



ANSO QUARTERLY DATA REPORT (Q.3-07)

Dec 22nd 2006 – Sept 30th 2007

(Reporting Periods 01-40, 2007)

****IMPORTANT DISCLAIMER****

This free report is only intended to provide a graphical representation of the incidents already provided within the ANSO weekly narrative reports.

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Since the beginning of 2007 NGO have been **directly** targeted or impacted in **106** separate crime and conflict related incidents.

As anticipated, the third quarter has demonstrated an escalation in the seriousness of events with **five additional fatalities** including 3 internationals.

Unlike previously, these deaths have come at the hands of AOG rather than criminals indicating a possible change in the manner with which these groups will interact with the NGO community.

The deaths are also significant in bringing international NGO casualties in Afghanistan to a **five year high**.

Beyond fatalities, the issue of abduction has dominated the period for NGO with more than **80 staff abducted** since January and an alarming 57 people in the last 3 months alone including 27 internationals.

ANSO assesses that NGO will **remain vulnerable** to abduction and armed attacks by AOG going in to the final quarter of the year despite the fact that overall AOG attacks levels will drop off.

Beyond conflict, NGO continue to be impacted by limited law enforcement capacity and widespread criminality which has resulted in one additional death and multiple armed robberies, beatings and a **significant escalation in criminal abductions**.

ANSO believes that NGO remain particularly vulnerable to serious crimes and are likely to continue sustaining injury and fatality going in to 2008.

Conflict tracking demonstrates a **significant downturn** in enemy initiated attacks for the Jul-Sep period however this has not impacted the rate of NGO incidents which have remained stable throughout the same period.

It is likely that only the conventional close range attacks will fall going in to winter but that placement of IED, missiles and suicide attacks will remain stable or escalate slightly resulting in **little change** to the overall NGO threat profile.


This free report is provided to assist in NGO strategy and planning for the remainder of 2007.

Nic Lee

ANSO, Kabul, Oct 25th 2007.


SECTION 1: Impact on NGO

1. Monthly NGO Incidents 1: This table shows the bulk number of NGO incidents per month for the year. It would indicate a fairly stable profile with no obvious sign of deliberate or widespread NGO targeting.




2. Monthly NGO Incident 2: This table shows same data as above but disaggregated according whether the incident was caused by criminals or AOG. It indicates that the substantial spike in September (seen above) is caused by an uncommon and coincidental *combination* of high levels of AOG and crime events rather than any significant escalation in either.

The data would also support the conclusion of a very slight escalation in AOG on NGO incidents with lows creeping from 1 (Jan/Mar) to 4 (Aug/Sept).



3. AOG incidents against NGO: Table shows the number of different types of AOG attacks against NGO (inset right) and their percentage of the whole (below).


The profile of AOG attacks against NGO has moved slowly towards more serious events with NGO now just as likely to be attacked or abducted as they are to receive a simple threat letter.



This is likely the result of a number of dynamics including increased AOG migration in to areas of NGO operations (especially in the Central and Eastern regions), the elevation of kidnapping as a lucrative political and economic tactic and the reluctance of NGO to acknowledge changes in the security context.

Also notable this period is the fact that AOG armed attacks have caused NGO fatalities (Logar, July 18th). This dynamic was notable in its absence last period and led to some hope that AOG would be discriminating.

Other less frequent events (such as being caught in missile strikes or subject to search) should be seen as the inevitable result of NGOs continuing to work in areas of AOG offensives rather than deliberate targeting.




Chronology of significant AOG attacks against NGO

- Jan 13th, Paktika: An NGO clinic was burnt in an effort to intimidate students;
- Jan 10th & 13th, Takhar: A series of IED detonates in front of a HR-NGO office;
- Feb 19th, Paktya: Three staff of de-mining NGO are abducted;
- April 3rd, Nimroz: Taliban kidnap five French NGO staff including two French;
- April 16th, Laghman: Taliban assault an NGO compound in a failed kidnap effort;
- May 29th, Nuristan: AOG enter NGO office to beat and interview staff;
- June 29th, Nangahar: AOG attack and enter an NGO clinic;
- July 18th, Logar: AOG open fire on NGO mini-van killing two staff;
- July 19th, Ghazni: AOG kidnap 23 South Korean NGO staff. Two will be killed;
- Aug 8th, Laghman: AOG open fire on a 'low-profile' NGO vehicle, no deaths;
- Aug 9th, Badghis: A group of AOG open fire on an NGO vehicle that fails to stop;
- Sep 3rd, Nimroz: AOG kidnap 4 NGO workers from a community centre;
- Sep 23rd, Logar: An NGO vehicle came under small arms fire from AOG

4. Criminal incidents against NGO: Table shows the number of different types of criminal attacks against NGO¹ (inset right) and their percentage of the whole (below).

Armed robbery at home or in transit remains the number one criminal threat to NGO and clearly demonstrates a vulnerability to this type of incident.



