



ANSO QUARTERLY DATA REPORT AND ANNUAL SUMMATION (Q.4-2007)

Jan 1st 2007 –December 31st 2007
(Reporting Periods 01-53, 2007)

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This free report is only intended to provide a graphical representation of the incidents already provided within the ANSO weekly narrative reports.

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DIRECTORS NOTE

While we normally limit observations to more immediate, day-to-day concerns, within this special report we will take the opportunity to articulate some of our more strategic estimates which we see as becoming relevant for the NGO community going in to 2008.

These estimates are drawn from the consolidated data of 2007 and our own analysis but more importantly are also drawn from the combined inputs of the hundreds of NGO staff, development workers, security specialists, journalists, soldiers, diplomats and academics with whom ANSO has had the pleasure of discussing such matters over the past year.

The following then attempts a distillation of the most common observations presented to ANSO throughout this time along with our considered opinion.

(#1) THE STATUS OF THE CONFLICT

A few years from now 2007 will likely be looked back upon as the year in which the Taliban seriously rejoined the fight¹ and the hopes of a rapid end to conflict were finally set aside² by all but the most optimistic.

This is unlikely to be seen as coincidental to the fact that it is also the first year in which NATO held country-wide command³.

With the Taliban evidently resurgent it has also become obvious that their easy departure in 2001 was more of a strategic retreat than an actual military defeat⁴.

To his credit, Commander of ISAF Dan McNeil (US) has already taken a cautious lead in acknowledging this reality⁵ which turns the dominant paradigm of the conflict on its head.

¹ "The conflict between Afghan and international and armed opposition groups in Afghanistan has significantly intensified and spread over the past 12 months, no longer confined to the South, but spreading to parts of the East, West and North" **UK House of Commons Defense Committee, 3 July 2007**, Thirteenth Report, P.16 (35) (<http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200607/cmselect/cmdfence/408/408.pdf>); also see **CRS, Report for US Congress, Dec 11 2006**, P.13 "Taliban insurgency [...] has improved its military effectiveness over the past five years of conflict, despite repeated attempts by Coalition ground and air forces to destroy it."

² US Senate Majority Leader Bill Frist: "'We're going to need to stay here a long time,'" (AP, Oct 2nd, 2006)

³ International Crisis Group, Countering Afghanistan's Insurgency: No Quick Fixes. 2 November 2006, p.15.

⁴ See for instance STRATFOR: http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/taliban_withdrawal_was_strategy_not_rout or "Imperial Hubris", Michael Schuer, 2004, p. 180 or NSD Chief Amrollah Saleh, Tolo TV, on 27 December "They were not defeated."

⁵ Washington Post, Sept 25th 2007: Mc Neil "The question is, were they ever defeated, and I don't think they ever were,"

NGOs too have noted that rather than “pursuing remnants⁶” of the Taliban in a conflict that is winding down, NATO is in fact just now entering a period of **broad and deep conflict** the outcomes of which are far from certain.

The implications could not be more profound and have given rise to urgent debates on issues of neutrality, impartiality and the anticipated difficulties in humanitarian access.

In simple terms, the consensus amongst informed individuals at the end of 2007 seems to be that Afghanistan is at the **beginning** of a war, not the end of one.

(#2) THE PROGRESSION OF THE CONFLICT

With an assumption that conflict is just getting underway NGOs are now rightly concerned by the questions of where, how quickly and by what means.

For location, while it seems clear that the South and East will continue to provide the backbone for conflict going in to 2008, NGOs have also become painfully aware of the extent of AOG expansion in to new areas such as Wardak⁷, Farah⁸, Herat and Badghis⁹.

ANSO assess that AOG will move to reinforce these positions in 2008 with a consequent deterioration of operating space for NGOs. Some of these new areas (especially in Wardak, Farah and Logar) have already become off limits.

The ongoing migration of conflict is also likely to bring to a permanent end the overly simplified North (safe)/South (dangerous) view of insecurity that has dominated political thinking for a number of years¹⁰.

⁶ A brief review of 4 years international media is illustrative of the dominance of the paradigm, for example: **2002-Boston Globe – March 13th** “US and allied forces moved into new territory in the mountains of eastern Afghanistan yesterday as they flushed out **battered remnants of Al Qaeda and Taliban fighters**” / **2003 – The Independent – Sep 6th** “The US military said yesterday it was pursuing **remnants of a Taliban force** across Zabul” / **2004 – New York Times – March 16th** Secretary of State Colin L. Powell said Monday that he would press President Pervez Musharraf of Pakistan to do more to track down **Taliban remnants on the Afghanistan border**. / **2005 – CNN – Oct 21st** Fighting in the country has persisted, particularly along and near the Afghan-Pakistani border, where **remnants of the Taliban** have endured.

