

THE ANSO REPORT

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YOU NEED TO KNOW

- Sustained AOG attack in Kandahar City
- Deterioration of security in Ghazni
- The IEA increases its efforts in Nuristan, government responds in kind
- Transition remains on schedule

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COUNTRY SUMMARY

The announcement of Operation Badar by the IEA during the last period had little overall impact on the operational context, though there was a temporary surge in threat reporting in regards to complex attacks countrywide. Not surprisingly, Kandahar in the South was the only location to experience a manifestation of this reporting, in a bold, multi-prong and sustained attack against various GOA facilities within the city. Otherwise, AOG incident scope, volume, and type remained within the trends previously identified this year, though there were a few standout exceptions this period.

Months of Helmand supremacy in incident volume reporting was broken this period as it recorded a dramatic decrease in reporting. This is likely due to a variety of factors, including 'fatigue' (of men and materials) after a sustained period of high-tempo operations, security force efforts at interdiction, as well as the reorientation of AOG resources towards the poppy harvest. Ghazni on the other hand noted a significant increase, bringing it back on line to achieve the high levels recorded in 2010. Other notable changes in incident volume were recorded

in Wardak (+25%), Khost (-50%), while most of the provinces in the Western Region have recorded varying degrees of decrease. Kabul also continues to report extremely low levels of conflict related incidents.

An NGO incident reported from Faryab in the North served to highlight one of the most concerning trends in this region, the prevalence of illegal checkpoints along the main routes. A second NGO incident from the North, this time in Sar-e Pul, also served to solidify the North's dominance in NGO incident volumes. The third and final NGO incident this period, this time from Kunar in the East, marks the latest in a series that has directly impacted NGO clinics in this province. While both key parties to the conflict have been responsible for incidents, the latest comes as the result of a search conducted by ISAF (following a previous incident involving the occupation of a clinic during a clash) and could have further negative implications as seen in similar circumstances from an incident in Logar earlier this year.

Following the wholesale occupation of Waygal District in Nuristan in late March, the IEA has continued to press its gains in the province this period, with large scale engagements reported from Parun (the provincial capital) and Bargi Matal, the site of similar efforts last year. While the IEA have enjoyed de-facto control of large portions of this province for some time, the introduction of ANA reinforcements represent government efforts to disrupt this. Due to its proximity to the border, and the concomitant availability of willing fighters, it is likely that the IEA will be able to continue its efforts into the short term.

The timeline for the previously announced 'transition' plans remains in place, set to take place in the coming months. Of note, in most of the areas scheduled (i.e. Bamyán & Panjshir), this process will result in little structural difference in the composition of the security forces presently insitu and, from an NGO operational perspective, will have a limited impact on the overall security dynamics as they are presently understood.

CENTRAL REGION

KABUL


In counterpoint to the dramatic AOG siege of Kandahar, Kabul remained calm. A sole case of corroborated AOG activity involved an IED discovery in Surobi. Still, Operation Badar fell on fertile land, at least in terms of an effective information campaign. The media announcement sparked yet another wave of spurious reporting about AOG attacks to come though, in absolute numbers, the momentum was seized by ANSF, who authored 80% of all incidents recorded.

Surobi, the only district outside of the planned security handover for Kabul this year, witnessed a rare case of IED deployment on the highway in Puli Khaki. The pressure-plate device was discovered and neutralized in the morning hours of 1 May. In the past, IEDs were sporadically deployed by AOG against the ANSF & IMF forces on secondary roads, in particular within Uzbin, and IED

	NGO Incidents
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emplacement on the Highway remains extremely rare. For the rest, AOG abstained from attacking IMF fuel convoys on the Surobi side of the highway, while attacks were recorded in the neighbouring Qarghayi of Laghman. Off the highway, the ANSF and IMF seized several sizeable weapon caches (Uzbin, Manogai, Jegdalak) with weapon seizures representing one third of ANSF-authored operations. Besides Surobi, these were mainly reported from Paghman, Bagrami, Qarabagh and several districts in Kabul City.

ANSF arrest operations targeted mainly criminal elements, while documented captures of AOG members remained rare. On 14 May, NDS released information on a successful disruption of an AOG cell in the Khawaja Jam Area of Paghman, during which three AOG members were arrest-



ed in possession of BBIED materiel. Two NDS operatives reportedly sustained SAF injuries during the operation (the encounter consequently proved fatal for one of them); the circumstances of the incident require further assessment.

Criminal activity encompassed armed intimidations, notably the explosion of a light magnetic IED against the residence of a retired ANP officer in PD 2. In Abdurrahimzai of Musayi, a less complicated hand-grenade method was opted to make a case. Karte Naw and Hoot Khel in Kabul City witnessed targeted assassinations and an honor killing, with another assassination (the escalation of a dispute) being reported from the hills of PD 6. Abductions for ransom, regular traits of previous reports this year, did not materialize this period.

GRAPH INFORMATION:

The graphs provided in this report are accurate as of the **11th of May 2011**. In addition, the NGO Incidents/Year to Date figures include Criminal and AOG attributed events only. Incidents attributed to other actors (i.e. ANSF) are not captured in this data.


LOGAR

Two cases of AOG abductions and a seizure of explosive material by IMF underlined the developments in Logar. A 37% increase in overall incident volumes has been recorded, although AOG activity remained constant with 10 AOG attacks captured so far. In opposition to the events in Wardak, the security forces were effective in the interdiction of IED attacks as all deployed devices were neutralized (5 devices collected by ANSF, and one by IMF). The core of AOG attacks indeed focused on the traditional close-range strikes against static and moving security targets (8 cases, security forces without exception). AOG escalations concentrated in Puli Alam (2 abductions and 3 close range attacks) and Baraki Barak (2 close range attacks and 3 IED deployments), whereas the IMF performed a dozen of arrests with a large majority of incidents taking place in the population centers of Baraki Barak, Puli Alam, Charkh and Muhammad Agha.

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	1
This Report Period	0

Of note, the Kashmir area in Baraki Barak witnessed a joint IMF-ANSF operation which tracked down and intercepted a truck transporting up to 10 tonnes of ammonium nitrate.

On 6 May, an ANP officer was abducted along with his vehicle in the bazaar of Puli Alam. Two days later, his dead body was recovered from Chiltan Area. On the same day, 8 May, a party of 3 expatriate (Turkish) engineers and a local driver, employees of a private construction company, got stuck in traffic on the highway north of Puli Alam, while the road was blocked following an IED discovery. Taking a detour via the ill-reputed Qalai Juma Khan – Babus section proved a disaster, as the party was immediately snatched from the road, presumably by local AOG elements. Later on this cycle, IMF conducted a follow up operation in Qalai Juma Khan, reportedly leading to the arrest of several AOG suspects. As of the time of writing, the fate of the



abductees and their whereabouts remain unknown.

In regards to NGOs, the cases of abductions remain rare, and have not resumed since 2008. Out of 30 AOG-initiated cases of abduction recorded since 2006, three instances included NGOs (Zarghun Shahr in Muhammad Agha, Wazirabad & Qalai Sayed Habibullah in Puli Alam). All the cases pertained to the temporary abductions (and subsequent release) of NGO de-miners over the summer season 2008. In counterpoint, criminal abductions targeted NGOs twice during September 2007 (in Qalai Ali Khan of Puli Alam & Shaikhabad of Baraki Barak). While the abductions, either as attacks of opportunity, or for premeditated criminal or political motives, remain rare, they nonetheless represent a key element of the NGO operational environment in the province.


BAMYAN

Absent this period, road-side robberies nevertheless constitute the only established (though infrequent) pattern affecting NGO freedom of movement in the province. The only event of significance in Bamyan was the NDS operation in Ghandak Valley (Shibar District) and the subsequent arrest of a local resident for illegal possession of firearms. In opposition to April, May did not confirm any lasting uptick of AOG activity. The two AOG attacks in Espushta area of Kahmard recorded in April (SAF against an ANP checkpoint on 12 April, IED against an IMF vehicular patrol on 28 April) remain

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	0
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outliers, although Eshpushta (and the wider Do Ab Mikh Zarin) has acquired a somewhat durable reputation of being perhaps the only pocket within the province with a more frequent presence of AOG.

For access to Bamyan from Kabul, both the Ghorband Valley road (via Shibar) and the Wardak Road (via Jalrez and Hajigak) continue to host security incidents. In both areas, the attacks have so far concentrated on the security forces and their associates (such as PSCs). For the last two weeks, AOG attacks in Ghorband were largely at par with AOG strikes in Jalrez, although the attacks dif-



fered in tactics and intensity: while the Ghorband incidents pertained to IED activity (with the devices usually emplaced overnight and mostly authored by IEA), the Jalrez road featured close-range combat and ambushes, with local accounts indicating a mixed AOG and ACG imprint along the road. The Ghorband road is currently assessed as a less exposed axis for NGO movement to/from Bamyan than the passage thru Jalrez.

KAPISA


The conflict in the eastern districts of Kapisa (Tagab & Alasay in particular) followed a slightly downward trend in comparison to the previous period, with both sides taking a breath after the countless IMF & ANSF offensives earlier this year. In counterpoint, AOG determination to escalate the conflict this season stood still. When engagements did occur this period, they remained lethal, often including multiple casualties and protracted fighting. The safe passage of civilians, incl. NGOs, is often compromised as the clashes do converge on main access routes and populated areas in their vicinity. In the west, a recent emergence of AOG IED activity (so far still modest in terms of frequency and impact) seems to represent a trend in the making.

