operation, and AOGs likely remain present in Almalik Village and other areas. While

AOGs have kept a markedly low profile throughout the operation, AOG attacks on ANSF positions may resume in the near future.

KUNAR

With 46 AOG-initiated security incidents reported in early April, the security environment in Kunar Province remains very violent, with the highest level of recorded AOG activity in the Eastern Region. As reported previously, direct attacks against security forces and supply convoys continue to be AOG's preferred tactic, accounting for 75 % of all recorded AOG incidents in early April. The frequency and intensity of these attacks inheres heightened risks for bystanders, and civilians get harmed frequently. For instance, on 10 April in Nari District, AOG attacked an IMF/ANSF convoy, injuring at least two children in

KEY THREATS


- ➔ Collateral damage from AOG – ANSF/IMF clashes
- ➔ IDF in Wata Pur and Sirkanay

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	4
This Report Period	0

the vicinity.

Additionally, six IDF assaults and four incidents related to explosive devices were reported. Most of them, both IDF strikes and IED assaults, are often inaccurate, posing again a threat to local population and civilians. For example, in Wata Pur District on 8 April, AOG fired four mortars towards the District Centre. The rounds missed and impacted in a residential area, injuring four civilians.

As part of an apparent shift in strategy, IMF announced that its withdrawal from Korengal Valley in Manogai District has been completed by 14 April. During the last couple of years, Korengal area was one of the most violent areas in the Eastern Region, with AOG-IMF clashes on a daily



basis. With IMF's withdrawal from such remote areas, it seems likely that the overall amount of recorded incidents might decrease in the future due to decreased likelihood of IMF-AOG confrontation.

NANGARHAR

With 14 ANSO-recorded AOG incidents, the level of AOG activity remains high throughout Nangarhar Province. In close connection to ongoing operations of the Pakistani Military on the other side of the border, this activity was concentrated in Nangarhar's southern and eastern bordering region to Pakistan, with a particular increase in assaults against ANBP in Lal Pur and Goshta recorded.

As reported in previous periods, Sherzad and Khogyani witness increasing frequency and intensity of AOG assaults against security forces. In early April, Sherzad District alone saw at least three AOG assaults against IMF/ANSF. The security environment

KEY THREATS


- AOG activity throughout the province
- IEDs, particularly in southern districts
- Brewing land disputes

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	3
This Report Period	0

in remote areas such as Hisarak has further deteriorated. In early April, AOG again attacked Hisarak's DAC with at least ten mortars. At the same time, due to the upcoming poppy season, attacks against counter-narcotics teams re-emerged. For instance, in Pachir Wa Agam on 6 April, AOG attacked an ANP Anti Narcotics Team for at least fifteen minutes.

IED deployment throughout Nangarhar remains high. In this reporting cycle, 15 explosive devices were located or detonated across the Province. Although most IEDs target security forces, the number of civilian casualties has increased in recent. For example, on 8 April in Jalalabad City, a bicycle-borne RCIED targeted a passing IMF convoy, killing three civilian and injuring thirteen. In another incident, in Khogyani District on 9 April, an IED detonated against two civilians. Additionally, the use of magnetic IEDs

NANGARHAR



throughout Nangarhar has increased in recent weeks. Hitherto, these devices were rather unusual in the province.

The number of incidents related to violent land disputes has decreased in early April, although it is understood that most internal conflicts throughout the province are still brewing. During this reporting period, only two such incident was reported. Namely, in Rodat on 1 April, about 400 local people - mainly illegal occupiers of government land - staged a demonstration in protest against the government's handling of their land issue. In another incident, on 13 April in Pachir Wa Agam, a local land dispute ignited to armed violence, resulting into ANP intervention.

NURISTAN

Nuristan Province continues to be inaccessible and isolated, with only little reports received from there. In early April, only three security incidents were recorded. Namely, on 7 March in Nurgaram District, an unidentified armed group abducted six employees of a private road construction company and took them into the mountains. Later that day, the

KEY THREATS


- AOG at large
- Abductions in Nurgaram District

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	0
This Report Period	0

abductees were released, after ANSF and the construction company's local security guards attacked the armed group for several hours. The third incident, again on 7 March in Nurgaram, was related to a personal dispute.

Information indicates that ANSF attempts to re-establish its presence throughout Kamdesh District. This district has been widely under AOG control in recent months and the new influx of ANSF might increase the potential of armed violence and confrontation in that area.

