



ANSO QUARTERLY DATA REPORT

Apr 1st – June 30th 2008

****IMPORTANT DISCLAIMER****

This free report is only intended to provide a graphical representation of the incidents already provided within the ANSO weekly narrative reports.

Unless otherwise stated ANSO, and our donors, do not infer, support, propose or endorse any conclusions or assumptions as may be drawn from, or are implicit within, this data.

Readers are reminded that all data is based solely on incidents which appear in the ANSO weekly report. Such incidents are compiled by ANSO on the basis of information received from multiple sources, including governmental, non-governmental, civilian, military, international and Afghan organizations and individuals, and thus should not be taken as a wholly accurate or complete representation of the level, nature, cause or trend of events.

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During this quarter, NGO have been directly impacted in **41** separate incidents ranging from armed robberies, arson, IED strikes, to murders and intimidation. This brings the **total number of NGO incidents recorded in 2008 to 75**. June 2008 saw more NGO incidents than any previous month on record.

While crime was the most common issue affecting NGO in 2007, **Armed Opposition Groups (AOG) are now the leading cause of NGO incidents** accounting for 55% of all NGO related incidents this year, up from 39% in 2007. If current trending continues, AOG will represent a much more significant threat to NGO than in previous years. That said, crime is still a serious problem, especially armed robbery which accounts for approximately 80% of all criminal incidents against NGO.

ANSO recorded 22 serious attacks and threats by AOG against NGO during this quarter including the killing of 2 national staff; the destruction/arson of 4 offices; the abduction of 10 staff; and a number of close range attacks such as vehicle ambushes and grenade attacks.

Following a deadly first quarter, NGO fatality rates dropped during the second quarter with **3 NGO staff fatalities** reported for a **total of 14 NGO staff killed during the first 6 months of 2008**. In comparison, 15 were killed in all of 2007. 2008 is shaping up to be the worst year on record for NGO fatalities with an additional 5 NGO staff killed while this report was being written in early July. **Attacks by AOG remain the most direct cause of NGO fatalities this year**, accounting for all but three of the casualties in 2008.

ANSO assesses that the increase in attacks on NGO during this quarter was driven primarily by the general escalation in conflict and by the partial erosion of the respect for NGO neutrality. **AOG are, in some areas, beginning to attack NGO staff and facilities that are perceived to be linked to Afghan Government programs**, such as the National Solidarity Program.


Beyond NGO incidents ANSO has continued to track conflict trends. The data presented in this report (which for the first time includes data from 2006) shows very **significant conflict growth over the same period last year**. As expected, the number of AOG attacks surpassed those of 2007 early in the second quarter and are now 40% higher than last year – which is significant given that the peak season of July and August has not yet arrived.

But perhaps more importantly, the data obtained during this quarter appears to confirm that **the conflict is now broadening to encompass much more of the Central, Northern and Western regions**; and that the conflict “growth” is no longer only (or mostly) driven by events in the South and East as was the case for most of 2007.

SECTION 1: Impact on NGO

1. NGO Direct Incidents:


This table shows the total number of incidents involving NGO during the first two quarters of 2007 and 2008. Both years were relatively similar until the spike in June 2008. June 2008 saw more NGO incidents than any previous month on record¹.




2. NGO Incidents by Cause:

These two tables show the same data as above but disaggregated by cause (AOG or ACG)².

Although the total number of NGO incidents has remained relatively consistent since last year, these tables show that the cause (AOG vs ACG) of NGO incidents may be changing



The first table shows that AOG incidents against NGO are up by a significant margin overall; while the second table shows that ACG incidents are slightly lower than in 2007. While crime was the most common issue affecting NGOs in 2007, AOG and ACG now cause about the same number of NGO incidents (overall).




¹ since ANSO began recording these statistics in 2005

² AOG = Armed Opposition Groups, ACG = Armed Criminal Groups


3. AOG incidents against NGO:

The table on the right demonstrates that the number of AOG attacks against NGO have increased by 20% over the last quarter and almost doubled (+95%) since last year (over the same period). Eleven AOG incidents against NGO were recorded in June, more than any previous month on record, although a similar spike (of 10 incidents) was recorded in July last year.