Out of 13 recorded incidents (7 AOG initiated in total), two were AOG initiated complex attacks in Alasay (Jangalez, the strike included an IED) and Tagab (Sultan Khel on the Tagab – Alasay axis).

	NGO Incidents
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The latter incident resulted in four AOG casualties, reportedly including expatriate fighters from Waziristan. Shatoray, on the Tagab – Surobi section of the road, saw an IED device detonate during defusal by a joint IMF-ANSF EOD team. The northern access route to Tagab from Nijrab witnessed the elimination by IMF of an AOG operative in process of emplacing an IED in Omer Khel, while in Lando Khel, three AOG were captured by a joint security force.

In Kohistan I, a low-yield RCIED largely missed an NDS officer driving a white Toyota Hilux in the Tape Malik Area in the late morning of 11 May. Previously, IED activity in this part of Kapisa typically related to makeshift (often lethal) devices used in local conflicts and interpersonal issues. Since 2011, however, two IED blasts and three discoveries have been identified as devices authored by AOG. The incidents gave weight to the accounts, regis-



tered earlier this year, of IEA efforts to recruit local elements and train them in the facilitation of road-side IED attacks against the ANSF and IMF. So far, the attacks have not been effective due to the technological shortcomings of devices emplaced. Although a failed attempt, the case of an ineffective strike against a white marked land-cruiser of an international organization in Nawabad – Karezai in January demonstrated the risks of NGOs being mistakenly targeted by inexperienced AOG recruits who, besides assembling the devices, have also difficulties in identifying legitimate targets. In this regards, the latest strike marked a progress, as the attackers correctly identified and explored a routine NDS movement. Still, it is yet to be seen whether the IEA training and logistical efforts will materialize in IED attacks of scale in the Kohistans.


DAYKUNDI

This cycle opened with armed escalations of two local disputes in Sangi Takht and Khedir. In the first case, two families clashed over land in Joye Mirazar. One of the individuals involved was shot dead, whereas eight individuals have been arrested by ANP. In Bala Woyeer, the armed security of a Khedir-based warlord escalated a clash with the ANP detail shortly after the police established a checkpoint 'threateningly too close' to the warlord's residence. For the rest, the province remained untouched by overt political or criminal violence with the

	NGO Incidents
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exception of the southern Kajran District.

The bazaar of Kajran actually hosted a single AOG-initiated attack, which took form of a brief night-time SAF engagement against an ANP checkpoint (3 May). The shoot-out left two ANP injured, sending once again a message of force to those who show intent to interfere with sporadic AOG passage. The IMF responded with a hearts and minds offensive six days later, when a special forces team made a mobile clinic available for the



community in the vicinity of the ANP checkpoint, seizing the opportunity to consult with local elders on the situation. Reportedly, the attractiveness of medical care outweighed the fear of AOG reprisals in the eyes of local residents, and the day was termed a success.

WARDAK


A steady upwards trend for incident volumes (+25% over the previous period), and the ratio of 7 AOG strikes per 3 ANSF & IMF interventions marked the reporting period. Nirkh and Saydabad continued to host recurrent AOG attacks aimed at disrupting ANSF-IMF movements along the highway, whereas significant volumes have also been reported from the district roads in Jalrez, Jaghatu and Day Mirdad, in addition to the DACs of Maydan Shahr and Chaki Wardak..

The AOG surge maintained high volumes of close-range attacks, although the most visible change has been noted in regards to IED deployment. In comparison with the first four months of 2011 (12 IED strikes in total, mainly in Saydabad), the first 10 days of this cycle accounted for 9 IED blasts alone which were also more equally distributed between Saydabad and Nirkh districts (3 strikes respectively), Maydan Shahr (2) and Jaghatu (1). The blasts targeted

	NGO Incidents
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security forces, their PSC associates and logistical providers, causing 9 casualties among the personnel. AOG experiments with IEDs did not go smoothly though - two premature blasts during the emplacement (one in Jaghatu and another in Nirkh), claimed lives of 6 AOG operatives (5 and 1 respectively). ANSF declared just one IED seizure (on the highway in Saydabad), although an IMF-ANSF operation in Maydan Shahr effectively targeted members of an alleged IED cell. Overall, IED deployment proved effective, although costly, on AOG side. With additional training and dissemination of materiel, IEDs will likely gain in proportion within the AOG patterns of attack, eventually increasing the statistical likelihood of NGOs to drive into an explosive device.

Besides the military operations, the IEA leadership showed a reactive face with the PSG reportedly touring the southern districts and



mobilizing the communities for more support. Voicing opposition to girls' education was mentioned as a recurrent topic of the PSG tour, but also a point of discord between the leader and his constituency.

GOA stabilization efforts focused on the deployment of the ALP (reportedly with the province's APPF structures integrating into the new program). Two specific traits have appeared since the early days of the initiative: the Wardak version of the ALP builds heavily on the APPF platform (benefitting from established organizational learning and trained cadres); and AOGs did not hesitate to promote the ALP among the targets of choice incl. intimidation of the communities in order to contain the roll-out of the program. Local ownership and the impact of the program on the grass-roots level is yet to be seen.

PANJSHIR

The sole incident recorded this period was linked to the police follow-up of the 19 April shoot out in Safid Chehr. With the perpetrator still at large, the course of investigation led NDS to a private residence in Koh Jaon (Parun) and while the security force carried out a search of the house, the team came under an accurate SAF from a distance. As a result, one NDS was wounded, while the

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	0
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perpetrator managed to escape.

Opposition voices from Panjshir, rather than security incidents, claimed attention this period and materialized in several congregations held in Kabul. The killing of Osama bin Laden indeed set the tone of protests, with the leaders refuting both the current establishment's attempts at reconciliation process with AOG, as well as

the alleged Pakistani interferences in Afghanistan. Despite the strongly worded warnings to the government by the prominent duo of Dr. Abdullah – A. Saleh, other strands of Panjshiri power-circles retain a strong representation within the current ruling elite, incl. the security forces. This level of accommodation of interests, and the restraint that the Panjshiri opposition leaders have demonstrated so far, make the scope for violent protests linked to the voices of dissatisfaction coming from Panjshir quite limited.

PARWAN


The IEA campaign in the Ghorband valley dominated the events in Parwan, incl. cases of targeted abductions & killing, IEDs and close-range attacks.

On 1 May, an ANP CP in Namak Ab came under AOG SAF, leaving two ANP injured while on the 2nd, AOG kidnapped two former AOG fighters in Surkhi, Siygerd (who had recently joined the Government within the auspices of the APRP). On 4 May, an IED was discovered at the Siyagerd DAC and on 7 May, a former Jamiat commander was taken by IEA members from a mini-van in Daraye Khiski, north of the main road in Siyagerd. His body was discovered later on in Quli Maqsud, further north in the mountains, with gunshot wounds indicating an execution-style killing likely related to the fact that the commander was in talks with ANP to establish an ALP/pro-GOA militia in his area (Taykhan). After the execution, the IEA communicated locally that any such attempts will be

	NGO Incidents
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punished in a similar manner. The cycle concluded on 15 May with an RCIED blast against an ANP Ford Ranger in Shah Tut, Shinwari. The number of AOG attacks recorded since the beginning of Operation Badar already equals the amount of aggregated AOG incidents staged in Ghorband over the first four months of 2011.

IEDs and RCIEDs, although destined for ANSF, constitute the main threat for NGO movements along the road to Bamyan. Respective to the Ghorband section of the Bamyan road, ANSO has so far recorded 4 IED strikes in 2011, while an additional 5 IED (incl. 3 multiple 'daisy chained' devices) have been discovered and neutralized by ANSF. Further in line, on 9 May, Shinwari ANP arrested an IEA IED-facilitator in Darazgerd, shortly after his return from a stay in Pakistan. Hindering ANSF movements to/from Bamyan, will likely remain high on the priority list for IEA opera-



tives, especially as Bamyan approaches the date of the formal security transition.

A sole case of an RCIED strike against an ANP vehicle was also reported from Kotale Basir Khel in Kohi Safi, constituting both the first AOG attack and the first IED deployment this year for that area. In the central parts of Parwan, AOG continued to harass the occupants of IMF and ANA bases with stand-off attacks as grenades, mortars and rockets appear in steady volumes and occasionally impact inside the premises. IMF also attracted a direct attack (SAF) along the Parwan - Kapisa Road in Qalacha Sukhtar (Chaharikar). Proximity to security targets in Ghorband and around the bases in central parts of the province will likely continue to represent a major external threat to NGO operations in the weeks to come.

NORTHERN REGION

BALKH

Perhaps the most notable security incident in Balkh Province; Mazar-e Sharif (MeS) saw a rare rocket attack on its airport (located in Nahri Shahi District) on May 11th. 2 rockets were fired from Nasiraband village (west of the airport), with 1 of them impacting harmlessly outside the airport, while the other detonated in an open area inside the airport, causing little damage, but exploding in close proximity to an IO helicopter. Nahri Shahi has typically been fairly quiet, with this marking only the 11th security incident in the district this year. Although an IED detonated on an IMF convoy in the Puli Tasadi area of MeS, on the road towards the airport as recently as March 5th of this year, the last incident similar to this one in Nahri Shahi took place on September 28th 2010, when a single rocket (107mm) impacted a local residence in Qul M u h a m m a d V i l l a g e (approximately 2 km northeast from Camp Marmal).