NURISTAN



ANSO ER would greatly appreciate any information, however trivial, regarding any known incidents, threats, or possible developments from this province.

PAKTYA

In early April, AOG activity increased significantly throughout Paktya, particularly in Zurmat and Jaji districts. Around four AOG-initiated incidents were recorded in Zurmat, Jaji and Lija Ahmad Khel, with two of them being di-


KEY THREATS

- AOG activity in Zurmat and Jaji
- Local disputes in Chamkanay

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	1
This Report Period	0

rect attacks against security forces as well as two IED strikes against IMF vehicles.

Still, the huge bulk of incidents reported from Paktya are related to a high level of security force operations, especially in Gardez and Zurmat. As seen in late March, local disputes continue to be of concern. For instance, on 12 April in Chamkanay, a land dis-



pute between Mangal and Zadran tribesmen escalated into armed clash, injuring four locals.

LAGHMAN


On 4 April in Qarghayi District, a group of at least 12 AOG approached the compound of a national NGO. Seven AOG entered the compound, overwhelmed the guard, and then searched the building. The group planted explosives inside the office and partially damaged it, leaving a written statement saying that the NGO should shut down all of its projects because it is immoral and does not conform with religious

KEY THREATS

- AOG presence in Qarghayi
- IEDs in Alishing and Alingar

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	1
This Report Period	1

obligations. Additionally, they abducted one national staff member from the scene who remains in captivity. It remains unclear why this NGO has been attacked specifically, and this incident marks the first direct attack against an NGO in Laghman Province since January 2009. Still, having in mind the recent influx of AOG into Qarghayi District, in combination with the NGO's apparent reliance on GoA-funding, it seems possible that this assault might be related to a perceived lack of the NGO's impartiality due to the nature of its projects. Next to this incident, the overall



security environment in Laghman Province remains rather moderate and accessible with five security incidents recorded. As seen in previous periods, IEDs remain to be of concern in the northern valleys of Alishing and Alingar. During this reporting cycle, three IED-related incidents were reported, with one discovery in Mihtarlam, one detonation in Alishing as well as one in Alingar.

NOTICE: Your input is invaluable for the production of this report. While we appreciate information on incidents, we also need general information on the security situation and context in your area. So please remember to call or email us regularly.

Contact details of ANSO staff are provided on the last page.

ZABUL


Zabul Province had a large number of security incidents during the report period, however the majority of them involved the discovery and disposal of IEDs. IEDs and indirect attacks appear to be the preferred type of AOG activity (as opposed to direct attacks) as the province sits astride the Kabul – Kandahar Highway and sees a great deal of traffic from IMF / ANA convoys as well

KEY THREATS

- IED strikes

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	1
This Report Period	0

as construction vehicles and their PSC escorts. The majority of IEDs were discovered in Qalat District, with several in the areas of Kakaran and Omakai. In the village of Mohammed Ali, located in Shahjoy District, an IED strike managed to kill three civilians. In Jamal Khel village, also in Shahjoy District, a roadside IED killed one civilian and wounded two others. Lastly, Shahjoy District also witnessed several rocket and mortar



attacks in the areas of Pash Kanda, Bazargan, and Zafar Khel villages.

HELMAND


Helmand recorded an enormous number of incidents during the last report period. Reports indicate that AOG are re-entering the Marjah area in significant numbers, along with IED materials, IED experts and foreign fighters. Elsewhere in the province AOG remain much more proactive in their activities, launching direct attacks on IMF / ANA / ANP on 32 separate occasions in the last two weeks alone. Similarly, intimidation and outright assassination of local leaders who appear to be cooperating with IMF 'Build' efforts (within the doctrinal context of 'Shape – Clear – Hold – Build') continue with the deaths of a tribal elder and four of his companions in Marjah on 8 April. Predictably, there is growing unrest amongst Afghan civilians at the lack of progress made

KEY THREATS

- Demonstrations / Popular sentiment against International Community
- AOG attacks

