

THE ANSO REPORT

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YOU NEED TO KNOW

- Destabilization of Jalalabad City
- Consistent NGO incident volumes
- Elections related civil unrest
- Inter-AOG conflicts
- Suicide attacks

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COUNTRY SUMMARY

While overall incident volumes have continued to decline as the year matures (see graph p.2), NGO incidents have continued apace (see graph p.8). A total of 9 NGO direct incidents from 8 separate provinces were recorded this period, covering 4 of the 5 regions (South being the exception). This data is a testament to the impact pervasive insecurity can have on the NGO community. These incidents were instituted by a variety of actors, including armed opposition, criminals, and in one case, the beneficiaries themselves. Incident composition was also diverse and included abductions, armed attacks, intimidation efforts and theft.

The Parliamentary electoral process has been an element shaping the countrywide context during the past few months. The recent announcement of disqualified candidates has resulted in a continuation of this dynamic, particularly the latter half of the period. Demonstrations on behalf of these disqualified candidates occurred countrywide, in many cases resulting in multi-day, primarily small scale (with the exception of Samangan), and peaceful gatherings. A deliberate tactic on the part of the

organisers was to stage these protests on main thoroughfares, resulting in numerous road blockages and hampering freedom of movement. While it is likely that the volume of such activities have peaked, it is also probable that they will continue into the short term as some of the aggrieved have vowed to continue their efforts until satisfaction is achieved.

Suicide attack trends for 2010 have remained consistent, averaging 11 incidents per month (see graph p.22). Of note, this attack vector appears to be divorced from the typical ratio based relationships noted between individual tactics and overall incident volumes. This period recorded BBIED related incidents in the East, South and West. The stand out incidents amongst these included the double BBIED attack against the ANP HQ in the provincial capital of Paktika and the detonation of a planned attacker during an arrest attempt in Ghor. It would appear that the introduction of this tactic into Ghor is part of deliberate effort to raise the armed oppositions profile in this province.

The events in Jalalabad City this period warrant atten-

tion as, until recently, it had remained relatively unaffected by the conflict which has embroiled the rest of the region. Direct attacks against the PRT and a PDO compound, along with separate IED strikes and ambushes against IMF elements, point to a concentrated effort to intensify AOG actions and bring the conflict to the regional centres doorstep. In response to this, there has also been push back on the part of security forces, including focused IMF operations along with a planned enhancement in the national security force presence within the city.

The inclusion of an AOG, composed of 73 members, in the reconciliation effort reported from Baghlan signifies one of the largest such event recorded. Typically, reconciled groups have consisted of small scale units, with the majority of these occurring in the Western and Northern Regions. In the West, these reconciliation efforts have actually become a source of insecurity, as disparate elements engage in politically or philosophically motivated armed clashes.


KABUL

Police forces in pursuit of AOG and ACG networks (in particular abduction gangs) maintained a sustained tempo of operations both in the capital and rural districts, representing 60% of the combined 31 incidents recorded during this cycle (as of 28th of November). The risks peculiar to NGO safety in the Kabul environment are currently assessed as low to moderate. Surobi remains the primary area of concern to NGOs, due to overt AOG activity and its impact on overland access towards Jalalabad. The announcement of the final election results (except for Ghazni) was followed by a series of peaceful demonstrations in Kabul, called, as in the previous cycle, by the Union of the Wolesi Jirga Candidates.

Despite the usual high volumes of threat reporting, Kabul City and the rural districts remained calm, with AOG actions having materialized in 3 confirmed direct incidents (2 close range attacks in

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Surobi, and another IED explosion on the link road between Karte Naw/PD 8 and Bagrami). In Karte Naw, two suspected AOG members were interrupted while emplacing an IED under a stationary ANA truck. Quick to jump on their motorcycle and drive away, the two individuals became involved in a vehicular accident which triggered the explosion of the device. As of the time of reporting, reports were also received about three separate instances of SAF targeting PSCs and IMFs convoys along the Jalalabad Road, and a local dispute between two villages in Surobi whose residents are involved in the Surobi Dam construction works, interpreted by other sources as AOG's abduction of 18 workers. The circumstances of the latter incidents are yet to be confirmed. Lastly, on 26 November, a newly appointed NDS liaison officer to the PD 15 ANP HQ was stabbed to death by unknown attackers. However, a clear link to AOG motivation behind the attack has not been established and the suspicion remains that the murder was not politically moti-



vated.


Several sources have also identified the recent appointment of a new AOG Shadow Governor for Kabul Province. If proved true, such a situation would most likely increase the mentioned AOGs' leadership motivation to stage a spectacular attack in Kabul in order to mark the appointment. However, more likely than close range and complex attacks, which require reconnaissance & planning, logistical preparations and clearly allocated resources, an IDF attack against a high-profile venue would be a more feasible option, though this would put the residents of the neighbourhoods adjacent to such location at the mercy of AOG IDF operators. The overwhelming majority of this year's IDF attacks in Kabul employed weapons such as 107 mm rockets, which rendered the attacks inherently imprecise. Prominent locations included KAIA, Kabul Polytechnic Institute, and IMF facilities in various locations in PD 9 and 10 as well as in Darulaman.

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Civil unrest
- Criminality
- Spectacular attacks

Total AOG Initiated Attacks per Month - 2010

(Close Range + Indirect Fire + Suicide Attacks)




KAPISA

Following a lull in armed escalations in the first half of November, when the preparations for Eid apparently outweighed the war game, Kapisa returned to the low-intensity warfare typical of the previous periods. Out of 5 reported incidents, all but one occurred in the eastern districts, including all three AOG-initiated attacks (one kidnapping in Nijrab, two close range ambushes of IMF/ANSF patrols in Tagab and an additional roadside IED discovery in the same district). Construction projects along strategic routes in Nijrab, Tagab and Alasay represent the main conflict hotspots. Nevertheless, AOG have demonstrated their capacity to challenge the pro-GOA structures right in the DACs. The vast majority of AOG attacks remain close-range assaults (64%) and stand-off IED or IDF (35%) attacks against security installations and patrols in the aforementioned districts. Due to low NGO penetration and weak presence of GOA, reporting from the eastern parts remains scarce with the mapping of security incidents coming hand-in-hand with assumptions about AOG's complete freedom of movement in large

	NGO Incidents
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swathes of the said districts, and occasional strikes by the French Special Forces. In such circumstances, conflict spill-over into the western parts of Kapisa remains a possibility, reminiscent of the recent AOG influx into Kohi Safid (Parwan) from Tagab. In counterpoint to this, however, the first 11 months of 2010 saw a combined 12 AOG-initiated incidents in the western districts as opposed to 20 incidents for the same period in 2009. Henceforth, while the risks of NGOs exposure to hostile action in the eastern districts are currently assessed as substantial, the western districts represent a favourable environment for NGO operations. However, the Shukhi Area of Mahmudi Raqi remains of concern for its explosive mixture of andiwal networks, conservative clerics and income-oriented criminal elements active locally, each of the structures occasionally hosting AOG members from the East.

During this cycle, ANP reported discovery of a quantity of military materiel from weapons caches in the area, while other sources claimed an influx of AOG fighters, supposedly intending to ramp up IED activity in the surrounding areas. So far this year, 2 armed clashes and an IED discovery were reported from Shukhi. Of note, Shukhi has a legacy of more intensive fighting resulting in several documented IMF casualties



last year. Overall, Kapisa witnessed a 10% increase in AOG-initiated attacks in comparison to the same period last year, and a 17% increase when compared to 2008.

Population-centric efforts continued by pro-GOA forces, in an attempt to wrestle Tagab district out of AOG control. Besides the training of regular police forces, IMF mentoring units have been engaged in recruitment and training of local militias, hired to assist ANP as an auxiliary force in policing the roads in the district. The deployment of such militias has been envisaged mainly in the areas where IMF-led infrastructure rehabilitation is underway. Allocated to particular checkpoints, the servicemen undergo a six-day training course ranging from weapons' maintenance to small-unit infantry tactics and first aid. As an IMF officer quoted in a recent press-release, "(...) for some residents [these units] are the only security forces or other government forces they see regularly and it's important they earn their neighbor's trust." In a public appeal in the Tagab bazaar earlier during this cycle, ANP and IMF unveiled the roll-out of 'the Guardians of Peace Program', a scheme of financial incentives for the community members in Tagab to inform the ANSF/IMF on AOG plans and movements in the province.

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Factional disputes in west
- Irregular security units
- AOG presence in east


LOGAR

A slight decrease in security incidents has been recorded in Logar during this cycle. Out of the 23 incidents, ANSF and IMF documented actions (60%) outweighed AOG activity, with at least 4 high-ranking AOG members’ arrests, 4 IED discoveries (all of them in Baraki Barak, including 2 ‘daisy chains’ formed of respectively four and three devices planted in two locations), and at least 2 substantial weapons cache discoveries with most of the action concentrated on the major population centers (Baraki Barak, followed by Puli Alam and Muhammad Agha). However, an IMF air strike conducted during Eid festivities on the 18th of November in Shah Mazar of Baraki Barak ended up in the tragic killing of at least 1 civilian and the critical injuries of 4 other (2 of whom reportedly succumbed to their injuries). The strike sparked a public outcry and instigated a delegation of elders to visit the deputy governor in the provincial capital. Although the IMF have been effective in reducing collateral casualties as one of the major standpoints of the COIN strategy (and a point of

	NGO Incidents
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contention with the GOA authorities), civilian casualties, combined with accounts of IMF’s night raids and house searches, severely undermine the communities’ support for the pro-GOA cause.

Logar also witnessed a targeted killing of a high-rank member of the Provincial Council and a prominent tribal leader. The deputy Head of the Provincial Council was gunned down alongside his brother in Qalai Sari Sang, near Puli Alam DAC, on the morning of 28th of November. His two bodyguards received injuries but survived the attack. While the murder would fit into the AOG’s agenda of targeting prominent GOA figures, several indications support the claims, also endorsed by several sources inside ANSF, that the individual was killed as a result of personal disputes. Furthering this assessment, no AOG has claimed responsibility for the attack and given the tribal identity and profile of the individual, such a killing, if publically claimed by AOG, could also considerably reduce AOG supporters’ base among the members of this important tribe. Disregarding the motives and authors of the attack, the killing represents the highest level civilian GOA official killing



in Logar this year. AOG activity concentrated on stand-off attacks (2 IED blasts and 1 IDF attack against an ANP checkpoint) and close-range ambushes along the main supply roads (4 close-range ambushes, and another case of a targeted killing of a local resident, most probably due to his known cooperation with the GOA security forces). NGOs with operations and movements in Logar should assume a continued elevated threat of their staff members’ apprehension at illegal checkpoints, boldly operated by AOG in ever closer distance to the ANSF bases along the Kabul – Gardez Highway. Prior to over-land travel, NGOs are encouraged to contact ANSO for updates regarding the road conditions. In general, movement between Chahar Asyab and Puli Alam should be effectuated between 0900 hrs and 1500 hrs; while the road from Puli Alam towards Gardez hosts regular illegal checkpoints shortly after 1400 hrs.