In a second AOG attributed event in Nahri Shahi this reporting period, a group of 10 AOG members riding 4 motorcycles entered the Shaharak villages on May 7th to extort money. It remains premature to assess any shifts to the

	NGO Incidents
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security paradigm for the district, as these 2 incidents—occurring within days of each other—mark the only AOG initiated security incidents on record in Nahri Shahi this year.

The deterioration of security in Chintal and Chahar Bolak districts west of MeS continued this reporting period, with reports surfacing from IMF that their security forces are being engaged—regardless of unit size and strength—almost every time they enter either district (as opposed to previously, when AOGs would only engage “softer” targets, such as foot patrols or low volume elements). ANSO recorded 6 attacks on ANP and ANSF targets in these districts this reporting period, which—while significant—does not represent an especially high volume or new dynamic for these highly AOG controlled districts. AOGs operating openly in Chintal and Chahar Bolak continue to conduct regular operations to assert their ability and control.

Zari District has shown an increase in insecurity (like much of Southern Balkh—including Kishindih and Sholgara), with a 7th security incident occurring this year, up from a total of 2 that oc-



curred in 2010. Although the district is still not considered exceptionally insecure relative to its’ neighboring districts, on May 3rd in Ghash village, an ANP officer travelling with teachers was stopped and robbed by 5 armed individuals on motorcycles, all of them then being released unharmed. It is worth noting that 4 of the 7 security incidents in Zari this year have consisted of armed robberies much like this one, the most recent of which occurred on March 12th, when armed individuals stopped and robbed a private vehicle on the Zari-Kishindih Road near Sair Qishlaq village. It seems likely that an armed group is operating regularly and effectively in Zari, with a good chance that more robberies are occurring unreported, and that further sporadic robberies are likely to occur.


Rounding up security in Balkh, Khulm District witnessed an AOG attack on an ANP checkpoint in Sayyad village on the 11th, and lastly, in a non-security related incident, a bus slid off a road and into a canal in Samar Qandyan village in Balkh District on the 14th, tragically killing 21 people, as many as 15 of whom may have been children.

KUNDUZ

Kunduz continues to show high levels of insecurity—generally characterized by crime and attacks on IMF/GOA/ANP/ANSF targets—with 31 security incidents this reporting period. This volume practically matches that of the previous reporting cycle (29), and represents a slight increase over the 26 security incidents which were recorded over the same period (May 1-15) in 2010. 12 of the 31 incidents this period took place in Kunduz District (one more than occurred in Kunduz District the previous reporting period), with a further 10 in Chahar Dara (as opposed to the previous reporting period, where the majority outside of Kunduz took place in Khanabad District). Perhaps most notable amongst these, an RCIED detonated on an Iranian construction vehicle along the main Kunduz-Khanabad road, in the Nawadabad Andrabi area of Kunduz District on the 14th. The blast caused some damage to the driver and his vehicle. Although IED detonations on this road are not uncommon—the last one occurring on April 21st in the Malarghi Area—it is less common for RCIEDs to target non-military targets. The previous one detonated on an ANA vehicle, and

	NGO Incidents
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due to ongoing military operations in Kunduz, the road is a “target rich” environment for AOGs. However, private construction vehicles are sometimes associated with the GOA and/or the general presence of international actors who support the GOA. Outside of this, the rest of these 12 incidents in Kunduz took on a broad scope of activities—with a notable 3 AOG attacks taking place either in the Gortepa area or on the road between Gortepa and Kunduz (2 IED strikes on IMF targets and the ambush of a pro-government militia). Also of note, AOG members entered a school on May 1st in the Malarghi area and burnt school properties, including 3 tents and some chairs, before fleeing (no injuries reported). Attacks on schools have occurred countrywide, although prominent speakers on behalf of AOG groups have recently posited to the media that these attacks will be cut down significantly. Lastly in the district, on May 6th an ACG attacked the National Bank, was engaged by the ANP, and escaped the scene. There are no indications this was anything other than a criminal act. Chahar Dara witnessed 10 security



incidents this reporting period, including 3 separate IED strikes on IMF targets on May 3rd (1 in Zhadran Village, 1 in Kharoti Village, and 1 in the Hikhanum area) followed by 2 joint search operations and 2 IMF night raids (both of these latter occurring on the 10th, 1 in Kharoti village—killing 3 and arresting 3 others—and 1 in Mama Khel village—arresting 3). 2 criminal incidents took place in Imam Sahib District, which—with the exception of 2 IMF operations—has seen only criminal insecurity since the beginning of April. Over this reporting period, an unknown armed individual shot and killed 5 AOG members in Kalbad area on the 9th, and in Majar Village, on the 10th, a local civilian was abducted in what has been assessed as likely the result of a personal dispute. Lastly, in the oft quiet Qalay-I Zal district, an RICED detonated on an ANP vehicle in the Zulmabad area on the 10th (injuring 6 ANP and damaging the vehicle). Although Qalay-I Zal has only seen 6 security incidents this year, all 6 of them have taken place over the last month and a half (April/May), and 2 others have involved the discovery and seizure of IEDs.

FARYAB

2 illegal checkpoints, with an INGO staff member being stopped at 1 of them, headlined a reporting period that was otherwise strongly characterized by AOG clashes with ANP/IMF/PGM forces in Qaysar District. Qaysar accounted for 9 of the province's 20 total security incidents.


At 1400 hrs on the 10th of May, an AOG set up an illegal checkpoint in Aqdara village (Sar-e Awz area) of Pashtun Kot, along the Kohistan - Maymana road. The checkpoint lasted approximately 30 minutes, during which AOG members searched private vehicles for ANSF/GOA personnel. One of the vehicles searched had an INGO national staff member as a passenger; however, the staff member was able to avoid being questioned and searched because AOG members believed he was sick. Aside from him, the AOG manning the checkpoint was asking all passengers to dismount from their vehicles to be checked. This underscores the importance of NGO staff members maintaining situational awareness at all times, and pre-constructing plans and mitigation measures during risk assessments for situations such as these—especially with illegal checkpoints becoming increasingly more prevalent throughout the North. Although not along the main ring road, this is the first illegal checkpoint in the

	NGO Incidents
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district since April 2009, and it is significant that it occurred in the middle of the day.

Anecdotal reports have recently arisen that there has been an increase in AOG activity in Pashtun Kot and Kohistan, although this has rarely been demonstrated in incident reporting. Over this reporting period, Pashtun Kot witnessed the discovery of 2 IEDs near Jar Qala village on the 8th, 2 separate AOG attacks on checkpoints (1 on an ANP checkpoint near Takhta Bazar on the 10th, and 1 on an ANBP checkpoint near Khwaja Namosa on the 7th), and on the 11th, an armed clash erupted—again in the Takhta Bazar area—between ANSF/IMF and an AOG. There were 5 security incidents total for the district this reporting period, which is equal to the 5 per month it has seen every other month so far this year. It is yet to be determined if this level of insecurity will continue throughout the entire month.

Prior to this, an illegal checkpoint occurred along the main ring road on May 1st in Khwaja Sabz Posh District. The checkpoint stopped at least 4 civilian vehicles in the area before ANP deployed to its location and engaged the armed personnel conducting it. This is the first AOG initiated incident in Khwaja Sabz Posh this year, and the first illegal checkpoint on AN-



SO record for this district. The North (and especially the ring road linking Mazar to Maymana) continues to see a significant amount of illegal checkpoints such as this, many of them appearing in locations where they had seldom (or never) been previously recorded.

The AOG stronghold of Qaysar—the most volatile district in the province—was responsible for almost half (9) of the province's total security incidents (20) with 7 ANP/AOG clashes—some of them with local militias involved, as well as 1 attack on an IMF patrol (where air support was called in) and an IED discovery. Of particular note amongst these, on the 1st in Chilgazi village, an AOG attacked an ANSF convoy, resulting in 1 AOG and 1 civilian death and injuries to an additional 2 AOG, 1 ANA, 1 ANP, and 2 civilians (including 1 child). Civilian casualties on both sides remain a source of strong contention.

Outside of Qaysar and the illegal checkpoints, Dawlatabad, a district with a known AOG presence that has seen significant activity this year, contributed to the province's insecurity when 2 AOGs were killed by the IED device they were emplacing when it detonated prematurely, and—elsewhere in the district—an AOG attacked an ANP checkpoint wounding (amongst others) 3 local civilians and an ANP.

TAKHAR


Takhar continued to display a relatively low level of general insecurity this reporting period, with only 11 security incidents recorded. The majority of these incidents (7 of 11) occurred in Taluqan District, which is noteworthy as it is the location where most NGOs in the province are based in or operate out of. 4 of these 7 included the discovery or detonation of explosive devices.

Taluqan City's PD#1 bore the brunt of the above mentioned 4 incidents, with a jerry can full of explosives (possessing no trigger) discovered and seized in a culvert in Sarakhi Shash area on the 3rd, a small IED detonation—likely prematurely—also in a culvert approximately 2 kilometers north of the city in Charasyab area on the 4th, and on the 7th, a small IED was discovered and defused in the Chaman Sarwali area. Fol-

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lowing these (but not necessarily related), an arrest was made of 2 AOG suspects during a search operation in PD#3 of Taluqan (Golaey Bagh area) on the 10th. The final 2 incidents in Taluqan consisted of interpersonal disputes and/or ACG crime.