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	3
This Report Period	1

following Operation Moshtarak, and a small demonstration was held in Marjah on 13 April against IMF and GoA. These types of protest will undoubtedly grow if no progress is made with respect to stability of the security situation. Compounding the serious problems of insecurity, the eradication campaign appears to be more active in the province (corresponding to the harvest season currently underway) and 15 separate eradication operations were recorded during this period throughout the province. This jump in eradication efforts reflects a level of confusion amongst GOA and IMF actors, who have at various times over the last two months have stated that eradication would be suspended for this season, or conducted in a selective manner to minimize the economic effect on certain key communities. Lastly, three international aid workers and six other local staff of an INGO in Lashkar Gah were arrested on suspicion of plotting with AOG to conduct suicide



attacks and assassinate the provincial Governor. Regardless of the truth – and it is by no means certain if the truth will be known – this incident has the potential to turn public opinion against the international community, especially if it appears that the standards of justice applied to the three ex-pats are markedly different from those applied to the six accused Afghans. A demonstration was held in Lashkar Gah following this well-publicized incident which demanded the removal of the INGO from the country, however reports indicate that this was well-planned, with participants bussed in to the city's stadium, and not a spontaneous expression of popular discontent.

KANDAHAR

Other than in Kandahar City, AOG attacks in the province, both direct and those involving IEDs, appeared to have leveled off somewhat over the past two weeks. The relative 'lull' in AOG-initiated incidents can be attributed to two main reasons: 1) the poppy harvest currently underway is drawing low-level AOG back to the fields for the next several weeks; and, 2) reports are that AOG are using this period to build up stocks of personnel and equipment to challenge the increasing presence of IMF / ANA in Kandahar City and the districts of Arghandab, Zhari and Panjwayi, all key areas in the upcoming operations. Kandahar City however has seen a series of spectacular attacks, most likely designed as a show of strength and defiance, in addition to causing significant casualties. A suicide attack involving three individuals equipped with BBIED was


KEY THREATS

- IMF/AOG operations

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	3
This Report Period	0

launched against the NDS HQ in Kandahar City on 12 April however they failed to inflict major casualties. A day later a female employee of a US-based aid contractor was killed as she left the office located in the city. Finally, on 15 April, the city was rocked by two large VBIED attacks. The first targeted a passing IMF patrol in the center of the city and resulted in at least one killed and three others wounded. The second attack was directed at a guest-house compound used to house international staff of several US-based contractors and resulted in 7 Afghan nationals killed and 3 internationals wounded, one critically.

ANP units have been significantly more active over the report period, locating and disposing of IEDs, conducting patrols in the City, and seizing increasing numbers of suspected AOG and increasing amounts of IED-making materials. The population in the province is clearly becoming more anxious in advance of expanded



operations and this is being made worse by several incidents where IMF have mistakenly killed civilians while on patrol. At the beginning of the report period, IMF shot and killed a civilian who failed to stop after several warnings, and on 12 April IMF opened fire on a bus, killing at least four civilians and wounding 18, including a number of women and children. This incident led to vocal demonstrations against IMF and statements by various Afghan officials demanding action be taken against those responsible. Adding to this tension was an obvious discrepancy in the accounts of the incident from IMF and local witnesses.

GHAZNI


The report period witnessed a mix of incidents initiated by AOG and IMF / ANA / ANP units. During the first half of the report period, a series of IMF and ANP operations captured a total of six AOG and 600 kg of explosives in Ghazni City. Additional operations later in the week resulted in the discovery of a cache of explosives near the DAC of Gelan Dis-

KEY THREATS

- IED and AOG Ops

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	0
This Report Period	0

trict, the seizure of a number of RPGs in Qala-e-Qalati area of Ghazni District and the arrest of four AOG in the village of Dand in Gelan District on 14 April. AOG initiated attacks on 14 separate occasions, targeting ANP six times, PSC escorting IMF convoys two times, IMF patrols three times and the DACs of Waghaz, Rashidan and Muqur one time each. Lastly, there were five separate IED strikes in the province, with the most serious incident



occurring 4 April in Ghazni City when an IED hit a civilian Mazda truck, killing four persons, including three women, and wounding five others.

URUZGAN


Uruzgan was relatively calm over the report period, with the majority of incidents comprising of IED discovery and disposal operations in Chora and Dihrawud Districts. A total of six AOG

KEY THREATS

- IED's

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	0
This Report Period	0

were killed in two separate incidents in Tirin Kot District when IEDs they were planting exploded prematurely. Lastly, reflecting the complex tribal and community dynamics of the province, a boys' school was set afire by individuals initially thought to be AOG however there are now reports that



perhaps rival community groups were involved.