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Abduction in transit
- Targeted killings
- Roadside IED


WARDAK

The abduction business came to the fore of security developments in Wardak, with an NGO abduction reported from Saydabad on 18th of November of an off-duty INGO staff member, returned to the province to celebrate Eid, in his home village. The preliminary information indicates that the staff member had been warned about the possibility of being a candidate for abduction (probably due to his profile and known employment with the NGO), and spent the first two days of his stay inside the family compound. However, the third day he left his home for an outdoor venue, where he was effectively kidnapped by a group headed by a prominent AOG mullah. Upon being relocated, negotiations for his release ensued. While in captivity, the individual was questioned in regards to his status within the NGO, information that the AOG confirmed with other sources including a direct phone call to a GOA office. While the full details regarding his release remain unclear at this time, family members and local leadership were the primary interlocutors, and while financial demands were made during the negotiations, it appears these demands were not

	NGO Incidents
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met. Ultimately, the staff member was released unharmed two days later. The incident marked the 4th NGO staff abduction within Wardak for 2010, 2 of which occurred within Saydabad. The scope of this recent abduction is similar to the previous cases, including the length of captivity, questions asked, as well as the safe release of staff involved. As in numerous other NGO abduction incidents countrywide this year, the group responsible took steps to confirm the veracity of the staff member's information with outside agencies. While the staff member's employment and local identity played a role in this incident, it also speaks to the saturation of the AOG presence and their situational awareness and information gathering abilities within Saydabad. Specific to the latest case, however, was the pressure exerted on the individual by the kidnappers. Reportedly, the victim was made witness to the beheadings of another two abductees, identified as local employees of a private security company.

On a more positive note, the group of four, including a former member of Meshrano Jirga and her female friend, kidnapped in Saydabad two weeks earlier, was released following a rescue operation by ANSF in the Tangi Area of Saydabad. For the rest, the province recorded the usual incident volumes featuring 29 entries



that included 21 AOG attacks displaying the typical tactical methods (ambushes, IED, abductions) and territorial distribution (main roads and DACs). 70% of all incidents occurred in Nirkh and Saydabad combined (for the most part close range attacks or IEDs) and confirmed all parties' converging interests in the control of the Highway 1. One of the IED incidents in Saydabad detonated against an IMF patrol, killing one and injuring another serviceman. AOG concentration along the Highway such as in Deh Hayat, Haftasayab, Salar, Sayadabad DAC, and Tangi, as well as further reports of seasonal influx of fighters into the southern districts from Ghazni, provide realistic ground to assume that AOG activism along the Highway will continue during the winter months.

AOG expansion in the northern districts has recently been voiced as a major concern by the head of the Afghan Public Protection Force (APPF) in Maidan Shahr. Accordingly, AOGs have started focusing on night letter campaigns and other forms of intimidation against the families of APPF personnel in the district. If confirmed, such a shift may indicate the next stage of AOG expansion in the province.

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Attacks along main road
- AOG expansion
- Abductions

DAYKUNDI

NGO perceptions of instability, largely nurtured by accounts of roadside criminality, weak governance and prevalence of local feudal lords in most areas of the province, found an echo in another road robbery reported during this cycle. On 13th of November at around 1700 hrs, an armed group robbed the passengers of at least three flying coaches transiting thru the Sangara Kish Pass in Shahrstan on the main road to Nili. Similar robberies were lately reported from Khadir, Miramor, Sangi Takht and Shahrstan districts, including the killing of one truck driver who attempted to

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS


- Migration of AOG into south
- Spoilers to peace
- Banditry

	NGO Incidents
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drive away from the scene of attack.

Local sources from Khadir confirmed that the local elder abducted by AOG on 13th of November was released two weeks later following the negotiations brokered by leaders from the Poshtroq Village. ANSO enquiries revealed that the case was a part of a more comprehensive stand-off between a local dominant commander and the district wuluswal, himself a prominent jihadi figure. Local sources reiterated that the clash had flared into a series of abductions instigated by both parties, with at least two abductees on each side, all of them released unharmed once the negotiations were brokered by the community leaders.

DAYKUNDI



Reporting from the southern districts highlighted the continued influx of AOG fighters into Gizab and Kajran. Yet, AOG presence has not materialized into tangible security incidents, and at this stage, it rather appears part of a seasonal migration outside of the prominent fighting areas in Helmand and Uruzgan. Migrating AOG fighters have so far constituted a less destabilizing element than, for instance, the well-entrenched presence of domestic criminal networks eager to answer the calls from local patrons.

BAMYAN

In a single incident reported from Bamyan during this cycle, ANP arrested a group of four on the main bazaar in Saighan, with the suspects reportedly engaged in the 'searching for ancient items'. While security incidents remain rare in the province, NGOs continue to monitor the situation in the Shikary and the Ghandak Valleys in the North-East for their mixture of politically and criminally oriented armed groups, as well as the access routes to Daykundi and Ghor for a continued presence of local armed gangs engaged in roadside robberies.

With only 4 AOG initiated incidents recorded this year (all of them in Kahmard), AOG incident


KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Instability in Kahmard & Shibar
- Climactic conditions
- Access restrictions

	NGO Incidents
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levels strike a flagrant lull as compared to the 20 incidents recorded for the same period in 2009, and 15 in 2008. Similarly, documented criminal attacks for the same period fell from 32 incidents in 2008 to 17 in 2009 and further downwards to the current 12 in 2010; however, the hard data are in contradiction with general NGO perceptions of increased criminality levels, namely along the strategic passes on the access roads between Bamyan and Daykundi. Since early 2008, 6 NGO combined incidents (both direct and collateral) were recorded by ANSO. The last case, reported on the 1st of July 2010 from the Khargul Pass in Waras, was a collateral incident involving a group of robbers disguised in ANP uniforms who apprehended, at gunpoint, a flying coach in transit and robbed (among other passengers) an NGO national staff member of

BAMYAN



cash and valuables. Indeed, overland access to Bamyan rose to prominence as the most significant security issue for NGOs in the province, with the Ghorband, Jalrez and Tala wa Barfak roads falling prey to deliberate attacks against pro-GOA forces and infrastructure rehabilitation projects, local factional disputes and criminality. Whereas the alternative access, such as the strenuous drive from the Marghzar Cluster in Zare (southern Balkh) via Balkhab (Samangan) to Yakowlang, presents the full array of vehicular access challengers encompassing road accessibility, climatic conditions and the remoteness of the areas. NGOs are encouraged to contact ANSO prior to undertaking overland road missions into the province.

PANJSHIR

Two rather brazen incidents were reported from the Valley during this cycle. Typically for the province, none of them has been ascribed to particular authors or motives, condemning outsiders to mere speculations about the intri-

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Factional disputes

	NGO Incidents
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cacies of internal Panjshiri disputes. The only certainty comes with the fact that the attacks were not initiated by AOG and that neither meant to cause human casualties. On first instance, on 16th of November, ANP recovered a makeshift explosive device from the road in Darkhel Area of

Rukha District. Ten days later, an IED detonated inside the Girls' School in Malpesa Village of Bazarak in the late evening hours, causing light structural damage to the building.

This year, Panjshir has witnessed seven escalations so far. When investigated, all of the incidents were largely interpreted as originating from local rivalries. NGOs should carefully monitor their environment to avoid being manoeuvred into similar local disputes.

PARWAN

The last day of November saw an NGO-related intimidation occur in the Monara Area of Jabalussaraj. During the night, an unknown attacker hauled a hand grenade inside the compound of an NGO training center, causing minor damage to the facility, and prompting the NGO to request assistance from the local shura in clarifying the incident and ensuring security guarantees for its staff and operations. Additional circumstances and motives behind the attack are yet to be established. Out of the combined 16 NGO-related incidents (both direct and indirect) reported from Parwan since 2006, 38% were cases of intimidation, varying from general night letters warning against 'cooperation with NGOs and GOA' to particular threats against NGOs including direct hostilities such as arson attacks against assets and equipment, IED explosions, handgrenade explosion and kidnapping; 30% represented forced intrusions into NGO premises and robberies; and the remaining incidents split into collateral involvement in armed attack, abduction and a

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS


- AOG/ACG in Ghorband
- IED & IDF in Bagram
- AOG in Kohi Safi

	NGO Incidents
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subsequent release of NGO staff, suspected surveillance of NGO movements and facilities. The only direct NGO incident resulting in casualties (1 NGO staff killed and 5 injured) occurred in the Jar Zaro Area of Ghorband on 20th of August 2008, when a national NGO road mission hit a roadside IED.

AOG strikes were once again distributed between the areas adjacent to the Bagram Airfield Base (Bagram and Kohi Safid) and the Ghorband Valley. Whereas the security environment in the former is dominated by AOG's attempts to disturb access and daily business at the base, vectors of insecurity in the latter include mainly the road construction project and AOG expansion. Exposure to strategic targets in the vicinity of the base, and movement along the main road in the Ghorband Valley, represent two distinctive risk factors increasing NGO vulnerability in the otherwise calm province.

Indeed, IED activity continued on the Kabul – Bamyān Road in Ghorband, with an instance of an RCIED exploding against a two-vehicle convoy (white, marked pick-up trucks) of an ANP unit on their way from Kabul to Khamard on 22nd of November at



0800 hrs. The explosion killed one and injured an additional two servicemen, bringing to seven the cases of effective IED strikes reported from the Ghorband Valley this year (the first such incident was recorded in June 2010). Another RCIED struck a private vehicle in Qalandar Khel, on the Bagram-Deh Sabz- Kabul Road, confirming the trend of increased IED activity alongside the access routes to the Bagram Airfield Base. In spite of the measures reportedly adopted by the ANP in Bagram in relation to the sustained IED activity, such as regular morning patrols along the main arteries in the district, effective IED strikes have become a regular occurrence in the area.


Following the patterns of the previous periods, both Kohi Safid and Bagram witnessed two instances each of effective IDF strikes respectively against the Bagram Airfield Base, and the ANP HQ in Kohi Safi (the latter at one instance coincidence with Parwan ANP Chief of Police visit to the facility). Reporting from Kapisa featured an additional influx of fighters from Tagab, ready to ramp up operations in Kohi Safi. In light of this, further escalations in the district are to be expected in the short term.