⁷ Institute for War & Peace Reporting, Wahidullah Amani ARR No. 271, 31-Oct-07, Trouble on Kabul’s Doorstep ““We can attack anywhere, in broad daylight. We hold meetings openly. We can send 200 or 300 of our people to the Kabul-Kandahar highway to attack..”

⁸ “Farah Province: The New Focus of the Taliban Insurgency” by By [Waliullah Rahmani](#)

⁹ “The Taliban’s new focus is the northwestern region, and there will be many surprises in the coming days,” Taliban spokesman” Qari Yousuf Ahmedi told Asia Times Online by telephone. Syed Saleem Shahzad 2007

¹⁰ Lecture of anonymous EU advisor before LISD Conference, Princeton University Brussels, 16-18 November 2007

NGO have amply demonstrated this point with their lives with more than half of our 2007 fatalities occurring in the assumedly 'safer' North.

In the conflict areas bordering Pakistan ANSO does anticipate some attitude changes driven by increased operational tempo (with AOG being pressed to clear areas more quickly) and the possible inclusion of more hard-line command elements due to consolidations occurring in Pakistan's Taliban¹¹.

These changes may cause AOG to behave more aggressively towards NGO.

Turning towards an estimation of how quickly the conflict might proceed we can look more closely at the main obstacle to it, ISAF, and what kind of obstacle it presents.

As of December 2007 ISAF is officially staffed with 41,000 troops but adjusting¹² for national caveats preventing combat, local contingents and the ratio of combat support troops to actual combat troops¹³, ANSO estimates that ISAF could not realistically field more than 5,000 – 7,000 troops for offensive combat.

Given that the current force strength of the Taliban is largely unknown¹⁴ it is difficult to determine the extent to which this inadequacy actually disadvantages ISAF, although the frequent claims that it does are probably indicative¹⁵.

With this in mind, ANSO believes it is reasonable to conclude that ISAF is at best only capable of **slowing** an expansion in 2008, even in cases where they are expanding through areas ISAF now holds¹⁶.

¹¹ The Nation, Dec 15th 2007 "Pakistani Taliban unites under Baitullah Mehsud"; International Terrorism Monitor Paper 334 "Fresh Flare-Up of Taliban--Shia Clashes in Kurram"; International Terrorism Monitor Paper 350 "PAKISTAN-A Threatening Volcano"

¹² 41,700 total, minus 6,500 Afghan contingent, minus 12,093 denied combat by national caveat, minus 58% (7,013) as combat support troops leaves just 5,079 combat troops. Of course "force multipliers" such as air and artillery support can be applied. All information sourced from ISAF: http://www.nato.int/ISAF/docu/epub/pdf/isaf_placemat.pdf at Dec 5th, 2007.

¹³ Ratio derived from Iraq <http://www.nytimes.com/2006/12/10/world/middleeast/10troops.html?pagewanted=print>

¹⁴ Chairman of the House Armed Services Military Procurement Subcommittee, William Hawkins estimated that Taliban held 50,000 men at arms in 2001: <http://www.carlisle.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/02summer/hawkins.htm> (Parameters, 2002, p. 24-32). Extending on this figure CIA Al-Qaeda analyst Michael Scheur estimates 40,000 Taliban were "left to fight another day" after the initial 2001 battle (Ibid, 2004, p. 181). This author has heard estimates from 2,000 to 20,000. Before being killed in 2006 Taliban Southern Commander, Mullah Dadullah, claimed that the Taliban could draw on 12,000 men although it is unclear whether he was just referring to the Southern Command or countrywide.

¹⁵ U.S. Admiral Michael Mullen, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff: ISAF is "plagued by shortfalls in capability and capacity, and constrained by a host of caveats that limits its ability," (Bloomberg, Dec 13th, 2007)

¹⁶ General Mc Neil, Reuters, 28 Sept, 2007: "'We are likely to have to do some of this work again...[.] I think there is some chance of that because the Afghan national security forces have not been as successful in holding as we would like them to be."

There would not appear to be any capacity within ISAF to stop or turn back anticipated AOG expansion.

Acknowledging this probability is an important step in enabling NGO to make plans according to the most **realistic scenarios**.