NIMROZ


Nimroz was characteristically quiet during the report period however this is expected to change for two reasons. The end of the poppy harvest may result in more unprocessed opium moving through the province en route to Iran, and as a precursor to this

KEY THREATS

- IED
- Criminal Activity

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	0
This Report Period	0

ANP seized a significant amount of opium – over 100 kg – from a house in Zaranj District near the border on 13 April. Secondly, AOG preparations to challenge upcoming IMF / ANA operations in Kandahar may result in an increase in the movement of arms from Iran destined for Kandahar however at this point the increase



in AOG and weapons is deemed to have mainly arrived from Pakistan, not Iran.

PAKTIKA


AOG appeared to have step up activity levels, including intimidation and assassination of local officials, during the report period with a significant number of incidents occurring in Barmal District. These included the killing of a tribal elder accused of supporting the GOA in Angor Ada, the killing of a local Mayor in the Margha area and attacks on ANP units near the DAC. Outside of

KEY THREATS

- IED
- Attacks on local officials

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	0
This Report Period	0

Barmal District, Yosuf Khel and Yahya Khel District witnessed high levels of violence, including attacks on both DACs, an attempt to kill the Provincial Governor while he was holding a meeting with the ANP Deputy Chief of Yahya Khel, and an IED attack on the residence of the District Administrator of Yosuf Khel. In two separate incidents, two ANP appeared to have abandoned their posts and joined AOG, a possible sign that such intimidation tactics are



working. IEDs remain a very serious threat in the province as well, with 13 incidents of strikes over the report period, four of them resulting in civilian deaths and injuries.

HERAT


Most of the security incidents in Herat Province during this reporting period were taking place in Shindand, Kushk and Kushki Kuhna Districts.

The risk of collateral damage remains a concern for the local population as well as for NGOs working and travelling in the province. This risk was particularly visible in Kushki Kunha District (Darzak area) and Kushk District (Sharekhalil and Cheldukhtar area) where the use of IEDs is visibly increasing since 9th April. All four IED related incidents during this reporting period were reported in these districts. So far there had been altogether only seven IED related incidents before in Herat Province this year. Two of the recent IED incidents in April were involving civilian casualties, highlighting the risk of being collaterally damaged. As it

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	1
This Report Period	0

was the case on 9th April in Kushki Kuhna district when a roadside IED hit a local transport vehicle which was travelling on the road leading to the Kushki Kuhna District Centre. The IED killed three civilians and wounding another five. However, on 10th April IEDs were safely defused and on 14 April an IED detonated prematurely while being emplaced by AOG members. Of note, especially in Kushk District an increase of AOG activity is to be expected since a known and influential AOG commander is said to have returned from Pakistan. In regard to Kushk, it is also worth noting that on 4th April a violent armed clash erupted between locals over a tribal dispute, resulting in one killed and another two civilians wounded.

Unusual were two incidents in Shindand District on 3rd and 9th April when AOG attacked and damaged towers of private telecommunication companies. Even similar incidents are commonplace in the South and became more frequent for example in Kunduz Province last year they



are rare in the Western Region. So far AOG attacks (five) on telecommunication facilities, towers or antennas had been taken place in Herat Province mainly in Injil District in 2008 before. The last recorded incident on a telecommunication tower in Herat City was on 23rd January 2009.

The seizing of weapons was continuing during the present reporting cycle throughout the province. Of note, besides search operations in Guzara and Shindand, a large quantity of explosive devices was seized on 4th April in Zinda Jan District (Shikh Zard area) including BM1 rockets and mines.

With two incidents during the reporting period, Herat City itself remained relatively calm. Of note, on 4th April ANP arrested two individuals carrying an unknown quantity of explosive devices (District 2) which indicates that there is AOG activity in the city. However, the second incident was personal dispute which turned violent (District 7).

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- IED/RCIED
- AOG presence in Kushki Kunha, Kushk and Shindand
- Criminal activity

NOTICE: Your input is invaluable for the production of this report. While we appreciate information on incidents, we also need general information on the security situation and context in your area. So please remember to call or email us regularly.

Contact details of ANSO staff are provided on the last page.

BADGHIS

Badghis Province continues to be assessed as volatile and unstable. In Murghab and Muqur ANSF/IMF operations are still in process. To counter the AOG presence ANSF/IMF launched a large operation in Murghab District (Sinyha area) on 6th April, resulting in numerous AOG fatalities. Compared to the previous reporting period, the province has witnessed an increase in security incidents from nine to twenty incidents over the past two weeks. This increase is most probably linked to the ongoing military operations since the vast majority of incidents are armed clashes and IED related incidents.