BALKH

After a short period of relative calm, AOG activity has resumed along the Mazar-Shibirghan Road, with four incidents of note occurring during the present period in Chahar Bolak and Balkh districts. On 25th November around 0815 hrs, an IO convoy escorted by an ANP vehicle came under an AOG attack (SAF and RPG) along this road in Timurak area. The RPG round missed the target and the convoy managed to escape from the area unharmed. Of note, this marks the first reported incident in the Timurak area since 28th October, when an armed clash occurred between ANP and AOG, also during day-light hours, following an AOG illegal check point. Despite the fact ANP checkpoints already exist along this road at kilometre intervals, another direct attack occurred on 19th November in Gortepa area, targeting this time an IMF convoy. As a result, two IMF soldiers

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were wounded. In addition, on the 30th two incidents occurred almost simultaneously. Around 0745 hrs, in Mirgan Tapa area an armed group stopped three vehicles travelling on the main road and abducted the passengers along with their vehicles. At the time of writing this report the exact whereabouts of the abductees and their identity remains unclear. It seems that while the first group conducted the abduction, a second follow-up group set up an ambush in Chahar Bolak District, on the main road, in the area of the Khanabad Intersection. An ANP vehicle deployed, probably in response to the presence of armed men, drove into the ambush. A brief fire fight ensued and the armed men finally withdrew from the area. The co-ordination of the attack indicates that the assault was well planned and executed. Due to the recent increase in incident levels along this road, travel after 1500 hours through the district, as well as expatriates' travel, is highly discouraged. Travel during the day-light hours should be taken ac-




cording to the individual NGO's risk threshold. As usual, NGO national staff should keep distance from any potential targets along this road and maintain an extremely low-profile posture.

Besides Chahar Bolak, AOG activity manifested itself in Chimtal District with three attacks against ANSF/IMF static positions. For instance, on 20th November, in Gas Pipeline area, an ANP CP came under SAF and mortar attack which apparently ended without casualties. The following day, an AOG attacked (also with mortars) an IMF FOB located in the area of Nawshahir Alizaz village, wounding three IMF soldiers. The incident marked the first use of mortars in the province indicating a diversification of AOGs' tactic in Balkh. Of note also, an increase in AOG activity has been reported in Kaldar District with a direct attack against an ANP convoy in Tazariq area and an IED discovery on the main road to Qara Jar village.

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- AOG checkpoints
- AOG expansion
- NGO abduction

Monthly NGO Incidents (Combined AOG/ACG)



SAR-E PUL

In Sar-e Pul, the activity recorded during the present period concentrated almost exclusively on Sar-e Pul and Sayyad districts. Continued risks of abduction along the main roads across the province were once again highlighted by the presence of AOG check points. During the present cycle, three check points have been reported on the Sar-e Pul-Shibirghan Main Road in Sa Shanba, Imam Jaffar and Adbakhshi villages of Sar-e Pul district, with AOG searching for ANSF and GOA employees. Of note, two of them occurred during day-


KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- ➔ Abduction along Sar-E Pul - Shibirghan road

	NGO Incidents
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time hours. In addition, on 21st November, AOG set up another check point along the Sar-e Pul-Jawzjan road in Adbakhshi area and attempted to stop a private vehicle. It seems that the driver refused to stop at the checkpoint and AOGs opened fire towards the vehicle, wounding two occupants. It should be underlined that, although for the time being, there is no indication that the AOGs were looking for NGO members, the potential risk of abduction while confronted with such check points should not be ruled out. Also in Sar-e Pul District, in Sang Tuda village (between Sar-e Pul and Sozma Qala districts) a group of armed individu-

SAR-E PUL



als surrounded the residence of a school principal with the intention to abduct him. This kidnapping was marred by an ANP deployment which forced the AOG to withdraw. Another large AOG entered the Charbagh village to collect taxes from the locals, an effort that was also foiled when again ANSF deployed to the area and the AOG retreated before their arrival. Finally, in Sayyad, Khowaja Yagana Village, an interpersonal conflict between two local commanders degenerated into fire fight that resulted in one person killed and one abducted.

KUNDUZ

The bulk of AOG activity in Kunduz was concentrated in the traditional hotspots of Imam Sahib, Qalay-e Zal, Chahar Dara and Kunduz districts. More than 60% of all recorded incidents were related to IED deployment. However, this period also experienced two AOG direct attacks targeting ANSF and pro-government militia personnel and facilities. Of note, a significant AOG attack occurred in Qalay-e Zal District, where after a fire fight that lasted several hours AOG overran an ANP checkpoint. One ANP, nine pro-government militia members, and six AOGs were killed. The AOGs also looted the checkpoint, seizing a number of weapons and ammunition.

Also during the present cycle, IED deployment primarily targeted the IMF. For instance, on

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- ➔ AOG offensive
- ➔ IMF operations


	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	3
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19th November in Kunduz District, an IED exploded against an IMF foot patrol, reportedly injuring four IMF soldiers. Three days later, in Chahar Dara, on the Kunduz-Chahar Dara Main Road, an IED struck an IMF vehicle, injuring another two IMF soldiers. Another area of IED concentration was the village of Zarkhadir in Kunduz District, where at least two RCIEDs detonated against ANSF, and another two were discovered and defused.

It is interesting to note that most likely as the result of a joint ANSF/IMF operation, Aliabad and Chahar Dara districts have witnessed a decrease in number of incidents in the past two weeks, with only one incident, an IED discovery, reported in the latter district on the Chahar Dara-Kunduz.

After two RCIED attacks reported in the PRP targeting the Aliabad District CoP and pro-

KUNDUZ



government militia commanders, on 16th November, in Khanabad District, an IED detonated targeting the Kunduz City Director of Municipality. The Municipality Director was injured, along with his two bodyguards, while his brother and one other person was killed as a result of the blast. It is worth noting that in Kunduz Province, GOA officials have become the subject of regular AOG attacks. Most recently, on 1st November, an IED detonated in the southern part of Kunduz City, targeting the vehicle of the Aliabad District Governor. The District Governor's two bodyguards were injured in the attack. While GOA officials may be targeted by AOGs for their effective role or symbolic value as government appointees, the fact that high profile individuals may also be targeted due to interpersonal or political rivalries should not be excluded as well.

BAGHLAN

Baghlan Province saw 73 AOG members surrender to the GOA forces in Baghlani Jadid District. Nonetheless, AOG activity continued in the past two weeks, particularly in Burka, Dushi and Pul-e Khumri districts, with direct attacks as the tactic of choice. For instance, on 21st and 22nd November, heavy fighting was reported in the Burka District Centre in which an AOG attacked the DAC with heavy weapons and SAF.


As mentioned in previous ANSO reports, the road security across the province remains a distinctive concern. This was underlined on the 21st, with an AOG attack on

	NGO Incidents
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an ANP check post located in Larkhabi area, along the Pul-e Khumri-Dushi Road. Another incident of note occurred on the 24th November in Pul-e Khumri District, when AOG attacked with RPGs and SAF an IMF convoy which was travelling on the Pul-e Khumri - Mazar-e Sharif Main Road which resulted in the wounding of two IMF soldiers. The incident marks the first ANSO-recorded day-time attack on this road since mid October, when on 13 October, a fuel tanker was hijacked from the main road in Cheshmashir area. Although, over the past few weeks the number of direct attacks has decreased on the road, this incident demonstrates once again the AOG capability to access the main road during the day. Therefore, NGOs

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- IMF operations
- Tensions in Baghlan-e Jaded
- Attacks on Baghlan-Kunduz road



should be aware of the continuing threat of direct attacks and potential for abductions in these areas, and plan road travel accordingly. ANSO has encouraged NGOs to restrict road travel through Pul-e Khumri District with a particular stress put on the Pul-e Khumri-Kunduz road. Also in Baghlan, the second half of this reporting period experienced demonstrations related to the elimination of local candidates from the parliamentary elections. On the 22nd and 23rd supporters of two local candidates interrupted road traffic along the Pul-e Khumri-Kabul Main Road. Finally, after the discussion with the local authorities the said protest ended peacefully.


BADAKHSHAN

As seen in several other northern provinces, events in Badakhshan Province during the present reporting period were shaped by political tensions ensuing from the ECC announcement of the list of candidates disqualified from the parliamentary elections. A total of five demonstrations in reaction to the ECC resolution took place in the province, all within the second week of the present cycle. Several hundred supporters of a parliamentary candidate staged demonstrations for two consecutive days

	NGO Incidents
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in Fayzabad City and further demonstrations occurred in Yaftali Sufla District. This being the stronghold of the said candidate, his supporters blocked the Fayzabad-Yaftal Payan (Sufla) Main Road over the course of three days. Although, the said demonstrations ended without reported violence, local reporting indicates that the possibility of further protests exists.

In Fayzabad City, in the vicinity of the Layab check point, ANP shot and injured a suspected AOG member who was carrying an AK 47 and a RPG launcher. Another incident of note occurred on 15 November, when unknown indi-



viduals fired two RPG rounds towards the PRT. The projectiles missed the intended target and impacted in an open area. According to ANSO data, this incident marks only the second attack against the PRT in 2010. The first took place on 10 September, when three RPGs were fired toward the PRT. In both cases, no casualties were reported. Despite the low level of reported incidents, AOG activity continued unabated, particularly in Kishim and Darayem districts.

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- IDF attacks in Fayzabad
- Instability in Kishim and Darayem

JAWZJAN


An NGO direct incident was reported during the present period in Shibirghan District, Sae Shanbi Afghani Village, which is located around 20 km south-west of Shibirghan City. On 21 November, three INGO national staff arrived to their project sites in the said area. Ministry for Rural Rehabilitation (MRRD) personnel were also visiting the INGO's project sites along with another car belonging to a consulting firm. After dropping off their staff, the two drivers were waiting in the area, when around 1030 hrs, two armed men riding on motorcycles appeared. They verbally and physically assaulted the INGO drivers, then got into the cars and forced the drivers to proceed. Of note, during the incident further armed men had been seen in the surrounding hills. While the exact circumstances regarding the conclusion of the event remains unclear, anecdotal reports indicate that while attempting to cross a small river, the INGO driver who

	NGO Incidents
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was in the first vehicle pretended to be stuck in the mud and the two armed men exited the vehicles, probably to assess the situation. This allowed the drivers to accelerate and escape. The gunmen shot at the INGO vehicle, breaking two of its windows but both drivers escaped unharmed. According to ANSO data, this is the first attempted NGO abduction reported in Jawzjan Province. Regarding the province as a whole, the majority of reported abductions have, so far, been concentrated in Darzab and Qush Tepa districts- well known AOG's strongholds. This incident may have been a sign that AOGs are intent on expanding their influence into this area however, it is also possible that this attempted abduction was criminally motivated (rather than politically) as this area is not known to host AOG activity. In addition, given the presence of the GoA employees at the time of the incident, the fact that NGO staff may have been mistaken for government employees or seen as being associated with the GOA should not be ruled out as well.