It is ANSO assessment then that the best case scenario for 2008-2009 will be **more of the same** with the continued expansion of AOG activity across the sub-district landscape and a corresponding retreat to provincial capitals of NGOs.

This is the best case scenario in that it will delay the inevitable provincial centre clashes which could cause humanitarian space to entirely collapse.

3. Embedded Expansion

To address the ‘how?’ question we can note that as early as 2005 UN analysts were observing that the flexibility of Afghan organized criminal groups was enabling them to rapidly adjust to changes in underlying context¹⁷.

Although in that case the concern was over the power to respond to the counter-narcotics efforts it was not long before private analysts began to confirm that organized crime was becoming energized in the ‘sea of lawlessness¹⁸’ created by the AOG expansion and migration.

Although not a dynamic that lends itself to easy analysis, escalating anecdotal evidence¹⁹ leads ANSO to believe that AOG expansion is in itself being reinforced²⁰ by a deepening trend of collusion and co-option with organized crime, local strongmen and, in some cases, corrupt officials inside the state security system²¹.

¹⁷ Chapter 7, UNODC *Drug Trafficking and the Development of Organised Crime in Post-Taliban Afghanistan*, 2005, 192

¹⁸ International Crisis Group, *Countering Afghanistan’s Insurgency: No Quick Fixes*. 2 November 2006, p.1

¹⁹ For example from debriefings with released AOG abductees (particularly the story of German abductee Rudolf Blechschmidt as in “Betrayal in Kabul” *Der Spiegel* 15th October 2007) ; from interviews with NGO staff whose offices have been over run and screened by Taliban units and within the changing MO, targets and locations of actions.

²⁰ IWPR, 31 Oct 2007 “Trouble of Kabul’s Doorstep”: A Taliban commander in Wardak told IWPR that a major source of Taleban strength was the corruption and crime rampant in the province, which he alleged are actively encouraged by elements within local government.

²¹ For important information on how this dynamic was initiated see : “Reforming Afghanistan’s Police” International Crisis Group, Report No 138, 30 Aug 2007, p.5

For instance it has been reported to ANSO that in some areas AOG and criminal groups have gone so far as to draft rules of cooperation in which AOG 'license' criminals to acts against certain targets, or in certain areas, in return for the provision of arms and manpower for an AOG led assault on the district centre.

To the extent that these agreements are being made and honored it can surely only result in a **robust and sustainable “win-win” scenario** for armed opposition, organized crime and corrupt security structures alike at the sub-district level.

It is ANSO assessment that it is through this means, which we might call “embedded expansion” that AOG activity will escalate significantly this year as opposed, for example, to a straightforward military dominion of an area.

Furthermore, in such a context, the introduction of proposals like the ‘*community defense initiatives*²²’ will be the perfect coagulating agent for ‘embedded expansion’ and ensure that the process will become almost impossible to reverse.

The implications for NGO of ‘embedded expansion’ are daunting as they will undermine our ability to judge the relative safety of our own position vis-à-vis other actors and essentially abandoned us to conduct operations in a volatile and often violent milieu of uncertainty.

Despite serious negative trends in the annual outlook ANSO continues to believe that **there will be space for NGO to operate** throughout 2008 and in to 2009.

The difference will be in the availability of district level travel, higher levels of uncertainty as to where risks are located and a need for the application of higher protection thresholds as conflict escalates.


We hope this free report assists in planning for a difficult year.

Nic Lee
ANSO Director,
January, 2008
Kabul.


²² Statement of Prime Minister Gordon Brown to House of Commons, 12th Dec 2007 (p.4 of transcript)

SECTION 1: Impact on NGO

1. Monthly NGO Incidents 1: This table shows the bulk number of NGO incidents per month for the year. It confirms that NGO incidents dropped off in the last quarter largely driven by a contraction of NGO activity itself.




2. Monthly NGO Incident 2: This table shows same data as above but disaggregated according whether the incident was caused by criminals or AOG. It indicates sporadic trends meaning that NGO are not consistently targeted. The last quarter's trends in crime would suggest that there is something in the NGO winter profile that drives down criminal exposure.



3. AOG incidents against NGO:

This page shows the number of different types of AOG attacks against NGO (inset right) and their percentage of the whole (below).


As was noted at the Q.3 stage the prevalence of more serious incidents (such as armed attacks and abduction) has been of concern in indicating a willingness to escalate violence against NGO.



It is likely that the threat 'portfolio' will remain close to this balance for the medium term although ANSO does predict that the armed attacks portion will become more violent and aggressive.