Outside of the 7 incidents in Taluqan, the other 4 incidents in the province consisted of 3 search operations (run by ANSF, 2 in Darqad District—where weapons were seized and 1 arrest made—and 1 in Chah Ab, which resulted in the arrest of a drug trafficker) and an RCIED detonation on an ANA convoy in Baharak. Although Baharak District in Takhar (not to be confused with the volatile district in Badakhshan) has only witnessed a total of 4 security incidents this year, all 4 have been AOG related (3 of them AOG initiated, and 1 an IMF raid that



resulted in the arrest of AOG members), and 2 of those 4 (both this one and an incident on February 19th in Jilo village) involved RCIED detonations. While this does not pose a significant development and/or trend, nor suggest that Baharak is suffering from intense insecurity, it is likely that AOGs have some established presence in the district, as they are responsible for every recorded act of insecurity there, which demonstrates a significant level of control.

The growth or deterioration of security in Takhar Province remains fluid, and will continue to be a situation that requires further monitoring and assessment.

Monthly AOG Incident Comparison: 2006-2011
(as of 11 May 2011)



BAGHLAN


Baghlan Province remained relatively quiet this reporting period, with only 10 security incidents (dipping slightly from the previous reporting period—which recorded 11—and the one before that, which recorded 15). 4 of these incidents were of little significance to the NGO community, with 2 of them consisting of peaceful demonstrations concerning governance issues, and 2 the result of interpersonal disputes. However, IMF night-raids—which continue to be a source of contention with the local populations countrywide—made up 4 of the security events, with 1 taking place in each of Baghlani Jadid, Dushi, Tala Wa Barfak, and Dahan-I Ghuri Districts. There was also an IMF operation in Baghlan Old City (Baghlani Kuna) with air support that took place on the 1st, allegedly resulting in the capture of an AOG commander.

The night raid in Dushi stands out amongst these 4. The raid took place on May 2nd in a local residence in the Gharchishma area,

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and resulted in the deaths of 3 males, 2 females and 2 children, along with the arrests of 5 AOG suspects. Night raids have been criticized for a number of reasons including how they are carried out, the legitimacy of targets, and the potential for civilian casualties. At this time it is unclear how or why the 7 individuals above were killed or how many of those 7 were assessed as “legitimate” targets (as opposed to collateral losses). At present, IMF continues to operate using night raids as an “essential” part of their military strategy.

Although—and likely, because—Baghlani Jadid and Burka have seen the brunt of recent “Operation Nowruz” military activities, Dushi District has recently surfaced as a flashpoint for insecurity, with an uncharacteristic 10 incidents occurring in April 2011 that included abductions, roadside attacks and illegal checkpoints in what had historically been one of the quieter districts in the region



(suffering only 14 security incidents in all of 2010, with only 2 in May of 2010). It is unclear at this point (although likely) whether this operation was undertaken in response to this recent spike, and whether it will have a lasting effect on security in the district. As operations in AOG strong Baghlan wind down, further assessment will be needed to see whether it will result in a lasting effect on security in the province, or—as has often been the case elsewhere in the North—whether AOGs will mount a new series of operations to re-establish their continued presence and capability. History seems to point to the latter.

Lastly, on May 9th in Puli Khumri, at the Talashi checkpoint along the Puli Khumri-Dushi Main Road, a Pakistani national was caught with a vehicle containing a large cache of weapons and ammunition. The driver was arrested and an investigation into where the weapons came from and were going remains ongoing.

JAWZJAN


Jawzjan saw significant security incidents this reporting period, with Fayzabad District in particular witnessing a spike in road insecurity that included 3 security incidents along the Shibirghan – Mazar Main Road (notably, all of them taking place after 1700 hours).

Amongst the above, on May 9th, an IO contracted truck was traveling this road en route to Mazar-e Sharif after conducting a food drop when it was attacked with SAF. No injuries were reported and the vehicle was able to continue on out of the hot area. On the 5th, an IED was discovered and defused in a culvert in the Khona-Kokaldash area, and on the 7th—in Sedarakht and Gorjak areas—AOG launched simultaneous attacks on 2 checkpoints using heavy weapons and SAF. An ensuing 3 hour long fire fight resulted in no casualties. These 3 incidents in a district not known to be particularly insecure shows a level of activity not previously seen along this segment of the

	NGO Incidents
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ring road. Fayzabad District has witnessed only 6 security incidents this year, but 5 of them have involved road insecurity, with 3 of these 5 taking place in the Kokaldash area (this IED discovery, an IED discovery on April 20th, and an illegal checkpoint on March 25th). It appears likely that an AOG is operating in the area, although whether this spike will be temporarily—as a result of Operation Wahdat's activity in the South—or more permanent—as there are anecdotal reports that the AOG may have ties with groups from Chimtal/Chahar Bolak districts in Balkh—requires more assessment.

With the recent completion of Operation Wahdat (the ANSF led, IMF supported operation in the Tri-Provincial area), activity has begun to increase in the districts where the operation occurred. This is likely the result of AOGs operating out of those strongholds which were targeted striving to reassert their presence and abil-



ity to carry out operations in the area. In that vein, 2 attacks took place in Qush Tapa; 1 on May 4th when an AOG attacked an ANP CP in Turkman Qudoq Village, and 1 on May 9th, where a large number of AOG elements attacked a newly established pro-government militia (PGM) checkpoint located around Nawabad Abdul Rahman Pahlawan village. The resulting engagement from this latter incident became relatively extensive, with ANSF deploying to the area to support the PGM detachment, and over the course of the attack, IMF air support called in as well. When the attack was over, it was reported that 11 AOG members and 1 PGM member were killed and 9 AOG members and 1 PGM commander injured. The establishment of PGMs in AOG strong areas continues to be a sensitive subject for AOGs operating in those areas, and PGM checkpoints are often the first ones targeted.

TRAINING NOTICE:

ANSO will be conducting free Basic Guard training and Radio Communications training for NGOs in the Northern Region in May. Please note that the two training courses are separate and take one whole day each to complete. At present we are soliciting interest for the training to be conducted in provinces other than Balkh so if you are interested, please provide an email to the address provided below detailing your NGO and the province in which you would like training to be conducted.

Full registration information will be provided shortly which will detail what provinces have been identified for the sessions.

Contact Person:

Operations Coordinator National Counterpart, Mr. Masoud Habibi:

operations2@afgnso.org.

SAR-E PUL


Sar-e Pul Province continues to show signs of deteriorating security in both the widely known AOG strongholds—such as Sayyad—and the historically more operable areas, such as Sar-e Pul. This reporting period it was Sayyad that saw the most insecurity, despite the conclusion of Operation Wahdat, which aimed at clearing out some of the AOG presence in the district. Most notable in Sayyad, in Shah Toot village on May 9th a group of armed men temporarily detained an NGO local staff member for an hour before he was released after the intervention of elders on his behalf.

Also in Sayyad, in the Khwaja Yagana area on May 3rd, an AOG ambushed an ANP convoy. During the ensuing fire fight, 1 ANP was killed and 9 others were injured. The AOG eventually secured an ANP machine-gun and subsequently burnt their vehicle. Lastly in the district, on May 6th in Khwaja Chargonbat and Khwaja Yagana Villages (the latter the same as the above ambush) AOG attacked ANSF positions in a fire fight that lasted for almost 3 consecutive nights. Eventually, ANSF was forced to withdraw from the area and the AOG captured the

	NGO Incidents
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villages. These attacks occurred after GOA/IMF statements that Operation ‘Wahdat’ had cleared Sayyad of AOGs. Typically, AOG elements in the North have responded strongly to such statements by launching operations to demonstrate their continued presence and capability.

While Sayyad District remained the center of insecurity in Sar-e Pul Province, Sar-e Pul District also suffered insecurity when an AOG established an illegal checkpoint along the main Shibirghan-Sar-e Pul road near Zaka village. The checkpoint lasted approximately 15 minutes, during which AOG members searched private vehicles for ANSF/GOA employees. ANP deployed to the area but—typical to such checkpoints—the AOG withdrew before their arrival. This marks the 7th illegal checkpoint along this stretch of road this year (with a further 3 incidents where AOGs were reported loitering in the vicinity of the road, likely with the intent to set up an illegal checkpoint). Zaka village in particular has witnessed a large amount of insecurity in the past, with the most recent incident occurring on



March 29th when at least 8 AOG members on motorcycles entered the area before being engaged by ANSF. Although this was the first established illegal checkpoint along the Sar-e Pul – Shibirghan road since March 18th, other insecurity along the road has occurred during the lapse, including most recently an April 10th AOG ambush and killing of an ANP officer en route to his duty station in the Sayed Abad area.

Anecdotal reports from the area had proposed that Kohistanat was witnessing an increase in AOG presence, and this may be beginning to show, with incidents such as the AOG abduction of a local elder from Shahnawaz Village on May 3rd. The individual was released after a ransom was paid on the 8th. Lastly in a few incidents of note in Sozma Qala District, on May 9th, AOG members entered Tapa Surkhi village to collect Ashur (religious dues) from the local civilians before they were chased out by ANSF forces, and an AOG abducted 3 locals from the village, but released them later after the intervention of local elders.

ACRONYMS:

Please see the final page for a list of ANSO-utilized acronyms.

BADAKHSHAN


Badakhshan Province in general remains home to some of the most permissive environments for NGOs in the North, with low level violence against GOA/ANP targets and incidents based on shifting power dynamics and interpersonal disputes making up the majority of manifested insecurity. Baharak—the most volatile district in the province so far in 2011—remained quiet this reporting period, with Kishim (one of the few districts in Badakhshan with a known AOG presence) displaying some of this periods' more significant insecurity. Kuran Wa Munjan continued to see violence in the District Administrative Center (DAC), as previously noted, likely the result of politics and existing grievances.