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- AOG/ACG activity
- Abduction



This period also recorded a rather unusual incident. On 23rd, in the Darzab DAC area, an unprovoked AOG fired RPGs at local civilians. Pro-government militia members responded to the attack and as a result, a child and two other local civilians were injured in the cross-fire. Reportedly, the local civilians were watching Buzkhashi game that had previously been prohibited by AOGs as they already warned the population not to attend. Another case of intimidation was reported from the Darzab DAC area, as AOG threatened the locals not to send their daughters over 13 year old to school, otherwise they will be responsible for the consequences. Still in the same district, two IMF helicopters came under attack by RPG and heavy machineguns fire. The helicopters made an emergency landing in Shibirghan airfield after one of them was hit in the tail. Finally, in Fayzabad District, in Shah Jaan Qala Village, AOG attacked an ANP check point with SAF and RPGs. The ANP responded to the attack and AOG retreated after a two hour-long fire fight.

NOTICE: The graphs provided in the report are accurate as of the **1st of December 2010.**

FARYAB


On 25th November in Kohistan District, a grenade was thrown into an INGO compound located in Lawlash Bazaar area. The grenade attack was followed by small arms fire from surrounding hills. The incident caused no casualties, but minor damage was reported to the compound. Although, preliminary information suggests criminal, rather than a political motivation for the attack, the area hosts an intermittent presence of exogenous AOGs. It is worth noting that Kohistan District has already experienced two similar incidents, though not recently. On 20th April 2009, in Bandar area, unknown individuals threw a grenade into an INGO compound, damaging one vehicle and causing no casualties. The same INGO's compound was the target of another hand grenade attack on 3rd May 2009. The result of the investigation of at least one of the aforementioned incidents indicated that the impetus for the attack was not AOG-related but

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	17
This Report Period	1

rather the result of local factions competing for perceived patronage in the form of jobs for the affected organization.

During the present reporting period AOG activity continued, in Qaysar and Almat, and also in Bilchiragh and Dawlatabad districts. In line with previously observed trends, the main tactic employed by AOGs across the province remained direct attacks on ANSF/IMF and pro-government militias. Significant activity was reported in Almat District, around Ghalbala Village, where within two consecutive days, AOGs launched three direct attacks targeting IMF patrols. Whereas these attacks were mostly 'hit and run' assaults and ended after a short fire fight, in the neighbouring district of Qaysar, in the area of Shakh Village, AOG attacked an ANP check point for two hours.

IED deployment remains a concern as well in the area, with four incidents reported during this period. For instance, in Qaysar District, on 15th November, in Doabe Village, an IED detonated targeting a construction company's vehicle. In the same village, this time on the 25th, another IED-related



incident resulted in two children being wounded.

In Bilchiragh District, AOG activity manifested itself in Archatu Village, with a direct attack on an ANP check post. Furthermore, a targeted-style killing occurred on the 24th when an AOG opened fire on a private vehicle on the road between Kawleyan and Qaralek Villages. Two ANP members and five district elders were killed and four other local civilians were injured in the incident.

A rather unusual incident took place on 21st in Dawlatabad District, Jungle area, when AOG fired an RPG round towards an electricity power pylon, damaging the tower. Additionally, in Pashtun Kot, a long term interpersonal dispute between two local commanders erupted into a fire fight. The clash lasted for about nine hours, killing two brothers of one of the commanders.

Finally, in Faryab Province tensions surrounding parliamentary elections affected Shirin Tagab District. The removal of a local prominent candidate from the list of successful candidates resulted in four days of protests with his supporters blocking the Shirin Tagab-Dawlatabad Road.

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Sustained attacks in Qaysar
- Suicide attacks
- Demonstrations

NOTICE: Your input is invaluable for the production of this report. While we appreciate information on incidents, we also need general information on the security situation and context in your area. So please remember to call or email us regularly.

Contact details of ANSO staff are provided on the last page.

ANSO: “..by NGOs for NGOs..”

SAMANGAN

This period Samangan witnessed one NGO related incident. On 28th November, in Dara-e-Sufi Bala District, 3 NGO national staff members were transporting construction materials to one of their projects in the DAC area. Before arrival to the village a discussion started between the said staff and local community over the transportation of these materials to their destination. A verbal argument degenerated into violence, and the three NGO staff members were physically assaulted by the members of the local community, strangely, the same group who were the NGO beneficiaries. ANP officials arrived at the scene and rescued the assaulted NGO staff. According to ANSO data, there have been three NGO


	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	4
This Report Period	1

direct incidents reported in Samangan for 2010 but this marks the first of its kind. Another incident of note occurred on 29th, in Dara-e Suf Payan District, Dara-e Khushk Area. A purported AOG abducted three national staff working for a private road construction company along with their car. The incident marks the first abduction in the said district since 22nd July 2010, when four staff members of an international road construction company were abducted from Kotal area.

During the present cycle, perhaps even more than in other northern provinces, the security situation in Samangan was shaped by tensions surrounding the parliamentary elections. The ECC announcement of the disqualification of a prominent local candidate from the list of successful candidates was at the origin of three days of demonstrations, which started in

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- AOG/ACG checkpoints
- Political tensions



Aybak City on 23rd November. Although the scenario of the protests was similar with other provinces—with candidate's supporters blocking the main road—the demonstrations were significant in their scale and organisation. According to reports around 3000 people participated in the protests, with a large group of demonstrators staying overnight to block the road (as seen in Faryab as well). Finally, on the 26th, the road was been reopened as a result of the ongoing discussion between the candidate and the authorities. As the security situation in the province has proven in the past to be particularly vulnerable to political tensions and rivalries, NGOs should closely monitor the result of these discussions and associated local developments in the short term.

TAKHAR


In the past two weeks incident levels in Takhar remained consistent with the previous period, indicating a slight increase in the number of AOG-initiated incidents. In the past two weeks, seven incidents were recorded of which three were AOG-initiated. On 28th in Taloqan City, an RCIED attached to a bicycle detonated in Sar-e Chawk area, killing two civilian and wounding another two. The incident marks the first IED detonation in the city since 8 October - the assassi-

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	5
This Report Period	0

nation of the Governor of Kunduz Province - who was killed inside Shirkat Mosque, along with 15 other civilians. Although the majority of significant incidents in the province were related to IED deployment, an AOG direct attack occurred on the 23rd, in Khwaja Ghar, Chaghati Village, where AOG attacked a pro-government militia's checkpoint with SAF and RPGs. A prolonged fire fight ensued, resulting in the injuring of two AOGs and a militia member. The following day in Khwaja Bahawuddin District Centre, a suspected AOG was killed, and a civilian injured, in a premature explosion of an IED that he was carrying. In ad-

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Tensions in northern Takhar
- Banditry along Takhar-Kunduz road



dition, another explosive device, this time an RCIED placed under a bridge, was located then defused in the Puli Haji Shamsuddin area of Yangi Qala District. Finally, as in other provinces, political tensions surrounding the elections resulted in two demonstrations reported. The first protest occurred on the 25th, with supporters of several unsuccessful candidates gathering in the Sar-e Chawk area in Taloqan City. Four days later, apparently as a result of the authorities' failure to address the protestors' demands, another peaceful demonstration took place in the City.

HERAT

As in previous months, AOG presence and activity in the north and north-eastern districts of Herat was visible. One of the two NGO related incidents during this reporting period is a symptom of this, even though it occurred in an area that is not usually affected by AOG activity. On 21 November in Karukh District an AOG (reportedly based in Kushki Kuhna) via a local spokesman, informed an INGO of the requirement to submit regular payments in order to continue its work in Palezkar Village, an area north of the district centre. Two days later, the spokesman then informed village elders that no NGO in general is welcome to work in the area, and those that do can expect to come under attack. The threat is further supported by rumours indicating that local groups are emerging, with apparent links to AOG efforts in Kushki Kuhna. The incidents are unusual for the


KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Local power struggles
- AOG in Karukh
- IEDs

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	17
This Report Period	2

abovementioned area as AOG activity has so far been concentrated in the north-eastern part of Karukh District. Local authorities, however, are rather reluctant to believe that these threats could result in action (though this may be just wishful thinking) despite locals concern about the security situation in the area. While these incidents indicate an apparent desire of AOGs from Kushki Kuhna to expand their activities further south, it is too early to tell if AOGs have the capacity to do so or if their efforts will remain limited to rhetoric-based intimidation.

The second NGO related incident, recorded in Azimabad Village of Injil, is unrelated to AOG activity (since AOG influence in the area is low). Rumours about a possible AOG attack on an INGO training centre spread on 21 November 2010 but after consultation with local elders, it appears that the source of the rumours is not necessarily credible. It is worth noting that other NGO training centres in the area



have not faced similar problems and the beneficiaries remained intent on continuing with the training. The rumours appear to be related to tensions emanating from a small community in a neighbouring village that have had objections, mainly because the training involves men and women alike. Local elders are currently involved in resolving the situation. Of note, this incident highlights the ability of local interest groups to capitalise on the prevailing conflict in order to further their own agendas.

Though there were no incidents recorded in Chishti Sharif during this reporting period, local power struggles and the related tensions are ongoing, with this destabilising influence likely to continue until a new power balance is achieved. Pashtun Zarghun, the site of an intensive ANSF operation on the 17th, is likely to enjoy a temporary period of increased stability, however the long term effects remain to be seen as AOG efforts to regroup and reengage is likely.

FARAH

The increased level of ANSF/IMF operations in Farah Province continued, particularly noted in the first part of the reporting period. These operations focused on Bakwa between the 20th and 22nd of November, reportedly killing four AOG members, including Bakwa's District Shadow Governor, and leading to the arrest of a further 10. In addition, the DSG of Pur Chaman was arrested during an operation in Khaki Safed


KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Security force-AOG clashes
- AOG direct attacks

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	0
This Report Period	0

on the 27th November. Bakwa and Pur Chaman districts are typical strongholds of AOG influence and the removal of these two DSG may have a follow on affect on AOG structures in other districts.

