ANSO QUARTERLY DATA REPORT

Dec 22nd 2006 – Mar 28th 2007

(Reporting Periods 1-13, 2007)

****IMPORTANT DISCLAIMER****

This free report is only intended to provide a graphical representation of the incidents already provided within the ANSO weekly narrative reports.

Unless otherwise stated ANSO, and our donors, do not infer, support, propose or endorse any conclusions or assumptions as may be drawn from, or are implicit within, this data.

Readers are reminded that all data is based solely on incidents which appear in the ANSO weekly report. Such incidents are compiled by ANSO on the basis of information received from multiple sources, including governmental, non-governmental, civilian, military, international and Afghan organizations and individuals, and thus should not be taken as a wholly accurate or complete representation of the level, nature, cause or trend of events.

INTRODUCTION

Since the beginning of the year NGO's have been directly impacted in **34** separate incidents ranging from armed robberies, arson, IED strikes and murders through to intimidations, petty theft and harassments.

Incidents and attacks have come at the hands of criminals, insurgent forces, ideologues and even the International military assigned to protect the development effort.

Sadly, two individuals have lost their lives to these events while fourteen other organizations have sustained damage or loss to facilities and vehicles.

Contrast this to 2006, a year widely reported to have been the worst on record, and for the same period of January – March ANSO recorded just **7** direct incidents against NGOs and a single fatality.

Despite this notable increase, ANSO continues to believe that NGOs remain widely accepted and appreciated and that the data presented herein supports that belief.

Beyond NGOs, ANSO has continued to track the devastating impact of conventional and asymmetric conflict across the country.

A depressing total of 264 civilian deaths have been entered in to our database, the causes of which are leading to new insights on the nature of 'human security' in Afghanistan that should be of interest to all readers.

ANSO has also continued to track and document multiple AOG related incidents and presents here for the first time a fully disaggregated chart of these events for your examination and analysis.
The impact of the winter on this data should be considered, especially with regards to crime and attacks levels which could be seasonally low/high respectively.

This free quarterly report is intended to provide support and information to NGO planning and policy making for the remainder of 2007.

SECTION 1: Impact on NGO

1. NGO Direct Incidents: It shows that although high, the volume of incidents against NGOs has not shown a significant increase/decrease over 3 months. Had any group initiated an organized campaign against NGO we would expect to see a steep incline in these figures.



2. Cause of Direct Incidents: It shows that the vast majority of direct incidents are caused by crime rather than conflict. The fact that the 'AOG caused incidents' drop off significantly, reinforces the belief that there is no wide spread 'anti-NGO' campaign.
IMF earns a place on the chart for occupying an NGO office in Nuristan.



3. NGO Incident Mapping: Attacks and incidents against NGO have occurred in 18 of Afghanistan's provinces indicating that there are not really any 'safer' areas in terms of being directly targeted or victimized.
The relationship between crime and high concentrations of NGO staff and assets is clearly demonstrated in the patterns for Kabul, Nangahar and Herat.
The wide distribution of incidents supports the idea of isolated, unrelated events and does not provide any evidence of an organized anti-NGO campaign.



4. AOG against NGO Incident Types: The table does not reveal any main or recurrent AOG type attacks against NGOs although it does indicate the willingness of some groups to apply deadly force.



5. Crime against NGO Incident Types: The table demonstrates that, by far, the greatest risk to NGOs has been of armed robbery whilst in transit followed by home invasion.
It should be noted that in many of these cases it would have been difficult for the assailants to know that the vehicle belonged to an NGO prior to stopping it.
The prevalence of 'in-transit' armed robberies must be logically associated with their relative wealth and the overall volume of NGO vehicles per capita of local population, especially in remote areas and roads.



SECTION 2: The Conflict

Although South and East suffer higher volumes of attacks, the data indicates that the Armed Opposition is active almost anywhere in the country.
To date just 4 provinces (Ghor, Bamyan, Daykondi and Samangan) have yet to record an AOG related incident although this could be due to lack of reporting rather than lack of incidents. The overall level of attacks is still roughly half of the volume recorded per week in summer 2006.

1. Total Attack Trends: This chart demonstrates that the overall volume of AOG attacks has not fluctuated significantly over the last 3 months but…



2. Tactic Attacks Trends: When we look at the same data as above disaggregated by the tactic used we see that there are clear patterns of increase in the use of both suicide and close range attacks. The data is consistent with AOG statements regarding a return to 'guerilla' tactics. The increases should also bee seen as associated with ISAF Operation Achilles and improving weather.



3. General Attack Diversification: Chart shows the ratio of tactics to one another over the entire period. If the information were disaggregated by time you would see a marked growth in the percentage of suicide strikes from about 2-3% in Jan to 12-15% in Mar.



4. Stand-Off Attack Diversification: Chart shows the diversification of tactics in the 'Stand-Off' range and indicates that the use of remote or time delayed IED is by far the preferred tactic. Although the targets of such attacks are almost uniquely ANP or IMF, the prevalence of IED as a stand-off tactic carries significant risk of collateral damage to NGOs. It is interesting to note that during this period the ANP and other actors have located and defused a further 176+ IED prior to detonation.
This is almost an impressive 1-2 (fail/succeed) ratio with actual IED strikes.



5. Regional Incident Profiles (6): These show the combined AOG related incidents by province. Included in the figures are all suicide, stand-off and close range attacks plus all threats, abductions, thefts and assassinations. Please note the differing chart scales when making visual comparisons.













6. Suicide Attacks I: Distribution across 13 provinces.



7. Suicide Attacks II: Volume (Severe spike in recent week, x3 increase on 2006)



8. Suicide Attacks III: Target (49% ISAF/PRT)



SECTION 3: Deaths and Injuries

1. Deaths per Sector: Shows those who have been killed by conflict and crime combined in different social groups. It demonstrates that civilian males and the ANP are bearing the brunt of both crime and conflict across the country.



2. Ratio of Civilian Deaths Caused by Different Sectors: This demonstrates that nearly as many civilians have been killed by acts of crime as have been killed by AOG attacks for this period. Additionally it shows that civilian casualties at the hands of IMF are not small and need to be understood in terms of eroding perception of the wider international community.



3. What is Killing Them?: This chart compares some of the major causes of civilian deaths. Of interest is the fact that basic domestic murder out-ranks other means of civilian death by a long way, at least in ANSO reporting.
Current efforts at Police reform tend to focus on counter-insurgency and counter-narcotics strategy whereas this data would indicate a need for a different focus.
'Force Protection' indicates an incident when ISAF have fired upon a vehicle or person traveling too close to a base or convoy.
It is notable that while 24 civilians have died for being 'suspected' vehicle bombers, only one civilian has died from an 'actual' vehicle bomb.
This statistic is qualified however by the fact that IMF have been the primary target of 49% of all suicide attacks and have suffered 11 serious injuries from VBIED attacks.



4. Combatant/Non-Civilian Casualties: Combat related deaths are difficult to assess but it is clear that the ANP is pre-dominant victim.



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