Kishim witnessed its' 7th and 8th security incidents for the year when AOG members ambushed the District Chief of Police (DCOP) from Tagab District on May 5th at 2000 hrs and then—in a separate incident—an AOG

	NGO Incidents
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abducted a former Jihadi commander on May 9th. Although it is widely postured that Kishim District has an active AOG presence, these 2 incidents mark the first AOG attributed security incidents in the district this year. In the incident with the DCOP from Tagab, which occurred in the Yakh Darab area along the Kishim – Tagab main road, the ANP responded to the attack shortly after the ambush occurred, and no casualties were reported. In terms of existing grievances against this DCOP, Tagab is not known to be an AOG hub, and has only seen 1 security incident this year—when an unknown individual hurled a hand grenade into a private residence in Kawara Village on March 22nd.

In Kuran Wa Munjan, an armed group shot 4 RPG rounds at the ANP headquarters in the DAC at 2200 hrs on May 2nd. This marks the 7th security incident in Kuran Wa Munjan over the first half of this year, which stands in stark



contrast to the 2 that took place over the entire previous year (2010), and only 1 in 2009. The general indication in the area continues to be that a local Jihadi commander is at odds with the DCOP, and has taken to mounting low level assaults on the DAC to put pressure on him, as well as on the GOA to remove him. 4 of the 7 incidents in this district have been attacks in the DAC, with the most recent occurring on April 3rd, when unknown individuals fired an RPG at a Government Clinic. As has been the case in Baharak District, the destruction of government property in DACs is often used as a means to gain attention with the hope that the GOA will give in to pressure/intimidation and be forced to deal with the offender. Kuran Wa Munjan, the southern-most district in Badakhshan, remains of political importance to both the province and region, as it separates Badakhshan from the more AOG heavy provinces of Eastern Afghanistan.

NOTICE: Your input is invaluable for the production of this report. While we appreciate information on incidents, we also need general information on the security situation and context in your area. So please remember to call or email us regularly.

Contact details of ANSO staff are provided on the last page.

ANSO: “..by NGOs for NGOs..”

WESTERN REGION

HERAT


The AOG presence in Herat Province was again evident in the eastern and the southern portions this period with AOG activity expected to increase during the summer months, particularly in such areas known to be problematic. The Darzak area, between Kushk and Kushki Kuhna in the north-east saw the discovery of two roadside IEDs on the main road between both districts, as well as a direct fire attack against an ANSF poppy eradication team on 14th of May. In the Shore Arabha area of northern Kushk, one civilian was killed and another six wounded by an IED on a secondary road on 2nd of May. Reportedly, AOG informed locals before to avoid the area. One day later, a premature IED detonation inside a house killed three AOG members as well as four children in Kushki Kuhna.

In the central-eastern Obe and Pashtun Zarghun Districts, AOG showed their continuing presence despite ANSF/IMF operations during the previous period. On the 8th of May, an IED detonation killed a local civilian on a secondary road in Servan Village of Obe and when ANP arrived to

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investigate the incident, an armed clash ensued. Of note, AOGs focused their activities in 2011 on the western part of Obe, the area where Servan is located. In Pashtun Zarghun, AOG kidnapped an ANP officer in Kurti Khaja Village and established an illegal checkpoint in Dasht-e-Nayzan Area (close to Obe) on 12th of May, searching for GoA employees. Intimidation measures, especially in Pashtun Zarghun, are likely to continue.

In the south, IEDs were the major concern during this period, particularly affecting the Herat-Kandahar Main Road and the main road to the Shindand DAC. Of note, the vast majority of IEDs targeted ANSF. On the Herat-Kandahar Main Road in Adraskan, an IED detonated in Khaja Uryan and explosive devices were discovered in Rodgaz while on the same road in Shindand District, an IED hit a PSC vehicle in Khaja Reg. On the main road to Shindand's DAC, IEDs exploded in Khaja Uryan (close to Adraskan) as well as the



Zeyarate Dorahi area and an IED was discovered in Senawghan Area.

Although Herat City itself remained relatively quiet, AOG nonetheless showed their presence around the city; however, without causing major damages or casualties. An ANSF search operation was conducted south of the citadel from 11th – 12th of May, after 25 BM1 rockets were discovered in Injil District, which were reportedly on their way to Herat City. As an IDF attack in the direction of the Regional ANP Training Centre in Guzara on the 2nd of May demonstrated, such attacks have to be expected particularly around the airport. However, IDF attacks remain still infrequent with only two such attacks recorded since January. In regard to IEDs, a device targeted an ANP vehicle on the main road in Sarjangal area of Guzara during the night and IEDs were discovered in Ferqa area (District 6) on the Herat - Karukh Road as well as on a secondary road in Rawzabagh area. Although further AOG related incidents in and around Herat City should be expected, they are not likely to increase on a large scale.

FARAH


The overall number of incidents in Farah Province increased slightly, though these remain lower than the number recorded for the first period in April. Of note, although the number of ANSF/IMF operations is the same as in the first two weeks of April, they increased from 13% to 41% compared to the overall number of incidents.

The emerging trend of increasing AOG activity in the western districts of Farah Province continued. Qala-I-Kah District was again in the focus, accounting for 25% of AOG activity and 43% of the recorded ANSF/IMF operations during the first half of May, indicating at least a temporary shift of AOG – ANSF/IMF hostilities to the western part of Farah. The district saw a direct fire attack against an ANP check-

	NGO Incidents
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point in Pusht Koh Area as well as an illegal CP on the Farah – Qala-I-Kah main road in Mulla Lalo village on 4th of May, searching for GoA employees. An ANA officer was abducted at this illegal checkpoint and killed later on. In addition, several ANSF/IMF operations further confirm a higher level of AOG presence in the area and suggest that more is expected in these usually quieter districts.

Apart from the west of the province, Pusht Rod saw fewer incidents compared to the beginning of April. However, a direct fire attacks against an ANP checkpoint in Durahi/Massaw Area and several incidents in Saj Village were recorded. Saj Village saw an ANP operation on 7th of May, followed by an IDF attack against an ANP checkpoint and the dis-



covery of three roadside IEDs. In addition, ANSF/IMF conducted an operation on the main road to Anar Dara. Khaki Safed, which was also quite affected by AOG activity during the last month, saw a direct fire attack against an ANA checkpoint in Diwar Sorkh Area on 11th of May. Hostilities in both districts are expected to continue.

Worth noting is that direct fire attacks significantly prevailed over IEDs, whereas IEDs have been the main concern during the cycles before. If this is connected to the recent west shift of AOG activities, where there might be still room for a stronger AOG engagement remains to be seen and it is likely that this will change again during the next weeks.

GHOR


Although Ghor province saw slightly more incidents than during the previous reporting periods, the province generally remains still quiet with only eight incidents out of which three were AOG/ACG initiated.

Sharak District, which already saw daytime ACG activity during the second half of April, witnessed a roadside robbery on 9th of May at approx 1000 hrs in Maidanak area on the main Herat – Chaghcharan Road, where ACG stopped a local transport vehicle and robbed the passengers. Although robberies remain infrequent, further incidents of such kind need to be expected.

The southern parts of Ghor Province, which usually see most of the AOG activity, still remain relatively quiet with two recorded incidents during this cycle. In

	NGO Incidents
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Pasaband, which witnessed the most AOG activity in Ghor in 2010, ANP conducted a search operation on 5th of May in Nahorak village, seizing a small amount of AP mines and ammunition. In Taywara, where AOG seem to be a more active this year, AOG attacked an ANP checkpoint in Yakhan Ulya area on 7th of May and forced the ANP to abandon the post, with the AOG occupying the post for a period before withdrawing. Of note, the Yakhan Ulya area hosted three similar incidents at the end of last year and further AOG activities targeting ANSF in the area – especially around ANP CPs – are therefore not unlikely. Altogether, AOG related incidents in the southern parts are expected to increase in May/June as has been the case the last two years. In



addition, Tulak District saw a direct fire attack on an ANP checkpoint in Gaw Kush srea in the early morning on 12th of May. This is the second AOG initiated incident this year after an IDF attack against the DAC on 30th of April; however, AOG activity remained infrequent in the district 2010.

Chaghcharan City remained calm apart from two unconnected incidents in Familyha area in District 2. On 3rd of May, the head of the Counter Terrorism Department for Ghor Province and his brother were shot and killed, reportedly due to a personal dispute. In addition, ANP stopped and searched a vehicle, discovering around 20-30 kg of explosives, which were being transported in the vehicle.


BADGHIS

Incident numbers during this reporting period decreased compared to April or March, though are on a similar level as May 2010. This might be a temporary effect of the significant number of airstrikes during the previous reporting periods, especially in April. However, it is likely that incident numbers will increase again with the AOG spring offensive, announced at the beginning of May. A signal in this regard might be the first recorded incident at Sabzak Pass on the Qala-I-Naw - Herat Main Road this year, where AOG attacked on an ANP check post. Sabzak Pass – not least due to its convenient geographic position – is known for its AOG/ACG presence. In addition, AOG activity was quite visible in the historic hotspots Murghab, Muqur and Ghormach. Whereas direct fire attacks were prevailing at the beginning of May, AOG

	NGO Incidents
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tactics were shifting to the emplacement of IEDs after the 6th of May. A trend that already emerged during the last reporting period was also evident the first two weeks of May: IEDs focused on the main road connecting Muqur, Murghab and Qala-I-Naw but also on the main roads to district administration centres in Ghormach and Muqur. Kotale Khaki area (located between Qala-I-Naw and Muqur) also saw an IED discovery, but most affected was the main road between Muqur and Murghab districts with four incidents, focused in Mangan and Doshori.