The lull in IEDs noted in the last reporting period has continued. It appears that AOG tactics have shifted to direct attacks against ANSF and IMF, concentrated in Bala Buluk, Bakwa, Gulistan and Pusht Rod. The recent BBIED activity (attack against the NDS and an arrest of another) has also



resulted in an increase in security measures, a possible contributing factor on AOG ability to deploy IEDs. An incident of exception to current trends was the SAF attack against two local transport buses in the Ab Khorma Area of Bala Buluk (along the Herat-Kandahar road) which resulted in the wounding of four civilians and abduction of a further eight.


GHOR

AOG activity targeting IMF is steadily increasing and in general the security situation is deteriorating. While the motivations behind this dynamic remains unclear, current operations north of Ghor (Faryab and Badghis) as well as operations to the south (Helmand and Kandahar), and the possible forced relocation of fighters, may serve as an impetus to amplify this process. As well, there are indicators of an increased AOG focus on the province, as noted in AOG statements and propaganda sites. It should be noted, however, that the trend of slow deterioration had been established previously and can be seen as part of the steady, continued expansion of AOG influence and operational areas countrywide as the conflict has progressed. In reaction, the GoA has begun the deployment of ANA soldiers to Ghor, to be based in Chaghcharan City, with 100 of the planned 400 soldiers already in place.

During this reporting period, there were two further incidents that fit this pattern of AOG activities targeting IMF in Ghor. On 21 November, AOG fired two

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	10
This Report Period	0

RPGs towards the PRT, without causing any casualty or damage. While RPG attacks in Chaghcharan have occurred previously they are typically rare, occurring once yearly against security targets. However, when taken into context it serves as another piece of the recent trend. Of greater significance was the BBIED related incident on the 28th of November. ANP attempted to arrest a suicide attacker in a private residence close to the PRT, which resulted in the panicked attacker detonating when the police surrounded the house. There were no casualties beyond the suicide attacker. Prior to October 2010, there had been no suicide attacks recorded for Ghor Province. This recent event, along with the BBIED attack against the PRT (in October), confirms a new and different level of AOG involvement in Ghor. Rumours of further BBIEDs already present in Ghor persist; however, opinions are divided regarding potential targets. Present trends indicate that continued targeting of IMF, as well as GoA related targets, is the most likely course of action. This assessment is furthered by AOG statements regarding the lack of media attention on the province, with high profile attacks in the interest of



AOG to attract significant media attention, since the internet statement on Ghor mentioned above refers to the lack of media attendance on their activities in the province. For NGOs the main risk is being collaterally involved, which increases with the proximity and the exposure to potential targets.

Dawlat Yar, an area typically known for the dynamics of tribal tensions saw an SAF against a vehicle on 27 November. An unknown number of armed men attempted to stop the vehicle of GoA officials (MRRD) and opened fire when the vehicle failed to stop, killing one person and wounding four. While the exact nature of the group responsible and the motivation behind the attack remains unclear, local dynamics suggest that an ACG is the most likely answer. In 2010 there have been similar incidents, as in April (also in Gandab Area) when a locally known ACG first robbed several travellers and then opened fire on them for unknown reasons. All attacks, including the recent one, occurred during the day with the groups demonstrating a significant propensity to violence. However, it is worth noting that ACG activities remain infrequent, with only three recorded cases during 2010 so far.

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- AOG activity against IMF
- BBIED/IEDs

BADGHIS

The previous period saw inter-AOG clashes in Muqur and Qadis and these clashes, between the 'reconciled' and the irreconcilable, continued into the present period. As seen on the 21st, an AOG attacked the residence of a former AOG commander who had recently joined the GoA. This is indicative of the tensions that exist between the two groups in the area, and that the process of reconciliation may actually serve as a destabilising influence. It is un-


KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Security force-AOG clashes
- Inter-AOG clashes
- IEDs

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	0
This Report Period	0

clear at this time if the reconciliation 'successes' are a result of the concentrated security force operations in the area. As well, all these factors may constitute a power struggle in advance of the expected handover to ANSF beginning in 2011.

Also during this reporting cycle, ANSF/IMF operations targeting the command structure of the AOGs continued, particularly in Qadis district. On 22 November, an AOG commander was killed and an AOG member wounded in an IMF/ANSF operation in Darae Boom Area. In addition, an air operation killed two AOG members and wounded three in Khirk-



hana Area on 27 November.

As anticipated in October, IED activity increased. The ratio between direct attacks and IEDs are more or less even; however, direct attacks were concentrated on Ghormach and IEDs focused in Murghab, the more established AOG operational area of the two. Qadis is also slated to become another hotspot in Badghis province as indicated during the parliamentary elections in September.

NURISTAN


In Nuristan Province, there was only one recorded incident during the reporting period: an airstrike in Waygal district, with no casualties reported. Waygal is known to be the core location for AOG fighters and commanders in the province's central and western districts, and as such is an understandable target for IMF air strikes – with the province's forbidding geography militating

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Weather driven inaccessibility
- Changing AOG perceptions of humanitarian actors

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	1
This Report Period	0

against ground operations by the Nurgram-based IM forces. Reports from the province suggest an increasingly fragmented GOA presence, and an inability even for many Afghans without strong family or friendship links to travel to the eastern districts, which are home to a significant number of Pakistani and Middle Eastern AOG fighters, particularly during the cold winter months when they seek refuge in isolated valleys blocked by snowfall from outside access.



As such, we are likely to see a significant dearth of security incidents – or at least their reporting – from Nuristan for the coming weeks, as the heavy winter weather shuts down most movements. Moreover, the weather itself may present a significant impediment to NGO access in the next months, certainly away from the primary arteries into the province.


NANGARHAR

Trends in Nangarhar Province were worrying during this period, in a number of important dimensions. First, there was a continuation of the clear escalation of the pattern of AOG attacks on the central IMF facilities in the province, which is all the more conspicuous for going against expected seasonal conflict trends. On the night of the 25th, AOG fighters staged the second hit and run RPG/SAF attack on the Nangarhar PRT this year, destroying a radio tower, and landing several grenades inside the compound. This incident stood out among the other attacks on IMF across the province, as did an IED against an IMF vehicle in Chaparhar on the 14th, which caused extensive vehicular damage but no casualties. Of note, this incident occurred in the Sra Kala Area, on the main district road just after the two tributary roads converge, very near to the site of the accidental killing of an NGO worker by an IED on November 10th. It was followed on the 21st by an AOG ambush on an IMF/ANSF convoy moving through the same area. As such, it should be noted that the Sra Kala area represents the key point of insecurity in the district. Moreover, this period also witnessed two failed suicide bombings, one in Shinwar near to the Marko Bazaar on Nov. 22nd, and one on the Jalalabad Ringroad on the 23rd. It is likely that each was on the way to attack a notable IMF/GOA target in the area, and as such can be seen as part of this escalation, in spite of their accidental failure. Also, on the 28th

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	3
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credible rumours of SVBIEDs in Jalalabad City were enough to put the IMF, GOA and ANSF on heightened alert for the evening. In all, therefore, there was a much heavier sense of threat across the province and in Jalalabad City in particular. This may be why it has been confirmed that Jalalabad will soon have its own 'ring of steel' security belt constructed and maintained by ANSF; more details will be provided as they are collated.

Second and similarly from the IMF side there was a clear escalation of significant capture/kill operations against AOG of importance across the province during this last fortnight. The most remarkable was a major operation in Marki Khel, Sherzad district, at 0200 hrs on Nov. 27th led to the killing of 23 AOG fighters, including one mid-level commander who was emerging as a key link in the inter-provincial and cross-border chain of preparing and activating suicide bombers for attacks against high profile targets across the province, as well as offering active armed opposition to IMF operations in Sherzad and Khogyani. The attack marked the largest death toll of an IMF operation in the history of the conflict in Nangarhar, and is a sign of the increased importance being placed on lethal operations by the IMF at the current juncture of the ongoing counterinsurgency campaign. More broadly, there have been a number of similarly casualty-heavy attacks in these southern districts in recent months, particularly during September, which each led to 3-5 AOG fighters being killed. Yet it would not be accurate to describe the IMF as solely interested in such lethal raids – even if it seems that their propensity to



opt for this method has increased. Two other raids took place in Khogyani, the first on the 19th seeing the detention of an IED 'facilitator', the second on the 20th, which led to the capture and detention of a mid-level jihadi commander and the confiscation of three automatic weapons found in his house. Indeed, this raid led to a demonstration outside the Nangarhar Provincial Council offices in Jalalabad the next morning, on the 21st, with locals from the commander's relatives and political constituency travelling *en masse* in 30-40 vehicles seeking his release from IMF detention, to no avail.

Furthermore, there was a raid on a house in the Muqam Khan area of Bihsud District on the 21st, in follow up to the ineffective attack on JAF on the 13th; in the operation, 11 AOG fighters/supporters were rounded up and detained. The following day – the 22nd – as with the Khogyani incident a follow-up demonstration took place in the area of the Farm-e Adda bridge, blocking the main road in the area, with the protestors asserting that the detained individuals were innocent. Given that it is known some of the individuals were self-confessedly involved, this is perhaps why the protest, while rowdy to start with, fizzled out relatively quickly.

The last point of note in the AOG-IMF conflict dynamic was the 'rogue' killing of 6 IMF trainer soldiers by an ABP policeman thought to be from Khogyani, at Nangarhar's primary ANSF training facility in Pachir wa Agam, which occurred late in the reporting period (on the 29th). This rogue killing, the worst in the intervention's history, which also led to the shooting dead of the policeman responsible, is likely to further escalate the IMF's proactive and aggressive targeting of AOG fighters in the south-west of the province.

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Escalation of the conflict
- IEDs in Jalalabad City
- Demonstrations

KUNAR

One of the two NGO incidents in the eastern region during the reporting period occurred in Kunar on the 16th. In this case, in Narang District, late in the evening a group of armed men came to the clinic, tied up the guards, and sought to make off with solar panels affixed to the roof – as they had done successfully twice previously. This time, the security measures taken by the clinic prevented their forceful detachment, and they were therefore smashed in anger. The two guards and a nurse were then temporarily detained and brought to another location, before being warned about reporting the incident. A small generator was also stolen by the assailants.