Although no deaths or injuries have resulted so far the frequency and apparent impunity with which they are conducted should be cause for some alarm.


The overall volume of criminal armed attacks against NGO has remained steady and accounted for two additional fatalities including one international.

The ongoing vulnerability of NGO staff (national and international) to acts of criminal murder ranks as one of ANSOs foremost concerns for NGO safety.

¹ For Abduction it shows the number of incidents rather than the number of persons. These 9 incident account for 21 persons.

Most notable in the data is the significant increase in the proportion of criminal abductions attempted or succeeding against NGO which has come close to doubling in the period (9%-14%).

This would indicate that kidnap has been adopted as an acceptable tactic by groups who might not have considered it before. The apparently opportunistic nature of many of the 21 criminal kidnappings would support this conclusion.



Chronology of significant crimes against NGO:

- Jan 30th, Laghman: 15 armed robbers assault NGO compound and steal assets;
- Feb 17th, Farayab: NGO employee killed at home in assumed personal dispute;
- March 8th, Sar-i-Pul: German NGO worker murdered by Mullah's gunmen;
- April 29th, Kunduz: NGO employee murdered on road in contract dispute;
- May 21st, Kabul: Local boy fires shots and throw grenade at NGO expat staff;
- June 13th & 20th, Nangahar/Nuristan: 8 NGO workers kidnapped for ransom;
- July 1st, Herat: A group of armed robbers open fire on an NGO compound;
- July 25th, Kandahar: An NGO clinic was looted and supplies stolen;
- Aug 13th, Samangan: An INGO staff member was threatened with kidnap;
- August 18th, Kabul: An German international NGO worker was kidnapped in broad daylight;
- Sep 6th, Kandahar: Armed criminals killed an afghan NGO worker at his home
- Sep 12th, Badakshan: Armed criminals killed a Bangladeshi NGO worker riding his motorbike;
- Sep 30th, Laghman: An NGO vehicle was stopped and robbed by 6 armed men in ANA uniforms.



5. NGOs and Abduction: The table shows the number of NGO staff abducted by either AOG or criminal groups each month so far (below) as well as the combined monthly total (inset right)

Emerging as one of the key characteristics of this period, the use of abduction as a tool for intimidation or political/economic gain has strongly impacted the NGO sector with **82** staff taken so far.

Although, thankfully, all but two have been released unharmed the volume of abductees (one for every two agencies registered with ANSO) demonstrates the alarming vulnerability of NGO to this particular type of threat.

It is also notable that close to 70% of abductees are Afghan nationals and if we discount the highly anomalous capture of 23 South Koreans in July this percentage would rise to more than 90%.

This would indicate that NGO anti-kidnap measures remain largely oriented around protecting international staff with national staff often encouraged to travel in areas off limits to foreigners.



6. NGO Fatalities: Shows fatalities of national and international NGO workers since 2003 (below) along with totals and geographic distribution for 2007 (inset right).


Province	INT	NAT	Total
Sar-i-Pul	1	0	1
Badakshan	1	1	2
Ghazni	2	0	2
Faryab	0	1	1
Kunduz	0	1	1
Nangahar	0	1	1
Logar	0	2	2
Kandahar	0	1	1

The data indicates that the previously escalating trend of national fatalities has been interrupted with deaths at the lowest level in 5 years.

This may well be the result of organizational policies protecting national staff after four years of terrible losses but could also be that AOG and criminals now just kidnap them instead of killing them.


Conversely however the data also indicates that deaths amongst foreign NGO workers have hit a **five year high** with 3 months still remaining in the year. Although there are few links between the deaths and each can be traced to localized dynamics, the basic volume indicates that the underlying level of violence in Afghan society has increased.

Also notable is the fact that five of eleven deaths this year have occurred in the North and North-East provinces which are more typically considered 'low-risk'. This fact should give serious pause for thought to the conventional wisdom that avoiding conflict areas minimizes exposure to threats.




7. Geographic distribution of NGO incidents: The final data in this section provides the number of NGO incidents per province. As would be anticipated the areas of highest NGO concentration (regional capitals) demonstrate the highest incident volumes. Chart scales match to allow visual comparison.


CENTRAL




NORTH




NORTH-EAST




EAST



SOUTH



WEST



SECTION 2: The Conflict

1. Enemy Initiated Attacks 1: Table below shows the combined close range, suicide and indirect fire attacks initiated by AOG per month as well as the gross volume of each type for the year to period (inset right).



ANSOs second quarter prediction of a peak of AOG attacks in mid to late October has proved inaccurate as at the time of writing October's figures look set to continue the de-escalation apparent for the third quarter.

Factors contributing to the early peak include major offensives by ISAF in the South which have drawn more AOG in to a defensive combat role, the escalation of conflict across the border in Pakistan which is assessed to have kept fighters engaged and the preparation and onset of Ramazan holidays in September.

As yet ANSO has not completed its comparative data for 2006 but estimates are of a 40-60% increase in attacks month on month over last year.