Although no airstrikes were recorded during this reporting period, ANSF/IMF operations continued. Qadis District saw three operations targeting AOG members between the 7th and 9th of May in two areas known for their



AOG presence. In Dara-E-Boom, close to the border with Murghab District, ANSF/IMF arrested six AOG members while in Ghal Charkh, north of the main road from Qala-I-Naw, two AOG members were killed and another one wounded during an ANSF/IMF operation. Apart from these AOG influenced areas; ANP also arrested an AOG member in the district centre. Other operations took place in Sange Atesh area and Sahra Arab as well as Majnon villages of Murghab, and Doshori Absharha area of Muqur, which is along the main road to Murghab. Of note, nine days later ANSF/IMF discovered three roadside IEDs in the Doshori area, demonstrating the reactive processes between ANSF/IMF and AOGs.

ANSO REGISTRATION INFORMATION:

Please note that both the ANSO email and SMS distribution lists are updated once weekly, every Sunday. The registration deadline is on the Thursday of every week, therefore, any requests submitted after this will not be updated until the following week. As well, NGOs are requested to provide their registration documentation (or to request the same) directly to the Operations National Counterpart, Mr. Masoud Habibi, at the following email address: registration@afgnso.org

EASTERN REGION

NANGARHAR


While the volume of conflict incidents rose considerably in Nangarhar during this report period, a significant portion of this increase comprised reporting of the ANP's poppy eradication campaign, with approximately 710 acres of poppy field destroyed in Sherzad and Khogyani; of note, there were no attempts to eradicate poppy in Achin this period, unlike last period. However, even after subtracting these eradication efforts, the volume of incidents clearly indicates that the provincial conflict continued to intensify, with key dimensions comprising a) an escalating IED campaign, especially along Highway 7, and b) a rise in IMF operations, particularly in Chaparhar.

First of all, though, in spite of expectations that the IEA's Operation Badar announcement would lead to some spectacular and/or suicide attacks against IMF or ANSF, this particular dimension of the conflict did not manifest itself. However, it remains a standing concern, and there were signs of ongoing AOG intent in this direction. For example, on May 5th a BBIED operative carrying his vest in hand was stopped at the ANP CP next to the ANA barracks and JAF, and detained by the NDS. Moreover, on the same afternoon NDS hooded two individuals in a crowded market in Jalalabad's Zone 1, for suspected involvement in AOG activities. Another, more powerful, remind-

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er of AOG reach into the provincial capital was the motorcycle-borne IED that detonated on the main shopping road that runs between Mokharabat and Talashi squares, which injured 8 and killed 1: the IMF convoy 30 metres away from the detonation was the presumed target. Three IMF raids in the city, two in Zone 3 and one in a mosque in Zone 2, detaining a total of 10 suspected AOG members, was an indication of the IMF's awareness and active efforts to combat this AOG reach into the heart of the city.

Outside the provincial capital, there was a marked increase in attacks on fuel tankers on Highway 7, between Jalalabad and Torkham, including what appears to be a new IED cell operating in the Torkham area aimed at targeting tankers working for the IMF. In Bati Kot, there were two direct attacks on fuel tankers, both at dawn and one killing the driver, while an IED detonated prematurely in the area of a petrol station, indicating it too was aimed at fuel tankers or their support infrastructure. In Muhmand Dara, two IEDs hit tankers in the Canal 27 area on separate occasions, while ANP and ANBP disrupted two vehicles transporting sizeable caches of IEDs – magnetic and remote controlled – at the Torkham border crossing, demonstrating that the IED attacks taking place this side of the border are



operationally connected to those also occurring just over the border in Khyber Agency, where similar numbers of tankers were destroyed in recent weeks. The IED campaign also impacted elsewhere in the province, with the most notable event the MIED that detonated on the vehicle of the CID provincial deputy chief in the Daman area of Bihsud, injuring an ANP officer and the deputy chief's son.

A second dimension of importance has been IMF operations, registered at an increased rate and 2 of which have led to accidental killings of innocents. In Chaparhar, known to be a stronghold for approximately a dozen small AOG factions with allegiances to the core IEA, an increased AOG presence led to 5 separate IMF operations between May 1st and May 3rd. They cumulatively led to 10 suspected AOG members detained, and during one operation in Solozu, a firefight led to the death of 7 AOG fighters. Other operations occurred in Khalis Family Colony, Bati Kot, Sherzad's Tutu village, and two in Sorkh Rod, one of which killed a 12 year old girl after a reported misidentification. Finally, on the 13th an operation in Hesarak DAC area led to the mistaken killing of a 15 year old boy; large community protests the following morning at the DAC led to an escalation of force incident in which 4 protestors were killed, demonstrating clearly the negative consequences of fatal IMF mistakes.

KUNAR


Kunar continued to be a volatile, highly kinetic environment in which the AOG-IMF/ANSF conflict remained the dominant form of insecurity, with AOGs making further gains in pressuring the security forces and dominating territory. There were also further incidents affecting NGO clinics, which again involved IMF. This time, in Khas Kunar IMF searched a clinic on multiple occasions due to suspicions that AOG members were being treated in them, with on one occasion smashing the door and windows to gain entry, and confiscating property. If similarly targeted by IMF, NGOs are advised to raise the issue immediately with ANSO. Khas Kunar was also home to further abductions and targeted killings during the period, similar to the pattern of incidents recorded there before.

In other developments in the province, Asadabad came under an elevated level of assault early in the period – the PRT was repeatedly mortared on the 1st and 4th, while the prison and ANP HQ were also attacked on the 1st. These, as well as attacks on 5 separate district ANP HQs across the province on the 1st, were thought to be connected to the commencement of the IEA’s Opera-

tion Badar, although the pattern was not significantly different from the normal picture of the provincial conflict.

In the western corridor of Chapa Dara, Manogai and Wata Pur, there continued to be a significant number of direct AOG attacks on ANSF and IMF targets, although Chapa Dara was relatively quiet – likely because a significant number of AOG fighters had travelled to Wama to take part in the attempts to seize Nuristan’s provincial capital (see Nuristan). In Manogai, the ANA came under repeated attack, although they did not suffer any casualties in the engagements – the only deaths reported were of 2 AOG fighters. However, AOG members did abduct an ANP policeman in the Tanteel area early in the period. Perhaps most significantly, a fire-fight erupted between AOG members and community members in the Bar Kandi area, reportedly because of local opposition to AOG CPs and their theft of valuables during their stop and searches; this is not an uncommon occurrence in the more mountainous communities of Kunar and Nuristan, and is excellent evidence for how strong local communities can oppose all types

	NGO Incidents
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of outsider interference, not just that of foreign forces. In Wata Pur, meanwhile, an armed group shot and killed an influential AOG commander on the 1st, another vivid indication that we are likely to see growing conflict between AOGs as their vying for greater influence in their post-IMF areas brings them into conflict with each other.

In the northern part of the province, Gha-ziabad was particularly insecure, with both a high number of AOG assaults (6) on ANA OPs, in the Jalala and Shaheed Barialay areas, and two separate mass abductions in Jalala, one of 16 assorted GOA officials and civilians, and the other of 25 clerics – the latter evidence of an increasingly extreme approach by local AOGs, who in the previous period also violently assaulted members of the clerical community. In Nari there were 4 assaults on ANP and IMF targets, while in Bar Kunar there were 4 IDF attacks on IMF and ANA facilities. In the central belt of Narang, Marawara and Sirkanay, finally, there were approximately 20 direct AOG assaults on ANSF targets, demonstrating that AOGs continue to re-establish quickly a strong presence in these areas after recent IMF operations.


NURISTAN

Nuristan continued to record concerted efforts by the IEA and affiliated foreign AOGs to formally seize territory, with Bargi Matal and the provincial capital Parun the key contested prizes this period. First in Bargi Matal, on May 3rd ANA commandos, supported by IMF SOF, were helicoptered into the Awla Gul area in IMF air assets from where they initiated a clearing operation against a heavy AOG presence, including locals, Punjabis, Arabs, Chechens, and recently arrived Swatis – who had come to assist in what appeared to be the imminent seizure of Bargi Matal DAC. While the Nuristan Provincial Governor asserted that this operation was a response to cross-border infiltration in retaliation for the killing of Al Qaeda chief Osama bin Laden, the facts indicate otherwise: the fighting took place far away from the bor-

	NGO Incidents
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der, in an area known as a training camp and staging post, against AOGs known to have been present there in the weeks and months before. The fighting resulted in 4 ANA injured, 25 AOG fighters killed, and 5 (Swati) AOG fighters detained. The ANA left late in the period, and there were reports of AOGs slowly regathering in Awla Gul and elsewhere in the district.

Given the presence of ANA in Bargi Matal, AOGs shifted their focus to Parun, the provincial capital, midway through the fortnight. After attacking ANP CPs in the Saparigal and Qalaigul areas on May 3rd, in which four AOG and 2 ANP were killed, a large massed force of approximately 400 AOG fighters started attacking a large ANP OP in the Eshtap area on May 10th, with the engagement



lasting all day – leading to the death of 4 AOG and the injury of 3 ANP, an important success for the significantly outnumbered ANP. The fighting broke out again on the 11th, and ANA air assets carrying an NDS QRF were also sent that morning to assist the ANP in Wama. One of the helicopters crashed while attempting to land, leading only to minor injuries, and at the time of writing neither side had gained a significant advantage against the other. In both Bargi Matal and Wama, fighting is likely to break out again repeatedly in the coming weeks, and as such, NGOs working in Nuristan need to remain alert to this possibility.