An ongoing threat in Khas Kunar District has been an opposition/criminal group based in Pakistan's Mohmand Agency but operating across the border. In August ANSO reported on information that the group had decided to target employees of humanitarian and private construction organisations for abduction, in order to extract ransom payments. During this reporting period, the first confirmed reports of abductions by this group were received; at 1500 hrs on Nov. 27th, on the main district road in the Ahangaro Kala area, 3 local engineers from a private road construction company – working on a PRT-driven road construction programme – were kidnapped by the group, and taken across the border. The case

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is ongoing, but the fact that this threat emerged as a real one has knock-on consequences for the threat environment faced by NGOs operating in/travelling through the district.

Apart from these two important incidents, the military conflict dominated the security landscape of the province. In Wata Pur, further tallies have been received on the scale of the IMF operations that took place there during the period of the 12th-16th. In the Kamano area of the district, 30 AOG fighters were reported killed, with large quantities of small arms and heavy weapons seized, while in the Kuro, Maidan, Sangar and Qatar Qala areas, a total of 13 fighters were reported killed, and further weapons seized. The IMF have deemed the operations as successes, and in so far as the 'clearing' phase is concerned, that may be partially true at present; however, just days after these operations ceased, AOG fired heavy weapons at a local house in the area, killing two civilians, suggesting that even such lethal operations have not fully eliminated the presence of the armed opposition in the district, and clearly there are questions about the sustainability of such operations.

Narang, Sirkanay and Manogai continue to form a central belt of insecurity in the province, with 7, 11 and 6 AOG-initiated attacks on GOA, IMF and ANSF in the respective districts – and each district not seeing a single IMF- or ANSF-initiated operation, indicative of the side with whom the momentum of the conflict lays. However, the conflict in these



districts has not heavily affected the nearby provincial capital, Asadabad, which saw only two IDF incidents against the IMF base in the Yar Gul area, marking a period of unexpected calm in the city.

In Dangam, while there were just three AOG-initiated incidents (lower than in other districts) those incidents that did occur were of noteworthy significance. First, on the 15th in the Dew Band area, AOG fighters ambushed an IMF patrol, which led to the killing of a local AOG commander. Second, on the 21st there was an AOG attack on the private residence of the District Governor of neighbouring Marawara with heavy weapons and small arms, killing one person on the residence and injuring seven others. Subsequently, ANP arrested two AOG fighters suspected of involvement. It is a noteworthy incident because the overwhelmingly military nature of the conflict in Kunar has typically squeezed out much of the targeting of GOA officials and facilities, making up only about 10% of all AOG attacks in 2010; in other provinces in the east, such as Khost and Paktya, this percentage is closer to 40%.

Just to the north of Dangam, in Nari district, there was an attack on a road construction company, while other attacks on IMF patrols and ANP CPs were also recorded. Finally, in Khas Kunar, apart from the abduction mentioned above, an IED hit an IMF vehicle in the Mangwal village area on the 18th, injuring 3 IMF soldiers and damaging the vehicle.

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Military operations
- Abduction in border districts

KHOST


Khost recorded the other NGO incident in the region during this reporting period, when an NGO clinic was semi-destroyed and its guards tied up by a group of unknown armed men in Qalander District, at 2200 hrs on November 26th. Qalander, a mountainous, isolated district with poor infrastructure and with a known foreign AOG presence, is remarkable among Khost's districts for being a comparative safe haven from the conflict which is affecting the rest of the province, at least in terms of the number of security incidents that are registered there. Until this attack on the clinic, the district had recorded just two security incidents in 2010, with a May killing of an abducted ANP policeman, and a September attack on a road construction company working in the district, which killed one employee. In 2009, only 4 incidents were recorded: 2 of which directly affected an NGO working in the district, 1 of which struck a road construction company, and the 4th of which was an IMF/ANP operation that killed 30 AOG fighters. As such, the picture is one of an isolated district used as a safe haven by foreign AOG fighters much less sympathetic to the local community and keen to maintain the district's isolation. In neighbouring Musa Khel, meanwhile, the sole incident registered was an ambush which killed the District Chief of Police as he travelled home from the DAC on the 21st. It is the first killing of a significant GOA official in the history of the district, the quietest in the province after Qalander and the ethnically homogenous and semi-autonomous Jaji Maydan,

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and is in one sense unsurprising, given that the district has witnessed a fourfold increase in security incidents on 2009.

This compares with slightly more than a doubling of security incidents across the province in 2010 more generally, as compared with 2009 levels, and while the absolute number of incidents dropped during this reporting period when compared with the last period – from 113 to 96 – this is only slightly outside of the statistical margin of error. As such, the colder weather that hits this mountainous border province at this time has not dampened its pervasive insecurity, and incident volumes have remained relatively consistent with those reported this period in 2009.

However, the locus of security incidents has changed when compared to the same period in 2009, when insecurity in the province was focused around Khost City. Now, while Khost remains the site of approximately a quarter of all incidents, insecurity is disproportionately focused upon Sabari District, which along with Bak and Tere Zayi forms the territory most hostile to IMF and GOA actors. While no continuation of the SVBIED campaign was seen during this period in Sabari or elsewhere in the province, 36 other serious security incidents were recorded there, the majority comprising what has emerged as a competition between IMF operations on the one hand, and AOG IDF and IED attacks on the DAC and nearby IMF base on the other. There were 14 separate IMF operations – or nearly one a day – mostly by special forces, focused on the immediate vicinity of the DAC, with 1 AOG fighter killed and 29 more captured across all the operations. Of note, of those 29 fighters, 5 were identi-



fied as mid-level commanders belonging to the primary cross-border AO Group in the region, the regional networks of which IMF are currently focusing on disrupting in Khost and neighbouring provinces. From the AOG side, their IDF and IED attacks, again focused on the area around the DAC, summed to 19, or more than one a day, showing that they are willing and able to execute a similar jump in operational intensity as displayed by the IMF. The pattern is broadly identical in nearby Bak and Tere Zayi Districts, which can be grouped together with Sabari as forming one unified battlespace, although the absolute intensity of the conflict there is somewhat lower than in Sabari. Across the two districts, 16 AOG attacks on their DACs and ANSF and IMF bases were registered, although it is worth mentioning that five of the incidents in Tere Zayi were against ANBP facilities – bases and outposts – along the border with North Waziristan. From the IMF side, an operation against a senior AOG figure in Tere Zayi captured another mid-level AOG figure on the 29th, in the Kuza Kala area near the DAC. Moving back to Khost City, the pattern of attack has remained stable on previous periods, with the majority of attacks (15 in total) either IDF attacks from outside the city, at night, towards GOA and IMF installations, or IEDs covertly emplaced to strike IMF vehicles or cause more generalised insecurity. It should be noted however, that most of the IDF attacks are inaccurate and ineffective, while a considerable number of the IEDs emplaced by AOG fighters are discovered and safely defused. For example, during this period, 5 of the 9 IEDs were safely defused, with 3 of the 4 that detonated causing minor injuries, and only one striking an ANSF vehicle. From their side, the IMF conducted one operation in the city environs, with a Nov. 21st raid in Bak village leading to the arrest of 14 AOG fighters.

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- AOG primacy in isolated districts
- Intensified conflict in north/east

LAGHMAN

Laghman registered an uncharacteristically high number of significant security incidents during the reporting period, suggesting a continuation of the concerted campaign by new provincial commanders against the IMF and GOA started in the last 6 weeks, which has also stood out against expected seasonal trends.


First, in the provincial capital, Mehtarlam, a twin IED attack occurred in the vicinity of the Laghman PRT on the morning of November 20th. The first took the form of a BBIED who blew himself up at an ANP CP in the vicinity of the Mehtarlam Public Health Hospital, killing himself and five children passing by. He also injured nearly 20 civilians, and two of the ANP policemen standing at the CP. Thirty minutes later, on the same road leading to the PRT but near to Intezar Chawk in the vicinity of the Laghman Battlestation, an IED detonated, injuring 8 civilians and causing no fatalities. Such attacks are broadly unheard of within the city. In 2010, the first IED to be emplaced in the city was discovered and defused on October 28th, while the detonation of the suicide bomber was the first such suicide attack Mehtarlam has ever witnessed. As with Nangarhar, then, during this period we can detect the expansion of AOG tactics traditionally used in the south and southeast into the eastern region.

Similarly, Dawlat Shah has also seen unprecedented high number of attacks by AOG fighters. Through 2009, the district registered on average just 1.5 security

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	1
This Report Period	0

incidents per month, concentrating on ANP vehicle patrols and the DAC, while in 2010 we saw a slightly higher level of ambushes on ANSF and IDF attacks against the DAC beginning to become particularly noticeable from August. For the last 3 months, the confidence and rigor of the AOGs operating in the district has significantly strengthened, with illegal CPs being set up to search for GOA and IMF employees, the first stand-off attacks against IMF convoys being registered, and a much more concerted effort to target ANSF. During this latest reporting period, we have seen 3 such significant events in just a fortnight, with two attacks in the Zarkamar area on the 15th and 16th, targeting an ANP CP and an IMF convoy respectively, and then an IDF attack on the DAC on the 21st. Furthermore, AOG fighters also kidnapped a local man in the Kundi Por Ziarat area on the 23rd, with his whereabouts still unknown.

The IMF have perhaps not caught up operationally to the changing security picture in the district, as there have yet to have been any IMF or joint operations in the district. Furthermore, information suggests they are in danger of losing the district for good; reports have come in that a memorandum of understanding has been agreed between the AOGs in Dawlat Shah and Alishing districts and their respective local communities that if these communities withhold their cooperation from the IMF, the AOGs will refrain from targeting development projects and cell phone towers, and will scale down their nighttime patrols. This, however, has clear positive benefits for NGOs working in these districts. The memorandum



came up after an IMF operation in Alishing that led to civilian casualties, about which the local community was angry, and for which the GOA set up a committee to investigate, but which was felt by the community to be an insufficient and ineffective response.

Part of why the IMF may not have quite sufficiently focused upon Dawlat Shah lies in their traditional focus on Alishing and Alingar, which remained unstable during this reporting period, particularly the latter district. In Alishing on Nov. 15th, an IMF convoy came under attack with SAF and heavy weapons, while in Alingar four IED incidents were recorded on the main road to the Alingar DAC: two IEDs struck IMF convoys on the 22nd and 23rd, the second one injuring four IMF soldiers and one AOG, while on the 16th the ANP found two separate IEDs and had them safely defused by an IMF EOD team.