This will be driven by an enhanced operational tempo in 2008 (with AOG sweeping conflict areas more rapidly) as well as by the anticipated inclusion of more hard-line command elements.

NGO suffered a large amount of displacement due to AOG combat operations in 2007 and this is likely to continue in 2008.



NOTE: "Abduction" refers to cases, not individuals. These 14 cases account for 66 persons

Chronology of significant AOG attacks against NGO in 2007

- Jan 13th, Paktika: An NGO clinic was burnt in an effort to intimidate students;
- Jan 10th & 13th, Takhar: A series of IED detonates in front of a HR-NGO office;
- Feb 19th, Paktya: Three staff of de-mining NGO are abducted;
- April 3rd, Nimroz: Taliban kidnap five French NGO staff including two French;
- April 16th, Laghman: Taliban assault an NGO compound in a failed kidnap effort;
- May 29th, Nuristan: AOG enter NGO office to beat and interview staff;
- June 29th, Nangahar: AOG attack and enter an NGO clinic;
- July 18th, Logar: AOG open fire on NGO mini-van killing two staff;
- July 19th, Ghazni: AOG kidnap 23 South Korean NGO staff. Two will be killed;
- Aug 8th, Laghman: AOG open fire on a 'low-profile' NGO vehicle, no deaths;
- Aug 9th, Badghis: A group of AOG open fire on an NGO vehicle that fails to stop;
- Sep 3rd, Nimroz: AOG kidnap 4 NGO workers from a community centre;
- Sep 23rd, Logar: An NGO vehicle came under small arms fire from AOG
- Oct 9th, Nuristan: An NGO worker was kidnapped from a local bus;
- Nov 15th, Ghor: A hand grenade is thrown in to an NGO compound. No injuries;
- Nov 18th, Badakshan: NGO vehicle is ambushed by armed men. One NGO dies and one is seriously wounded;
- Nov 26th, Wardak: 2 NGO staff working on NSP are abducted and later released;
- Dec 8th, Balkh: An international staff member is targeted with an IED. He sustains only minor injuries.

4. Criminal incidents against NGO:



Page shows the number of different types of criminal attacks against NGO (inset right) and their percentage of all attacks (below).

This year NGO demonstrated an alarming vulnerability to the most basic of criminal activities, the armed robbery.

The volume, 50 for the whole year, represents one robbery in every 3 NGO registered with ANSO. Although resulting in no deaths and only a few injuries, the apparent ease of gaining entry to an NGO compound needs urgent review. Especially in light of the strategic estimates made at the outset of this report regarding the merging of AOG and criminal interests.

As ANSO frequently comments, even in the complete absence of AOG activity, NGO would still be vulnerable to a significant level of threat from ambient criminality and violence that kills and injures at least as many NGO workers as does the 'proper' conflict.

While all eyes remain on winning the war it is unlikely that organized crime and societal violence will receive the level of attention it urgently needs and that NGO will continue to suffer as a result.




NOTE: "Abduction" refers to cases, not individuals. These 9 cases account for 22 persons

Chronology of significant crimes against NGO in 2007

- Jan 30th, Laghman: 15 armed robbers assault NGO compound and steal assets;
- Feb 17th, Farayab: NGO employee killed at home in assumed personal dispute;
- March 8th, Sar-i-Pul: German NGO worker murdered by Mullah's gunmen;
- April 29th, Kunduz: NGO employee murdered on road in contract dispute;
- May 21st, Kabul: Local boy fires shots and throw grenade at NGO expat staff;
- June 13th & 20th, Nangahar/Nuristan: 8 NGO workers kidnapped for ransom;
- July 1st, Herat: A group of armed robbers open fire on an NGO compound;
- July 25th, Kandahar: An NGO clinic was looted and supplies stolen;
- Aug 13th, Samangan: An INGO staff member was threatened with kidnap;
- August 18th, Kabul: An German international NGO worker was kidnapped in broad daylight;
- Sep 6th, Kandahar: Armed criminals killed an afghan NGO worker at his home
- Sep 12th, Badakshan: Armed criminals killed a Bangladeshi NGO worker riding his motorbike;
- Sep 30th, Laghman: An NGO vehicle was stopped and robbed by 6 armed men in ANA uniforms
- Oct 2nd, Bamyan: Gunmen open fire on an NGO vehicle injuring one staff member;
- Oct 11th; Bamyan: NGO guards is found stabbed to death in the compound;
- Nov 7th, Herat: Armed men enter an NGO compound an abduct one guard;
- Nov 16th, Kabul: An NGO office was overrun by 6 armed man who looted the place;
- Dec 17th, Kabul: Armed robbers enter an NGO office and steal computers.