LAGHMAN

After last period's notable increase in conflict incidents in Laghman, this period saw volumes fall slightly, with a notable calm prevailing in Alishing. However, it also marked the second suicide bombing in the province this year, with a BBIED operative on a motorcycle detonating his vest at the Qarghayi DAC, targeting an IMF convoy visiting district GOA officials there; it killed 3 civilians, injured 2 ANP and wounded or killed an unknown number of IMF, thought to be 2/3. Also in Qarghayi but on the Kabul-Jalalabad Highway, a number of attacks were seen, consistent with the pattern of elevated targeting seen on the Nangarhar section of

	NGO Incidents
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the Highway during the period. On May 5th AOG attacked an ANP convoy in the Tangi area, while a number of rockets were fired at the ANA base in the Kheirokhel area, which was also the site of an attack on a fuel tanker on the 13th.

In Mihtarlam, an elevated number of IED discoveries was recorded, in the Adizai, Bibi Haji, Katal and Kanda villages. Other than that, however, the provincial capital was quiet. In Bad Pakh, AOG fighters attacked an ANA CP and fired 3 rockets at the new ANP HQ, consistent with the expected pattern of AOGs returning to the new district after the recent IMF



clearing operation; we can expect that Bad Pakh will see a steady increase in AOG attacks in the coming months. Finally, in Alingar two IMF vehicles were struck by IEDs in separate incidents, while one discovery also occurred. As such, while the BBIED was an important demonstration of the ability for AOGs to conduct the occasional significant attack in the province, the provincial security situation was relatively permissive during the first half of May.

KHOST

In an unusual development, incident volumes in Khost, the most kinetic of the border provinces, fell by approximately 50% from roughly 150 to 100, during the first half of May. However, comparatively, the province remained the leader in security incidents, including witnessing one NGO incident in which 21 demining staff from a local NGO were abducted en masse while clearing IEDs from a worksite in Tani right on the border with North Waziristan. Mass abduction incidents involving deminers working in a border area are not uncommon, and it was only the ANP's quick reaction time, as well as assistance from campaign soldiers, that managed to prevent the AOGs from exfiltrating the deminers across the border; in the clash which led to the recovery of all deminers, 3 AOG fighters were killed.


In Sabari, last period's drop in conflict incidents, particularly from the AOG side, continued to be a feature, with IMF operations comprising a slight majority of recorded events; in all, 20 AOG fighters were detained in 9 operations, while 2 direct and 2 IDF attacks on IMF targets were also recorded, with just one leading to an IMF soldier's injury; as such, the momentum in Sabari remains with the IMF for now. There was, however, an SVBIED attack on a joint convoy in the DAC

	NGO Incidents
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area, which missed its target and instead only killed the driver and injured 9 passers-by. Bak was even quieter, likely a result of the very high level of IMF operations during the previous period, with two further operations recorded that detained a total of 6 AOG fighters. The only recorded AOG incidents were 2 IED discoveries, a remarkable near-total absence in an ordinarily highly insecure province, which suggests, as in Sabari, a marked operational effectiveness on the part of the IMF, although its durability as always remains an open question.

Neighbouring Tere Zayi was a little more kinetic, with two effective IED strikes on ANBP, injuring a cumulative total of 6 policemen. There were also 4 IDF attacks, 3 on the Chargoti IMF base and 1 on an ANBP CP in the DAC area, as well as two brief hit-and-run SAF attacks, one again on the Chargoti facility and one on an ANBP base in the Babrak Tana area. In the other key border districts, Gurbuz and Tani, apart from the aforementioned temporary mass abduction, 4 hit-and-run attacks on security force targets were recorded, and Gurbuz saw one IED injure a local GOA official, but beyond this the districts were below average in incident volumes.

In Khost City, threat reports circulated concerning a Kandahar-



style complex attack on the main GOA facilities, and ANSF were on elevated alert, but nothing of the sort ultimately materialised. IED incidents were also down approximately 30%, with only 8 discoveries and 7 detonations, one of which killed a policeman. Perhaps the most worryingly security trend in the provincial capital is the increasing prevalence of IED detonations in commercial buildings and bazaars, the damage from which could cut substantially into the local economy and is already generating greater fear in the city, with business hours curtailed and trading occurring at a lower level. Also recorded were 5 IDF attacks on IMF facilities in the Sahrah Bagh and Kundai areas, none of which caused any damage.

Outside of these primary areas of conflict, a small number of kinetic incidents were recorded, the most significant of which were two hit-and-run attacks on the Musa Khel DAC and a firefight between AOG fighters and an Afghan Security Guard in the Spera DAC, which led to the ASG being injured, one of his assailants being killed and the other wounded. In all, then, on current trends it appears that persistent IMF operations may take the edge off AOG activity in the coming weeks and months, although the provincial situation remains fragile enough that a concerted AOG push from North Waziristan could tip the scales in their favour without major difficulty.

PAKTYA


The conflict in the restive Zurmat, home to the increasingly powerful AOG faction the Mansur Network, significantly intensified during this period, and was the main driver behind the substantial increase in overall provincial incident volumes. Comprising almost half the total registered conflict events in the province, Zurmat's district insecurity was characterised by a new but unsuccessful IED push by local AOG units, particularly in Rahman Khel, although all but one of the 10 attempted IED attacks was disrupted by a vigilant IMF; the one that did detonate, a car either rigged as an VBIED or filled with IEDs for transport, did so prematurely and killed both occupants. There were also 6 kinetic engagements between AOGs and IMF, including one which attacked an IMF EOD team as it was defusing an IED in Rahman Khel, but most were ineffectual, with just one IMF soldier and two ANA soldiers wounded across all incidents. IMF conducted two operations, one in the Kolago area which killed 5 AOG fighters but also 5 civilians, including 2 women and 2 children, and one in Shahak which led to the detention of 3 AOG members. In all, given Zurmat's position as the heartland of the Mansur Network, we can expect that it will be home to the majority of this year's provincial conflict,

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and as such remain broadly off limits for humanitarian actors.

Elsewhere in the province, the most significant incident was a rocket attack on the provincial ANP HQ in Gardez City, on the evening of the 14th; one rocket landed in the facility, injuring 2 ANP policemen. This is the second incident involving an attack on a provincial government headquarters in the past month, after the IED which detonated at a side gate of the governor's office in late April, and demonstrates the persistent ability of AOGs to penetrate into the provincial capital. While no other incidents were recorded in the capital city, the wider capital district experienced 2 other notable incidents, a premature detonation in the Ghafoor Khel area of the Kabul-Gardez Highway, and one SAF attack on the ANP in Ibrahim Khel.

In the northern border districts of Chamkanay, Jaji, Dand wa Patan and Jani Khel, security incidents were low, with no BBIED or complex attacks recorded. There were 2 kinetic engagements initiated by AOGs, in Chamkanay and Jani Khel, with the former leading to the death of one ANP policeman after he jumped from his Ranger to engage the AOG fighters and stepped on an IED; in the latter, AOG fighters attacked the



Jani Khel DAC at night for a short period. Also in Jani Khel, ANP arrested 8 AOG fighters, including 3 Pakistanis, in two separate operations, one of which was a response to the DAC assault the previous day. A final incident of note in Jani Khel was the temporary abduction of 4 tribal elders in the Mia Khel area, who were beaten up by their abductors and then released. Subsequently, the Mia Khel sub-tribe announced they would oppose all AOG in their area, in the latest of a series of AOG missteps in the border region which have led to their loss of support amongst local communities.

In the Jaji DAC area, AOG fighters conducted 3 IDF attacks on the IMF base in the area. Given Jaji's position as a key infiltration route into Logar from Kurram Agency, this tactic is likely a means to keep IMF busy as AOG fighters conduct their movements away from the DAC. Finally, in the southern district of Shwak on the 14th, four AOG fighters including a mid-level commander were detained in a clearing operation during a night raid in Sori Khel. As such, although Zurmat's insecurity escalated considerably, and signs of persistent AOG capacity were evident, the provincial security situation remained relatively predictable in the first two weeks of May.

SOUTHERN REGION

KANDAHAR

Kandahar continues to face a panoply of threats, though AOG efforts at the close of last year into the opening months of this one have been focused on IED related incidents, attacks against ANP posts, and targeted the killings of ANSF/GOA personnel.


In this period, 2 ANP and a local Shura member were executed while in transit, while a third ANP was abducted. In addition, one local elder was hung under suspicion of 'spying', though this happened in Maruf District so the exact circumstances remain a bit murky.

For IEDs, there were at least 9 strikes against security targets, with a further 2 affecting civilians. This is a regular occurrence in the use of this tactic, typically the re-

	NGO Incidents
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sult of less sophisticated and more indiscriminate victim operated devices. This is also the result of the sheer volumes of devices deployed, as this period there were a further 47 IED discoveries in 17 separate incidents. The standout was the discovery of 21 separate devices during an operation in Zhari District, indicative of a standard AOG tactic of 'seeding' an area with IEDs in order to hamper security force freedom of movement.

Of course, the key element for this period was the prolonged, multi-pronged attack that occurred within Kandahar City. AOG fighters managed to continuously engage security forces for almost 30 hours, with an initial primary effort focused on the



Governor's Compound. Numerous suicide vectors were utilised (both body borne and vehicle) as well as VBIEDs. SAF and RPGs were also utilised against the variety of targets which, beyond the Governors Office included the NDS Headquarters, various ANP posts, along with an ANCOB base. It is likely that this attack was the manifestation of the IEA Operation Badar announcement and it is not surprising it occurred within Kandahar City, a long term centre of gravity for the IEA with Kandahar Province proving the most mature and resilient theatre within the wider conflict.