Finally, in Qarghayi district, the main Kabul-Jalalabad Highway, usually a site for AOG attacks and IEDs against ANSF, IMF and fuel/supply convoys, has been unusually quiet. This is similar to the trend on the Jalalabad-Torkham Road in Nangarhar. In Qarghayi, it is likely that attacks have dropped because of IMF operations to disrupt AOG networks in Nangarhar's southwestern districts of Khogyani and Sherzad, which have traditionally served as the origin of the networks that are based south of the Highway which conduct attacks on it. Furthermore, for those AOGs that operate from the north of the highway, from the Bad Pakh safe haven, it is thought that they are also involved in AOG activity in Alishing and Dawlat Shah; as such, the high activity in these districts has a direct impact on the number of attacks those groups stage on the Highway.

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS


- IEDs
- Suicide Attacks

PAKTYA

Paktya recorded no NGO incidents during the reporting period, but interesting trends in the wider conflict were visible. Zurmat, the district through which the main Gardez-Ghazni and Gardez-Sharan roads run, was the focus for IMF operations against AOG facilities outside of Gardez, with four IMF raids on compounds in Shah Karez village, and in Degan Qala and Sahak areas, on the 21st, 22nd and 23rd. In all, 4 AOG fighters were killed, including an IED ‘facilitator’, approximately 21 were arrested, and a number of weapons seized. Moreover, an IMF/ANSF operation in the Zurmat DAC area on the 15th led to a further nine AOG fighters being arrested, while the ANA conducted an autonomous search operation in the DAC area on the 19th, which saw 2 further AOG being detained. Finally, on the 28th an IED cell leader was killed in an IMF operation in the Janek Khel area, alongside an unconfirmed number of fighters. Zurmat has typically been one of the least stable districts in the province, in spite of its flat central topography and well developed road infrastructure, and it is clear from this heightened number of proactive military operations that the IMF and ANSF are currently placing significant emphasis on taking back the momentum in the district from the AOGs present. Consistent with this picture, from the AOG side we have seen a preference for IED emplacement in the district, as a means to work around the IMF/ANSF pressure the AOG fighters are currently

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	0
This Report Period	0

experiencing; what IEDs have been emplaced have not been effective, with two discovered and defused, and only one striking a target, in the DAC area on the 15th, which caused minimal damage to an IMF vehicle. Unfortunately, this preference also led to the accidental killing of eight civilians, including two children, in two separate IED detonations during this last fortnight. However, AOGs also staged two short hit and run stand-off attacks on ANP CPs in the area, and three IDF attacks with mortars/rockets against IMF and GOA targets – two of which misfired and caused AOG deaths and/or injuries. Moving north to Gardez City, a lower proportion of attacks were witnessed in the city than normal, similar to the quiet picture in Kunar’s Asadabad provincial capital. The capital district was the second focus for IMF and ANSF operations during this fortnight, with an IMF operation in Rabat Shahr village on the 24th, which led to the arrest of 5 suspected AOG, a joint operation in Shakarkhel on the 23rd that arrested one suspect, a ‘facilitator’ of assassinations against GOA targets, and a solo ANP operation that discovered and confiscated a weapons cache in the Qala Abdullah area on the 24th. The majority of the other incidents were not of major significance, including 3 defused IEDs, one that detonated in an open area away from civilians, and an ineffective opportunistic SAF attack on an IMF helicopter on the 19th. The one IED that did strike a target was an anti-personnel mine that struck and injured two ANA soldiers in Shebet Kelay village on the 22nd. Continuing north to the districts



of Jaji and Chamkanay, which form the north-eastern section of the province and contains its main border crossing to Pakistan’s Kurram Agency, the pattern of the conflict in these provinces during the current reporting period (as in previous periods) is one of a mature and confident set of AOGs – much closer in form to that which exists in Khost and Kunar. This is largely due to geography, as these districts are on the other side of the mountains from the main body of the province, and thus closer to Kurram than Gardez in commerce, family ties and political influence. As such, in these districts the GOA and IMF is faced with AOGs that have the momentum with them, and who therefore primarily focus on attacking IMF bases and convoys, DACs and key ANP facilities.

Moving back to the south of the province, in Wuza Zadran district a demonstration in support of a failed parliamentary candidate and local tribal strongman took place on the main Khost-Gardez Road on the 17th, blocking it for three hours in the Laka Tiga area. This is the second demonstration to take place over the parliamentary elections issue in a month along this main road, the other being one in neighbouring Shwak district on October 23rd, which took place in support of the same candidate – whose tribal-political constituency stretches across both districts. This protest made a change from the usual pattern of incidents in Wuza Zadran, where it is much more normal to see IDF attacks on the IMF base in the area. True to form, 3 of the 4 other incidents were such IDF attacks, while the fourth was an IMF operation that led to the arrest of 4 AOG, including a mid-level commander, in the Sarawti area on the 25th.

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS


- IEDs in Zurmat & Gardez
- Military operations in northeast

KANDAHAR

Kandahar Province witnessed a decrease in activity compared to the previous reporting period. This period AOGs were active in Maywand, Zhari, Argistan and Kandahar City. The trend of AOG avoidance of direct confrontations with security forces has continued through to the current period, with only three such incidents reported. In addition, a hand grenade attack was reported on 15th November in Kandahar City District 8 against an ANP check post. Also, an armed clash occurred between AOG and IMF/ANP during an operation in Zhari District, Sanzari Village. Whereas the province experienced a low level of direct attacks, IEDs have continued to represent the main threat in the area. There have been at least 28 IED related

	NGO Incidents
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incidents (detonations and discoveries) of which 17 occurred in Kandahar City. Although, the vast majority of IEDs were discovered and subsequently safely defused, AOG continued to targeted security forces in Spin Boldak, Maywand and Kandahar City. Of note, two IED strikes were reported in Kandahar City in District 6, Sarpoza Prison area. On 17th November in the said area, one IMF soldier was wounded as a result of an IED strike. Later, on 29th, another IED detonated wounding three ANP officials. As seen in the previous reports, IED deployment frequently affects the security of the local population. This period, on 21st in Shah Wali Kot District on the Kandahar-Uruzgan Main Road, a roadside IED struck a civilian Toyota Saracha vehicle en route to Uruzgan Province, killing four occupants, including two women and one child and wounding three others. As well, on the 26th in Zhari, Mak-




wan Village, another three civilians were killed in a similar incident.

AOG campaign of targeted killings of ANP officials have continued as well during the present cycle. In Kandahar City, two off-duties ANP were killed in District 1 and 7. Additionally two officials were killed by AOG in Maruf and Maywadan districts. In the past two weeks ANSF/IMF operations were concentrated in Zhari, Daman, Dand, Kandahar City and Maywand districts. In the latter district, 25 AOG members were reported to have been arrested.

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Direct attacks against ANP
- AOG assassinations
- IMF operations

SUICIDE ATTACKS - 2010 (Combined VB/BBIED)



HELMAND


During the present cycle the level of security incidents in Helmand has decreased compared to the PRP. The probable reasons behind this decrease are the combined factors of the Eid-e-Qurban celebrations and the continuing high level of IMF/ANSF activity across the province. Of the security incidents recorded, AOG direct and indirect attacks accounted for the majority and concentrated during this period in Nad Ali, Sangin, Nahri Sarraj and Garmser districts. The favoured target of these attacks remained ANSF/IMF patrols. This period Nad Ali District was particularly active with three reported AOG attacks on ANSF/IMF patrols, followed by two such attacks in Sangin.

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- IMF operations
- AOG attacks
- IED strikes

	NGO Incidents
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IED related incidents have decreased as well compared to the previous period with eight reported events. In one notable IED strike in Nahri Sarraj District, on 17th November, an IED hit an ANA patrol wounding two ANA soldiers. The use of IEDs throughout the province continued to represent a significant threat for the local population. For instance, on 22nd in Naw Zad, an IED detonated where several children were playing, killing two of them. In another incident, on 19th in Lashkar Gah District, explosives placed in a ditch detonated near a large group of people who had come to the area for a picnic, fortunately causing no casualties. Several days later, again in Lashkar Gah City, an RCIED placed in a rickshaw detonated as an ANBP vehicle was passing by. As a result of the detonation five civilians were wounded, including three children.



As mentioned previously, ANSF/IMF continued to lead numerous operations, killing and arresting large number of AOG members. In parallel with AOG activity, ANSF/IMF efforts, during this period, were focused on Nad Ali, Sangin and Kajaki districts, particularly targeting AOG commanders. On 18th in Nad Ali District, Spin Jumat area, IMF conducted an airstrike, killing a reported 18 AOG members. Three days later, as a result of a joint ANSF/IMF operation, another 20 AOG were reported to have been killed in Sangin District. The same day, but in Kajaki District, an IMF airstrike accounted for 22 AOG deaths, including those of five commanders, among them the Sangin District Shadow Governor.

NOTICE: Your input is invaluable for the production of this report. While we appreciate information on incidents, we also need general information on the security situation and context in your area. So please remember to call or email us regularly.

Contact details of ANSO staff are provided on the last page.

ANSO: “..by NGOs for NGOs..”

ZABUL

The incident level in Zabul Province was consistent with the previous period. The province continued to experience very low AOG activity, which in the past two weeks was concentrated in Daychopan, Shamulzayi and Qalat districts. In the latter district, a targeted killing was reported on 21st November in Basaka area, as an AOG shot and killed an ANP. In Daychopan, Chinarto area, a roadside IED detonated against a civilian vehicle, wounding four


KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Political tensions
- IMF operations
- IED strikes

	NGO Incidents
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occupants. In line with the previous period, ANSF/IMF activity accounted for the majority of reported incidents. IMF operations affected Shahjoy and Shamuzayi districts, and resulted in the reported death of three AOG members and the detention of another five.

Two election related demonstrations occurred in Zabul during the present cycle. On 22nd November in Qalat City, around 100 people staged a demonstration voicing their discontent concerning the elimination of 3 local candidates stemming from the parliamentary elections. The supporters of the said candidates attempted to con-



tinue the protest on 25th November but the small scale gathering was dissipated rapidly following talks with local authorities. Finally, the protest continued on 30th with around 200 demonstrators who temporarily blocked the Kabul-Kandahar Main Road. It should be noted that the demonstrators vowed their determination to continue the protest until their candidates have been reinstated.

URUZGAN

Unlike others provinces in the southern region, the level of security incidents recorded in Uruzgan sharply increased compared to the previous report. One of the most notable incidents occurred on 16th November in Chora District, Darweshan area, where a suicide attacker detonated his device in the house of a prominent local, killing the elder and wounding another six civilians. It should be noted that although rarer lately, suicide attacks are not unheard of in Uruzgan and, according to ANSO data, there have been three similar incidents across the province in 2010. The most recent incident was reported on 26th June in Tirin


KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- IED strikes

	NGO Incidents
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Kot (Bazaar area), when a suicide attacker detonated his device against the Provincial Governor's convoy while it was passing in the area. This incident caused numerous casualties beside the attacker, with three children killed and four other civilians and one ANP wounded.