As noted in the last period the escalation of AOG attacks does present signs of being structured which would indicate a deliberate strategic intent as opposed to opportunistic or ad-hoc attacks.

Monthly trends in enemy-initiated attacks for each province can be found in the annex to this report.




3. Enemy Initiated Attacks 2: Table presents the same data as above but disaggregated by the three main attack types ANSO records².

The data demonstrates that it is indeed the ‘manpower heavy’ close range attacks which are driving the de-escalation of Jul-Sept while trends in setting IED, firing missiles and conducting suicide attacks remain comparatively even.

The distinction is important to note as indirect and suicide attacks are by nature more indiscriminate than close range ones and therefore carry more inherent risk to NGO staff and resources.

This creates the counter-intuitive prospect that **decreasing attacks generally can lead to increasing threats to NGO specifically.**

ANSO assesses that this dynamic will occur again this year (as it did last year) with suicide, missile and IED strikes escalating as conventional fighting winds down for winter.




² **Indirect** includes all IED, mines, mortars and rockets; **Close Range** includes all small arms, RPG, grenade, arson, beheading and hanging and **Suicide** includes all suicide VBIED/BBIED that actually detonate (not those recovered before detonation)


3. Improvised Explosive Devices: The table shows the number of successfully detonated roadside IED per month as compared to the amount recovered or prevented by various security forces (ANP/NSD/ISAF etc).

Data indicates that the growth of a significant disparity between recoveries and detonations is due to the escalation of the placement rate rather than a falling recovery rate.

As noted in the last period the use of secondary IED has continued although no additional data has been obtained regarding the use so called EFP³ devices.



4. Suicide Attack Trends: Table shows the monthly number of suicide attacks countrywide. The pattern is unpredictable (as always) although a distinct preference for the use of body borne devices is emerging possibly due to the higher casualty rates they are able to achieve.



³ Explosively Formed Projectile (shaped charges)

Chronology of Significant Suicide Attacks:

January 23rd, Khost: BBIED at East gate of Khost Airport kills 6 day-laborers;
Feb 27th, Parwan: BBIED at Baghram kills 16 civilians and 3 ISAF troops;
Mar 19th, Kabul: VBIED rams PSC convoy killing one expatriate;
April 16th, Kunduz: BBIED enters ANP compound kills 9 injures 24
June 15th, Uruzgan: VBIED targets ISAF convoy killing 8 civilians and 1 ISAF
June 17th, Kabul: BBIED boards NP bus killing 22 ANP and injuring 35 more;
July 5th, Kandahar: BBIED detonates inside police station killing 10 ANP;
July 10th, Uruzgan: BBIED prematurely detonates killing 8 children and 9 adults;
Aug 28th, Paktya: BBIED jumps on ISAF convoy killing 6 soldiers;
Sep 10th, Helmand: BBIED detonates at bus stop killing 30 civilians;
Sep 29th, Kabul: BBIED boards ANA bus killing 32 and injuring 21.


SECTION 3: Casualties and Damages

1. Civilian Community Fatalities: Table shows the number of national and international fatalities in the three civilian communities ANSO tracks⁴. It demonstrates that NGO national fatalities are comparable with those occurring in other communities but that international rates are high.

The absence of international deaths in the humanitarian community sector might be associated to the greatly enhanced security measures available to these groups such as armored vehicles and compulsory travel restrictions.

Volume and location of NGO fatalities have been explained in Section 1 so here it only remains to note that five of the 11 NGO deaths (2 international and 3 national) ANSO associates to AOG with the remaining 6 associated to crime.


⁴ NGO includes only NGO staff, Humanitarian Community (HC) includes UN, Red Cross and profitable agencies with humanitarian mandates (such as de-mining companies) while International Civilian (INT-CIV) includes any other foreigner not working for one of the first two (such as private sector, journalists, development organizations)




2. Civilian Casualties: Table indicates the total number of civilians killed to the end of the third quarter by each of the parties to the conflict and an additional tally for civilian deaths caused by crime.

It demonstrates that despite claims to the contrary neither AOG nor IMF are particularly successful at protecting civilians from the effects of their attacks. It also confirms, as has long been reported by ANSO, that domestic homicide constitutes a substantial and significant threat to the average Afghan civilian.


Given that the basic dynamics of the conflict are not changing (with ISAF drawing suicide bombers in to cities and AOG drawing air-strikes in to villages) ANSO sees it is inevitable that civilians will continue to be killed in fairly high numbers.



3. Civilian Casualties 2: Shows the monthly civilian casualties caused by IMF and AOG combined. The data demonstrates a strong correlation with the overall attacks data presented in Section 2 with civilian casualties rising and falling in synch with the conflict.



4. Civilian Casualties 3: Table shows total the civilian casualties caused by IMF or AOG by the region they occurred in. Data reaffirms South and East as epicenters of conflict while indicating that at the local level differences in casualties caused by either side are not as great as at the aggregate level.



****REPORT ENDS****

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