HELMAND


Quite surprisingly, AOG incident levels dropped off dramatically this period following a extremely active and kinetic 3 months. This can be partially attributed to a refocusing of efforts to the poppy harvesting as well as the operational realities that require periods of resupply and reorganization following extended periods of activity. In addition, IMF have continued high levels of activities, primarily in the districts in which the Helmand River flows (as this is where the population is concentrated).

From an incident perspective, the period opened with a suicide attack against a police post in

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Sangin and continued with a series of ineffectual IED strikes. While frequent, direct attacks against IMF/ANSF patrols also continue to be relatively ineffective, more akin to harassing fire than an attempt to actually inflict casualties. Security forces continue to find almost double the number of IEDs that actually detonate, along with seizing various small scale caches. The exception to this was the seizure of 110kg of poppy and numerous IEDs in a sole incident.

The pending transition for Lashkar Gah continues on track, though one should note that will not likely result in any significant structural changes in the force



composition within the city. ANSF have already assumed de-facto control for the city, with IMF in support, so the actual shape of transition will be more perceptual than anything.

Overall one should expect an increase in incidents and kinetic activity as the month closes as the poppy harvest will also come to a close and AOG will be able to once again focus their efforts on the conflict.

PAKTIKA


Although absolute levels of conflict in Paktika remained lower than Khost during the period, the offensive posture of the AOGs operating there and the intensity of the engagements recorded in the past fortnight signify that the province has again been the most violently contested battleground in the southeast. Not only did the number of conflict incidents rise by roughly 15%, but a high proportion of the total incidents were of a ‘stand-out’ nature.

Most significantly, on May 1st a BBIED operative conducted a targeted attack in Shkin bazaar, a key urban area in southern Barmal on the primary route by which the main South Waziristan AOG commander and his faction run cross-border attacks into the province. The target of the attack was the head of a local community shura, who was killed alongside 3 civilians, with 12 further civilians injured. The attack was declared by the IEA to be a notable success in their new Operation Badar campaign, which was announced as starting on the 1st, the day it occurred. However, while in line with their stated intention to target local leaders aligned with the GOA, it was unusual in its taking place in a crowded bazaar area, given another stated intention, that of avoiding civilian casualties; more closely resembling the

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character of Pakistan-based targeted suicide attacks, it likely indicates that the Wana-based AOG commander most likely responsible is not fully in harmony with the tactical parameters the IEA have laid out.

This incident, and the intensely kinetic character of the remaining incidents, does not bode well for the security of the province in the coming months. Of those other incidents, a significant number of both AOG-initiated attacks and IMF operations resulting in substantial rates of killed and wounded. For example, of the 20 other AOG-initiated direct assaults on IMF and ANSF targets, of which half occurred in Yahya Khel, 5 resulted in multiple AOG deaths. In Jani Khel’s Ingul village, an AOG-ANP firefight killed 6 AOG fighters, while in Urgun, an exchange of fire between AOG and a joint patrol led to the death of 10 Pakistani AOG fighters, including their field commander. In Yahya Khel, Bambi village saw a protracted engagement which resulted in 3 AOG fighters, two policemen and one ANA soldier killed, and 6 opposition fighters arrested, including 3 who were wounded. In Gayan, a hit-and-run attack on the district’s main IMF facility led to an IDF response from IMF of unusual ac-



curacy, killing 6 and injuring a further 2 AOG fighters. In Mata Khan, an AOG-IMF/ANSF engagement killed one AOG fighter, while in a separate ANA operation in the Mata Khan DAC, 2 suspected BBIED operatives were arrested, attesting to the ongoing threat of suicide attack in the province. IDF attacks also registered, with the same quantity, 13, as in last period, although none caused any reported damage or casualties.

The IMF side was similarly eventful, with 8 significant operations, 3 of which occurred in the border areas of Barmal, as mentioned above a key AOG infiltration route from South Waziristan. On May 5th, a joint IMF/ANSF operation supported with air assets targeted and killed 10 AOG fighters in the Mangaky area, including Pakistanis and Russians, who were infiltrating into Afghanistan in two vehicles. Similarly on May 14th, 10 fighters were killed in IMF airstrikes in the border area. In separate operations in the Dila, Omna and Yahya Khel DACs, IMF and ANSF killed 1 and captured 2, killed 2 and captured 2, and arrested 11 respectively. In Yosuf Khel’s Mashkhel area meanwhile, 6 AOG fighters were killed in two separate operations on consecutive days.

GHAZNI

Incident levels in Ghazni have spiked dramatically this period, almost reaching par with the entire volume recorded in April. This falls in line with the trends of last year when their activity surged in April as well, leading to a considerable peak in June. There have been no significant changes in force configuration there (on either side) to suggest that this won't be the case again this year.


Much of this activity is focused on Ghazni City (the provincial capital) as well as the districts in the south and west of the province. These are standard operational areas which help create a contiguous space (through to Uruzgan and Zabul) to allow for an unimpeded flow of their supplies. To illustrate, Nawa District at the extreme south of the province, and wedged between Zabul and Paktika, has been reported to be completely under the sway of

	NGO Incidents
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AOG leadership with limited GOA presence and influence. In addition, the bazaar in Andar has been closed for almost a month and there is an ongoing embargo of mobile phone service in Qarabagh. All of these speak to the extent of AOG influence and control over the population.

Structurally, activities within Ghazni follow the standard form, with IEDs, attacks against supply convoys on both primary (Hwy 1) and secondary routes, and small scale attacks against ANP checkpoints on the same. Of note, an attempted suicide bomber was intercepted this period, marking the first suicide attack related incident for this province this year.

Despite AOG efforts to contain security forces to the vicinities of their facilities, IMF and ANSF have been active, primarily in the form of low level operations



(cache seizures, presence patrolling) and night raids with the view of disrupting the persistent AOG networks.

As Ghazni was identified as the Centre for Islamic Culture for 2013, it is likely that this province will continue to be hotly contested terrain with the impetus on the government to dramatically improving access and security in light of this upcoming event. Security will be a key element in the preparation for this event, as large sums of money have been pledged for large scale rehabilitation and construction programs. While AOG will likely contest any such efforts, the impact such efforts will have on their local support remains unclear due to the Islamic nature of this event.

ZABUL


Instability along the highway continues to be a primary element of the conflict within Zabul. While attacks and IEDs are common along Hwy 1, recent AOG efforts to restrict access along secondary routes are a growing concern. An ongoing IED campaign has had an effect on the local population, forcing them to resort to alternate, less convenient, routes of travel and is also forcing a limitation on the use of vehicles due to the fear of hitting such a device.

Along with this, the ongoing AOG embargo of the mobile phone networks continues, encompassing the entire province and now extending into it's third straight week. When similar efforts were attempted in Helmand,

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the large scale local response forced a reversal, though wide scale local discontent has not surfaced within Zabul as of yet. However, it is likely only a matter of time before this does occur.

At present it is unknown what the impact of the above efforts on local livelihoods will have on AOG acceptance levels, though the IEA have demonstrated enough political savvy to understand the implications. However, the recent kill/capture of foreign fighters north of Qalat this period (reportedly aligned to Al Qaida) indicates that there are groups operating in this province who are less focused on the concerns of the local population and more on



the prosecution of the conflict, though the full extent of their influence over the larger IEA elements is unknown.

Lastly, the Afghan Peace and Reintegration Program has opened their office in Qalat (populated with elders from Qalat District), though the local population is reserved in their assessment of the future effectiveness of this program. Primarily, there is concern that these efforts will be targeted (as in other areas), a concern that is inline with AOG operational directives announced this year.



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ANSO ACRONYMS

ACG-Armed Criminal Group /
AEF-Afghan Eradication Forces
/ **ANA**-Afghan National Army /
ANBP-Afghan National Border
Police / **ANP**-Afghan National
Police / **ANCOP**-Afghan National
Civil Order Police / **AOG**-
Armed Opposition Group /
APPF-Afghan Public Protection
Forces (local deputised mili-
tias) / **DC**-District Centre /
GOA-Government of Afghani-
stan / **IDF**-Indirect Fire (ex:
mortars) / **IED**-Improvised Ex-
plosive Device / **IMF**-
International Military Forces /
NDS-National Directorate of
Security (Intelligence) / **PRP**-
Previous Reporting Period /
PSC-Private Security Company
/ **RPG**-Rocket Propelled Gre-
nade / **SAF**-Small Arms Fire /
VBIED-Vehicle Borne Impro-
vised Explosive Device / **PDO**-
Private Development Organisa-
tion / **ALP**-Afghan Local Police
/ **LDI**-Local Defence Initiative /
IEA-Islamic Emirate of Afghani-
stan (Taliban) / **PSG**-Provincial
Shadow Governor (IEA) / **DSG**-
District Shadow Governor (IEA)
/ **APRP**-Afghan Peace and Re-
integration Program

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MISSING

This report ANSO
could not provide
analysis for the prov-
inces of:

Samangan
Uruzgan
Nimroz

This is because we
do not know enough
about the area to
comment on the sig-
nificance of the inci-
dents occurring
there.

If you can help us
understand the prov-
ince better, please
contact us.

FEEDBACK ON ANSO SERVICES: Advisory Board email address

ANSO welcomes your feedback. To provide confidential feedback, please email the
ANSO Advisory Board at advisoryboard@afgnso.org.