AOG have now surpassed ACG as the leading cause of NGO incidents accounting for 55% of all NGO related incidents this year, up from 39% in 2007.

Abduction, armed attacks, and arson make up the bulk of the more serious AOG attacks against NGO (see right).



The table below compares this year's attack profile with the same period last year (Jan-Jun). As identified in the last quarterly report, and as demonstrated in the chart below, AOG attacks against NGO are not only becoming more frequent but also growing more violent/serious, and this quarter proved no different.

ANSO recorded 22 serious AOG attacks and threats against NGO during this quarter including the killing of 2 NGO national staff in the northeast; the stabbing of 1 NGO staff in the south; the destruction of 4 NGO offices as the result of armed attacks, arson, and explosive devices; the abduction of 10 NGO staff (during 5 separate events); and a number of vehicle ambushes and grenade



attacks that fortunately did not result in any casualties. Note that these are NGO incidents attributed to AOG only and do not include those caused by criminals/ACG.

ANSO continues to believe these trends to be caused by a generally expanding conflict which is bringing more NGO in to direct contact with AOG, and the partial loss of AOG respect for NGO impartiality.


Further to this last point, there is a growing body of evidence that NGO implementing programs that are, or perceived to be, linked to the Afghan Government are at particular risk in areas where AOG maintain a strong presence such as in the Central, South, and Eastern regions of the country. In the past 12 months, ANSO has noticed a disproportionately high number of incidents involving the National Solidarity Program (NSP), including a number of serious ones including the abduction, interrogation and execution of NSP staff (South), the burning or bombing of several NGO/NSP Offices (South, East), and the issuance of very specific and concerning threats to NGOs involved in NSP. Although the violent attacks recorded in the South/South-East have drawn most attention to the issue, it should be noted that NSP specific threats have been recorded in every Region, suggesting that this problem is expanding country-wide. While AOG are using a range of intimidation tactics and not yet aiming to kill NSP staff (except in parts of the south), they are resorting to increasing levels of violence.

While increases in AOG activity do not usually (or necessarily) correlate to increases in NGO incidents, it seems increasingly clear that it does correlates to increases in attacks against NSP. Although more time and data is needed to prove this theory, ANSO strongly believes that NGO involved in NSP (or other projects seen to be linked to the government) are at high risk in areas with high AOG activity. This is a logical development as AOG typically begin targeting “government” establishments and staff once they gain sufficient strength in an area. NGO should therefore track AOG incident levels in areas where they are implementing such programs and re-evaluate the risk accordingly. To assist in this regard, ANSO publishes AOG incident statistics for every province in its biweekly reports (and the latest figures are also provided are provided on page 11 of this report.)



4. Criminal incidents against NGO:

This table shows the total crimes against NGO for the first two quarters of 2007 and 2008 by the three main categories (*these are the only categories of attacks for 2008 whereas in 2007 there were some additional threats*).

The total volume of serious criminal incidents against NGO remains lower than in 2007, but only by a slight margin.




In terms of crime, NGO remain particularly vulnerable to armed robbery, as clearly shown in the graph on the right. A breakdown of NGO robberies recorded in 2007/2008 (presented in the graph below) indicates that robberies in transit and compound robberies occur with about equal frequency.



5. NGO Kidnap:

Table shows the number of NGO staff kidnapped during the first 6 months of 2007 and 2008. Despite a considerable surge during the first two months of the year, kidnapping rates appear to have stabilized to 2007 levels. It is worth

remembering however that 2007 was one of the worst kidnapping years on record and therefore the current rate of abduction is not a positive one.




6. NGO Fatalities:

This table shows a comparison of the number of NGO workers killed, by AOG or crime, per month for 2007 and 2008.

Following a deadly first quarter, NGO fatality rates dropped during the second

quarter. The total (for the first 6 months of 2008) stands at 14, nearly as many as were killed in all of 2007 (15).





Much like the first quarter, the prevalence of AOG armed attacks against NGO can be cited as the most direct cause of NGO fatalities in 2008, accounting for all but three of the casualties this year. The two NGO fatalities reported this quarter resulted from a suspected AOG attack in the North of Afghanistan. 70% of all NGO fatalities reported to date in 2008 occurred in the Northern Provinces.