KEY THREATS

- AOG operations
- IED
- Abduction

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	0
This Report Period	0

Similar to previous cycles incidents were concentrated around the Murghab Valley and the surrounding districts of Muqur, Murghab and Ghormach with AOG ambushes and attacks on ANSF/IMF convoys and check posts. It is worth noting that beside these historic hotspots AOG activity continued to manifest itself also in Qadis District. In addition, on 13th April there was also an armed clash in Jawand (Ghare Seyah Village area) allegedly between AOG and pro-government militia. Furthermore, IED related incidents are increasing visibly. One-third of all IED related incidents in Badghis took place after 11th April. In addition, 80% of IED related incidents were reported in Murghab and Muqur Districts.

As seen in other western prov-

inces the local population is frequently the victim of ongoing conflict. On 3rd April, a shepherd was shot and injured by an AOG member in Ghormach. He apparently had refused to pay illegal taxes which AOG were collecting from villagers. On 11th April, AOG shot and killed a religious elder allegedly due to a dispute. In addition, the trend of mainly AOG initiated abduction continued in the province during the present cycle. For instance, on 3rd April AOG abducted three local civilians en route from Qala-i-Naw City to Muqur District Centre. They were released the following day in Chakarha area due to the intervention of local elders. Of note, two GoA employees' relatives who were abducted on 29th March were released on 1st April due to the intervention of local elders again.

The killings as well as the abductions can be seen as an AOG tactic to intimidate the local population. This is of course closely connected to the high level of AOG activity in the province which becomes increasingly a kind of base for AOGs (especially Murghab District) to operate in the North while having access to the South and Iran.

FARAH

Farah province remains unstable. During the current reporting period, armed clashes and roadside IEDs continued to be the main threats for the local population as well as the NGOs in Farah Province. AOGs were quite active. Nine of thirteen incidents were AOG initiated. Of note, all armed clashes and IED related incidents during the last two weeks took place in Bakwa and Pusht Rod Districts according to ANSO data. These incidents are an indicator for a significant AOG presence. In addition, they are increasing the risk of being collaterally

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- IED & Ambush
- Criminality

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	1
This Report Period	0

damaged especially while traveling. On 7th April for example, a roadside IED struck a local transport vehicle in Bakwa, wounding one local civilian. Three days later, similar incident in Pusht Rod killed five civilians. The vast majority of casualties caused by IEDs this period were civilians. This had already been the case in the reporting period.

In addition, attacks on ANSF/IMF as well as logistic convoys remain frequent throughout the province. The latter are strategically important for AOGs, especially on the Herat – Kandahar Highway. On 1st April, a suicide bomber on a motorbike detonated his vest close to a convoy of fuel tankers on Herat-Kandahar High-

way in Bakwa. The suicide attacker was killed and two PSC vehicles as well as a fuel tanker were damaged. The following day on the same road, a PSC convoy was attacked by AOG resulting in heavy fighting, claiming several casualties on both sides. As further military operations in the South (especially in Kandahar) have been announced, an increase in AOG attacks on security forces and 'affiliates' can be expected particularly along IMF supply roads.

Another pattern that has already been observed during the previous reporting cycle was again evident in this period. Significant military/police operations were going on in areas of significant AOG activities in the province, especially in Bakwa and Pusht Rod. But also in Lash Wa Juwayn District where ANP discovered various munitions including two mortar bombs, one RPG-7 and one BM1-rocket.


GHOR

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	1
This Report Period	1

In the early morning of 10th April, an armed roadside robbery directly involving two INGO staff members (off duty) took place in Dawlat Yar District on the road from Dawlat Yar to Chaghcharan. The course of events started when three ACG members stopped one person on a motorcycle and robbed him of his valuables including his motorcycle. As the two INGO staff members with their motorcycles arrived as well, they were also robbed by the ACG. Afterwards a private transport vehicle was approaching the scene. So far there is no clear information what exactly happened to the vehicle when it was arriving. The ACG left the scene on the stolen motorcycles. However, the leader of the group turned back again and opened fire, killing four civilians including one INGO staff member and wounding three persons including the second INGO staff member. The reason for his action is not exactly clear. At present it seems likely

that a person in the private transport vehicle recognized the ACG. At present, allegedly all three ACG members were arrested. Additional information indicates that the respective three armed men are an ACG operating in Ghor and are well known by locals. Of note, the INGO staff members were travelling off duty and had no IDs, tags or similar items with them, that might have identified them as INGO staff. Therefore, it can be excluded that the INGO itself was targeted.