5. NGO Abduction:

This page shows the number of NGO staff abducted by AOG and criminals combined (below) as well as the level of NGO abduction with the larger trends (inset right)



By mid summer of 2007

abduction was posing a serious threat to NGO with close to 15% of all cases involving an NGO in some way or another.


Of the 88 total NGO abductions of 2007 ANSO associated 66 to Armed Opposition Groups and the remaining 22 to (not so) organized crime.

Modus Operandi was often similar with Afghan nationals as the dominant target group and a captivity period of 6-8 weeks before release without harm.

At the end of the summer ANSO did observe a rash of highly opportunistic abductions with NGO staff literally stuffed in to boxes at the side of the road while a plan for ransom was worked out.

Heightened awareness of the threat combined with improved movement control measures managed to drive down abductions in the last quarter but there is no doubt that NGO will remain vulnerable to this threat.

The emerging criminal/AOG nexus will play a key role in determining the severity of the abduction threat to NGO going in to 2008.



6. NGO Fatalities²³:

Page shows the fatalities of national and international NGO workers since 2003 (below) along with totals and geographic distribution for 2007 (inset right).

Two additional NGO deaths occurred in the final quarter of 2007 (both in the 'quiet' North) bringing the year total to fifteen.


As was noted at the Q. 3 stage the data indicates that the previously escalating trend of national fatalities has been interrupted with deaths at the lowest level in two years with international deaths, inversely, at a high.

Province	INT	NAT	Total
Sar-i-Pul	1	0	1
Badakshan	1	2	3
Ghazni	2	0	2
Bamyan	0	1	1
Faryab	0	1	1
Kunduz	0	1	1
Wardak	0	2	2
Nangahar	0	1	1
Logar	0	2	2
Kandahar	0	1	1
Totals	4	11	15

The data continues to demonstrate that, despite low levels of formal conflict, the north and north east regions dominate the NGO fatalities figures.

ANSO is concerned that criminal groups, who already express a willingness to escalate to the more extreme levels of violence more quickly than their AOG counterparts, will become further radicalized and enthused by the spread of conflict anticipated at the outset of this report.


NGO are going to have to work really hard in 2008 to avoid further terrible losses at the hands of both AOG (which will escalate) and criminals.




²³ It is important to note that the figures given are for NGO workers only and not for the broader 'humanitarian workers' or 'aid workers' used by other agencies. Where there are differences between these figures and, for example, those of UNDSS, it is caused by the different definitions used with ANSO having perhaps the narrowest definition.

7. Geographic distribution of NGO incidents: The final data in this section provides the number of NGO incidents per province for your record. What strikes us is that NGO have been targeted in all but 3 provinces.


CENTRAL REGION NGO DIRECT INCIDENTS 2007




NORTH REGION DIRECT NGO INCIDENTS 2007




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
NORTH-EAST NGO DIRECT INCIDENTS 2007



SOUTH REGION DIRECT NGO INCIDENTS




WEST REGION DIRECT NGO INCIDENTS 2007



SECTION 2: The Conflict

1. AOG Initiated Attacks²⁴ 1:

Table below shows the combined close range (small arms, RPG, grenade), suicide (VBIED/BBIED) and indirect fire attacks (IED, missiles) initiated by AOG per month as well as the gross volume of each type for the year (*inset right*)




The year demonstrated a classic bell curve of conflict escalation in a reasonably broad and successful annual AOG campaign.

We totally disagree with those who assert that the 'spring offensive' did not happen and would instead argue that a four-fold increase in AOG initiated attacks Feb to July constitutes a very clear cut offensive. The numbers do not lie.

The offensive was wide and deep in scope and succeeded in bringing activity to a number of new geographic areas, especially in the North, Central and West.

The anticipated trail off of events in the third quarter was notable in that was not as deep or fast as expected with many AOG staying in place and continuing a decent operational tempo.



²⁴ ANSO conducts individual analysis of every incident we report to determine who we think is most likely to have initiated the event. These figures count only those incidents where we have determined that AOG are initiating (have an offensive role in the incident) and NOT those in which other parties, ISAF/ANP, are initiating. This explanation is given to our most common criticism (usually from ISAF) that increases in attacks are because "ISAF is on the offensive". ANSO system is EXPLICITLY and deliberately set up to make sure that we do not fall foul of this dynamic.