Given that the growing death rate among NGO workers this year is mostly the result of "conflict" related events, and not crime, the NGO death toll is expected to continue climbing over the next quarter as AOG and military operations reach their peak. 2008 is shaping up to be the worst year on record for NGO fatalities with an additional 5 NGO staff killed while this report was being written in early July.

7. Location of NGO Incidents:

The following charts provide the provincial distribution of NGO related incidents (*below*) as well as the regional percentages (*right*).


They indicate a geographically wide threat area with incidents occurring in 2/3 all provinces (24 of 34).




SECTION 2: The Conflict

1. AOG Initiated Attacks:

The table on the top right compares the total volume³ of AOG initiated attacks per month during the first 6 months of 2006-2008 while the graph below shows long term AOG attack trends.



These graphs clearly demonstrate that the conflict is escalating more rapidly in 2008 than in previous years. It is also worth noting that the high mark of “569” incidents recorded this June will probably be surpassed as AOG incidents tend to peak in July and August (having already reached 310



by July 10th). The graphs also clearly show that AOG are able to sustain high attacks rates for longer periods with each passing year. The shorter/more narrow “valleys” also indicate that the winter “lull” is growing shorter every year, which suggests that AOG are able to hold more ground during the winter months and resume activity much more quickly in the spring, perhaps due to their growing strength and logistical capabilities. AOG were able to ramp up very quickly during the first quarter of 2008 and surpass last year’s “peak” within a few weeks of the second quarter. AOG attacks rates may begin to grow exponentially as the “lulls” get shorter and the offensive season grows longer.

Although this rise is sharp, it should not come as a surprise to those who monitor the conflict closely (or read ANSO reports). The short winter lull, the early and rapid increase in activity in the first quarter, and the significant gains made by AOG in 2006 and 2007 served as clear signals for this development.

³ Includes **only** close range (Small arms, RPG, grenade), indirect fire (IED, missile, mortar) and suicide attacks (SVBIED/SBBIED) attributed to AOG. They do not include any attacks launched by national or international military forces. As such they provide a good, if basic, indicator of the offensive capacity of AOG.

2. AOG Attack Distribution






Tables showing AOG initiated attacks (all types) on a regional level are provided on the right.

Just as the graphs on the previous page help demonstrate the overall growth of the conflict, these graphs help to show the depth or broadening of the conflicts.


The sharp increase in total AOG attacks observed this year is the result of country-wide increases in AOG activity and not only driven by events in the South and East as was the case in 2007.

Although the South is still mostly responsible for the overall spike in AOG attacks, large increases in AOG activity this year in the Central (+93%), Northern (+58%) and Western (+67%) regions are also helping drive incident levels to new record highs.

Unlike other regions, the East has not seen a significant increase this year. Whether this is due to events in Pakistan, to a repositioning of forces by the Taliban, or due to containment efforts by ISAF/ANA is up for debate. No matter the cause, AOG have expanded their activities in every other region and will likely attempt to match that expansion in the East. Should this be the case, then total AOG incident rates could easily double those of 2007.



This table provides the same data as presented on the previous page (AOG Initiated Attacks for Jan-Jun 2008) but displayed on provincial level.







3. AOG Attack Composition:

The first three charts show AOG initiated attacks disaggregated into three types: close range (small arms, RPG, grenade); indirect fire (IED, rocket, mortar) and suicide attacks (SVBIED/SBBIED) attributed to AOG.

The significant increase in close range attacks recorded during this quarter supports our assessment that AOG offensive capability is increasing; that AOG have sufficient infantry, access to logistical support, and ammunition to conduct these attacks.

Suicide attack rates were down in the first quarter but now match 2007 levels more closely. This is important to NGO to the extent that suicide attacks carry the highest risk of sustaining collateral damages.

The chart on the right shows that the total number of abductions conducted by AOG is markedly higher in 2008 than over the same periods in 2006/07. The consistency with which this tactic is being applied, and the fact that the increase matches that of other AOG tactics (discussed above) indicates that kidnapping is an integral part of AOG strategy. This is important to track since this tactic is also being increasingly used by AOG against NGO (as discussed in Section 1.3).



****REPORT ENDS****

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