During the present cycle the AOG's tactic of choice remained IED, with 34 IED related incidents reported mainly in Tirin Kot, Dihrawud and Chora districts. The large majority of IED were discovered but, in two separate incidents in Dihrawud, a total of three ANA soldiers were killed and another one was wounded. In addition, on 22nd in Tirin Kot, Mirabad area, an IED detonated targeting a civilian vehicle, killing



two occupants and wounding five others. The following day in Chora, Jangal area, another roadside IED detonated wounding three road construction company workers.

There were also eight AOG direct attacks in the province. In the most notable incident that occurred in Tirin Kot, Khanaqa area, AOG attacked the associates (body guards) of the former provincial Governor while they were praying in a mosque. As a result of the fire fight, two of the former Governor's associates and one AOG member were killed, and another associate was wounded.

GHAZNI

In Ghazni this report period, the most important dynamic has been political. The province remains the only in the country to still await the final results of the parliamentary elections, scheduled for the 1st of December and therefore as yet unknown at the time of writing. However, from the preliminary results known so far, all 11 seats in the majority Pashtun province swung to candidates belonging to the Hazara minority, who previously held just 5, and the concerns surrounding this highly significant political shift in the province is likely to be the primary reason for the delay of announcement by the IEC, which, however, cited 'technical reasons' as the cause.

This result profile is likely to remain in effect however, and while compensatory measures are likely to be taken by the central government – perhaps in proposing that a number of Pashtuns from the province are fast-tracked to positions in the upper house of the parliament – the impact of the results is likely to be highly negatively felt amongst the Pashtuns, and to have an important impact upon their view of the central government and therefore their propensity to side with armed opposition. The next reporting period will include a fuller analysis of this political picture.


In terms of the security environment, the province remains volatile, with a high number of AOG IDF and stand-off attacks occurring in Andar above all other districts, but also Zana Khan and Dih Yak. Also, it was announced that IMF, which are conducting capture/kill operations at greater

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	1
This Report Period	0

intensity in the province as across the country, killed the Taliban Shadow Governor for Khogyani on the 24th in nearby Waghaz District, detained two other AOG members, and recovered a cache of ANP-issue weapons thought to have been stolen in the high profile assault on Khogayani DAC during the previous reporting period.

Andar District, a strategically vital district through which the main Kabul-Kandahar and Sharan-Ghazni Roads both run, remained above and beyond the least secure district in Ghazni, with 23 AOG-initiated incidents, more than 75% of them in the area around the DAC, Miri. All but two were attacks on the district's IMF base, newly built at Sini, and on IMF patrols and convoys in the vicinity, showing a strong momentum in the district on the side of the AOG, while the other two were attacks on the DAC. The remaining incidents were entirely IMF discovery and disposal of IEDs. Andar has been this unsafe for much of 2010, and when compared with 2009 levels, it can be seen that the absolute number of security incidents has more than quadrupled, even with a further month to go in the year.

Ghazni City has similarly substantially deteriorated in 2010 on 2009 levels, yet this period saw it record a number of security incidents below average, with 6 IEDs discovered and defused, and just 1 detonating against an ANBP vehicle on the 26th, wounding 5 ABP policemen. Of note, IMF air assets targeted and killed 3 AOG members on the 25th as they were planting IEDs in the Qala-ye Qazi area, and arrested 8 others during an operation in the Mullah Noh Baba area on the following day. The only direct kinetic engage-



ments initiated by AOG fighters were three attacks in the Khak-e Ghariban area to the west of the city, two stand-off attacks on IMF patrols, wounding 4 soldiers, and one mortaring of an ANP CP, wounding 4 police. Zana Khan and Dih Yak, northeastern neighbours of both Andar and Ghazni City, are also worth mentioning for the registered insecurity in this period. First, when compared with 2009, when Dih Yak recorded 23 incidents and Zana Khan 26, this year's tallies so far are approximately 120 and 39, respectively. During the current reporting period, Dih Yak, which has suffered a substantial deterioration so far this year, saw 8 AOG attacks, targeting IMF patrols and the district IMF base, ANP vehicles, and a PSC vehicle, killing a PSC guard. Meanwhile, Zana Khan, up to now not rapidly deteriorating, registered 5 separate stand-off attacks by AOG fighters on the DAC, an attack on an ANP CP, and an IED against a PSC vehicle; put another way, in one fortnight a fifth of the annual sum of attacks was recorded.

In each of Giro, Qarabagh, Muqur and Gelan (along the highway) there were approximately 5 AOG attacks focusing on DACs and ANSF/IMF targets, and a number of IED disposals along the route. Again in each of these districts, the absolute number of security incidents in 2010 is two to three times higher than last year.

As such, with a number of districts in the province having substantially deteriorated through this year so far, it is with a sense of deep foreboding that the parliamentary consequences of highly organised and effective Hazara voting tactics will sink in during the next month and into 2011. And more immediately, we may well see demonstrations in Ghazni City and/or the eastern Pashtun-majority districts in the coming period as the results are released.

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS


- Elections related unrest
- Clashes in eastern districts

PAKTIKA

The stand out security event in Paktika during the reporting period was the double suicide attack that took place against the province's ANP HQ and central training facility, located in the provincial capital, Sharan. The two attackers were strapped with suicide vests underneath ANP uniforms, and managed to negotiate their way inside the installation during the daytime, before detonating their vests. In total, they killed 13 policemen, wounding 16 more, including the District Chief of Police. Suicide attacks have not been as common in Paktika as in neighbouring Khost or to the south in the greater Kandahar area, with this only the 3rd in the province in 2010, and the 9th in the past two years. However, this was very much the most significant suicide attack seen in the province's history, and as such may be part of the same pattern of a more concerted and larger scale campaign by the primary AO Group based across the border in Waziristan which is being seen in Khost and Nangarhar. We can reasonably expect that more such attacks, while not necessarily on the same scale, will occur in the medium term, if indeed it was part of this wider campaign seen in the eastern and southeastern region. Up to now in 2010, Sharan has been one of the more relatively secure districts in the province, with a registered drop in the number of AOG-initiated attacks on 2009 levels, partly the consequence of a higher number of proactive IMF and ANSF operations in and around the city, with the NDS taking a particularly visible role in disrupting AOG cells and networks. The only other se-

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	0
This Report Period	0

curity incidents in the capital district bear this out. One of the two took the form of a joint ANP/NDS operation on the 22nd, which led to the detention of one suspected AOG member and the seizure of an automatic weapon. The other was an IMF operation on the 27th, which detained a mid-level AOG commander and one of his cell members. In this respect, Sharan stands in stark contrast to Khost and Gardez cities, the other Loya Paktya provincial capitals, within which a very high proportion of AOG-initiated security incidents are concentrated. Kinetic engagements remained focused on the province's most insecure districts; Barmal particularly, but also Sar Hawza, Dila, and Jani Khel. Barmal, the most populous of the border districts, continued to see the greatest provincial insecurity, as it has during 2010 more generally, as part of the AOGs' 'pen and press' strategy; that is, penning GOA and IMF to urban centres and central installations once they have given up trying to actively hold rural ground, and then routinely pressing them with frequent IDF and occasional stand-off attacks to ensure awareness of their presence and a consistent heightened state of alert. This same strategy can be seen in neighbouring Khost particularly, but also anywhere where AOGs have a strong infrastructure of safe havens, good access to weaponry, and broad control/influence over areas of the countryside. During the reporting period, there were eight such IDF attacks on the DAC and the IMF base in nearby Margha, as well as one stand-off attack on that base. Furthermore, there were 3 IED detonations in the DAC area, one striking an IMF vehicle and one killing a civilian; IMF safely defused one other



found near their Margha base. Indeed, the nearly total focus on the IMF base and the DAC was abnormal, as we have normally seen, during 2010, approximately 75% of incidents directed at these two sites. Of note, 2010 has seen a fourfold increase in incidents in the district.

In Jani Khel and Sar Hawza – the next most insecure district during the reporting period, and more insecure than normal – the pattern was slightly different, with a greater emphasis by AOG fighters on attacks against mobile IMF and ANP patrols and convoys. In Sar Hawza, there were two attacks on ANP patrols on the 22nd, each wounding one policeman, while there were two other attacks – one stand-off and one IED – against IMF convoys on the 16th and 19th respectively, all of which focused around the district centre. In Jani Khel, there were also two attacks on IMF convoys, one stand-off and one IDF, while there was a further attack on an ANP CP with SAF and heavy weapons. From the ANSF side, Jani Khel also saw operations by the ANSF, which led to two arrests and one AOG injury, while in Sar Hawza, ANP located and defused two separate IEDs. As such, in these districts we can see that the AOG are still at the stage of pushing the ANSF and IMF back to the district centre, and can therefore continue to expect kinetic engagements in the future until this task is completed.

In Yahya Khel, interestingly, generally the second most insecure area in the province, there was a notable quiet, with just two incidents, neither of which were AOG-initiated. On the 22nd, the ANP discovered and defused two IEDs emplaced in the same area, and as such is likely to have disrupted an attack that had been planned with a little more effort than on average, while on the 25th IMF arrested a local AOG commander in a raid who is believed to be an important actor in planning and executing IED attacks in the district.

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- IDF/IED in urban centres
- Collateral damage from attacks



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ANSO ACRONYMS

ACG-Armed Criminal Group /
AEF-Afghan Eradication Forces
/ ANA-Afghan National Army /
ANBP-Afghan National Border
Police / ANP-Afghan National
Police / AOG-Armed Opposition
Group / APPF-Afghan Public
Protection Forces (local depu-
tised militias) / DC-District
Centre / GOA-Government of
Afghanistan / IDF-Indirect Fire
(ex: mortars) / IED-Improvised
Explosive Device / IMF-
International Military Forces /
NDS-National Directorate of
Security (Intelligence) / PRP-
Previous Reporting Period /
PSC-Private Security Company
/ RPG-Rocket Propelled Gre-
nade / SAF-Small Arms Fire /
VBIED-Vehicle Borne Impro-
vised Explosive Device / PDO-
Private Development Organisa-
tion / ALP-Afghan Local Police
/ LDI-Local Defence Initiative /
IEA-Islamic Emirate of Afghani-
stan (Taliban) / PSG-Provincial
Shadow Governor (IEA) / DSG-
District Shadow Governor
(IEA)/ALP-Afghan Local Police

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about the area to
comment on the sig-
nificance of the inci-
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there.

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