2. AOG Initiated Attacks 2:




These three tables presented to the right show the same data as in AOG 1, but disaggregated by the three main attack types ANSO records²⁵.

The data demonstrates that while it is usually the 'manpower heavy' close range attacks which drive the de-escalation for this final quarter (Oct-Dec) suicide attacks and indirect fire attacks have actually dropped by greater percentages (41%/62% respectively) over the period than the close range.

What this tells us is that infantry are staying in place to fight which in turn indicates that they have sufficient access to logistical support, ammunition and at least some sense that they do not need to dislodge from the communities they are in.

This analysis would be consistent with AOG own statements about staying put this year and could be a warning that the coming escalation period of spring 2008 will be able to be conducted with greater ease and speed than 2007.

ANSO will continue to track AOG attacks by separate types going in to 2008 as it remains a useful way of identifying changes in track or priority.




²⁵ **Indirect** includes all IED, mines, mortars and rockets; **Close Range** includes all small arms, RPG, grenade, arson, beheading and hanging and **Suicide** includes all suicide VBIED/BBIED that actually detonate (not those recovered before detonation)

3. AOG Initiated Attacks 3:


This table shows the combined AOG initiated attacks per month by the region they occurred in. (For the provinces of each ANSO region see section 1, part 7)

Immediately apparent is the extent of fighting in the East which on at least four occasions in the year surpassed that in the South. This was one of the key conflict dynamics of 2007 that made it different from 2006.

The impact of ISAF operations can be seen in falling figures for South July-Sep.




4. Improvised Explosive Devices: The table shows the number of IED attempted, succeeding and recovered. The IED underwent multiple evolutions in 2007 including in sophistication and lethality. ANSO believe it will remain a primary weapon of choice for AOG going in to 2008 with a likelihood of use against soft targets, possibly in combination with other attack types. In 07' IED prevention was simply outpaced by widespread placement.



5. Suicide Attack Trends:


Page shows the target of suicide attacks (inset right) the region they occurred in (inset below) and the attacks per month along with the total fatalities per month (main table below).



The annual data would


support a couple of conclusions about these most terrifying of attack types. Firstly that, despite some claims to the contrary, they are largely targeted towards the military/security services (42%IMF/13%ANA/20%ANP) with civilian Government or International Community accounting for just 12% of target selection. NGO have never been targeted in a suicide attack.

Secondly, that while it is often the attacks in the capital that get the headlines, suicide attacks remain a dominantly 'southern' phenomenon with close to half of all attacks occurring in just Kandahar, Zabul, Paktika.



Suicide attacks have been notable in their absence in the North but it will be interesting to watch this change as AOG activity pressurizes Balkh in 2008.


And finally that suicide attacks have become more effective (measured by casualty yields). ANSO observes that suicide attacks have evolved both tactically and technically over the last 12 months and anticipates an ongoing evolution in 2008 as AOG experiment with new forms of attack. It is highly likely that suicide attacks will be more frequently used in conjunction with other forms of attacks such as IED or along with infantry assault teams.



SECTION 3: Casualties and Damages

1. Civilian Casualties 1:


Tables shows the number and percentage of all Afghan civilian deaths caused by each party to the conflict and crime (inset right) and the disaggregated male, female and child civilian deaths caused by the same sectors (below).



At the Q.2 stage IMF and AOG had almost parity in civilian casualty rates (37%/38% respectively) whereas AOG are have now accounted for close to 50% of all the civilian death ANSO records.

Nevertheless that fact that IMF have been responsible for approximately 539 civilian deaths this year (27% of all) must carry some serious implications for the ambient acceptance of international assistance.

With an escalation of combat anticipated this year and given that the basic dynamics are not changing (with ISAF drawing suicide bombers in to cities and AOG drawing air-strikes in to villages) ANSO sees it is inevitable that civilians will continue to be killed in fairly high numbers.




2. Civilian Casualties 2:

Table shows in ascending order the top seven leading causes of Afghan civilian deaths caused by AOG or IMF only and the number of civilians killed by each cause.

The data would indicate that, despite claims to the contrary, AOG ground forces do target civilians for execution on a broad and consistent basis. Many of the individuals within the 416 figure are simple villagers hung or beheaded on suspicion of spying.

The increased lethality of suicide attacks has driven this up the table in to second place with IMF operations more or less on a par with AOG indirect strikes such as IED and missiles.



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