Nevertheless, armed roadside robbery remains one of the main threats to NGO operating in Ghor Province. Another roadside robbery occurred on the following day in Du Layna District. A group of armed men stopped a local transport vehicle. They physically assaulted the driver and abducted the passengers. Peripheral information suggests that it was a planned attack probably related to a personal grievance. In addition, on 3rd April a roadside robbery involving a private transport vehicle took place in the usually quiet district of Lal Wa Sarjangan. Until April 2010, three of twelve ACG related incidents in Ghor were



armed roadside robberies. With another three armed roadside robberies during the last two weeks, this kind of incident seems to be increasing. However, it remains to be seen if this trend continues. Nevertheless, it is important to plan road missions carefully and exercise caution while travelling. In addition, as most robberies take place in order to gain some kind of valuables, it is advisable to remain calm and co-operate with the robbers, minimising the risk of injury or retaliation.

AOG incidents worth mentioning took place in Tulak and Charsada Districts. On 4th April, an AOG ambushed ANP who were on their way to arrest a local commander in Tulak. Furthermore, on 10th April three RPGs were fired towards the Charsada DAC which landed in an open area and therefore were neither very precise nor effective. The last AOG attack against a DACs recorded by ANSO in Ghor Province (Tulak District) was in September 2009. Overall, AOG attacks on DACs in Ghor were relatively rare so far. There had been only four in the last 15 month according to ANSO data.

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Armed Robberies on Road
- AOG in Pasaband/Taiwara
- Criminality



ANSO is hosted by
[Deutsche Welthungerhilfe](#)

To Register with ANSO
contact:
registration@afgnso.org

ANSO is managed by an NGO
Board. If you have any
feedback, good or bad, let
them know on:
ansoab@yahoo.com

ANSO ACRONYMS

ACG-Armed Criminal Group /
AEF-Afghan Eradication Forces
/ **ANA**-Afghan National Army /
ANBP-Afghan National Border
Police / **ANP**-Afghan National
Police / **AOG**-Armed Opposition
Group / **APPF**-Afghan Public
Protection Forces (local depu-
tised militias) / **DC**-District
Centre / **GOA**-Government of
Afghanistan / **IDF**-Indirect Fire
(ex: mortars) / **IED**-Improvised
Explosive Device / **IMF**-
International Military Forces /
NDS-National Directorate of
Security (Intelligence) / **PRP**-
Previous Reporting Period /
PSC-Private Security Company
/ **RPG**-Rocket Propelled Gre-
nade / **SAF**-Small Arms Fire /
VBIED-Vehicle Borne Impro-
vised Explosive Device

CONTACT ANSO

CENTRAL REGION OFFICE (KABUL)

Phil Priestley - central@afgnso.org - 0799 323 792

Mukhtar - central2@afgnso.org - 0799 322 116

NORTH REGION OFFICE (MAZAR)

Elizabeth Detwiler - north@afgnso.org - 0799 404 617

Firoz - north2@afgnso.org - 0799 408 252

EAST REGION OFFICE (JALALABAD)

Philipp Schweers - east@afgnso.org - 0799 248 362

Shohar - east2@afgnso.org - 0798 778 014

SOUTH REGION OFFICE (KANDAHAR)

Peter Dimitroff - south@afgnso.org - 0796 688 416

Noori - south2@afgnso.org - 0700 492 550

WEST REGION OFFICE (HERAT)

Patrick Malach - west@afgnso.org - 0799 322 192

Sayed Karim - west2@afgnso.org - 0707 474 135

COUNTRY MANAGEMENT (KABUL)

Nic Lee - director@afgnso.org - 0799 325 349

Ali Riazi - operations@afgnso.org - 0797 165 017

Rachel Adam - rsamobile@afgnso.org - 0793 230 118

MISSING

This report ANSO
could not provide
analysis for the prov-
inces of:

➔ NONE

This is because we
do not know enough
about the area to
comment on the sig-
nificance of the inci-
dents occurring
there.

If you can help us
understand the prov-
ince better, please
contact us.

FEEDBACK ON ANSO SERVICES

ANSO welcomes your feedback. To provide confidential feedback, please email the
ANSO Advisory Board at ansoab@yahoo.com.